INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
PROCEEDINGS

(2001) 14 ICCP

REPORTS

Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation Inquiry
Medical Aid Claim

Peguis First Nation Inquiry
Treaty Land Entitlement Claim

Cowessess First Nation Inquiry
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to the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation Inquiry --
WAC Bennett Dam and Damage to Indian Reserve No. 201 Claim,
to the 'Namgis First Nation Cormorant Island Inquiry,
and to the Duncan’s First Nation 1928 Surrender Inquiry
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FROM THE CO-CHAIRS

We are pleased to present this the 14th volume of the Indian Claims Commission Proceedings on behalf of the Commissioners of the Indian Claims Commission. The volume includes three reports of inquiries; it also reproduces letters from the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development responding to the Commission’s recommendations in four inquiries.

The first report is the Commission’s inquiry into the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation medical aid claim. For the first time since its inception, the Commission was asked to review whether medical aid was part of promises made by the Government of Canada under the terms of Treaty 1, and, therefore, was the Government of Canada obligated to compensate the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation for moneys deducted from its trust account for medical aid between 1909 and 1934? The results of this inquiry can be found at page 3.

The second report recounts the events in the Peguis First Nation treaty land entitlement inquiry. A total of five planning conferences were organized by the Commission. At the first one, representatives for the Government of Canada asked the First Nation to submit its claim with respect to the 1907 surrender of St Peter’s reserve, since Canada felt that both the surrender and TLE claims should be reviewed together. After the claim was submitted by the First Nation and reviewed by Canada, an offer to negotiate the surrender claim was made. At the fifth planning conference, the government representative requested additional research into the impact of the surrender on the TLE. Following its review of this additional research, and a report prepared by Mr Jim Gallo of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), the Government of Canada offered to negotiate the Peguis First Nation’s TLE claim.

The third report includes the results of the Commission’s inquiry into the Cowessess First Nation 1907 surrender claim. Near the beginning of this inquiry, the parties agreed to place before the panel of Commissioners one legal issue: the interpretation of section 49(1) of the Indian Act; and two factual issues: 1) the number of eligible voters in attendance at the surrender meeting, and 2) the number of valid votes cast in favour of the surrender.

Also included in this volume are four responses from the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. In his letters, the Minister writes that the Government of Canada has rejected the Commission’s recommendations regarding the claims of the Moose Deer Point First Nation, the
FROM THE CO-CHAIRS

Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, the ‘Namgis First Nation, and the Duncan’s First Nation.

Daniel J. Bellegarde
Co-Chair

P.E. James Prentice, QC
Co-Chair
ABBREVIATIONS

AC  Appeal Cases
BCR  Band Council Resolution
CA  Court of Appeal
CCC  Canadian Criminal Cases
CNLC  Canadian Native Law Cases
CNLR  Canadian Native Law Reporter
CR  Criminal Reports
DIAND  Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DLR  Dominion Law Reports
DSGIA  Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs
Ex. CR  Exchequer Court of Canada Reports
Ex. Ct  Exchequer Court
FCTD  Federal Court Trial Division
ICC  Indian Claims Commission
ICCP  Indian Claims Commission Proceedings
IR  Indian Reserve
Man. R  Manitoba Reports
NA  National Archives of Canada
NSCA  Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
OR  Ontario Reports
PAM  Provincial Archives of Manitoba
PC  Privy Council
QB  Court of Queen’s Bench
RSC  Revised Statutes of Canada
SC  Statutes of Canada
SC  Supreme Court (provincial)
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<td>SCW</td>
<td>Specific Claims West</td>
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<td>Superintendent General of Indian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research</td>
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<td>Trial Division</td>
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INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

ROSEAU RIVER ANISHINABE
FIRST NATION INQUIRY
MEDICAL AID Claim

PANEL
Commissioner Carole T. Corcoran, Chair
Commission Co-Chair Daniel J. Bellegarde

COUNSEL
For the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation
Rhys Wm. Jones / Andrew P. Kelly

For the Government of Canada
Robert Winogron

To the Indian Claims Commission
Kathleen Lickers / Thomas A. Gould

FEBRUARY 2001
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

This claim by the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation\(^1\) originated during one of the most complex periods in Canadian history, when the newly created nation struggled to consolidate and expand upon the achievements of the former colonies of Canada West (previously Upper Canada, now Ontario), Canada East (formerly Lower Canada, now Quebec), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. Once Confederation had been confirmed in 1867, it was widely expected that combined nationhood would assist the former British North American colonies in achieving a series of shared goals, including the establishment of viable defensive forces in the face of the threat of United States expansionism, the maintenance and elimination of significant public debts accumulated by the participating provinces, and the shared desire to acquire Rupert’s Land, the vast region west of the Great Lakes that had been granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company in the 17th century.\(^2\) More significantly for the purposes of this inquiry, the period also heralded a major turning point for prairie Indians, whose lives were forever changed by the disappearance of the buffalo, the appearance in epidemic proportions of life-threatening diseases such as smallpox and measles, and the arrival of ever-increasing numbers of settlers from eastern Canada and Europe. These events triggered the negotiation of the first of the so-called numbered treaties and the concomitant conversion of aboriginal hunters and trappers to a more sedentary life centred on reserve-based agriculture.

Shortly after Confederation, Rupert’s Land was identified as an ideal location for population growth and economic expansion, and to that end Britain

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\(^{1}\) Depending on the historical context, the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation will be referred to in this report as "Roseau River," the "First Nation," or the "Band." At the time of Treaty 1, the First Nation was known as the Pembina Band and included at least two groups, one residing at what is now Roseau River Indian Reserve (IR) 2 at the mouth of the Roseau River, and the other residing some 10 miles upstream at what is now Roseau Rapids IR 2A. The reserves are located approximately 60 miles south of Winnipeg and less than 10 miles from the U.S. border. The Pembina Band became known as the Roseau River Band in 1887.

provided a loan to Canada to enable it to acquire the territory from the Hudson’s Bay Company. An agreement was struck by which the company surrendered the land to Britain in November 1869, while retaining small land parcels immediately surrounding its trading posts, as well as one-twentieth of the fertile western prairie lands. The terms of the transaction provided that Britain would transfer the west to Canada once the latter became ready to assert effective control over the region.

This arrangement stirred apprehension and uncertainty among residents of the Red River area, including the French and English populations and former local officials of the Hudson’s Bay Company, but particularly among the two most populous groups in this region - the Indians and the Métis. One of the greatest failings of the high-level negotiations to transfer the west to Canada lay in the fact that local inhabitants were not given the opportunity to participate. They feared that the transfer would be implemented without sufficient regard for their interests. This concern became heightened in August 1869, when Canada dispatched teams of surveyors to run surveys in township patterns, which conflicted with existing river lots established in the Red River settlements.

In October 1869, Canada sent out William McDougall to become the Lieutenant Governor of the new territory. A group of Métis under the leadership of Louis Riel barred McDougall’s entry at the American border, refusing to recognize his authority because Canada had not yet assumed control of the area. With the Hudson’s Bay Company having relinquished its authority over the territory, and the British having no presence there, McDougall was powerless. His efforts to assert his authority forcefully served only to unify the disparate Red River population against him. Riel, whose seizure of Fort Garry had originally been opposed by British residents, filled the political void with little opposition and established a provisional government on December 7, 1869. With this move, the Métis sought to compel the federal government, in the course of negotiating the terms of annexation with the rest of Canada, to acknowledge the rights of citizens in the newly acquired territory. The Métis were willing to allow their homeland to be annexed by Canada, but they were adamant that the process be achieved in harmony with their concerns. They were prepared to support their convictions with the threat of arms.

Although measures were soon under way to reconcile the interests of Canada and the provisional “authorities,” Riel took the provocative step of having “rebel” Thomas Scott executed by firing squad after his conviction at trial. With the anger of Ontario Orangemen galvanized by this act, racial ten-
sions erupted. A military expedition was sent west to establish discipline and eventually it gained control of the region, forcing Riel to flee. By April 1870, the brief tenure of the provisional government had run its course.

First Nations also manoeuvred to have Canada acknowledge their title to the lands in question. In May 1869, for example, as rumours swirled about the negotiations with the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Portage Indians under Chief Yellow Quill, who “objected to the further settlement of their lands,” forced a group of immigrants away from Rat Creek, west of present-day Winnipeg. In an effort to ameliorate this situation, the company authorized James McKay to negotiate an agreement with the Band. McKay, a prominent anglophone Métis businessman and politician fluent in several Indian languages, was able to conclude an agreement whereby the Band agreed to “give a lease of the land ... for the term of three years.” In agreeing to this arrangement, the Band made it known that it was “fully expecting that some arrangements will be made with us before the expiration of the three years, about our lands.” Clearly, band members were adamant that Canada recognize their title to the land and provide compensation for its extinguishment.

Ultimately, this series of events led to the passing of the Manitoba Act on May 12, 1870, to create the province of Manitoba, followed by the proclamation of the legislation and the transfer of Manitoba and the remainder of the west to Canada two months later. British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871, followed by Prince Edward Island in 1873. By these broad strokes, the Canadian political and geographical landscape had been transformed in a remarkably few years.

With the Canadian desire to open the west came the recognition, in accordance with the conventional thinking of the time, that the vested interests of aboriginal residents would have to be extinguished to free up the land for settlement and development. The extinguishment of Indian title had been government policy since the issuance of the Royal Proclamation in 1763. Conflicts over land had already arisen in Manitoba by 1870, and the Indians pressed for treaties to clarify the positions of all concerned. For its part, the federal government realized that any resolution concluded with respect to grievances in Manitoba would require the cooperation of the aboriginal inhabitants. However, Canada and the new province, still seeking to organize

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and establish authority in the aftermath of the Red River uprising, were not yet ready to deal. When they did come to the table in 1871, lengthy negotiations resulted in Treaties 1 and 2, which, like the succeeding numbered treaties, focused primarily on the extinguishment of aboriginal title in exchange for the Indians receiving, among other things, annual cash payments, or “annuities,” and reserve lands.

A central issue in the present inquiry is whether medical aid was one of the “other things” to which Canada committed under Treaty 1.

**THE COMMISSION’S INQUIRY PROCESS**

Roseau River claims that medical aid was an unwritten, or “outside,” treaty promise. In the First Nation’s view, therefore, when Canada deducted medical aid payments from the First Nation’s trust accounts between 1909 and 1934, this action amounted to a breach of the government’s treaty obligations. The First Nation further asserts that these deductions were not authorized by the Indian Act or by the terms of the Band’s surrender of a portion of its reserve in 1903. As Roseau River stated when it originally submitted its claim in a report by Roger Townshend to Indian Affairs’ Office of Native Claims in September 1981:

> This paper presents a claim for compensation based on the management of band funds. Specifically, it disputes the propriety of medical care having been paid for with band funds for the period 1909 to 1934, and proposes appropriate compensation.

> This claim is based on free medical care having been one of the promises made at the negotiations leading up to Treaty Number One.\(^5\)

After reviewing the claim and completing additional confirmation research, Director R.M. Connelly of the Specific Claims Branch informed Chief Carl Roberts on March 1, 1984, that the claim had been rejected:

> The Department of Justice has completed its review of all the materials prepared cooperatively by your band and this office. They are of the view that there was no undertaking made by the Crown to provide the Roseau River Band with free medical aid, pursuant to Treaty 1. Consequently, there is no outstanding lawful obligation to reimburse the Roseau River Band for medical expenses charged to the band’s trust fund account. In reaching this conclusion, the Department of Justice also points out

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\(^5\) Roger Townshend, “Roseau River Indian Band Claim for Compensation Arising from Management of Band Funds, Specifically, Band Funds Used to Pay for Medical Care” (Winnipeg: Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Manitoba, September 1981) (ICC Exhibit 1, p. 3).
that the application of band funds to pay medical expenses was authorized by the Indian Act as amended from time to time.\textsuperscript{6}

On October 8, 1996, Roseau River’s legal counsel wrote to the Indian Claims Commission (the Commission) to request that it inquire into Canada’s rejection of this claim.\textsuperscript{7} After an initial planning conference, the inquiry continued with a staff visit to the First Nation on June 11, 1998, to take “willsays” from elders regarding the First Nation’s oral history of Treaty 1 and promises of medical aid. On July 14, 1998, the Commissioners conducted a community session at Roseau River’s Gînê School. The First Nation delivered written submissions to the Commission on February 26, 1999, and Canada responded on March 10, 1999. The Commission received oral submissions from the parties on March 25, 1999, in Winnipeg.

A summary of the written submissions, documentary evidence, transcripts, and the balance of the record in this inquiry is set forth in Appendix A of this report.

**MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION**

The mandate of this Commission is set out in federal Orders in Council providing the Commissioners with the authority to conduct public inquiries into specific claims and to issue reports on “whether a claimant has a valid claim for negotiation under the [Specific Claims] Policy where the claim was already rejected by the Minister.”\textsuperscript{8} This Policy, outlined in the Department’s 1982 booklet entitled Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy – Specific Claims, states that Canada will accept claims for negotiation where they disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation” on the part of the federal government.\textsuperscript{9} The term “lawful obligation” is described in Outstanding Business as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{6}] R.M. Connelly, Director, Specific Claims Branch, Office of Native Claims, DIAND, to Chief Carl Roberts, Roseau River Indian Band, March 1, 1984 (ICC file 2106-03-03).
  \item[\textsuperscript{7}] Rhys Wm. Jones, Lofchick, Jones & Associates, to Indian Claims Commission, October 8, 1996 (ICC file 2106-03-03).
  \item[\textsuperscript{9}] DIAND, Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy – Specific Claims (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1982), 20; reprinted in (1994) 1 Indian Claims Commission Proceedings (ICCP) 171–85 (hereafter Outstanding Business).
\end{itemize}
The government’s policy on specific claims is that it will recognize claims by Indian bands which disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation,” i.e., an obligation derived from the law on the part of the federal government.

A lawful obligation may arise in any of the following circumstances:

i) The non-fulfillment of a treaty or agreement between Indians and the Crown.
ii) A breach of an obligation arising out of the Indian Act or other statutes pertaining to Indians and the regulations thereunder.
iii) A breach of an obligation arising out of government administration of Indian funds or other assets.
iv) An illegal disposition of Indian land.10

Furthermore, Canada is prepared to consider claims based on the following circumstances:

i) Failure to provide compensation for reserve lands taken or damaged by the federal government or any of its agencies under authority.
ii) Fraud in connection with the acquisition or disposition of Indian reserve land by employees or agents of the federal government, in cases where fraud can be clearly demonstrated.11

The Commission has been asked to inquire into and report on whether the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation has a valid claim for negotiation pursuant to the Specific Claims Policy. This report contains our findings and recommendations on the merits of this claim.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

EVENTS PRECEDING TREATY 1

The Commission has already alluded to some of the events that formed the backdrop to the negotiation of Treaty 1 in 1871, and, in particular, the unsettled state of political affairs in the west. Meetings were held with various bands in 1870 to discuss Canada’s intentions and to secure the support of these groups while the government took steps to address the demands made by the Métis concerning the transfer of Hudson’s Bay Company territory to Canada. That fall, with the province of Manitoba just four months old, Lieutenant Governor Adams G. Archibald met with Henry Prince, the Chief of the St Peter’s Band, to ask for his patience in dealing with the pressing questions of land tenure and treaties:

I have been sent here as you are aware by the Governor General of the Dominion of Canada as the Representative of your Queen and I thus take the earliest opportunity of meeting you Prince and your people so that without further delay you may return to your hunting grounds and make provision for your families during the coming Winter. The Government of this Province has not as yet been fully established and it is impossible just as yet to make treaties but in the spring when matters are in order, I shall be most happy to meet all our Indian friends again.... When the proper time arrives for holding a council I will summon you to it through your Chief.... We must first proceed to enact laws for the protection of the Indian & the Whiteman alike.12

Negotiations for a treaty were accordingly postponed until the government had set its house in order.

12 “Notes of Interview between the Lieut. Governor of Manitoba and Henry Prince (Miskookeenu), Chief of the Salteaux [sic] & [illegible] at St. Peters Parish School,” September 13, 1870, Provincial Archives of Manitoba (PAM), MG 12 Al, RM 1-1, No. 22 (ICC Documents, pp. 10–11, 13)
By the following spring, the Indians felt compelled to take steps to prevent encroachments on their territory, and it became clear to Archibald that treating with the Indians could not be put off any longer:

[A]s soon as the spring opened they became anxious about the Treaty. They have sent repeated messages enquiring when the Treaty was to come off, and appeared very much disappointed at the delay. They have interfered with emigrants, warning them not to come on the ground outside the Hudson’s Bay Company’s surveys, and lately they have posted up a written notice on the door of the church at Portage La Prairie, warning parties not to intrude on their lands until a Treaty should be made.13

Archibald further noted the “anxiety and uneasiness among the Indians, with a feeling of danger on the part of emigrants seeking lands and ready to commence work, but subjected to enforced idleness by the danger of entering against the will of the Indians.”14

Joseph Howe, Canada’s Secretary of State for the Provinces, responded by appointing Wemyss M. Simpson as Indian Commissioner to arrange “with the Bands inhabiting the Tract of Country between Thunder Bay and the Stone Fort, for the cession (subject to certain reserves such as they should select) of the lands occupied by them.”15 Besides being a Member of Parliament for the Algoma (Sault Ste Marie) district at the time, Simpson benefited from 28 years as a trader and employee with the Hudson’s Bay Company and seems to have been conversant in Ojibway. His experience and linguistic skills prompted the government to appoint him as interpreter for the Red River expeditionary force sent west during the summer of 1870 to depose Louis Riel and establish Canadian jurisdiction within the former Hudson’s Bay Company lands. In theory, Simpson’s combined experience made him uniquely qualified for the role of treaty commissioner.

Simpson was concurrently engaged with Simon J. Dawson and Robert Pether to act as commissioners in seeking the surrender of Indian lands in what is now northwestern Ontario between Lake Superior and the Manitoba border. The instructions issued by Howe to these three men reveal a great

15 Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, to Governor General in Council, April 17, 1871, Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1872, vol. 7, No. 22, p. 4 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 2).
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ay-ee-ta-pe-tung</td>
<td>Spokesman for the Portage Indians at Treaty 1 negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Archibald, Adams G.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, September 1870-October 1872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiniwinin</td>
<td>Selected by the Chiefs and elders of the Ojibway tribe and Pembina bands to commit to memory the proceedings and promises made during the Treaty 1 negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochrane, Rev. Henry</td>
<td>Native pastor for Church of England Missionary Society; Indian settlement, St Peter’s Parish, 1859-64 and 1866-75; interpreter at Treaty 1 negotiations</td>
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<td>Howe, Joseph</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Provinces/Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 1869-73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ke-we-tay-ash (Flying Round)</td>
<td>Chief of the Roseau River Anishinabe in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKay, James</td>
<td>Métis guide, interpreter, and prominent businessman; President of Executive Council and Speaker of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly, 1871-74; assisted Archibald and Simpson in the negotiation of Treaty 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laird, David</td>
<td>Minister of the Interior/Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 1873-76; Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories, 1876-81; Indian Superintendent for the North-West Territories, 1876-79; Indian Commissioner, 1898-1909</td>
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<td>Marlatt, S.R.</td>
<td>Inspector of Indian Agencies, 1897-1907</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morris, Alexander</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba, 1872-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na-na-wa-nanaw (Centre of Bird’s Tail)</td>
<td>Chief of Roseau Rapids Anishinabe in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na-sha-ke-penais (Flying Down Bird)</td>
<td>Chief of Fort Garry Anishinabe in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pedley, Frank</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 1902-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prince, David</td>
<td>Member of St Peter’s Band; signed the “Prince affidavit,” along with James Letter Sr, Henry Chief, Thomas Flett, William Bear, and Thomas Spence, December 30, 1872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince, Henry (Mis-koo-kenew or Red Eagle)</td>
<td>Son of Peguis; Chief of St Peter’s Band in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provencher, J.A.N.</td>
<td>Indian Commissioner, February 1873- February 1876; Indian Superintendent for Manitoba, 1876-78</td>
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<td>St John, Molyneux</td>
<td>Clerk of Manitoba Legislature, 1870; Secretary to the Indian Commissioner, July-August 1871; Assistant to the Indian Commissioner/Indian Agent, July 1872- May 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schultz, John C.</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Lisgar, Manitoba, 1871-82; Senator, 1882-88; Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba, 1888-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson, Wemyss M.</td>
<td>Hudson’s Bay Company employee, 1841-69; Member of Parliament for Algoma, 1869-71; Indian Commissioner, April 1871-February 1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spragge, William</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 1862-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa-ko-wush (Whippoor-whil)</td>
<td>Chief of Pembina and Joe Creek Anishinabe in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa-sus-koo-koon</td>
<td>Spokesman at the Treaty 1 negotiations for the three chiefs representing bands between Pembina and Fort Garry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow Quill (Oo-za-we-kwun)</td>
<td>Chief of Portage Indians in 1871; signed Treaty 1</td>
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deal about the approach Canada expected to employ in treating with the Indians generally:

One object which the Government have in view in seeking the surrender of this tract of country is to make the route now being opened from Thunder Bay to Manitoba secure for the passage of Emigrants, and of the people of the Dominion generally. They also desire to throw open to settlement any portion of the land included in this area which may be susceptible of improvement and profitable occupation....

The ... maximum amount which you are authorized to give, is twelve dollars per annum for a family of five, with a discretionary power to add small sums in addition when the families exceed that number. In fixing this amount, you must not lose sight of the fact that it cannot fail to have an important bearing on the arrangements to be made subsequently with the tribes further West.
Another point to which I wish to call your attention is the policy of restricting as much as possible the amount to be paid in money. It has been represented to the Government that money is but little used by the Band with whom you will negotiate and that provisions and clothing are much more highly prized. There is a danger too that, should money become plentiful among those people, traders will bring spirits into the settlement, and demoralize and destroy the Indians.

One part of your duty, and by no means the least important, will be to select desirable reserves for the use of the Indians themselves, with a view to the gradual introduction of those agencies which in Canada have operated so beneficially in promoting settlement and civilization among the Indians.  

The three Commissioners were unable to conclude a treaty in Ontario in 1871. The Indians of that region wanted time to consider the proposal placed before them, but they were forced to disperse in any event by the onset of “a disease very like scarlatina” that claimed 11 lives, many of them children, and left “many more in a precarious state.” However, heartened by the reception they had received, the Commissioners agreed to return the following year, and Simpson journeyed on to Manitoba.  

Shortly after his arrival at Fort Garry on July 16, 1871, Simpson met with Lieutenant Governor Archibald and Métis businessman James McKay, who had been retained as an interpreter, to discuss how to proceed in light of Simpson’s experience in Ontario and Archibald’s knowledge of the Indians in Manitoba. As Archibald reported:

We were all of opinion that it would be desirable to procure the extinction of the Indian title, not only to the lands included within the Province, but also to so much of the timber grounds east and north of the Province, as were required for immediate entry and use, and also of a large tract of cultivable ground, west of the Portage, which, having very few Indian inhabitants, might be conceded with very little additional cost.

Although Simpson and Archibald would have preferred to deal with all the Indians in one set of negotiations, they believed doing so would lead to delays that would prevent newly arrived immigrants from getting on the land.

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in time to build homes and make preparations for the coming winter. Moreover, they were concerned with having to feed the entire aboriginal population for the entire length of the proceedings, as well as having to disperse the large assembly once negotiations were complete. For these reasons, Simpson issued two separate proclamations to invite the Indians to commence treaty negotiations, one to the Indians of Manitoba to meet at the Stone Fort on the Red River on July 25, and the other requesting the Indians residing north and west of the province to assemble on August 17 at the Hudson’s Bay Company post on Lake Manitoba.

Archibald was keenly aware that the negotiations in Manitoba would “probably shape the arrangements we shall have to make with the Indians between the Red River and the Rocky Mountains.” However, he expressed some misgivings that it might not be possible or even appropriate to attempt to extinguish Indian title in Manitoba on the same basis authorized by Ottawa for aboriginal lands in northwest Ontario:

I doubt if it will be found practicable to make arrangements upon so favorable a basis as that prescribed by his Excellency the Governor General, as the maximum to be allowed, in case of a treaty with the Lake Indians.

Nor indeed would it be right, if we look to what we received, to measure the benefits we derive from coming into possession of the magnificent territory we are appropriating here, by what would be fair to allow for the rocks and swamps and muskegs of the Lake country east of this Province.

Nevertheless, Archibald was determined to ensure that all appropriate preparations were in place to expedite the negotiations. To that end he assembled the necessary supplies of food to sustain the Indians in attendance, and he arranged for Major A.G. Irvine of the North-West Mounted Police to have his men on hand because “the presence, even of a few troops, will have a good

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tendency.” Simpson, meanwhile, issued another proclamation, this one banning the sale of liquor until the negotiations were completed, “to protect, not only our said Indian subjects, but also the population of this Province from the terrible evils and mischief which would ensue, if intoxicating liquors were allowed to be used by the Indians on the occasion aforesaid.”

Still, although Archibald recognized the precedent that the Manitoba negotiations were likely to establish for Canada’s future negotiations with First Nations, it seems unlikely that Canada and the Indians truly comprehended each other’s intentions. Neither the government nor Archibald had a comprehensive understanding of the concerns of aboriginal peoples within the newly acquired territory, such as their fear of losing traditional lands or their desire to be compensated for past loyalty to the Queen. Instead, as we have seen, the government intended to rely on established policies and practices that had been convenient when they had been applied to different circumstances in eastern Canada.

As for the Indians, it is apparent that they, too, misconstrued Canada’s objectives. From their many decades of experience as traders in commerce with the Hudson’s Bay Company, First Nations people had come to expect treatment as equals to the white man, and they believed that this perspective should guide all discussions regarding the proposed treaty. As Simpson’s fellow Commissioner in Ontario, Simon J. Dawson, warned:

Any one who, in negotiating with these Indians, should suppose he had mere children to deal with, would find himself mistaken.... [T]hey are shrewd and sufficiently awake to their own interests, and, if the matter should be one of importance, affecting the general interests of the tribe, they neither reply to a proposition, nor make one themselves, until it is fully discussed and deliberated upon in Council by all the Chiefs.

At these gatherings it is necessary to observe extreme caution in what is said, as, though they have no means of writing, there are always those present who are charged to keep every word in mind. As an instance of the manner in which the records are in this way kept, without writing, I may mention that, on one occasion at

Fort Frances, the principal Chief of the tribe commenced an oration, by repeating, almost verbatim, what I had said to him two years previously.\textsuperscript{27}

Circumstances had changed, however, with the decline of the fur trade, commencing in the mid-1800s, and First Nations did not comprehend how the substitution of Canada for the Hudson’s Bay Company would alter their relationship with the governing authorities. Nor did they appreciate the changes that increased immigration would have on their homelands. It is not surprising, therefore, that neither party may have been entirely prepared for the negotiations giving rise to Treaty 1.

**TREATY NEGOTIATIONS**

When Indian Commissioner Simpson’s appointed day – July 25, 1871 – arrived to commence negotiations, he found that he was unable to proceed because many of the Indians were not yet present. The meetings were postponed, first until the next day and then until July 27, pending the arrival of the remaining bands. Once the meetings were under way, Lieutenant Governor Archibald outlined the basis of what Canada was prepared to offer the bands in return for the extinguishment of their title to the lands in question:

Your Great Mother wishes the good of all races under her sway. She wishes her red children to be happy and contented. She wishes them to live in comfort. She would like them to adopt the habits of the whites, to till land and raise food, and store it up against a time of want. She thinks this would be the best thing for her red children to do, that it would make them safer from famine and distress, and make their homes more comfortable.

But the Queen, though she may think it good for you to adopt civilized habits, has no idea of compelling you to do so. This she leaves to your choice, and you need not live like the white man unless you can be persuaded to do so with your own free will. Many of you, however, are already doing this....

Your Great Mother, therefore, will lay aside for you “Lots” of land to be used by you and your children forever. She will not allow the white man to intrude upon these Lots. She will make rules to keep them for you, so that, as long as the sun shall shine, there shall be no Indian who has not a place that he can call his home, where he can go and pitch his camp, or if he chooses, build his house and till his land.

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These reserves will be large enough, but you must not expect them to be larger than will be enough to give a farm to each family, where farms shall be required. They will enable you to earn a living should the chase fail, and should you choose to get your living by tilling, you must not expect to have included in your reserve more hay grounds than will be reasonably sufficient for your purposes in case you adopt the habits of farmers....

When you have made your Treaty you will still be free to hunt over much of the land included in the Treaty. Much of it is rocky and unfit for cultivation, much of it that is wooded is beyond the places where the white man will require to go, at all events for some time to come. Till these lands are needed for use you will be free to hunt over them, and make all the use of them which you have made in the past. But when lands are needed to be tilled or occupied, you must not go on them any more. There will still be plenty of land that is neither tilled nor occupied where you can go and roam and hunt as you have always done, and, if you wish to farm, you will go to your own reserve where you will find a place ready for you to live on and cultivate....

You will look to the Commissioner to fulfil everything he agrees to do, and the Queen will look to the Chiefs you name to us, to see that you keep your parts of the agreement.28

Simpson followed with his own comments aimed at convincing the Indians to be reasonable in their requests for land:

I want you to listen to the words spoken by the great chief, the Governor, who has given you the very best advice which can possibly be given. The Government of Her Majesty is perfectly willing and anxious to provide for the welfare of her Indian subjects, as you have heard; but you must not imagine for a moment that in a country such as this, with immense cultivable acres, and with white people thronging into it, it is the intention of the Government to allow immense reserves to the different bands of Indians. The Government will give to the Indians, reserves amply sufficient. The different bands will get such quantities of land as will be sufficient for their use in adopting the habits of the white man, should they choose to do so.29

In the course of this speech, Simpson requested that the Indians choose representatives from within their own ranks to participate in the negotiations that were to begin in earnest the following day.

28 "Memorandum of an Address to the Indians by the Lieut.-Governor of Manitoba," July 27, 1871, attached to a letter from Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, July 29, 1871, Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1872, vol. 7, No. 22, pp. 16-17 (ICC Documents, pp. 16-17; ICC Exhibit 8, tab 2).

29 Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner, July 27, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 5, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, "‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited" (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 340 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
When the discussions resumed on July 28, the Indians requested more information regarding the proposed treaty terms. As reported in the *Manitoban* newspaper, Simpson explained:

Where ever I have been connected with the treaties alluded to, he said, the arrangement was that each family should get a yearly payment of so much per head, men women and children, which payment goes on in perpetuity, and is not, as in the United States, for only a certain number of years. The agent comes annually with the goods or money and payment is made to every individual Indian - not to the chiefs alone. If the Indians do not come the money is put by for them, or given to any one duly authorised to draw their payment. The agent paying the annuity has a roll drawn out, showing exactly how many Indians are to be paid and giving their names, which list is made up from a census and prevents any cheating. With regard to the reserve, the Indians themselves are always consulted as to where they will want it - whether all in one place, or in several....

His Excellency [Archibald] explained that reserves did not mean hunting grounds, but merely portions of land set aside to form a farm for each family. A large portion of the country would remain as much a hunting ground as ever after the Treaty closed.30

By Saturday, July 29, it had become apparent that, notwithstanding the groundwork laid by Archibald and Simpson, the Indians perceived the purpose of reserves as something markedly different from what had been envisioned by the Crown. Through James McKay and his fellow interpreter, the Reverend Henry Cochrane, Simpson and Archibald admonished the spokesmen for the various bands, “showing them that their demands were so preposterous that, if granted, they would have scarcely anything to cede, and urging them to curtail their demands.”

His Excellency [Archibald] further reminded them that the terms offered them were better than those under which white men came to settle and made themselves comfortable homes. In the United States reserves were sometimes given and sometimes withheld, while the annuities generally terminated after 20 years. The annuities offered the Indians in this negotiation would last as long as the sun shines. Each family of five, under these provisions, gets 160 acres and $12 a year, and if there are more than five in the family, they get in proportion to the amount named.31

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30 Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner, July 28, 1871, as quoted in the *Manitoban*, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 345 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).

31 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, July 29, 1871, as quoted in the *Manitoban*, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 348-49 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
At the close of the day, Simpson asked the Indians to consider this proposal and to be prepared to reply to it when negotiations resumed. He left the table “inclined to think that the Indians will accept these terms.”

However, on July 31, 1871, the fifth day of negotiations, the parties reached an impasse. Some of the Indian negotiators threatened to leave, believing that the treaty terms proposed by Simpson would not benefit them and would be insufficient to sustain future generations of their people. More particularly, Wa-sus-koo-koon expressed the concern that Indian farmers would be unable to raise the capital necessary to establish themselves. In response to a suggestion by Ay-ee-ta-pe-tung, Simpson indicated his willingness to increase the annuity from $12 per family of five to $3 per person, but the parties were still unable to conclude an agreement. Simpson ended the day’s discussions by warning that he would “break up the negotiations unless they came to a close next day.”

In fact, the meeting did not reconvene until August 2, “the interval being rendered necessary, partly through bad weather, and the absence of the Lieut.-Governor – Tuesday being his day for attending business at the Upper Fort and partly in order to give the Indians full time to decide finally.” The focus of conversation changed considerably, with additional emphasis being placed by the Indians on requests for agricultural assistance and clothing. In reply, Archibald promised that the Queen was willing to help the Indians in every way, and that besides giving them land and annuities, she would give them a school and a schoolmaster for each reserve, and for those who desired to cultivate the soil ploughs and harrows would be provided on the reserves.

Perhaps encouraged by this concession, the bands’ representatives, led by Henry Prince, tendered additional requests, including housing, furnishings,
hunting equipment, buggies for the chiefs and councillors, various domestic utensils, and freedom from taxation.\textsuperscript{36} As historian D.J. Hall has noted:

The Governor and Commissioner had not spoken of how the Indian might be assisted in the future, probably because that was not part of the treaty as they conceived it. They were confined by precedent, which meant chiefly the Robinson Huron and Superior treaties of 1850, which provided for small annuities, an initial gratuity, reserves, and hunting and fishing rights in return for the general surrender of lands to the Crown. Agricultural and educational assistance were later provided as a matter of policy but not as a treaty right.

This promise of assistance by the Governor altered the whole mood of the negotiations. Whether or not Prince’s sally had been a deliberate change of strategy by the Indians, they now saw an alternative way to secure their future if the reserves and annuities were not to be increased. At this point, however, orderly discussion clearly broke down.\ldots Although the Commissioner responded in good humour, suggesting that if all these demands were met, he himself would be better off as an Indian, clearly he was not prepared to concede much. When the Portage Indians left the proceedings, and others were considering doing so, it finally dawned on the officials that no treaty would be possible without some last ditch compromises.\textsuperscript{37}

With negotiations obviously at a pivotal juncture, McKay assumed a central role in the proceedings. The Manitoban reported that, besides the Portage Band, “other Indians were also thinking of leaving, but Hon. Mr. McKay asked them to stay over one more night and meet the Commissioner again next day, promising that in the interval he (McKay) would try and bring the Commissioner and Indians closer together.”\textsuperscript{38} Archibald himself recognized the risks facing the government should the negotiations fail, and he later lauded McKay’s efforts to achieve a compromise:

On Wednesday, we met and spent the whole day with no apparent progress; on the contrary, at the close of the meeting, notwithstanding all that could be said, we had reason to fear that our efforts to negotiate a Treaty would prove abortive. The Indians of the Portage, on our Western Frontier, were the least civilized of the assemblage. Their principal spokesman was a Savage, besmeared all over with white clay, and naked, except a cloth around his loins. This band of Indians it was most important to propitiate; but, at the close of the meeting, they announced their determination to

\textsuperscript{36} Wa-sus-koo-koon, August 2, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 355 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).

\textsuperscript{37} D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 327-28 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).

\textsuperscript{38} Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 355 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
withdraw from the Council and go home. They rose and left the meeting, declaring that they would go back, stake off their reserves as they themselves had named it, and would continue to hold it.

This was rather a critical point of affairs. Their words were peaceful enough, but it was easy to see what would be the end.

It was obvious therefore that we must yield something, or we must be prepared to people the country, with hostile Indians hovering on our settlements, and an Indian war in the back ground.

We thereupon invited them to think over our propositions during one more night, and if there was any chance of coming to terms to meet us in the morning.

During the night, active negotiations were carried on with the Chiefs, and it was ascertained that, by a pecuniary present to cover all claims for damages by reason of the intrusion of the white man up to this date, and by some little provision for the Chiefs and a few Braves, not to be repeated, there was a prospect of the parties closing with us.

We acceded to the demands, and the whole matter was finally arranged at a meeting on Thursday. I had taken care to have the Treaty written out and all ready to be signed, whenever the Blanks for the matters in dispute could be filled in, and at four o’clock in the afternoon the Treaty was signed to the entire satisfaction, not of the Indians only, but of the whole inhabitants of the Province.

A large number of Immigrants, who had made selections near the Western Border, and who had been warned by the Indians not to intrude on their soil till the Treaty was signed, were in attendance and returned to their homes delighted to be able to put an end to the idleness of themselves and their families and teams, which their dread of the effects of incurring the resentment of the Savages had imposed upon them.

There is a general feeling of relief here at the happy close of a matter which at one point looked sufficiently threatening.

In the success we have had in bringing this matter to a close, we are largely, very largely indebted to the unceasing and judicious efforts of the Honorable James McKay, who deserves to be mentioned in terms of the highest praise.

I brought to your notice, some time ago, the importance of securing his services in the negotiating of a Treaty. He enjoys to a large extent the confidence of the Indians. He speaks their language with great force and fluency, and his addresses were most judicious and forcible while his personal acquaintance with the Chiefs gave great force to his advice and persuasions....

I may add that Mr. Simpson’s appreciation of Mr. McKay’s services is entirely in accordance with my own.39

This account makes it clear that Archibald and Simpson believed it was necessary to “yield something” to reach an agreement and avoid future hos-

tilities, and that they eventually “acceded to the demands” of the Indians. A contemporaneous account of the proceedings attributed to David Prince of the St Peter’s Band refers to a number of terms, including an initial present or “gratuity” of $3, subsequent annual payments of $3 per person, reserve land of 160 acres for each family of five, clothing, farm animals, horses and buggies, protection from the sale of liquor, and exemption from taxation on the reserve. However, it also suggests in closing that not all the agreed terms were immediately reduced to writing:

The treaty book was opened one hour to any man to speak, nobody spoke. When the hour expires the great man get up again and said, the hour is up now am going to close our treaty books, the book is closed and sealed no man under the sun will open the book except our great Mother Queen. If any man brings new thing on top of this book he will sound like a [illegible] talking away far off and we are enclosing this agreement and we are not putting down here small articles which we are now promising to you all, we shall have them [on] one side of the paper we just put down the big articles what we are promising you. Our great Mother and all the white people with the Governor Archibald and Indian Commissioner Simpson and all the witnesses signs this agreement which is now made.40

In this same vein, Prince, together with fellow St Peter’s members James Letter Sr, Henry Chief, Thomas Flett, William Bear, and Thomas Spence, later swore an affidavit (referred to in this inquiry as the “Prince affidavit”) in which he asserted “[t]hat Governor Archibald and Commissioner Simpson did both promise to the Indians that the things demanded should be given, but said that we will not put all those things in the Treaty paper, but we will promise to make a separate paper which will do as well, and you will be sure of the things.”41

Unfortunately, the record does not provide further particulars regarding the course of discussions during the evening of August 2, 1871, and for this reason it is impossible to identify precisely how the gap between the parties was bridged. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Manitoban’s coverage of the brief, seemingly affable, final meeting on August 3, 1871, that the serious bargaining had been completed the previous night:

All the Indians met His Excellency and the Commissioner to-day in better humor. The Commissioner said he understood they were disposed to sign the treaty, and in consideration of their doing so, he would, in addition to what was stated in the treaty, give them a present, but for this year only, of $3 per head, a pair of oxen for each reserve, and buggies for each of the chiefs.

This gave general satisfaction, and the treaty was soon signed, sealed and delivered, with all due formality. The ceremony was witnessed by a large crowd of spectators.\[42\]

It did not take long, however, for serious differences of opinion on the content of Treaty 1 to emerge.

**THE CROWN’S RECORD OF TREATY 1**

The written text of Treaty 1 sheds little additional light on the promises made on August 2, 1871, but comparisons with the statements in the Manitoban and by David Prince confirm that some of the negotiated terms did not find their way into the final document. Treaty 1 states:

Whereas all the Indians inhabiting the said country have pursuant to an appointment made by the said Commissioner, been convened at a meeting at the Stone Fort, otherwise called Lower Fort Garry, to deliberate upon certain matters of interest to Her Most Gracious Majesty, of the one part, and to the said Indians on the other, and whereas the said Indians have been notified and informed by Her Majesty's said Commissioner that it is the desire of Her Majesty to open up to settlement and immigration a tract of country bounded and described as hereinafter mentioned, and to obtain the consent thereto of her Indian subjects inhabiting the said tract, and to make a treaty and arrangements with them so that there may be peace and good will between them and Her Majesty, and that they may know and be assured of what allowance they are to count upon and receive year by year from Her Majesty's bounty and benevolence....

The Chippewa and Swampy Cree Tribes of Indians and all other the Indians [sic] inhabiting the district hereinafter described and defined do hereby cede, release, surrender and yield up to Her Majesty the Queen and successors forever all the lands included within the following limits, that is to say: [legal description of the ceded lands]. To have and to hold the same to Her said Majesty the Queen and Her successors for ever; and Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside and reserve for the sole and exclusive use of the Indians the following tracts of land, that is to say: ... for the use of the Indians of whom Na-sha-ke-penaís, Na-na-wanaw, Ke-we-tayash and Wa-ko-wush are the Chiefs, so much land on the Roseau River as will furnish one hundred and sixty acres for each family of five, or in that

\[42\] Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “A Serene Atmosphere? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 356 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
proportion for larger or smaller families, beginning from the mouth of the river; ... it being understood, however, that if, at the date of the execution of this treaty, there are any settlers within the bounds of any lands reserved by any band, Her Majesty reserves the right to deal with such settlers as She shall deem just, so as not to diminish the extent of land allotted to the Indians.

And with a view to show the satisfaction of Her Majesty with the behaviour and good conduct of Her Indians parties to this treaty, She hereby, through Her Commissioner, makes them a present of three dollars for each Indian man, woman and child belonging to the bands here represented.

And further, Her Majesty agrees to maintain a school on each reserve hereby made whenever the Indians of the reserve should desire it.

Within the boundary of Indian reserves, until otherwise enacted by the proper legislative authority, no intoxicating liquor shall be allowed to be introduced or sold, and all laws now in force or hereafter to be enacted to preserve Her Majesty's Indian subjects inhabiting the reserves or living elsewhere from the evil influence of the use of intoxicating liquors shall be strictly enforced.

Her Majesty's Commissioner shall, as soon as possible after the execution of this treaty, cause to be taken an accurate census of all the Indians inhabiting the district above described, distributing them in families, and shall in every year ensuing the date hereof, at some period during the month of July in each year, to be duly notified to the Indians and at or near their respective reserves, pay to each Indian family of five persons the sum of fifteen dollars Canadian currency, or in like proportion for a larger or smaller family, such payment to be made in such articles as the Indians shall require of blankets, clothing, prints (assorted colours), twine or traps, at the current cost price in Montreal, or otherwise, if Her Majesty shall deem the same desirable in the interests of Her Indian people, in cash.

And the undersigned Chiefs do hereby bind and pledge themselves and their people strictly to observe this treaty and to maintain perpetual peace between themselves and Her Majesty's white subjects, and not to interfere with the property or in any way molest the persons of Her Majesty's white or other subjects.43

Signed by Na-sha-ke-penais, Na-na-wa-nanaw, Ke-we-tay-ash, and Wa-ko-wush on behalf of the Indians at Roseau River, Treaty 1 in its written form contains no other significant terms for the purposes of this inquiry.

Once the treaty was completed and executed, Archibald forwarded it to Howe in Ottawa on August 5, 1871, where it was ratified "on the conditions expressed in the said Treaty" by Order in Council dated September 12, 1871.44

43 Treaties 1 and 2 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Chippewa and Cree Indians of Manitoba and Country Adjacent with Adhesions (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1957), 3–5.
44 "Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council on the 12th September 1871," PAM, MG 12 B1, item 466 (Exhibit 8, tab 6).
Based on the foregoing record, it is unlikely that officials in Ottawa who did not attend the actual negotiations were aware that the government's commitments may have gone further than "the conditions expressed in the said Treaty." That document in its written form did not include any obligations beyond the stipulated reserves, annuities, payment of an initial present of $3 per person, schools for those bands desiring them, and protection against the sale of alcohol to Indians on or off the reserves. Although modern-day commentator D.N. Sprague has referred to "[t]he discrepancies between the verbal understandings and the written text of the treaty [as] dangerous oversights if not deliberate deceptions,"45 historian D.J. Hall is more circumspect:

The treaty itself marked only a slight change from the general scheme of the Huron and Superior Treaties. It surrendered to the Crown an area slightly larger than the original province of Manitoba. In return the government gave each Indian a present of $3; agreed to maintain a school on each reserve; promised to prohibit the sale of liquor on the reserves; undertook to pay an annuity of $15 per family of five, prorated for larger or smaller families, and payable in goods useful to the Indians or in cash; and agreed to provide reserves on the basis of 160 acres of land per family of five, again prorated for larger or smaller families. Hunting privileges which had been promised by Lieutenant Governor Archibald in his opening speech, and which had been included in the treaties of 1850, were for some reason omitted. The provisions regarding liquor and education were new to treaties; although both were certainly within the administrative intentions of the government, their inclusion in the treaty seems curious since neither appears to have been the subject of extensive Indian pleading, if the newspaper account is any indication. No provision was made for the agricultural implements, animals, clothing, hunting equipment, or other concessions demanded on the last day of negotiations.46

THE "OUTSIDE PROMISES"

Although Treaty 1, as approved by Order in Council, makes no mention of medical aid, it is obvious that there was considerable confusion at the time of the treaty negotiations over what had actually been promised. Officially, Canada took the position that all its obligations could be found within the four corners of the treaty, although some of its representatives seemed to acknowledge that the written document did not list all the promises that had been made. By way of contrast, almost immediately following the execution of

46 D.J. Hall, "'A Serene Atmosphere'? Treaty 1 Revisited" (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 328 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
Treaty 1, the Indian signatories began to press for the fulfilment of alleged unwritten commitments that came to be known as the “outside promises.”

Roseau River’s interpretation of the oral obligations encompassed by Treaty 1 has been passed down in the form of oral history by succeeding generations of band members. In anticipation of this inquiry, elder Oliver Nelson, a former Chief of the First Nation, prepared two reports in 1998 describing the methods used by his forefathers to preserve for future generations the promises made during the meetings to discuss Treaty 1.47 In the report forming the basis for his oral submission to the Commission in this inquiry, he wrote:

Ni Misomis Assiniwinin as a young boy, was selected by the Chieftains and Elders of Babagwanoskozeebee and the Pembina Bands to commit to his memory the proceedings and promises made at the treaty negotiations. Our people could not write in those days and this practice was used by the Ojibways to record significant events in our tribal history. Mr. and Madam Commissioners I can assure that the cession of our traditional tribal lands to the British Crown was and always will be the most significant event in the tribal history of the Babagwanoskozeebee and the Pembina Anishinabe....

Assiniwinin undertook this responsibility very seriously and with great fervor, as can be attested to by the Elders here in Roseau River, who can remember Ni Misomis Assiniwinin.... Assiniwinin did not speak or understand English. All the promises that he committed to his memory were those that were spoken and translated into Ojibway.48

After itemizing in considerable detail the promises made by the Indians to the Crown in 1871, Nelson listed the considerations recounted by Assiniwinin as having been promised in return by the Crown:

- the Indians would be permitted to retain the lands they occupied before treaty, with those lands to be surveyed and titles to be issued to the respective owners;
- the Indians would be treated equally with other bands in Canada;
- the treaty would last “as long as the sun shines, the rivers flow, and the grass grows,” with the Crown pledging to protect the Indians’ lands;

each Chief, together with two councillors and two headmen for each band, would receive distinctive clothing, a horse and a buggy, with the Chief also receiving a flag and a medal;

the Crown would enact laws to prohibit the sale of alcohol to Indians either on- or off-reserve;

for each band, the Crown would set apart and survey 32 acres of reserve land for each person in the band over and above the lands already owned outright by individual Indians within the band, with more land to be made available further west for children born into the band;

to enable the Indians to farm the land reserved to them, the Crown would provide farm implements, seed, a farm instructor, farm animals, a blacksmith, a carpenter, and the use of hay lands and timber lands;

on settling down to commence farming, the Indians would be provided with domestic items such as cloth, sewing needles, thread, soap, and wash boards;

the Indians would be permitted to hunt, trap, fish, and gather on their own lands and on lands not yet taken up by white farmers;

to help Indian hunters feed their families, the Crown would provide guns, lead, powder, snare wire, traps, and fishline;

when the hunt failed, the Crown would supply rations, including salt pork, flour, baking powder, lard, beans, salt, tea, and sugar;

when the Indians requested it, each reserve would be provided with a school and a teacher;

there would be no taxation on reserve lands; and,

most significant for the purposes of this inquiry:

When the Indians got sick the Queen promised she would provide medicines for the sick. Assiniwinin said the medicine men were upset about this because they said that the Indian’s medicines were better than [sic] the whiteman’s. Because, many white men were also seeing the Indian medicine men. The missionaries, the Indians from Sageeing and the St. Peters reserves wanted the medicines for the sick, so medicines for the sick was promised. The other
Indians did not like this promise but accepted this promise in their tents, for the other Indians.49

Nelson continued by describing those Crown undertakings that came to be known as the “outside promises”:

So, from the point of view of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation and the other Treaty One First Nations, any agreements made and agreed to in the negotiations of the Treaty of 1871 that were outside the draft treaty document, were the outside promises. It was also the understanding of the Roseau River Chieftains, Wakowosh, Keywaytayash, Nanawanan and Nashakeypenais that the Commissioner would return and put the outside promises on another piece of paper, later, but soon....

The draft treaty document did not provide for the new promises secured by the Treaty #1 First Nation negotiators. What were these outside promises?

Among the Treaty #1 First Nations, the outside promises each First Nation has listed have been consistently the same and these were; ...

x. Medical attendance for the sick....

x[v]i. Medical attendance was promised and was accepted by our Chieftains reluctantly, because it would benefit our brothers on the St. Peters and Sakeging Reserves, at the time of the Treaty.50

It will be noted that, at this point in his report, Nelson referred to “medical attendance” rather than the term “medicines for the sick” used earlier in the report and in his prior report. Additional outside promises enumerated by Nelson at this point, but not previously listed in his report, were exemption from conscription; restriction of police from entering the reserve except in cases of murder, rape, or grand larceny; and, because Roseau River had three Chiefs rather than one, provision of extra clothing, medals, flags, equipment, and animals.

From these reports it can be seen that, in the summer of 1871, Assiniwinin and the other members of the Band had a considerably different view of the Crown’s obligations under Treaty 1 than would be suggested by the bare words of the treaty document. It is not surprising that this should be


so, given the recollections of Indian Agent Molyneux St John regarding the negotiations:

When Treaty No. 1 was in process of negotiation, the spokesmen of the several Indian bands enumerated the gifts and benevolences which they required from Her Majesty’s representatives in return for the surrender of the Indian country. Some of these were accorded, some refused; but, in the natural desire to conclude the Treaty, His Excellency, the then Lieutenant Governor and Mr. Commissioner Simpson, assumed, as it afterwards proved too hastily, that their distinctions and decisions were understood and accepted by the Indians.

Amongst the several speakers on the part of the Commission was a clergyman [Rev. Henry Cochrane] who had been for many years in pastoral charge of the St. Peter’s Reserve, and this gentleman supplemented the articles enumerated by the Indians by mentioning others, which the Lieutenant Governor, he said, had authorized him to say they were to receive. Though immediately interrupted by Mr. Commissioner Simpson, the words had been spoken; and, at that juncture of affairs, it would have been difficult and probably inexpedient to entirely disallow them. So the Treaty was signed, the Commissioner meaning one thing, the Indians another. The proceedings were over but a short time before it became evident that there was some misunderstanding, and with the view of setting the matter at rest, as far as regarded one side, His Excellency the then Lieutenant Governor, asked Mr. Commissioner Simpson, the Hon. James McKay and myself, as the persons knowing best the circumstances and details of the matter, to join with him in signing a list of articles [that has become known as the “memorandum of outside promises”] which we severally and collectively understood to be the things promised to the Indians but not mentioned in the Treaty. Some little discussion took place about this, but it was eventually signed, and, I believe, forwarded to Ottawa with the Treaty, in October, 1871.

This list expressed our understanding of the matter, but it by no means covered the understanding or expectations of the Indians; and, from that time to the present, we have not visited any band, parties to that Treaty, without the untrustworthy nature of the Commissioner’s and Governor’s promises being thrown in our teeth....

There is no difference of sentiment amongst them on this point; however remote they may be from one another, their demands and assertions are alike. In every case the cry has been the same, and there is not a shadow of a doubt that when they left the Grand Council at the Stone Fort, they were firmly impressed with the idea that the demands which they had made had been, with few exceptions, granted by the Queen’s representatives.

I am not aware whether or not Mr. Archibald was a joint Commissioner with Mr. Simpson, but he was the central figure at the Council table, and the Indians attached as much weight to his utterances as to those of Mr. Commissioner Simpson.

In after times they constantly visited him on the subject of the Treaty. It is necessary to know this to understand some of the conflicting accounts that are given by the Indians themselves. For instance, the Pembina band base their expectations of a complete settlement of the matter in 1871, on their understanding of a conversation with Mr. Archibald. When we visited them in the Fall of that year they asserted that they
had been told by the Lieutenant Governor to go back to their Reserve (Roseau River), and that when the Commissioner visited them to pay them he would satisfy them as to the articles they asked for. Mr. Simpson made them repeat the assertion, and took it down in writing, signed by the Rev. Mr. Cochrane, himself an Indian, who acted as interpreter, for he denied having given any authority for such a promise. The Indians, however, thought that what the Lieutenant Governor had said was as binding as the word of the Commissioners, and so they became sulky and unmanageable....

It is but common honesty to say that ... the things which were promised, and those which were refused, mentioned as they were by three apparent authorities and spoken of in no regular communication, were so mixed up that it is little wonder if even the four persons most likely to know the exact state of the case, could hardly agree in the precise definition, when that was attempted to be made [in the “memorandum of outside promises”], within a month after the Treaty; and not at all surprising that the Indians believe their demands were complied with at the time, and that we are now trying to shuffle out of our obligations.

It is not necessary to give all these things at once; I certainly would not recommend it, but I should be in a position to tell the Indians exactly what they will have, in addition to what they have received, and when they will have it.51

Although he made no mention of St John’s presence, Archibald similarly referred to a meeting in which he, Simpson, and McKay convened to formalize the outside promises: “Mr. Simpson has a memo signed by him and attested by myself and Mr. McKay, containing all the stipulations made with the Indians, that were not formally embodied in the Treaty. The Indians expect these promises to be rigidly kept, and it will be most unsafe to disappoint them.”52

From the foregoing evidence, it appears that the list or memorandum cited by St John and Archibald was prepared no later than October 1871 in response to immediate concerns that a difference of opinion existed with regard to the promises actually made during the treaty negotiations. The record in this inquiry includes an undated “Memorandum of things outside of the Treaty which were promised at the Treaty at the Lower Fort” signed by Simpson, Archibald, McKay, and St John. The Commission concludes that this memorandum of outside promises was the instrument referred to by St John and Archibald, and it promised the following items:

For each Chief who signed the Treaty, a dress distinguishing him as Chief.

52 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, February 17, 1872, PAM, MG 12 B1, Despatch Book 3, No. 26 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 7).
For braves and for councillors of each Chief a dress; it being supposed that the
braves and councillors will be two for each Chief.
For each Chief, except Yellow Quill, a buggy.
For the braves and councillors of each Chief, except Yellow Quill, a buggy.
In lieu of a yoke of oxen for each reserve, a bull for each, and a cow for each
Chief; a boar for each reserve and a sow for each Chief, and a male and female of
each kind of animal raised by farmers, these when the Indians are prepared to
receive them.
A plough and a harrow for each settler cultivating the ground.
These animals and their issue to be Government property, but to be allowed for
the use of the Indians, under the superintendence and control of the Indian
Commissioner.
The buggies to be the property of the Indians to whom they are given.
The above contains an inventory of the terms concluded with the Indians.53

Interestingly, when Simpson finally attended to submitting his own report
on the treaty negotiations on November 3, 1871, he made little or no men-
tion of the memorandum of outside promises, although in closing he advised
Howe that “amongst the papers accompanying this report is a requisition
for dresses, buggies, medals, &c., as promised to the Indians, which I trust
may receive early consideration, so that contracts may be given out in time to
enable all of the articles named being distributed early in the coming sea-
son.”54 Whether this “requisition” was the document signed by Simpson,
Archibald, McKay, and St John is unclear, but Simpson’s report nevertheless
 echoed the terms of the memorandum of outside promises:

It was not until the 3rd of August, or nine days after the first meeting, that the
basis of arrangement was arrived at, upon which is founded the Treaty of that date.
Then, and by means of mutual concessions, the following terms were agreed upon.
For the cession of the country described in the Treaty referred to, and comprising the
Province of Manitoba, and certain country in the North-East thereof, every Indian was
to receive a sum of three dollars a year in perpetuity, and a Reserve was to be set
apart for each Band, of sufficient size to allow one hundred and sixty acres to each
family of five persons, or in like proportion as the family might be greater or less than
five. As each Indian settled down upon his share of the Reserve, and commenced the
cultivation of his land, he was to receive a plough and harrow. Each chief was to
receive a cow and a male and female of the smaller kinds of animals bred upon a

53 “Memorandum of things outside of the Treaty which were promised at the Treaty at the Lower Fort, signed the
third day of August, A.D. 1871,” in Treaties 1 and 2 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Chippewa and
Cree Indians of Manitoba and Country Adjacent with Adhesions (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of
54 Wemys M. Simpson, Indian Commissioner, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, November 3,
farm. There was to be a bull for the general use of each Reserve. In addition to this, each Chief was to receive a dress, a flag and a medal, as marks of distinction, and each Chief with the exception of Bozawequare [Yellow Quill], the Chief of the Portage Band, was to receive a Buggy, or light spring waggon. Two councillors and two braves of each Band, were to receive a dress, somewhat inferior to that provided for the Chiefs, and the braves and councillors of the Portage Band excepted, were to receive a buggy. Every Indian was to receive a gratuity of three dollars, which, though given as a payment for good behaviour was to be understood to cover all dimensions for the past.

On this basis, the Treaty was signed by myself and the several Chiefs, on behalf of themselves and their respective Bands, on the 3rd of August, 1871, and on the following day the payment commenced.55

Simpson’s report provides indisputable confirmation that the written document referred to as Treaty 1 did not embody all the promises made by the Crown’s representatives to the assembled bands on August 2 and 3, 1871. Moreover, since Simpson did not submit his report to Ottawa until after the treaty had been ratified by Order in Council, Canada apparently entered into a binding treaty without a thorough understanding of its contents. As Hall has remarked, officials and politicians in Ottawa believed that the treaty document alone defined government obligations, in terms “more generous than they had first intended”; accordingly, “they took a narrowly literal, hard-line approach to its administration when faced with Indian protests about broken promises.”56

**CONFUSION OVER THE “OUTSIDE PROMISES”**

Those protests were not long in coming. In the succeeding months, Canada was forced to address both the Indian complaints and its own uncertainty regarding its outstanding treaty obligations.

**Complaints Regarding Unfulfilled Treaty Terms**

As Indian Agent Molyneux St John recounted, disagreements over the substance of Treaty 1 arose almost immediately after its execution and they appear to have been largely responsible for the preparation of the memorandum of outside promises by October 1871. Similarly, in a February 10, 1872,

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56 D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 328–29 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
report to Lieutenant Governor Archibald, James McKay remarked that he was constantly “being waited upon by Indians, claiming that the provisions of the Treaties should be carried out.” 57 After completing the treaty negotiations, Indian Commissioner Simpson had left the area, and, as McKay noted, his absence made it difficult to deal with the Indians, who refused to believe that Archibald and McKay, as fellow members of Simpson’s treaty party, did not have the same powers as the Indian Commissioner to fulfill the treaty’s terms. In the face of the Indians’ demands to be supplied with the “utensils, stock and seeds” claimed to have been promised under the treaty, McKay asked Archibald to “obtain the necessary permission from the Indian Department to give these provisions to them, and at the same time find out when the Indian Commissioner will be prepared to carry out the conditions of the Treaties.” 58

Two days later, on February 12, 1872, Archibald forwarded McKay’s letter to the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Joseph Howe, commenting that he, too, had received “a deputation of Indians from Fort Alexander” requesting that the treaty provisions be fulfilled. Archibald shared McKay’s dismay at Simpson’s absence, adding that “[i]t would be a mere mockery in reply to their request, for explanations or aid, to say, they may apply to a commissioner, distant a thousand miles from here.” Archibald suggested that Howe consider appointing someone to represent Simpson in Manitoba, observing that, otherwise, the former “easy access” the Indians had enjoyed to “the representative of the governing power” under the Hudson’s Bay Company would be lost. In that event, Archibald warned, Canada would sacrifice its “friendly relations” with the Indians and forgo the benefits won during the treaty negotiations. 59

Like Treaty Commissioner Simon J. Dawson three years before, Archibald had come to appreciate the ability of the Indians to memorize the details of their negotiations:

It is impossible to be too particular in carrying out the terms of the arrangements made with these people. They recollect with astonishing accuracy every stipulation

made at the treaty, and if we expect our relations with them, to be of the kind, which it is desirable to maintain, we must fulfil our obligations with scrupulous fidelity.\textsuperscript{60}

Since the Indian recollection of the outside promises did not conform with the position taken by the government, Indian dissatisfaction festered.

In the days and months that followed, Archibald’s complaints to Howe became more strident in their open criticism of Simpson’s failure to assume responsibility. On February 17, 1872, Archibald wrote:

It is in vain for me to disclaim to these poor sons of the soil any responsibility for, or power to deal with Indian affairs. They are not politicians enough to distinguish between the representative of Her Majesty in one capacity and Her representative in another. They say they made the Treaty with the Queen, and they feel they have a right to look to me, as Her Representative, to see that the stipulations contained in the Treaties are kept. They say that I was present and took part in the negotiations [sic]. They consider a reference to a Commissioner wholly inaccessible to them as really a refusal to fulfil the Treaty.

What can I do under these circumstances? To refuse interviews would be to involve serious danger. To grant them, involves serious trouble and embarrassment. If I were free, after hearing the Indians, to act upon my own judgment, I should consider the trouble a matter of small moment, but to be obliged to listen to all they have to say, without power to deal with their complaints and talking to them at the risk of contravening the policy of the Commissioner or the Government, is exceedingly disagreeable. It is a position in which I think I ought not to be placed....

Of course I assume the Commissioner is preparing to discharge the obligations he contracted; but I do not know that he is – and I cannot assure the Indians that he is – while the spring is now at hand and there is not a moment to lose, if the promises are to be fulfilled.

May I therefore ask you as the head of the Department to see that there should be somebody here, if Mr. Simpson is unable to come himself, who may, under the instructions of Mr. Simpson, deal with the Indians and explain to them what is doing [sic] and what they may count upon.

It will be a matter of profound regret, if by neglect or indifference, we should forfeit the advantages of the Treaties and pave the way for a condition of things such as has arisen in the United States, much of which is due to indifference to & neglect of the Indians and to failure to fulfil strictly the obligations incurred in the Treaties made with them.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{61} Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, February 17, 1872, PAM, MG 12 B1, Despatch Book 3, No. 26 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 7).
Six days later, on February 23, 1872, having met with the Indians of Roseau River, Archibald wrote again, this time lamenting the Crown’s failure to protect the Indians’ reserves by undertaking the census promised in the treaty. Because a band’s population determined the acreage of reserve land the band would receive, the lack of a census, in Archibald’s words, made it “impossible to say with accuracy how far the [Roseau River] reserve extends,” thereby exposing potential but unsurveyed reserve lands to plunder by non-aboriginals intent on removing timber for construction, fencing, and heating purposes.\(^{62}\) When band members asked whether Archibald could provide them with the seed and farming implements promised in the treaty so they might start farming that spring, the Lieutenant Governor could only disclaim his own power to act while assuring them that Simpson, as Indian Commissioner, would fulfill the treaty promises. However, Archibald privately conveyed his concerns to Howe:

> I trust Mr. Simpson is not forgetting what he has before him. There is work enough here to keep a man of business steadily employed the year round, and Mr. Simpson is mistaken if he imagines that his absence prevents these people from making continual application about matters which interest them, or has [any] other effect upon them than to shift them over to me or to Mr. McKay, work which he should do himself.\(^{63}\)

On March 1, 1872, Archibald sought to ameliorate the troubling problem of unauthorized logging by issuing a proclamation forbidding the non-aboriginal population from cutting wood on reserve lands. At the same time, the proclamation prohibited Indians from harvesting timber outside the reserves, selling wood from their reserves to traders, or interfering with cutting outside reserve lands.\(^{64}\) On April 6, 1872, Archibald forwarded a copy of the proclamation to Howe with a suggestion that, “as the faith of the Crown is pledged ... to the preservation of the Reserves for the use of the Indians,” the federal government should afford the same protection to the reserves contemplated by Treaties 1 and 2 as to Indian lands elsewhere in Canada.\(^{65}\) Nevertheless, on July 6, 1872, Archibald felt compelled to write yet again:

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\(^{62}\) Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, February 23, 1872, PAM, MG 12 Al, R. M3-1, No. 35 (ICC Documents, p. 71).

\(^{63}\) Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, February 23, 1872, PAM, MG 12 Al, R. M3-1, No. 35 (ICC Documents, p. 72).

\(^{64}\) Proclamation issued by Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, March 1, 1872 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 8).

\(^{65}\) Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, April 6, 1872, PAM, MG 12 B1, Despatch Book 3, No. 55 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 9).
When the Treaty of 3rd August last was made, the Indians were promised that a

census of their different tribes should be taken with as little delay as possible, and

that immediately afterwards the Reserves should be laid off, allotting to each soul

thirty-two acres. A year, or nearly a year has elapsed and not a step has been taken
towards ascertaining the number of Indians or laying off the Reserve. Meanwhile, at

Roseau, the Reserve is robbed by whites, under color of an authority from an under

officer of the Land Department, licensing them to cut anywhere on Dominion lands.

The wood and timber, which formed a principal object of the Indians in their

choice of a Reserve, have been carried off, notwithstanding the solemnly plighted faith

of the Crown. This of course is known to the body of Indians all over the Province. Is

it any wonder if it creates suspicion and fear or that the Indians, seeing nothing done
to carry out the terms of the Treaty, should come to the conclusion to take the matter
into their own hands?

This is not a state of things that ought to continue....

I feel a delicacy in interfering with matters outside my jurisdiction, but I cannot

allow a feeling of that kind to prevent me doing what I can to put out sparks which, if

neglected, might produce a serious conflagration. It is quite time those questions

should be settled. Instructions should be given to have the Indian census taken and

the reserves laid off, with the least possible delay, so as to avoid the very serious

complications which may arise if the work is not done.66

In his own defence, Simpson, in a letter dated August 2, 1872, to the

Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Spragge, professed surprise

at Archibald’s attacks on his administration of Indian affairs in Manitoba:

I am unaware upon what authority Lieutenant Governor Archibald grounds his

belief that no step had been taken to obtain a census of the Indians; but I may inform

you that he is altogether wrong in his supposition. Those means promising most suc-

cess were adopted last autumn, and I have a fairly accurate list of every band included

in the Treaty, with the exception of one. Steps were taken to ascertain the number of

Indians included in this band, but, up to the present time, I have not been able to

obtain any trustworthy account of them. Probably at their payment, which takes place

in about a week’s time, I may be more successful.

I am at a loss to understand Lieutenant Governor Archibald’s expression that noth-

ing has been done to carry out the terms of the Treaty, because I do not know what

stipulations contained in the Treaty have been omitted, saving the definition of their

Reserves.

No definite time was spoken of for this survey, and I am unable to control the

action of other federal officers who may adopt courses of which I disapprove. In a

former letter Lieutenant Governor Archibald referred to the delay in furnishing the

Indians with ploughs, harrows, &c. These things, however, were promised to be given

66 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the


to them only when they adopted the habits of white men and settled on their respective portions of their band’s reserve. No Indian has yet applied to me for agricultural implements.

With regard to the surveys, you will be aware that the Government have only lately been able to deal with the pressing demands of the white population of the Province. The half breed grant, although given long prior to that to the Indians, has been unavoidably postponed, and I had neither power nor instructions to ask the Superintendent of Surveys to discontinue the work laid out for him in order to define the limits of the Indian Reserve.67

Notwithstanding Simpson’s protests that the complaints were ill-founded or beyond his control, his tenure as Indian Commissioner would prove to be short-lived. J.A.N. Provencher was appointed within a year to replace him.

The Pembina Bands Claim Medical Aid

In early September 1872, Indian Agent St John received a deputation from the “Pembina bands,” including the Indians of Roseau River and Roseau Rapids, who presented him with a series of demands that, in their view, arose from the treaty negotiations. St John prepared a list of these demands and his responses to them, which he forwarded to Deputy Superintendent Spragge in a later report. It is particularly notable that, in item 9 of this list, the question of medical aid made its first appearance in the Crown’s written record:

1. Demand – Ploughs and harrows. Reply – Perhaps more may be given when the Government are satisfied that those already given are used as intended.
2. Demand – A farmer. Reply – Some one will be employed to show them how to plough. (Memo.: told Atkinson to devote one week to this end in the spring.[])
4. D. – Dresses for children. R. – Cannot say anything at present; by and by when children are at school, perhaps Government may allow me to do something.
7. D. – Pigs, sheep, hens. R. – Pigs – yes. Sheep, no, because of dogs. Hens – yes, when I see where they are to keep them.
8. D. – Another yoke of oxen. R. – Only one promised, can do all the work they want at present.

11. D. - Store at River Marais. R. - No; never promised; useless.
18. D. - Surveyor. R. - To be sent as soon as Commissioner returns.

St John appeared to have some sympathy for the Indians’ position – indeed, as we have seen, he frankly acknowledged the Crown’s inability to keep track of the obligations it had assumed during the treaty negotiations – but he believed that not all the claims amounted to treaty promises or should be accepted by the government. Referring to the foregoing list of demands and replies, he later commented in a February 24, 1873, letter to Spragge:

You will observe in this that there are several matters not spoken of in the Treaty or mentioned in the outside promises. It would be a long and tedious story to show the expressions which led to such and such a demand, and to explain the why and wherefore of each misunderstanding. It has been palpable from the first that the present unsatisfactory state of the relationships was inevitable, and Mr. Commissioner Simpson, though always seeking to tide over any difficulty in the hopes that time would exercise its usual influence in such cases, has always expressed his regret at having allowed the signing of the first Treaty to be rushed as it was, when as subsequent events has [sic] shown it was so necessary to have a perfect understanding. The full demands of the Indians cannot of course be complied with, but there is nevertheless a certain paradox in asking a wild Indian, who has hitherto gained his livelihood by hunting and trapping, to settle down on a reservation and cultivate the land without, at the same time, offering him some means of making his living. As they say themselves: “We cannot tear down trees and build huts with our teeth, we cannot break the Prairie with our hands, nor reap the harvest when we have grown it with our knives.” The Indian can of course be dealt with on the basis [of] “$3 a head and continue hunting and fishing till you die or are civilized off West” – or he can be induced to settle on his reserve and add to the working portion of the population. In the former case all the promises real and alleged could be commuted for a sum of money down, and the Indians would gradually disappear from here to re-appear in diminished numbers further west; but taking the latter view as the more desirable one, the necessity of helping the Indian rather with what he really requires than with

what he thinks he wants seems to me to be beyond a doubt. And it must be mentioned that there is a wide difference between one band of Indians and another.\(^{69}\)

The Prince Affidavit
Other Indians turned to their Member of Parliament, Dr John Schultz, to take up their cause. On September 23, 1872 – just 17 days after the meeting between St John and the Pembina deputation – Schultz wrote directly to Secretary of State Howe, noting not only the outside promises but also what appeared to have been misleading representations by the Crown’s negotiators regarding the level of annuities paid to other Indians in Canada:

They [the Indians] say, first, that at the Treaty of August, 1871, certain promises were made to them by the Commissioner which have not since been fulfilled.

That these promises included work oxen, ploughs, harrows and other agricultural implements, indispensable to a people who, by the sale of their lands, would be compelled to give up the hunt and depend upon agricultural pursuits.

That, owing to the high price of merchandise here, the three dollars per head which they get is quite insufficient to supply even fishing twine for their nets, and is not even equivalent to the loss of time entailed on those living at a distance in coming to the payment.

That the treaty now in print is not as they understood it at the times [sic] when it was signed in August, 1871.

That it was stated to them that no Indians in the other Provinces ever received more than three dollars per head for their lands, and that they have now reason to believe that the Government has before paid as high as four dollars per head.

That the chief councillors and headmen alike only get three dollars per head, whereas in other parts of Canada the chief, councillors, etc., receive a considerable amount more than the ordinary members of the tribe.

These are the complaints made by the band to which I have last alluded, and I have reason to believe that the same complaints are made by all the Indians of the Province; and it has lead [sic] to a general feeling that they are unfairly dealt with, and that the Government should take some steps at once to redress the grievance.

To have, then, a wide-spread dissatisfaction among the Indians of the Province; this feeling is more likely to increase than decrease, and is certain to influence the Plain Creees and other tribes west of us, and may possibly lead to serious complication if the matter is not at once dealt with by the Government. I have therefore the honor to suggest that, as one of the means of arriving at a better understanding with the Indians, that you should make an appropriation sufficient to cover the expense of taking the principal chief, his subordinates and some competent interpreters to

Ottawa, and allow them to confer with the Government in the same manner as is pursued so often at Washington and with such good results.\textsuperscript{70}

At about the same time, on October 20, 1872, the Reverend Henry Cochrane, the Indian clergyman who had participated in the Treaty 1 negotiations as an interpreter and witness, also stepped forward on behalf of the Indian parties to the treaty. His request focused on schools and medical aid rather than the land and agricultural supplies and implements emphasized by Schultz:

I have not the least doubt the terms of the Indian Treaty will be carried out to the letter. I see in it, that other Reserves in the Lower Provinces obtain assistance from the Government [illegible] others [illegible] of Missionaries, school teachers, medical assistance for the indigent poor. Now Sir, may I enquire from what sources are these obtained. If funds were available to help our Missionaries & School Teachers in the three Reserves which are already settled on by Natives it would be a great boon for our people.... This my dear Sir is merely an enquiry. I know “a school” is only promised in the Treaty when the Indians “desire it” but I am certain that the Government wuld [sic] help our poor Indians not only in Church and Schools but also in medical assistance (that would only apply in St. Peter’s Reserves, as the other Reserves are at present out of reach of the Doctors) & for the indigent poor.... \textsuperscript{71}

Although the record contains no evidence of a reply to Cochrane, in October 1872, Deputy Superintendent Spragge responded to Schultz on Howe’s behalf, apparently suggesting that the claims made by Schultz for the Indians did not accord with the treaty or that the Crown had satisfied its treaty obligations to the Indians.\textsuperscript{72} On January 4, 1873, Schultz replied to Spragge:

Referring to your letter of October last, on the subject of Indian affairs in Manitoba, I beg to state that I communicated its contents to the chiefs and headmen of the complaining Bands, but that they still insist and even with greater earnestness than before, that the conditions of the treaty as interpreted to and understand [sic] by them have not been carried out, and have sent me the enclosed affidavit of parties.

\textsuperscript{70} John Schultz, MP, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, September 23, 1872, Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1873, No. 23, “Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 30 June 1872,” p. 7 (ICC Documents, p. 91). Although Schultz alluded to the Indians having seen the printed text of the treaty, he was presumably referring only to the document approved by Order in Council on September 12, 1871, and not to the memorandum of outside promises, which, as we will see, did not become part of Treaties 1 and 2 until 1875.

\textsuperscript{71} Henry Cochrane, Archdeacon, St. Peter’s Reserve, to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, October 20, 1872, NA, RG 10, vol. 3582, file 930, reel C-10102 (ICC Documents, pp. 93–94).

\textsuperscript{72} Spragge’s letter to Schultz is not part of the record in this inquiry. We have inferred its content from Schultz’s reply of January 4, 1873.
present at the treaty, to bear out the statements which they made before and which they desire to be substantiated to you.

On enquiring among respectable natives, who did not receive the treaty money, but who were present at the Councils which preceded the signing of the treaty, I am led to believe that the Indians have good grounds for their present state of dissatisfaction and in view of the consequences which are sure to follow a widespread disaffection among the Indian tribes I respectfully urge the Department to give the subject the immediate and earnest attention it is entitled to, with a view to removing the difficulty.\(^{73}\)

The affidavit to which Schultz referred was the so-called Prince affidavit sworn on December 30, 1872, by David Prince, James Letter Sr, Henry Chief, Thomas Flett, William Bear, and Thomas Spence of the St Peter’s Band. In addition to declaring, as we have already noted, that Lieutenant Governor Archibald and Indian Commissioner Simpson had promised to set the Crown’s verbal promises down on a separate piece of paper, the deponents attested:

\begin{itemize}
\item That they are natives of the country and they understand both the English and Indian languages.
\item That they were present at the signing of the Treaty at Lower Fort Garry last year, and did hear all the discussions which took place previous to the signing of said Treaty.
\item That on the day when said Treaty was signed the chiefs did enumerate the articles which they demanded in addition to the Treaty money.
\item That these articles enumerated were agricultural implements for the chiefs and headmen; wagons, horses, harness and suits of clothing; work oxen, bulls, cows, hogs, sheeps [sic], turkeys and fowls; on each reserve, medical aid and a school and school master; If they wished to take their treaty money in goods they would be supplied at Canadian prices....
\item That these things have not been given, and that when they were demanded by the chief, Henry Prince, at the payment of this year, he could get no right answer from the Commissioner.\(^{74}\)
\end{itemize}

When Spragge delivered Schultz’s letter and the Prince affidavit to Howe, the Secretary of State was apparently surprised by the claim to medical aid. On February 8, 1873, Howe forwarded the letter and affidavit to Simpson


with a request for “information as to promises of Medical Attendance if any, made the Indians of Manitoba at the time of the Treaties being effected with them.” Given Simpson’s resignation in February 1873, the request eventually crossed Indian Agent St. John’s desk on March 1, 1873, for reply. Referring to his letter of February 24, 1873, in which he had listed the Indians’ demands and his responses arising during the meeting of September 6, 1872, with the Pembina bands – including the declaration that the Indians “[m]ust take care of their own sick” – St. John denied any recollection of medical aid as a treaty term and, at the same time, questioned the motives of Schultz and his aboriginal constituents:

My letter of the 24th ult[imo], in reply to a telegram received from Deputy Superintendent Spragge, will have explained the asseveration [i.e., earnest assertions] of the Indians.

There is however the question of medical aid, about which you specially ask, I do not remember any promise of this nature and I have never heard the subject mentioned until the receipt of your letter.

I am a little surprised that the Indians should never have spoken of this in their recapitulations of the many things they believed themselves entitled to, until Dr. Schultz’s meeting with the respectable natives who did not take the Treaty “money,” and I can only assume that it may have occurred to them, that having been fortunate enough to secure that gentleman as their representative in Parliament, they would do well to cement the alliance by obtaining his services as their medical adviser.

Despite St John’s denial that medical aid comprised one of the promises made during the negotiation of Treaty 1, just two weeks later, on March 14, 1873, Spragge, in his annual report to Howe, “proposed to extend to Manitoba and the North-West Territories the system of providing medical treatment for the Indian population, which in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec has been productive of such value and satisfactory consequences.”

**Spragge’s Instructions to Provencher**
Complaints from the Indians continued to filter into Ottawa. In July 1873, just five months after his installation as the new Indian Commissioner and one

75 Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, to Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner, February 8, 1873, NA, RG 10, vol. 4382, item 309, reel C7407 (ICC Documents, pp. 100–1).
month after his arrival in Manitoba, J.A.N. Provencher reported a meeting with Indians claiming that treaty promises had not been fulfilled and that the treaty document “did not contain the true conditions of the surrendering of their lands.” In response, Spragge advised Provencher on July 18, 1873, that reserve surveys previously deferred pending the new Indian Commissioner’s arrival would be allowed to proceed, with Provencher expected to be intimately involved in the selection process. Spragge’s instructions then proceeded to address “the promises made to the Indians,” but a significant portion of the most critical passage in this key document has been lost to the ravages of time:

With reference to your letter of the 5th inst., and the promises made to the Indians
5 lines illegible
St. John particularized the presents which it was understood that Governor Archibald & Commr. Simpson had promised should be given and by Telegram of the 31st of the following month Mr. St. John was informed that the recommendation contained in his letter would be complied with. Accordingly, the following may be purchased and delivered when the parties are prepared to receive them:-
A Sow for each Chief; and
A Boar Pig for each Reserve on the terms described in Mr. St. John’s letter.
For each Chief “a male and a female of each animal used by a farmer.”
The maintaining of a School on each of the Reserves specified.
one line illegible
will be given to each Band.
Medicines for the sick will be provided.
Scythes will be given to those Indians who require to use them.
The Commissioner and Agents must carefully protect the Timber on the Indian
Reserves from plunder and destruction and waste.
You will use your discretion with reference to the delivering [of] farm animals and
other [illegible] keeping in view their [illegible] of taking care of them.

Two other documents referred to in this correspondence which might have shed additional light on the gaps in Spragge’s instructions – Provencher’s letter of July 5, 1873, and the telegram sent to St John on the 31st of an unspecified month – have unfortunately never been found.

Despite the apparently good intentions embodied in Spragge’s letter, St John remarked on October 22, 1873, that the Indians remained irritated

78 J.A.N. Provencher, Indian Commissioner, to unidentified recipient, July 18, 1873 (ICC Documents, pp. 119–20).
not only by the Crown’s failure to comply with the treaty terms, as the Indians understood them, but also by those terms being less favourable than those granted to Indians elsewhere:

Although the demands of the Indians have been of late somewhat more moderate than formerly, they are not content with the terms of the Treaty and are unanimous in the belief that they have been deceived and promised more than they have received.

In one instance I thought it advisable to explain how this difference between the Indians and the Commissioner arose; but while they accepted the explanation as justifying the position I assumed, they said there could be no satisfaction about the matter until I or some one else was authorized to re-arrange the bargain.

This, it should be remembered, was prior to the negotiation of the Treaty at the North-west angle of Lake of the Woods [Treaty 3], and looking to the extraordinary disparity between the terms granted in Treaties 1 and 2 and at the N.W. Angle I do not entertain the least hope of being able to satisfy the Indians of the former Treaties under the altered condition of affairs. Not an item granted to the Indians eastward of the province will be forgotten by the others, nor will the latter omit to point out, as Lt. Gr. Archibald’s printed dispatch has already told them, that they are giving up valuable prairie lands while the Indians of the east are surrendering rock and muskeg.80

Similarly, Provencher observed in his year-end report for 1873 to the Minister of the Interior, David Laird, that the Indians of Manitoba remained dissatisfied:

On my arrival here, in the beginning of June last, the different Chiefs of Bands in the vicinity of Fort Carry hastened to visit me to express their satisfaction at the arrival of a Resident Commissioner, and moreover to represent their wants and grievances.

As has been frequently advised by all who engage with Indian Affairs in this part of the Dominion, there is no doubt that serious misunderstandings exist in the locality of the treaties concluded in 1871.

The sum of money to be paid by the Government was clearly fixed; and those who received it, though maintaining that it was too little, yet understood till last autumn that it could not be augmented. But in spite of this the representative of the Canadian Government, at that period, made them many promises, still undetermined as to details, and of which those interested now claim the fulfilment, with a persistence the greater as their expectation has lasted two years. They do not perfectly agree as to the nature of these promises, and some Chiefs have announced the most exaggerated pretensions on this subject. They think that the Government has undertaken to furnish them first-class residences; clothes of a supe-

80 Molyneux St John, Indian Agent, to J.A.N. Provencher, Indian Commissioner, October 22, 1873, Canada, Parlia-
rior quality, and provisions of their own choice for them and their families; but putting aside what is impossible and absurd in these different rumors, it is undoubtedly that by an interpretation put by the Indians on the words of the Commissioners, that they who were present at the treaties Nos. 1 and 2, were led to expect many more benefits than were expressed in those two treaties; and in the meantime they almost accuse the representatives of Canada of obtaining their consent under false pretences [sic].

We can easily understand how such charges, however ill-founded, may raise difficulties in the future.

All these Indians are in communication with each other, and the dissatisfaction of any, whether with or without reason, cannot fail to exercise an influence on the minds of others.

Up to the present time, it is true, we have not had occasion to realize these doubts, but it is none the less in the interest of the tranquility of the future, to prevent all pretexts at defiance on the part of the Tribes with whom the Government may find it advisable to conclude new treaties.81

Provencher recommended that, in the interests of both the Indians and the government, and “to avoid all causes of misunderstanding and dissatisfaction in the future,” new treaties should be made “on a more definite basis.” With more particular reference to Treaty 1, he urged that steps be taken “as soon as possible, to arrive at a thorough understanding on all points under discussion.”82

Recommendations of the Board of Indian Commissioners

Although the record is not clear how it came about, sometime in 1873 Canada appointed a Board of Indian Commissioners to review the Indians’ concerns and devise a means for resolving them. The board consisted of Indian Commissioner Provencher and Alexander Morris, who had succeeded Archibald as Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and the North-West Territories. Indian Agent St John, the only one of the three who had actually participated in the treaty negotiations, acted as secretary, and his record of the March 13, 1874, meeting states:

After full discussion the following resolutions were adopted and the Lieutenant Governor was requested to transmit the same to the Minister of the Interior that is to say:-

1st. Repeated complaints having been made to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Indian Commissioner by the Indians who were parties to the Stone Fort Treaty, whereby they alleged that certain articles had been promised to be given them which were not included in the treaty, and, whereas the Indians have asserted these promises ever since the making of the Treaty:- The Indian Board have given the matter their careful consideration and having made inquiry into the matter and having found that there were some promises made which were not included in the Treaty, but not to the extent or of the character claimed by the Indians, they are of opinion that it would be desirable if possible to put an end to these constant complaints and demands of the Indians.

They would therefore recommend, that without recognizing the alleged promises in their entirety, the Privy Council should announce to the Indians, that without in any way interfering with the provisions of the Treaty, which are binding alike on the Government and the Indians, the Governor General in council had resolved, out of the benevolence of Her Majesty, to give the Indians, parties thereto, as a supplement to their existing annuities & other benefits under the Treaty, the following viz:-

1st. One plough & harrow for every four families on their actually settling on the Reserve and commencing to farm.
2nd. One axe, two hoes, one spade, a scythe for each head of a family.
3rd. One pair of oxen for every ten families settled on the Reserve.
4th. A cow to every chief not already having received one.
5th. A bull for each Reserve if required.
6th. Tools for building purposes for each Reserve, of such amount as the Commissioner may deem necessary.
7th. The Schools to be maintained as provided for by the Treaty, the importance of which is strongly urged.
8th. The Commissioner to be authorized to employ, from time to time, a Farmer and a carpenter, for such limited period of engagement as shall be found necessary, to aid the Indians in farming on any Reserve, or in building on the same.
9th. A supply of simple medicines to be provided for each Reserve, and placed in the custody of some suitable person.
10th. Seed Wheat, Potatoes, and garden seeds.
11th. Certain [illegible] of goods to be purchased by the Indian Department and kept on stock to be distributed to the Indians at cost price on account of their annuities by the local agents.
12th. Ammunition and twine, fifteen hundred dollars per annum for the Treaty.
13th. Clothing for Chiefs and four officers once every three years.
14th. A flag and Silver medal for each Chief.
15th. Twenty-five dollars to each chief and fifteen dollars to each of four councillors, these payments to the chiefs and councillors to be approved by the Chief Indian Agent as to their rank as such, and its continuance dependent on their good conduct, and further, that an addition be made to the annuity of two
dollars per head, and that the annuities may be payable semi-annually in the event of sub-agents being appointed and its being found expedient.83

Since the Indians of Treaty 2 had been promised by the Crown’s treaty negotiators to be placed “on the same footing” as the Indians of Treaty 1, the board further proposed that its recommendations apply to the signatories of that treaty as well.

It is evident that the board considered the written form of Treaty 1, as ratified by Order in Council, to be the “treaty.” Moreover, although Provencher and Morris acknowledged that the written form of the “treaty” certainly understated the promises that had been made to the Indians during the treaty negotiations, they also concluded that Indian claims regarding the extent of the outside promises were overstated. Accordingly, while they were prepared to make recommendations to settle the matter, they were careful not to equate their recommendations with prior “alleged” promises or to recognize “the alleged promises in their entirety.”

For whatever reasons, however, the board’s recommendations were apparently not accepted or otherwise acted upon by the government. As Edgar Dewdney commented in 1880, after succeeding Provencher as Indian Commissioner, “[t]hese recommendations (with the exception of No. 11 which I think was injudicious) if assented to at the time would[,] I have no doubt[,] have been satisfactory to the Indians, but no action appears to have been taken” on them.84

When Morris met with Chief Yellow Quill and the members of the Portage Band in the summer of 1874 to mark out their reserve, he encountered resistance in relation to the outside promises and to the lands to be set apart - in both cases arising from the differences between the Indians’ recollections of the treaty promises and the written text of Treaty 1. Moreover, Chief Yellow Quill expressed concern that, although Archibald and Simpson had promised that “all the Indians were to be treated alike ... the Indians at the North West Angle [Treaty 3] had been paid more.” Given that the government had “already been furnished with corroborative testimony” regarding the outside promises, Morris recommended the report of the Board of Indian Commissioners to the Minister of the Interior and strongly urged a decision: “[T]he harm that arises from the Indian mind being impressed with the

belief that the white has broken his promises is very great, spreading as it will do through all the Tribes.”

THE AMENDMENT OF TREATIES 1 AND 2

The ongoing complaints prompted the Minister of the Interior, David Laird, to take personal charge of the matter. He toured Manitoba during the summer and early fall of 1874, meeting with representatives from “every leading band in the Province.” On September 30, 1874, three chiefs, including Ke-we-tay-ash, who had signed Treaty 1 on behalf of the Roseau River Indians, provided Laird with a letter outlining the failure of the Crown’s representatives to fulfill the terms of the treaty:

They don’t follow the agreement at all. It is not for three dollars a head that I would have sold my land. I sold neither signed the treaty. Before they had promised me what I asked but now they don’t even give us enough to eat. I never sold my land only at Stone Fort and Now we all the Chiefs want our rights of the treaty.

The following day – October 1, 1874 – Laird met in Winnipeg with residents of the Roseau River reserve, who picked up where the letter had left off:

Red Bone said, I am not going to say everything just now, only to lodge a few complaints. I am very glad to have met you, and have something very important to say. I want to speak about the Treaty. It has not been fulfilled by the parties who made it with them. What is stated in the letter you received yesterday are facts. Of all the promises that were made we only received the $3.00 per head. We never would have made the Treaty if it was not for the promises that were made besides the $3.00 per head. Now when we see one of our great Mother’s representatives here we expect to get what was promised us. I just felt as if it were the first time I had seen daylight when I heard of your arrival here. The impression of all the Indians out there is that you will cause the promises to be fulfilled if you hear the complaints fully. We want nothing more than the promises, when we get that we will be contented. I am speaking for all, and would like to get before we start for home all that was promised in the Treaty....

The Indian said he had been one of the speakers when the Treaty was made, that he was stupid but he had not forgotten the promises made and which they cannot

deny were made. There are plenty of people who heard Simpson and Archibald promise. They would not ask for them if they had not been made.88

On his return to Ottawa, Laird prepared a memorandum to the Governor General in Council on April 27, 1875, in which he reviewed the outside promises and his recommendations for their resolution. With regard to the written form of Treaty 1, he stated:

The undersigned has the honor to bring under the consideration of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the very unsatisfactory state of affairs arising out of the so called “outside promises” in connection with the Indian Treaties Nos. 1 and 2....

Of the matters thus stated to have been promised during the negotiations as enumerated in the above extract from Mr. Commissioner Simpson’s Despatch [of November 3, 1871], the only one actually embodied in the Treaty, in addition to the usual stipulation respecting Reserves and Schools, is the annual payment of $3.00 to each Indian in perpetuity.

Of the other things promised, a memorandum was, however, subsequently made.89

After setting forth the terms of the memorandum of outside promises, Laird continued:

From that moment to the present these outside promises have been a source of constant embarrassment to the Department, and it is to be observed that the Order in Council passed on 12th September 1871, confirming the Treaty concluded on the 3rd August of that year takes no notice whatever of the memorandum above referred to.

The memorandum it may be remarked is attached to the original Treaty which it is probable did not reach the Department until after the Order in Council was passed.

The validity of the promises thus made would appear however, to have been admitted by the then Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs....

These “outside promises” have also repeatedly been referred to and partially at least recognized in the official Despatches of their Honors Lt. Governors Archibald and Morris and in the reports of the Indian Commissioners [Simpson and Provencher], and also in the minutes of the N.W. Council.90

89 David Laird, Minister of the Interior, to Governor General in Council, April 27, 1875, NA, RG 10, vol. 3621, file 4767, reel C-10108 (ICC Documents, pp. 149, 151–52). The copy of this memorandum in the record of this inquiry is very poor, with many revisions, deletions, and marginal notes, several of which are virtually illegible. For clarity, we have referred to a clean, revised copy of the memorandum in the record of the Long Plain loss of use inquiry (Long Plain First Nation Inquiry, Loss of Use Claim, ICC Documents, pp. 168–84 at 168, 171).
After reproducing excerpts from Spragge’s letter of March 14, 1873, St. John’s letter of October 22, 1873, and Provencher’s letter of December 31, 1973, Laird concluded:

That the dissatisfaction among the Bands of Indians included under Treaties 1 and 2, arising out of the misunderstanding as to the nature and extent of the so-called “outside promises,” is deep and widespread, the undersigned had ample means of ascertaining while on his visit to Manitoba last summer. He was met by deputations from every leading band in the Province; and while some of their complaints were unreasonable they all appeared to agree that faith had not been kept with them in regard to the articles promised to be distributed among them....

In order to make the present position of this matter intelligible, the undersigned has felt obliged to go to some length into the history of the case, and he thinks it is apparent in view of what has been stated that it is now imperatively necessary for the Government to take steps once and forever to dispose of this matter on a basis which will be satisfactory to the Indians interested in Treaties Nos. 1 and 2.

It seems clearly made out that these so called “outside promises”, to the extent at least of what is set forth in the memorandum attached to Treaty No. 1 and in the official letter of Mr. Commissioner Simpson, are officially sanctioned by that officer, that their fulfillment was from the first, and persistently since claimed by the Indians, that such claims have been strongly urged by their Honors Lt. Governors Archibald and Morris, and by Mr. Commissioner Provencher and finally that they have been to a large extent admitted, and to some extent carried out by the Indian Department.

In conclusion the undersigned would respectfully recommend:—

1st. That the written memorandum attached to Treaty No. 1 be considered as part of that Treaty and of Treaty No. 2, and that the Indian Commissioner be instructed to carry out the promises therein contained in so far as they have not yet been carried out, and that the Commissioner be advised to inform the Indians that he has been authorized so to do.

2nd. That the Indian Commissioner be instructed to inform the Indians, parties to Treaties Nos. 1 & 2, that, while the Government cannot admit their claim to anything which is not set forth in the Treaty and in the memorandum attached thereto, which Treaty is binding alike upon the Government and upon the Indians, yet, as there seems to have been some misunderstanding between the Indian Commissioner and the Indians in the matter of Treaties 1 and 2, the Government out of good feeling to the Indians and as a matter of benevolence, is willing to raise the annual payment to each Indian under Treaties 1 and 2 from $3.00 to $5.00 per annum, and make payment over and above such sum of $5.00 of $20.00 each and every year to each Chief and a suit of clothing every three years to each Chief and each Headman, allowing two Headmen to each Band, on the express understanding however, that each Chief or other Indian who shall receive such increased annuity or annual payment, shall be held to abandon all claim whatever against the Government in connec-
tion with the so-called “outside promises” other than those contained in the memo-

randum attached to the Treaty.91

Three days later, on April 30, 1875, the Governor General in Council passed

an Order in Council adopting Laird’s recommendations word for word.92

Lieutenant Governor Morris was instructed to meet with the Treaty 1 and 2

bands to secure their agreement to the proposed amendment, but he recog-

nized that he lacked sufficient time to meet with all of them that fall. Accord-

ingly, while he proceeded to Manitoba House to negotiate with the Treaty 2

Indians, he seconded Indian Commissioner Provencher to meet with the

bands of Treaty 1.93 Provencher secured adhesions to the treaty amendment

from the Indians at Fort Alexander on August 23, 1875, and at Broken Head

River on August 28. He then proceeded to Roseau River, where the Band

adhered to the amendment on September 8. In general, the Indian Commiss-

ioner reported that he was well received:

I am happy to be in a position to inform you that the intercourse between the

Indians and the Government, through me, has been of the most peaceful nature, and

denotes, on the part of the former, a general feeling of satisfaction and of

contentment.

The appearance of difficulties, which had been anticipated the preceding year, and

which had been considerably exaggerated by the circulation of outside rumours,

entirely disappeared when sufficient explanations had been given.

The Indians now understand the position secured to them by the treaties; and, if

all causes of misunderstanding have not yet disappeared, they only bear on minor
details and cannot create any serious disagreement....

I already had the honour to mention, in a former report, that at the time of the

execution of the Treaties in 1871, several promises, not mentioned in the Treaties,

had been made to the different Tribes, and that the nature and particulars of those

promises were of too indefinite a character to allow of a settlement without calling a

new convention to annul all engagements – real, or given as such – with the excep-
tion of those expressly mentioned in the Treaties.

This solution has been accepted by the Government, who now offer an annuity of

$5 per head, instead of $3, on condition that all claims not mentioned in Treaties

shall be given up. All the Indians of Treaties 1 and 2 have eagerly accepted that

91 David Laird, Minister of the Interior, to Governor General in Council, April 27, 1875, NA, RG 10, vol. 3621, file
4767, reel C-10108 (ICC Documents, pp. 158–60; Long Plain First Nation Inquiry, Loss of Use Claim, ICC
Documents, pp. 160–84). The first and third paragraphs of this excerpt are included in the Long Plain version
of the memorandum only.


93 Alexander Morris, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, to [David Laird, Minister of the Interior], Oc-
tober 4, 1875, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880; reprinted Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1991), 133
(ICC Documents, p. 174).
proposition, with the exception of one Band [the Portage Band under Yellow Quill], who refused on private grounds - that is, in reference to the extent of the Reserve to be granted to them.94

The agreement so “eagerly accepted” consisted of the April 30, 1875, Order in Council with the assents of the various bands endorsed on the back. The Roseau River Indians assented in these terms:95

We the undersigned Chiefs and Headmen of Indian bands representing bands of Indians who were parties to the Treaties Nos. 1 and 2 mentioned in the report of a Committee of the Queen’s Privy Council of Canada, as [approved on April 30, 1875, and] printed on the other side of this sheet, having had communication thereof and full understanding of the same, assent thereto and accept the increase of annuities therein mentioned, on the condition therein stated, and with the assent and approval of their several bands, it being agreed, however, with the Queen’s Commissioners, that the number of braves and councillors for each Chief shall be four, as at present, instead of two, as printed.96

Once Chief Yellow Quill and the Portage Band endorsed the Order in Council in 1876, all Treaty 1 and 2 bands were party to the amendment. At that point, the memorandum of outside promises officially became part of Treaties 1 and 2.

From these government accounts of the treaty amendment proceedings, it would appear that the Indian participants considered the revisions to be cause for celebration. However, in the present inquiry, the members of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation submit that, in the course of amending Treaty 1, their forefathers did not fully comprehend or appreciate what they had been asked to relinquish.

RESERVE CREATION AND SURRENDER

In the midst of the bitterness felt by the Indian signatories to Treaties 1 and 2 regarding the outside promises, additional resentment surfaced when non-aboriginal settlers encroached on lands earmarked for future reserves to

94 J.A.N. Provencher, Indian Commissioner, to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, October 30, 1875, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1875, pp. 31–32 (ICC Documents, pp. 177–78).
96 Treaties 1 and 2 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Chippewa and Cree Indians of Manitoba and Country Adjacent with Adhesions (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1957), 9 (ICC Documents, p. 173).
acquire scarce supplies of wood for building, fencing, and fuel. Not surpris-
ingly, many bands were anxious to have their reserves marked and set apart without delay so that their resources could be better identified and protected. As the Commission has already noted in its report dealing with the mediated settlement of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation’s treaty land entitle-
ment claim:

Immediately following the signing of Treaty 1, the Anishinabe Chiefs expressed their concern about the level of protection that the agreement was providing for their lands. Dissatisfaction mounted over the delay in surveying the promised reserve, the continuing encroachment of settlers on their land, and timber permits being granted on lands that the Anishinabe understood had been promised to them. The Anishinabe wanted to have a reserve that straddled the Roseau River and that ran along its length. It was not until 1874 that a proposed site was marked off at the mouth of the Roseau River. This was not, however, the final survey. The official survey did not occur until 1887, when a plan was prepared by the Dominion Land Surveyor. What was surveyed, however, was a block-shaped reserve that extended back from the river, not along its length.

The lands that eventually became the reserve (or reserves) were not set out until 1887 and 1888. By this time much of the land desired by the Anishinabe, and which they understood to be theirs, had already been alienated. Consequently, the designated reserve lands were in a different location from the reserve that the Anishinabe had understood would run along the river. In the end, the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation asserted that Canada did not fulfill its promise to the Band to set aside the reserve promised to it by the terms of Treaty 1.

Ultimately, the Band received Indian Reserve (IR) 2, which comprised roughly 13,500 acres at the confluence of the Red and Roseau Rivers.

In the context of the present inquiry regarding the alleged treaty right to medical aid, the significance of the reserve is that a portion of it was later surrendered in 1903 on these terms:

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98 Jim Gallo, Treaties and Aboriginal Rights Research, Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, "Notes on the Establishment of Roseau River I.R. No. 2 1871–1882," September 24, 1979 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 17, p. 4). Gallo relies on a figure of 13,554 acres based on "Schedule C, Shewing Indian Reserves Surveyed," in Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1875, No. 8, p. 55, whereas D.N. Sprague cites a figure of 13,349.84 acres based on Orders in Council dated January 20, 1917, and November 21, 1913, confirming IRs 2 and 2A: D.N. Sprague, "Reserve Entitlements under Treaty Number One: The Case of 'Land on the Roseau River,'" June 14, 1993 (ICC Exhibit 8, "History" tab, p. 27). Another paper, which Sprague refers to as an "earlier work by Gallo in which he mistakenly concluded that 1874 was the date of first survey," also employs the 13,349.84 figure: "Treaty Land Entitlement in Manitoba," undated (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 16, p. 10), as given in the Sprague paper at p. 23, footnote 47.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, THAT WE, the undersigned Chiefs and Principal men of the Roseau River Band of Indians resident on our Reserves No. 2 and 2a in the Province of Manitoba and Dominion of Canada, for and acting on behalf of the whole people of our said Band in Council assembled, do hereby release, remise, surrender, quit claim, and yield up unto OUR SOVEREIGN LORD THE KING, his heirs and Successors forever, ALL AND SINGULAR, that certain parcel or tract of land and premises, situate, lying, and being in the said Reserve No. 2 in the Province of Manitoba containing by admeasurement twelve square miles be [sic] the same more or less and being composed of all that portion of the Indian Reserve No. 2 (two) on the Roseau River, as shown by a map or plan of the said Reserve made by A.W. Ponton D.L.S. in September and October 1887....

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto His said Majesty THE KING, his Heirs and Successors forever, in trust to Sell the same to such person or persons, and upon such terms as the Government of the Dominion of Canada may deem most conducive to our welfare and that of our people.

AND upon the further condition that all moneys received from the Sale thereof, shall, after deducting the usual proportion for expense of management, be placed to the credit of the Roseau River Bands of Indians.

AND WE, the said Chief and Principal men of the said Roseau River Bands of Indians do, on behalf of our people and for ourselves, hereby ratify and confirm, and promise to ratify and confirm, whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered. It is further understood and agreed that a survey shall be made of the lands surrendered and the lands sold at the earliest possible date. It is further understood and agreed that one tenth of the amount realized from said sale shall be expended [as] soon as available for such articles or commodities as the Indians may desire and the Department approves of. Any advances made at this time, or at any time subsequent to the sale of said land to be repaid from the 10% before mentioned. It is further agreed that the Department shall purchase for the Bands two sections of land adjacent to the reserve known as Reserve No. 2a, or Roseau Rapids, said lands to be purchased as soon as funds are available.99

Following the surrender, the Inspector of Indian Agencies, S.R. Marlatt, reported on June 19, 1903, to Indian Commissioner David Laird – the same man who, as the Minister of the Interior, had 27 years earlier recommended the amendment of Treaty 1. Marlatt outlined his intentions regarding how the “one tenth of the amount realized from said sale” should be spent “to the best advantage of the Indians.” He continued:

In looking at this question there are certain facts that should be taken into consideration, such as: The surrender was obtained not by the desire of the Indians but by the strong wish of the Department, it was with great difficulty secured and only after a clear understanding that the 10% would be available almost immediately after the sale.

... last but most important it will be but a short time until they are again asked to surrender the balance of the reserve, and unless they are generously and fairly treated according to their own ideas at this time they will be very slow to sign another surrender.100

Frank Pedley, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, approved Marlatt’s proposal, adding that “no doubt [it] is felt that you will use your best endeavors to make use of the money in the way which will most greatly benefit the Indians.”101 Just six years later, in 1909, the government began applying funds from the Band’s interest trust account to the payment of the Band’s medical expenses.

THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL AID

To better understand the First Nation’s claim that the deductions from its interest account were inappropriate and indeed unlawful, it is necessary to review the manner in which medical aid was delivered to the people of Roseau River and other bands – before Treaty 1 was signed in 1871, in the interval between Treaty 1 and its 1875 amendment, and following the treaty amendment until 1934, when deductions from the First Nation’s interest account ceased.

Medical Services before 1871

There is no evidence before the Commission regarding Canada’s delivery of medical services before 1870 to the Indians of the vast region that became Manitoba and the North-West Territories. In those early years, that territory was still known as Rupert’s Land and comprised the domain of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Canada’s jurisdiction – and any responsibility it might have had to provide medical aid – had not yet extended that far.

Within a few months of Manitoba’s entry into Confederation in May 1870 – and before the negotiation of Treaty 1 – Canada was forced to confront a

100 S.R. Marlatt, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, June 19, 1903, NA, RG 10, vol. 3565, file 82, pt 29, reel C-10100 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 73–74).
101 Frank Pedley, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to S.R. Marlatt, Inspector of Indian Agencies, June 24, 1903, NA, RG 10, vol. 3731, file 26306-2, reel C-10127 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 76).
serious smallpox epidemic that “raging throughout the ... summer,” threatening to claim the lives of significant numbers of the aboriginal inhabitants in the newly acquired territory. Lieutenant Governor Archibald met with Henry Prince on September 13, 1870, to request a postponement of treaty negotiations until the following year, including among the reasons for delay the need to disperse the Indians to reduce the risk of spreading the infection. The next month, on October 24, 1870, the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Joseph Howe, instructed Archibald to take more concrete measures:

The spread of the Small Pox among the Indians is much to be deplored and ought if possible to be prevented or mitigated by general vaccination. You will turn your attention to this subject without delay and I shall be glad to be informed to what extent and by what Agencies it is in your power to control this loathsome disease.

From these brief excerpts it may be seen that, before the treaty was signed, Canada had already undertaken some steps to provide for the health and welfare of Indians in the west. Indeed, by 1869, the legislation at the heart of this inquiry – section 8 of An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42 – had been put in place and remained substantially unchanged in various versions of the Indian Act during the entire period to which the claim relates. Section 8 stated:

8. The Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in cases where sick or disabled, or aged and destitute persons are not provided for by the tribe, band or body of Indians of which they are members, may furnish sufficient aid from the funds of each tribe, band or body, for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute persons.

Canada’s researcher, Frances Foley Smith, suggests that, when the time came to negotiate Treaty 1, medical aid may have been provided “without treaty stipulation” as a matter of fairness and equal treatment of the Indians.

105 An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, SC 1869, c. 6, s. 8.
of Treaty 1 and the later numbered treaties with the aboriginal peoples of central and eastern Canada:

The government repeatedly undertook to treat equally with all Indians in the country. In the course of Treaty One negotiations, Governor Archibald promised to “deal fairly with those of the setting sun, just as she would with those of the rising sun ... she (Queen) will not do less for you”.... [E]astern bands were already receiving substantial medical aid at the time Treaty One was signed, without treaty stipulation. However, it was a pay as you can policy.106

Medical Services, 1871-75
Within months of the execution of Treaty 1, and in the context of Archibald’s repeated complaints about Wemyss Simpson’s neglect of his responsibilities as Indian Commissioner, Howe provided Archibald with $330 on February 27, 1872, for contingent expenses that might arise in assisting needy Indians during the winter of 1871-72:

You will apply this money for the relief of such aged, poor or sick Indians as may require aid throughout the winter. It is the policy of the Canadian Government not to encourage pauperism but industry among the Indians, and in future the larger portion of the funds will be expended with a view to encourage them to self-exertion and permanent improvement.107

Nevertheless, seven months later, on September 6, 1872, on receiving the delegation from the “Pembina bands” seeking to enforce what they understood to be the terms of Treaty 1, Indian Agent Molyneux St John, as we have seen, advised the Indians that they “[m]ust take care of their own sick.”108 In subsequent months, prompted by the Reverend Henry Cochrane’s request for “medical assistance for the indigent poor”109 and John Schultz’s delivery of the Prince affidavit claiming “medical aid” as a treaty promise,110 Howe sought, on February 8, 1873, to be briefed on “promises of Medical Attend-
ance if any” made to the Indians during the negotiation of Treaty 1. 111 On March 1, 1873 – just five days after reporting his advice to the Pembina bands during the preceding September that they were to care for their own sick – St John responded to Howe that he did not recall a treaty promise of medical aid and had “never heard the subject mentioned until the receipt of your letter.” 112

Within two weeks, Deputy Superintendent William Spragge issued his March 14, 1873, proposal “to extend to Manitoba and the North West Territories the system of providing medical treatment for the Indian population, which in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec has been productive of such value and satisfactory consequences.” 113 However, Smith comments that little is known about the system to which Spragge referred:

Despite extensive research no definitive statement concerning [the] government “system of providing medical treatment to the Indian population” in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec could be located for the first few decades following Confederation.

However, in his report for the year ending June 30, 1872 Howe does shed some light on the subject when he notes that:

In those Provinces (Ontario and Quebec) many of the bands ... maintain their own agents, doctors, and schoolmasters....

An examination of the Indian Branch financial statements for the years ending June 30, 1872 reveals a substantial number of cases in which costs of medicines, doctors salaries, “medical comforts” etc. were charged to individual band accounts.

It is also interesting to note that similar expenditures were made from the Indian Land Management Fund. (This was an administrative fund consisting of 10% of sales of Indian land).

In Lower Canada (Quebec) expenditures registered in 1872 for medicines, doctors salaries etc., were debited to the Lower Canada Indian Fund. (The origins of [this] trust fund which boasted a substantial amount of capital is unclear. Nevertheless it is clear that this was a “Trust Fund” which belonged “exclusively to ... and [was] employed for the benefit of the Indians of Quebec.” It was supplemented annually by legislative appropriations as was the Indian Land Management Fund and many

111 Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, to Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner, February 8, 1873, NA, RG 10, vol. 4382, item 309, reel C7407 (ICC Documents, pp. 100-1).
of the other Indian funds). In subsequent years debits to individual Quebec Band accounts occur as well. (For example see Return B, 1873 annual report)

With respect to the rest of the country disbursements for medicines, doctors etc., appear to have been made from the “Indian Fund” of each respective province or territory. [Deputy Superintendent General] Lawrence Vankoughnet explains in his annual report for 1876 that:

The funds employed in the Indian Service, in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, Manitoba and in the North West Territories are provided by Legislative appropriations, with the exception of certain insignificant amounts, in the case of some of those Provinces, which have accumulated from the sale or lease of small tracts of land, or from Timber dues. (p. 4 1876 Annual Report).

While the amounts from such sales may have been insignificant, it is interesting to note that some such amounts were deposited to the credit of the Indian Funds (For examples, “Table F.”, Return E(3) 1873 annual report; New Brunswick Indian Fund, Return D. p. 68, June 30, 1875; Return C(2) June 30, 1876).¹¹⁴

From the returns for the year ending June 30, 1872, it seems that, although the federal government assumed responsibility for ensuring that the medical needs of the Indians were met, it dealt with these needs as “contingencies” on a case-by-case basis as they arose. It is significant that these returns were entitled “Statement of Special Payments, Contingent and Incidental Expenditures by the Indian Branch, Department of the Secretary of State for the Provinces.”

In the summer of 1873, Spragge issued his instructions to Indian Commissioner Provencher based on St John’s recommendations arising from the promises made by Archibald and Simpson. As we have seen, those instructions included the stipulation that “[m]edicines for the sick will be provided,”¹¹⁵ with regard to which the First Nation commented in its initial claim submission:


Following Spragge’s instructions of July 1873, in the fiscal year July 1, 1873 to June 30, 1874, the records of the Department for the superintendency of Manitoba and the North West Territories indicate an expenditure of $71.00 paid to A. Jackes, M.D. The following fiscal year, $227.00 was expended by the Department for medical services and medicines in Manitoba and the North West Territories. In that same year (July 1, 1874 to June 30, 1875), Provencher’s report indicates that he sent a doctor to St. Peter’s reserve, and would have sent one to Fort Alexander, had he heard about a measles epidemic sooner. [Frances Foley Smith notes that the figure was $527.99 for 1875–76.116]

What is noteworthy is that these expenditures took place before the “revision” of Treaty One in 1875. (This took place mostly in August and September of 1875, and was not agreed to by the last band until 1876.) So we see that the Department acknowledged its obligation to provide medical care and implemented this before the matter of outside promises was settled in 1875.117

However, although the Commission concurs with the First Nation that Canada provided medical care in the interval between the execution of Treaty 1 in 1871 and its amendment in 1875, it also appears that medical services were delivered even before Treaty 1 in both Manitoba and other parts of Canada.

For its part, Canada did not consider Spragge’s directive to Provencher in 1873 to have finally settled the question of medical aid. In March 1874, the Board of Indian Commissioners, established to devise a solution to the broader problem of the outside promises, issued its recommendation that, among other things, “[a] supply of simple medicines ... be provided for each Reserve, and placed in the custody of some suitable person.”118 Ultimately, as we have seen, the board’s recommendations were not adopted, and, on April 22, 1875 – just five days before delivering his own recommendation that formed the basis for the amendment of Treaties 1 and 2 – the Minister of the Interior, David Laird, made $500 available immediately to deal with “contingencies,” including medical aid, in a manner strikingly reminiscent of Howe’s instructions to Archibald three years previously:

The sum of $500 will be placed at your disposal for such expenses (of a purely contingent nature) as you may be called on to meet: it must be distinctly understood, however, that this sum is not to be used in the payment of accounts for articles hereinbefore enumerated.

118 Minutes of a meeting of the Board of Indian Commissioners, March 13, 1874, NA, RG 10, vol. 3608, file 3117, reel C10105 (ICC Documents, p. 138).
You will render a statement of its expenditure quarterly, and will take care always to apply for an additional sum before that in hand is exhausted. It is considered that $2000 a year will be amply sufficient to cover every possible contingent expense and you will [illegible] not exceed the expenditure of $500 per quarter without having first obtained authority for so doing. From the funds thus placed at your disposal you will, when necessary, extend aid to indigent, sick or aged Indians, pay each small gratuities as you may be called on to give from time to time, and make such other payments as need not be referred for approval to headquarters.119

Medical Services after the 1875 Amendment of Treaty 1
Following the treaty amendment late in the summer of 1875, Provencher reported on the “general feeling of satisfaction and of contentment” that had come to prevail in relations between the Indians and the government. He commented on the importance of the amendment, surmising that ongoing bad feelings could have affected “the advancement of the country” and might have led to a decrease in immigration, “to which so much importance is attached.” To avoid future complaints and problems, he “authorized the incurring of certain expenses to which the Government was not strictly held, but which were necessitated by the apprehensions already alluded to.”120 According to Frances Foley Smith, “[w]hile he [Provencher] did not particularize these expenses at the time, his accounts for Treaty One provisions in 1876 included payments for ‘Dr. Lynch’s services’ and ‘medical comforts.’”121 Provencher noted that there was “no regular tariff concerning the payment of medical men,” but he did not consider Lynch’s charges to the government of $25 per day to be excessive “when over thirty houses are entered, over fifty persons examined, and twenty prescriptions given.”122

In the fall of 1876, another outbreak of smallpox claimed hundreds of Indians residing on the west shore of Lake Winnipeg. Provencher reported that, had the government not taken immediate steps to implement quarantines and provide medical assistance, the toll likely would have numbered in the thousands. He added that, “[t]hough the greatest economy was used in the measures taken in that emergency, unexpected and unprovided for expenses had to be incurred, made larger still by the distances over which

119 David Laird, Minister of the Interior, to unidentified recipient, April 22, 1875 (ICC Documents, p. 147).
120 J.A.N. Provencher, Indian Commissioner, to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, October 30, 1875, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1875, p. 32 (ICC Documents, p. 178).
goods had to be transported during the winter, by the difficulties of communications that did not allow an immediate verification of the reports circulated, and by the absolute necessity of not remaining below the exigencies of the case, as the lives of hundreds depended on the proper steps being immediately taken.”

During the winter of 1876–77, Indian Agent H. Martineau arranged for the vaccination of those Indians on the Roseau River reserve who had not been vaccinated with the rest of the Band in 1875. In his report to Provencher on February 26, 1877, he requested that “help in the shape of provisions” be provided to some 35 band members who were “invalids and old people rendered helpless by old age and failing health.” Although Martineau’s letter did not expressly ask for medical assistance, Provencher advised the Minister of the Interior that “provisions, ammunition and medicines” had been sent to Roseau River in accordance with Martineau’s requisition. Still, despite the provision of these medicines, it is apparent from a report by missionary John Scott that band members had not yet received the regular services of a doctor:

One thing I ought not forget to mention, it is the great need of a house or place in which blind, sick and infirm Indians can be cared for. Things needed by the sick they can seldom get. They have no doctor to visit them and when taken sick their case is often hopeless from want of attention, nourishment and aid. I hope that Government will give them their kind consideration.

Provencher, in his new role as Acting Superintendent of the Manitoba Superintendency, agreed in a letter of November 17, 1877, to the Minister of the Interior that the Indians of Manitoba needed a more formalized system of medical assistance:

There are now, in that Superintendency, so many Indians altogether unable to earn their life on account of sickness, old age or infirmities, and without relations to take care of them, that I believe it is necessary that the government should provide for them some more permanent system of relief.

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126 John Scott, Presbyterian missionary, to unidentified recipient, March 27, 1877, DIAND, THRC file, Treaty 1, Roseau River 2 (ICC Documents, pp. 199–202).
These people can hardly be admitted in the existing hospitals, because the system followed in these establishments could not conveniently accommodate them, and because they would be an unbearable source of annoyance to the other patients; moreover it is considered that your Department alone is responsible for the keeping of the Indians and for all the expenses connected with it.

I have reason to believe that if only a suitable building of a cheap character, was supplied by your Department, with the quantity of provisions that must be, anyway, given to the poor, sick and needy Indians, some persons could be found to supply the necessary attendance without further expense.

I have the honor to recommend this proposal to your favorable consideration, as I understand that it is not only a question of ordinary administration or policy but of humanity.127

It is notable that Dr Daniel Hagerty was also appointed in 1877 to implement a comprehensive program of vaccinating the Indians of the North-West Territories to prevent the spread of smallpox.128

However, based on the record assembled for this inquiry, it seems clear that, into the late 1880s, the Indians of Roseau River’s agency and other Manitoba agencies were still not receiving regular medical visits. In 1887, the Indian Agent at Clandeboyne, Manitoba, advised E. McColl, Manitoba’s Inspector of Indian Agencies, that “the death rate amongst the Bands is no greater than it was years ago, and now whenever it is required a Medical man is sent to them.”129 Two years later, in 1889, Indian Agent Francis Ogletree of the Portage la Prairie Agency explained to McColl why he had not complied with the department’s requirements for vaccinating the Indians of his agency:

making the payments it will be impossible to ever get the Indians together at any other

time.130

Ogletree advised McColl that 232 Indians in his agency had been vaccinated in 1885 and 1886, including three members of the Roseau River Band. He added that, "as it is considered advisable to vaccinate every seven years
and as it is now nearly seven years since the Indians of my Agency have been
vaccinated and if the Department sees fit to instruct me to see that the operation
of vaccinating all the Indians within the limits of my Agency is carried
out I will do all that is in my power to have it done, but unless it is done at
the time of making the payments of annuities, it will be a useless expense to
send a Dr. as very few of them can be found on the Reserves at any other
time."131 Nevertheless, the implication of the correspondence from Ogletree
and his counterpart at Clandeboy is that, while physicians could be made
available when circumstances required, they did not make regular visits to
the reserves and some of their usual functions, such as vaccinations, were
routinely carried out by the agents. In addition, a few documents provide
glimpses of requests being made of various Indian agents in Manitoba and
elsewhere to obtain medical assistance for Indians in need,132 with approval
being given in one Ontario case to having the costs of assistance charged
back to the band.133

In 1892, McColl advised Deputy Superintendent General Vankoughnet that
some Manitoba bands had been pressing for the services of a physician:

Both Mr. Martineau and Mr. MacKay represented to me unofficially that the Indi-

ans had spoken to them about the necessity of a medical man being sent out to them

130 Francis Ogletree, Indian Agent, to E. McColl, Inspector of Indian Agencies, Manitoba Superintendency, November

131 Francis Ogletree, Indian Agent, to E. McColl, Inspector of Indian Agencies, Manitoba Superintendency, November

132 Thomas Boshi, Chief, to R. Donnelly, Indian Agent, Port Arthur, November 1886, NA, RG 10, vol. 2359, file
72642, reel C-10104 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 47); R. Donnelly, Indian Agent, Port Arthur, to Superintendent General
of Indian Affairs, November 15, 1886, NA, RG 10, vol. 2359, file 72642, reel C-10104 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 48);
Resolution of Chippewa Council of Walpole Island, March 4, 1887, NA, RG 10, vol. 2372, file 75238, reel C-
11210 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 49); Chiefs, St Francis Indian Village, to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs,
February 28, 1890, NA, RG 10, vol. 2501, file 103957, reel C-11230 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 50); Chiefs, St Francis
Indian Village, to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, February 28, 1890, NA, RG 10, vol. 2501, file
103957, reel C-11230 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 51); J.W. Jermyn, Indian Agent, to Lawrence Vankoughnet, Deputy
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, June 28, 1890, NA, RG 10, vol. 2524, file 106266, reel C-11232 (ICC
Documents, p. 52); T. Walton, Indian Agent, to Lawrence Vankoughnet, Deputy Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs, May 16, 1890, NA, RG 10, vol. 2516, file 106266, reel C-11232 (ICC Documents, p. 52).

133 R. Donnelly, Indian Agent, Port Arthur, to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, November 15, 1886, NA, RG
10, vol. 2359, file 72642, reel C-10104 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 48).
to prescribe for their sick. There is no doubt but what these Indians are of as much
need of medical treatment as those who are favored with the benefits of such officers.

It appears to me that some cheaper means might be devised in supplying the
Indians of Messrs. Ogletree, MacKay, Reader and Martineau with the requisite medical
services than by the payment of ten dollars per day with travelling expenses. It would
be less expensive to increase the salary of Dr. Orton to an amount commensurate with
his services and have him to make annual visits to as many reserves as he could
during the year, and then only his travelling expenses beyond his salary would be
required to be paid, whereas under the present system the ten dollars a day will
amount to a considerable sum more than double his present salary if he makes an
annual visit to the above mentioned Indians whom I assume require his services as
much as those whom he visits frequently.134

In a marginal note on McColl’s letter, Vankoughnet remarked that the
department should look into different arrangements for these agencies,
including that of Francis Ogletree, the Indian Agent responsible for the
Roseau River Band:

... if Dr. Orton should be again employed to visit Ind[ian]s outside of his district
proper an arrangement must be previously made that his partner is to attend the
Ind[ian]s of the latter [section] without extra charge. In the meantime it would be
well to ascertain & report whether medical men living nearer to the Reserves in
[Messrs.] Ogletree, Martineau and McKay’s Agencies could not be employed at less
expense & with greater advantage to the Indians & attend on the latter when required
or to make annual visitations to the Reserve than Dr. Orton’s annual visits entail.135

Clearly, by 1889, some arrangement was in place for Dr Orton to make occa-
sional visits to the reserves, but the bands and their agents did not believe
that this service was sufficient. The record does not disclose, however, the
accounts to which such services were charged.

Orton visited the Roseau River reserves with McColl in 1892 and, like
Ogletree in previous years, met with resistance to the government’s desire to
have band members vaccinated:

My visit to medically inspect the Reserves in the Agency of Angus McKay Esq.
having prevented me from going to vaccinate the Indians of the Roseau Reserve at

134 E. McColl, Inspector of Indian Agencies, Manitoba Superintendency, to Lawrence Vankoughnet, Deputy Superin-
tendent General of Indian Affairs, November 14, 1889, NA, RG 10, vol. 3851, file 76261-4 (ICC Documents,
pp. 230–31). The second paragraph of this quotation is from an additional page of the document which the
parties did not submit with their evidence, but which the Commission has considered in this inquiry.
135 E. McColl, Inspector of Indian Agencies, Manitoba Superintendency, to Lawrence Vankoughnet, Deputy Superin-
tendent General of Indian Affairs, November 14, 1889, NA, RG 10, vol. 3851, file 76261-4 (ICC Documents,
p. 231).
treaty time as instructed by the Department & learning that the Indians at the Rapids had positively refused to be vaccinated by Mr. Agent Ogletree as well as that many vaccinated by him at mouth of River had failed, I decided it was my duty to visit the Reserve in company with Mr. Inspector McColl & use my best endeavors to vaccinate them all. At the mouth of the River portion of the reserve I found that only one or two of all vaccinated by Mr. Ogletree had succeeded, so I vaccinated all we could find 27 in number. I also prescribed and compounded medicines for a number of sick to their great satisfaction. We then proceeded to the reserve at the Rapids up the Roseau some 30 miles. We here found but few on the Reserve, many having gone to gather ginger root. Notwithstanding all my persuasive efforts aided by Mr. McColl, those on the Reserve refused positively to be vaccinated. The Chief had taken a determined stand on the subject & they curiously mixed up vaccination with some proposal of the Department to retract the supply of food at treaty time & some demands they made for implements [illegible] by stating that faith had not been kept with them & that they might as well die of small pox as be left without the means of making a living & starving to death.136

Ten years later, in a December 1902 meeting with the Roseau River Band, Indian Commissioner David Laird encouraged the surrender of a portion of the Band’s reserve so that its members would have funds to acquire horses, farming implements, food, and other things “to help them to live.” In the course of that meeting, Laird discovered that the Band was dissatisfied with its medical service. The primary complaint appeared to be that, although the designated doctor was a “good” one and lived close to the reserve, he would not visit when requested by band members because the Indian Agent would not authorize him to do so.137 When Laird asked Marlatt, the Inspector of Indian Agencies, in a letter of December 24, 1902, to determine why the doctor would not attend to sick Indians,138 Marlatt replied on December 26, 1902:

Regarding the Doctor not attending sick Indians, the Doctor receives $80.00 per annum for attending the two reserves, for this amount he will not visit them every time they may request, unless for extra pay, he attends to all cases at his office, which is only five miles distant from the principal reserve, he also visits the reserves when he is in the vicinity, he is very kind to them and I have had no complaints from the Indians about lack of attention, in cases where he expects extra pay I have instructed

137 Interview between David Laird, Indian Commissioner, and Councillors Seeenee (Cyril) and Szhawisgokesick (Martin Adam) of the Roseau River Band, December 23, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3565, file 82, pt 29, reel C-10100 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 62–63).
him not to go, unless instructed by Mr. Ginn, and Mr. Ginn has been instructed to send the doctor out when he considers it necessary.

I would like to say for the Doctor that he has done very much for the Indians considering the remuneration received, he has had several severe surgical cases, and has been successful in treating them, Councillor Seenee forgot to tell you that he pulled himself, and son, through the typhoid fever a little over a year ago, visiting them nearly every day for three weeks.139

Ultimately, just over a month later, on January 30, 1903, the Band surrendered a portion of the reserve.

In the years following the surrender, proceeds from the sale of the surrendered lands were received by Indian Affairs and deposited to the credit of the Band. As Public History Inc. notes in its report prepared for this inquiry, before 1906 the proceeds were, on some occasions, deposited in trust into the Band’s capital account and, on other occasions, split between the capital and interest trust accounts.140 However, Superintendent General Frank Oliver commented in 1906 that, during the surrender negotiations, the Band had been led to understand that “a considerable amount of interest [would be] available for distribution,” and it therefore became necessary to direct all interest accruals into the Band’s interest account:

This statement was made without knowledge of the fact that the Department of Indian Affairs has for very many years capitalized the interest on these deferred payments as well as the principal sum. This practice was doubtless adopted in what was considered the best interests of the Indians as it would tend to build their capital funds and render unnecessary the distribution of relatively large sums of interest which had been found to be of no particular benefit, and, in some respects, to be a positive detriment to the welfare of the Indians. On the other hand the building up of capital which might, from time to time, be used in permanent improvements on the reserves would better conserve the interests of those interested in the fund.... The Department now finds itself in the position of being unable to make good the statement made at the time of the surrender, and the Indians of the Rosseau [sic] River Band are, therefore, in a state of dissatisfaction and threaten to re-possess themselves of the lands, which have been sold, unless the estimated payments of interest are forthcoming. Under these circumstances, and as it appears good policy to keep faith with these Indians, the undersigned would recommend that an advance of $2,000.00 each year for the next three years during the first week in April should be distributed, per capita, to these Indians in satisfaction of the statement made in good faith by the


officer who took the surrender, and that, as the normal interest on the capital invested by the ordinary usage of the Department would not produce a sufficient amount to repay this advance, that in this instance alone a division should be made between the amounts received as principal and interest on land payments and that the interest should be added to the ordinary interest or current account. As the whole amount of the land transactions amounts to $82,000.00, and as there is a balance now in the account of $4,177.94, it would appear that the proposed arrangement can be carried out.\footnote{Frank Oliver, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to Governor General in Council, February 21, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3731, file 26306-2, reel C-10127 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 88–90).}

A complete record of the Band’s interest account from 1902 to 1945 is set forth in the table attached as Appendix B to this report. That table shows that the revenues in the Band’s interest account were relatively meagre in 1906–7 and in the preceding fiscal years, but rose sharply in 1907–8 and, with few exceptions, remained high for the years reported to 1944–45. In the words of Public History Inc., these figures demonstrate “the dramatic effect that the land sales revenue had on the account.”\footnote{Public History Inc., “Roseau River First Nation Medical Aid Claim, 1902–1945: Historical Report,” May 12, 1998, p. 10 (ICC Exhibit 4).} More significant for the purposes of this inquiry, however, is the fact that the federal government began to deduct from this account for medical assistance in 1909–10 and, with the exception of four years – 1915–16, 1916–17, 1920–21, and 1929–30 – continued making these deductions until 1933–34. By the Commission’s tally, the deductions included $1,149.32 for medicines, drugs, and medical supplies, $2,467.36 for physicians’ services, and $430.70 for hospitalization expenses and other charges. These amounts totalled $4,047.38 over the 25-year period, but the First Nation claims that, when these figures are present-valued by applying the interest rates in effect to the amounts outstanding from time to time – and subject to some minor revisions to the numbers as noted in Appendix B – the total sum owing as of March 31, 1981, was $133,078.22.\footnote{Roger Townshend, “Roseau River Indian Band Claim for Compensation Arising from Management of Band Funds, Specifically, Band Funds Used to Pay for Medical Care, 1909–1934” (Winnipeg: Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Manitoba, September 1981), pp. 10 and 40 (ICC Exhibit 1).}

The record contains very little evidence regarding the provision of medical services to the Roseau River Band after 1906. A “Medical List” for 1912 indicates that Dr D.B. Houston was paid $80 per year to “attend Roseau Riv[er] Ind[ian]s,” together with “$5.00 a trip for visiting Roseau Riv[er] Reserve and $10 a trip to Roseau Rapids.”\footnote{G.M. Matheson, “Medical List,” revised to October 16, 1912, NA, RG 10, vol. 997, file “Medical Lists, c. 1912,” reel T-1454 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 110–11).} This arrangement, as we have
seen, appears to be similar to the one described by Inspector Marlatt to Indian Commissioner Laird in 1902 in the days leading up to the 1903 surrender.\textsuperscript{145} With regard to the policy to be applied when dealing with Indian patients as opposed to non-aboriginals, the Assistant Deputy and Secretary of Indian Affairs sought the advice of O.I. Grain, the Chief Medical Officer for Indians, in 1915 in connection with an invoice of $100 submitted by a Dr Hassard for an operation on an Indian named John Roberts:

I beg to say that you should not lose sight of the fact that the Department does not pay for operations upon Indians at the same rate as would be charged to White people in fair circumstances. When doctors operate upon Indians they should do so upon the understanding that their charges are to be the same as is made to the poorest class of Whites. They should also bear in mind that their accounts will be promptly paid when a reasonable fee is charged. In ordinary practice they may have to take into consideration the question that their accounts in some cases will not be paid, but such is not the case when they work for the Department.\textsuperscript{146}

Similar sentiments were expressed by Indian Commissioner William Graham in 1921 regarding a suggested flat fee of $15 for “confinements”: “I am aware that this is smaller than the fees usually charged by medical men when attending white women, but I think the fact that the Doctor will incur no bad debts in his practice among the Indians, providing the accounts incurred have been authorized by the Indian Agent, is sufficient reason for the payment of the fee of $15.00 suggested for confinement cases.”\textsuperscript{147}

Ultimately, as we have noted, the deductions for medical aid from Roseau River’s interest account ceased in 1934, but there is no explanation why this change occurred. There is no evidence that the deductions stopped at the Band’s request. During the period in which deductions were made, medical services were provided by Canada in response to appeals from the Band to alleviate the suffering of its members, but there is no evidence before the Commission to suggest that the Band ever asked to have charges for medical aid deducted from its interest account or that it even knew at the time that

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{145} S.R. Marlatt, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, December 26, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3565, file 82, pt 29, reel C-10100 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 67).
\textsuperscript{146} Assistant Deputy and Secretary to O.I. Grain, Chief Medical Officer for Indians, December 20, 1915, NA, RG 10, vol. 4076, file 451868, reel C-10127 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 118-19).
\textsuperscript{147} William Graham, Indian Commissioner, to unknown recipient, in “Medical List,” revised to August 1921, NA, RG 10, vol. 998, file “Medical Lists, 1921,” reel T-1454-5 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 136).}
such deductions were being made. In fact, during the community session conducted at the Roseau River reserve on July 14, 1998, elder Oliver Nelson commented that the First Nation did not discover the deductions until it conducted the background research for its 1982 claim arising out of the 1903 surrender.

In the years preceding and following the 25-year period during which the government made the deductions, there is no record of any payments for medical purposes being made by or for the Band from its interest trust account. Moreover, although limited evidence of parliamentary appropriations has been placed in evidence before the Commission, there is no evidence to show what portions of those appropriations, if any, were spent at Roseau River.
PART III

ISSUES

The essence of this inquiry is whether Canada is lawfully obliged to compensate Roseau River for deducting payments for medical aid from the Band’s interest account between 1909 and 1934. Although the parties have not provided the Commission with an agreed list of issues, the submissions before us can be summarized in the following four questions:

1. Did the terms of Treaty 1 include a promise to provide “medical aid” and, if so, has that promise survived the 1875 amendment to the treaty?

2. Did the deductions constitute a breach of any statutory provision by Canada?

3. Did Canada breach the terms of the 1903 surrender by deducting amounts for medical aid from the Band’s interest account?

4. Did Canada induce Roseau River to rely on free medical aid to the detriment of the Band’s own traditional healing methods, and, if so, does Canada owe Roseau River a lawful obligation for unilaterally withdrawing medical aid by charging medical expenses to the Band’s trust account from 1909 to 1934?

We turn now to our analysis.
PART IV

ANALYSIS

Roseau River claims that Canada owes it a lawful obligation by virtue of the deductions made from the First Nation’s interest account for medical aid between 1909 and 1934. Although the First Nation argues four separate bases for its claim – breach of treaty promise, breach of the Indian Act, breach of the terms of the 1903 surrender, and detrimental reliance – it acknowledges as a preliminary matter that, should the Commission find that the claim is valid solely on the basis of breach of treaty promise, an additional level of analysis will be required. Specifically, the Commission will also have to consider the nature and scope of the treaty right – that is, whether the treaty promises made by Canada’s representatives included only drugs and medications or whether the promises were sufficiently broad to include hospitalization charges and fees for doctors’ services. Even if the treaty promise was a narrow one, the First Nation submits that, at the very least, it will be entitled to compensation for the costs of all drugs and medicines charged to its interest account, plus interest and costs. Alternatively, if the treaty promise was broadly framed, or if the claim can properly be upheld on one of the remaining three bases, the First Nation contends that it is entitled to be compensated for all the deductions made, together with interest and costs.151

For its part, Canada takes the position that it has always provided medical aid to aboriginal peoples as a matter of policy and that it has no lawful obligation to do so pursuant to Treaty 1. Should the Commission conclude that the treaty did give rise to an obligation to provide medical aid, however, Canada argues that the obligation was effectively settled by the 1875 amendment to the treaty. Ultimately, in Canada’s submission, it has breached no statutory, fiduciary, or other duty, since it was authorized by statute to make deductions as it did to provide medical aid to the Band.152

After having invested considerable time and effort to assess the parties’ submissions, the members of the present panel of the Indian Claims Commission make similar recommendations regarding the overall disposition of the claim, although we follow quite different paths to reach that end. In the view of Commissioner Bellegarde, Treaty 1 created a treaty obligation to provide medical aid; therefore, Canada’s deductions from Roseau River’s interest account between 1909 and 1934 were improper and give rise to an outstanding lawful obligation on Canada’s part. By way of contrast, Commissioner Corcoran concludes that the deductions did not trigger any lawful obligations stemming from the treaty, the Indian Act, or the 1903 surrender, and did not precipitate a claim based on detrimental reliance. She finds, nonetheless, that the claim should be accepted for negotiation on the basis that, while Canada’s policy may have been correctly implemented, the outcome for the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation is unfair.

The implications of this inquiry extend far beyond the circumstances of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation and the territorial limits of Treaty 1. As can be seen from a paper entitled “Indian Health Care in Alberta: An Historical Study,” prepared in 1979 by Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research of the Indian Association of Alberta, the question of medical aid as a treaty right has spawned an ongoing debate involving not only Canada and First Nations but also those provincial governments to which Canada has looked in later years to shoulder at least part of the burden of Indian health care. We are also aware that Saskatchewan’s Office of the Treaty Commissioner has recently launched an examination of treaty rights to health benefits which will span no fewer than five treaty areas. As a panel, we believe that the subject of medical aid is worthy of a comprehensive review by both Canada and First Nations to give additional definition to the parties’ intentions in the negotiation of the various treaties and in their subsequent dealings.

Be that as it may, we must address the case before us on the evidence as presented. Subject to reserving the right to reconsider our opinions in the event that a broader-ranging inquiry should disclose new information, we turn first to the reasons of Commissioner Bellegarde, followed by those of Commissioner Corcoran.

Before doing so, however, there is one final preliminary matter to be addressed. Following the hearing, but before the Commission issued this

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report, former Commissioner Elijah Harper, who was a member of the panel, resigned from the Commission. Although Mr Harper is no longer in a position to be able to sign this report as a member of the Commission, Commissioners Bellegarde and Corcoran wish to recognize his involvement in the extensive deliberations that went into creating this report and believe it is important to acknowledge his strong concurrence with the reasons of Commissioner Bellegarde.

REASONS OF COMMISSIONER BELLEGARDE

The Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation claims that an outstanding lawful obligation is owed to it under the terms of the Specific Claims Policy on one or more of four grounds: breach of treaty promise, breach of section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act, breach of the terms of the 1903 surrender, and detrimental reliance. By way of introduction, I do not consider it necessary to consider the issues relating to the Indian Act or the 1903 surrender. Because I conclude that Canada had an obligation under Treaty 1 to provide medical aid to Roseau River and the other signatories to that sacred instrument, it does not matter whether the legislation or the surrender were broad enough to permit an interpretation that would allow the deductions made by Canada from the First Nation’s interest trust account between 1909 and 1934. Since medical aid was a treaty right, there was no possible basis for Canada to justify making the deductions without contravening that right. Furthermore, it is also unnecessary to consider the First Nation’s arguments based on detrimental reliance, since these arguments were framed in the alternative, assuming the Commission were to conclude that medical aid did not amount to a treaty promise.

I will now elaborate on my conclusions that Canada promised medical aid under Treaty 1 and that the deductions for medical aid constituted a breach of treaty.

Breach of Treaty Promise
Did the terms of Treaty 1 include a promise to provide “medical aid” and, if so, has that promise survived the 1875 amendment to the treaty?

Treaty 1
Canada and the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation agree that the negotiations preceding Treaty 1 spawned a great deal of confusion regarding the
terms of the treaty. Where the parties differ is with respect to the legal significance of that confusion.

Roseau River initially takes the position that, although the written text of Treaty 1 did not include medical aid as one of its terms, the evidence indicates that medical aid did constitute one of the verbal promises made during the treaty negotiations. Elder Oliver Nelson testified at length about Canada’s oral commitments as recorded by the promise keeper, Assiniwinin. In addition, counsel sets forth a number of bases on which he submits that the documentary record before us supports the conclusion that medical aid was a treaty promise:

- The Prince affidavit, coming so soon after the parties had signed Treaty 1 and being sworn subject to the penal consequences associated with preparing a false affidavit, demonstrates the Indian understanding that the treaty promises included “medicines for the sick.” In counsel’s view, given Lieutenant Governor Archibald’s comments regarding the “astonishing accuracy” of the Indians’ recollections and Indian Agent Molyneux St John’s statement regarding the consistency of those recollections from band to band, nothing in the record of this inquiry carries the weight of this affidavit, and in such circumstances a judge would be compelled to accept that evidence.

- St John acknowledged that “[the] Treaty was signed, the Commissioner meaning one thing, the Indians another.” Given this fact, principles of treaty interpretation – in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sioui – direct the Commission, in the First Nation’s submission, to construe the treaty not according to the technical meaning of its words but in the sense that it would be naturally understood by the

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Counsel argues that such an interpretation would permit the Commission to conclude that the promise of medical aid amounted to a term of the treaty, notwithstanding that the promise existed outside the scope of the treaty document, because that document recorded merely a part of the treaty. Since it was the function of Indian Commissioner Wemyss Simpson to record the content of the treaty, the responsibility for the confusion should rest, according to the First Nation, at the feet of Simpson and Canada.

- Although St John in his letter of March 1, 1873, could not recall a promise of medical aid being made during the Treaty 1 negotiations and claimed to “have never heard the subject mentioned” until he received Joseph Howe’s letter of February 8, 1873, counsel for the First Nation notes that St John did not deny that such a promise had been made. Indeed, to the contrary, counsel suggests that St John’s statement was inconsistent with the earlier Prince affidavit. Similarly, in the First Nation’s 1981 submission, Roger Townshend argued that, in making this statement, St John contradicted his own letter of February 24, 1873 – just five days previously – in which he described the demands of the Pembina bands for “(among other things) medical care, as arising from the promises made at the treaty.”

Moreover, counsel contends that St John’s particularization of the treaty promises must have included medical aid, since Deputy Superintendent Spragge later noted that, as the government intended to comply with St John’s recommendation, “[a]ccordingly, the following may be purchased and delivered when the parties are prepared to receive them:... Medicines for the sick will be provided.”

- Given in the wake of input from Simpson, St John, and the deponents of the Prince affidavit, Spragge’s direction to Provencher to provide “medicines for the sick” is, in the First Nation’s submission, the most critical piece of...
evidence in support of the conclusion that Spragge himself must have considered medical aid to constitute one of the treaty promises.\textsuperscript{168} According to counsel, there was nothing in Spragge’s letter to suggest that medical aid was something new, provided simply as a matter of the government’s benevolence or policy, while other matters—such as animals and implements, which formed the context for Spragge’s direction to provide medical aid—comprised treaty promises.\textsuperscript{169}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Roseau River considers the inquiry by the Board of Commissioners in 1874 as the best, if not the only, real opportunity to reconcile the differing views regarding the nature and extent of the outside promises, given that the participants in the treaty-making process remained alive and well and were accessible to the board.\textsuperscript{170} The findings of that board, in counsel’s submission, although not recognizing the promises as claimed in their entirety, nevertheless support the conclusion that promises were made outside the scope of the written treaty and that some of those promises, such as a supply of simple medicines, should be provided to resolve Indian discontent.\textsuperscript{171} The board’s findings also confirmed Spragge’s instruction that medical assistance amounted to a treaty promise. Therefore, according to counsel, the Commission should afford those findings considerable weight and, like an appellate court, should be reluctant to disturb those findings and to substitute its own conclusions.\textsuperscript{172}

  \item Nevertheless, the First Nation argues that the findings of the Board of Commissioners constituted mere recommendations, had no legal effect, and were irrelevant in any event because, by the time the board convened, Spragge had already issued his directive to Provencher to provide medical aid. Therefore, by 1873, Canada had acknowledged a treaty right to medical aid and that treaty right was being implemented; in counsel’s words, “as a matter of law, medical aid is already an acknowledged right pursuant to Treaty #1 and is no longer ‘outside’.”\textsuperscript{173}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{169} ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 22 and 27 (Rhys Jones).
\textsuperscript{171} Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{173} Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, pp. 36–37, 40–41, and 43.
Once it is accepted that a promise of medical aid had been made, the First Nation submits that the promise was enforceable from that point forward and could not be extinguished, surrendered, or waived except in accordance with principles of law relating to the termination of treaty rights. Furthermore, once it is conceded that Roseau River had a treaty right to medical aid, then “as a matter of logic” it became improper for Canada to use a statutory authority – if such an authority existed at all – to make deductions for medical aid from the First Nation’s trust account.

For its part, Canada contends that Treaty 1 on its face is silent on the question of medical aid, although counsel acknowledges the confusion surrounding the outside promises. However, Canada submits that the confusion does not arise simply by virtue of one party advocating that medical aid was an outside promise and the other denying it; rather, there were differences within the two camps themselves. For example, although the Prince affidavit clearly makes reference to medical aid, it is contradicted, in Canada’s view, by Prince’s earlier account of the treaty negotiations – signed by “four of the seven Chiefs who were parties to the Treaty” – that makes no mention of medical aid. Canada cites other instances as well:

Aside from the affidavit, numerous other complaints of unfulfilled “outside promises” or requests for aid were made during the period of 1872-1875 by Dr. Schultz, a medical practitioner who treated the Indians, Reverend Henry Cochrane, who was present at treaty, the Chiefs of the area in petitions requesting aid, and the Chief of the Roseau River Band at a meeting with the Minister of the Interior. None of these complaints or requests for aid claimed any treaty obligation to provide medical aid. The only reference to medical aid was contained in the letter from Rev. Henry Cochrane who requested medical aid but did not claim the request was a treaty obligation, in contrast to the request he made in the same letter for a school which he did relate to the treaty.

Although the First Nation submits that St John’s reports were inconsistent and thus unreliable, Canada argues that “[a] more plausible explanation is that St. John never heard of the demand for medical aid being tied to a treaty obligation, which is consistent with what he told the Indians at the time of

177 ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 81 and 85 (Robert Winogron).
their demand.”\textsuperscript{180} Moreover, the recommendation by St John on which Spragge based his direction to Provencher in March 1873 has never been found, and Canada suggests that it is unlikely, given St John’s earlier statements, that he would have recommended supplying medical aid in fulfilment of a treaty obligation.\textsuperscript{181}

As for Spragge’s letter, counsel for Canada argues that key portions of the document are illegible and unclear, and that, contrary to the First Nation’s position, the document does not resolve the issue of medical aid or even constitute evidence that the Crown confirmed medical aid as a treaty promise.\textsuperscript{182} In particular, although the letter states that “St. John particularized the presents which it was understood that Governor Archibald & Commr. Simpson had promised should be given,”\textsuperscript{183} Canada suggests that it is not explicit who had that understanding:

Certainly, it was understood by the Indians, or at least there is some evidence of it, that medical aid was promised. It was certainly the position of some Crown officials that medical aid was not promised. St. John himself in a letter said that medical assistance is not a treaty promise and that the Indians will have to care for their own sick.\textsuperscript{184}

Canada further disputes the First Nation’s contention that, by 1873, as a result of Spragge’s letter, medical aid had ceased to be an outside promise. In counsel’s submission, when the Board of Commissioners met in 1874, its members did not admit to any of the “promises” dealt with in their recommendation, but rather considered medical aid to remain an unresolved issue and, being beyond the scope of the written treaty, an outside promise, if indeed it was promised at all. The board’s report merely recommended a solution to the problem, but the outside promises remained unsettled until the amendment of Treaty 1 in 1875.\textsuperscript{185} Canada submits that its supply of medical services before 1875 reflected government policy, based on the provisions of the Indian Act, rather than an acknowledgment of a treaty obligation, since the evidence discloses government appropriations to quell a

\textsuperscript{180} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, March 10, 1999, p. 12.


\textsuperscript{182} ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 85 and 87–88 (Robert Winogron).


\textsuperscript{184} ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 87 (Robert Winogron).

\textsuperscript{185} ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 88–89 and 91 (Robert Winogron).
smallpox outbreak even before Treaty 1 was signed. Counsel summarizes the policy in these terms:

The [statutory] provision was that where sick or disabled Indians were not provided for by the band of which they were members, the Superintendent General could furnish sufficient aid from the funds of the band for the relief of such sick or disabled Indians. The legislative scheme and administrative policy was that the Indian bands were to be primarily responsible for their own sick. If a band did not provide for its sick the department would provide assistance and, if possible, the cost of such assistance would be charged to the band. If not, appropriations would be made from general government revenue.

In my view, the question of whether there was a treaty promise of medical aid stands or falls on the events of 1871, and the circumstances between 1871 and 1875 do not serve to change the nature of that promise. It is important to have careful regard for the historical context, therefore, as well as the specific events giving rise to Treaty 1, to allow a precise identification of the nature and extent of the treaty promise of medical aid made in 1871.

At the outset, I acknowledge that there is documentary evidence both supporting and opposing medical aid as a treaty promise. Without more, I might feel uncomfortable siding with Roseau River in concluding without reservation that an obligation to provide medical aid arose under Treaty 1, but I would be equally troubled in positively deciding, as Canada proposes, that a treaty right to medical aid was not contemplated or created.

I believe, however, that the recollections of Roseau River’s “promise keeper,” Assiniwinin, as passed on to the Commission through Oliver Nelson, have the effect of breaking the deadlock in the documentary evidence. In considering this evidence, I have given careful regard to a number of cases in which the courts have been called on to consider the admissibility and weight to be accorded to the oral histories of First Nations. In 1981, MacKinnon JA of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Taylor and Williams:

Cases on Indian or aboriginal rights can never be determined in a vacuum. It is of importance to consider the history and oral traditions of the tribes concerned, and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the treaty, relied on by both parties, in


determining the treaty’s effect. Although it is not possible to remedy all of what we now perceive as past wrongs in view of the passage of time, nevertheless it is essential and in keeping with established and accepted principles that the courts not create, by a remote, isolated current view of past events, new grievances.188

Four years later, in Simon v. The Queen, former Chief Justice Dickson concluded, based on oral history, that the appellant Simon was a descendant of the Mi’kmaq (Micmac) Indians who had been party to the Treaty of 1752. In overruling the decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Dickson CJ wrote:

In my view, the appellant has established a sufficient connection with the Indian band, signatories to the Treaty of 1752. As noted earlier, this Treaty was signed by Major Jean Baptiste Cope, Chief of the Shubenacadie Micmac tribe, and three other members and delegates of the tribe. The Micmac signatories were described as inhabiting the eastern coast of Nova Scotia. The appellant admitted at trial that he was a registered Indian under the Indian Act, and was “an adult member of the Shubenacadie-Micmac Indian Band Number 02.” The appellant is, therefore, a Shubenacadie-Micmac Indian, living in the same area as the original Micmac Indian tribe, party to the Treaty of 1752.

This evidence alone, in my view, is sufficient to prove the appellant’s connection to the tribe originally covered by the Treaty. True, this evidence is not conclusive proof that the appellant is a direct descendant of the Micmac Indians covered by the Treaty of 1752. It must, however, be sufficient, for otherwise no Micmac Indian would be able to establish descendancy. The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature. To impose an impossible burden of proof would, in effect, render nugatory any right to hunt that a present day Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based on this Treaty.189

The succeeding Chief Justice, Lamer CJ, offered the following comments in R. v. Van der Peet on the manner in which the courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims:

In determining whether an aboriginal claimant has produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that her activity is an aspect of a practice, custom or tradition integral to a distinctive aboriginal culture, a court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were no written records of the practices, customs and traditions.

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188 R. v. Taylor and Williams (1982), 34 OR (2d) 360 at 364 (Ont. CA), MacKinnon JA.
engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for example, a private law torts case.190

Lamer CJ later expanded on these reasons in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia:

[Although the doctrine of aboriginal rights is a common law doctrine, aboriginal rights are truly sui generis, and demand a unique approach to the treatment of evidence which accords due weight to the perspective of aboriginal peoples. However, that accommodation must be done in a manner which does not strain “the Canadian legal and constitutional structure”.... Both the principles laid down in Van der Peet – first, that trial courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims, and second, that trial courts must interpret that evidence in the same spirit - must be understood against this background....

This appeal requires us to apply not only the first principle in Van der Peet but the second principle as well, and adapt the laws of evidence so that the aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given due weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts to come to terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, for many aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past. Given that the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act, 1982] are defined by reference to pre-contact practices or, as I will develop below, in the case of title, pre-sovereignty occupation, those histories play a crucial role in the litigation of aboriginal rights....

Many features of oral histories would count against both their admissibility and their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional approach to the rules of evidence. The most fundamental of these is their broad social role not only "as a repository of historical knowledge for a culture" but also as an expression of “the values and mores of [that] culture”: Clay McLeod, “The Oral Histories of Canada’s Northern People, Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada’s Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers of the Past” (1992), 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1276, at p. 1279. Dickson J. (as he then was) recognized as much when he stated in Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, at p. 109, that “[c]laims to aboriginal title are woven with history, legend, politics and moral obligations.” The difficulty with these features of oral histories is that they are tangential to the ultimate purpose of the fact-finding process at trial – the determination of the historical truth. Another feature of oral histories which creates difficulty is that they largely consist of out-of-court statements, passed on through an unbroken chain across the generations of a particular aboriginal nation to the present-day. These out-of-court statements are

admitted for their truth and therefore conflict with the general rule against the admissi-
ability of hearsay.

Notwithstanding the challenges created by the use of oral histories as proof of
historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evi-
dence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of histori-
cal evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical docu-
ments. This is a long-standing practice in the interpretation of treaties between the
C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 232. To quote Dickson C.J., given that most aborigi-
al societies “did not keep written records”, the failure to do so would “impose an
impossible burden of proof” on aboriginal peoples, and “render nugatory” any rights
that they have (Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 408). This process
must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.191

More recently, these principles have found expression in the majority
reasons of Binnie J in R. v. Marshall:

The trial judge’s view that the treaty obligations are all found within the four corners
of the March 10, 1760 document, albeit generously interpreted, erred in law by fail-
ing to give adequate weight to the concerns and perspective of the Mi’kmaq people,
despite the recorded history of the negotiations, and by giving excessive weight to the
concerns and perspective of the British, who held the pen. (See Badger, at para. 41,
and Sioui, at p. 1036.) The need to give balanced weight to the aboriginal perspective
is equally applied in aboriginal rights cases: Van der Peet, at paras. 49–50; Del-
gamuukw, at para. 81.

While the trial judge drew positive implications from the negative trade clause
(reversed on this point by the Court of Appeal), such limited relief is inadequate
where the British-drafted treaty document does not accord with the British-drafted
minutes of the negotiating sessions and more favourable terms are evident from the
other documents and evidence the trial judge regarded as reliable. Such an overly
deerential attitude to the March 10, 1760 document was inconsistent with a proper
recognition of the difficulties of proof confronted by aboriginal people, a principle
emphasized in the treaty context by Simon, at p. 408, and Badger, at para. 4, and in
the aboriginal rights context in Van der Peet, at para. 68, and Delgamuukw, at
paras. 80–82. The trial judge interrogated himself on the scope of the March 10,
1760 text. He thus asked himself the wrong question. His narrow view of what consti-
tuted “the treaty” led to the equally narrow legal conclusion that the Mi’kmaq trading
entitlement, such as it was, terminated in the 1780s. Had the trial judge not given
undue weight to the March 10, 1760 document, his conclusions might have been very
different.192

The present case is much like Simon in that the claimant is unable to offer direct proof of the question at the heart of the inquiry. There are admittedly no treaty documents to establish medical aid as a promise as of 1871. There is clear evidence, however, that Canada’s own representatives were prepared to concede that the written form of Treaty 1 submitted to Ottawa for approval by Order in Council in September of 1871 was incomplete. This evidence must be considered in the context of Oliver Nelson’s evidence regarding the role of the “promise keeper” in the meetings with Lieutenant Governor Archibald and Commissioner Simpson. As Lamer CJ stated in Delgamuukw, it is a long-standing practice in the interpretation of treaties between Canada and aboriginal peoples that this sort of oral evidence should be “accommodated and placed on an equal footing” with the documentary evidence before us.

As we have seen, Assiniwinin was specially chosen by Roseau River’s leaders to preserve the promises made during the treaty negotiations, and one of those promises was “medicines for the sick.” The vividness of Nelson’s stories of the promise keeper pounding on the table at treaty time to remind Canada’s representatives of the obligations they had incurred in 1871 remains with me. Those stories serve to corroborate and underscore the claim to aid for their sick people made by the Pembina bands to Indian Agent Molyneux St John on September 6, 1872, and, in particular, the later statement by members of the St Peter’s Band in the Prince affidavit – a sworn document attracting serious consequences if falsely declared – that they were entitled to, “on each reserve, medical aid.” Nothing in Canada’s case directly challenges the memories of Assiniwinin, and it is worth repeating Lieutenant Governor Archibald’s words in marvelling at the Indians’ recollections of their negotiations:

It is impossible to be too particular in carrying out the terms of the arrangements made with these people. They recollect with astonishing accuracy every stipulation made at the treaty, and if we expect our relations with them, to be of the kind, which it is desirable to maintain, we must fulfil our obligations with scrupulous fidelity.193

Is it appropriate to give effect to verbal promises in the face of a written treaty document in which no mention of medical assistance is made? Perhaps the most relevant consideration of this issue for the purposes of the present

inquiry can be found in the Commission’s discussion of the Pottawatomi rights claim of the Moose Deer Point First Nation. In that case, the essential question was whether promises regarding presents, land, and equality made to a council of 75 principal chiefs on Manitoulin Island by Samuel Peters Jarvis, the Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs, on behalf of Lieutenant Governor Sir Francis Bond Head, constituted a treaty. In the present case, unlike the Moose Deer Point inquiry, there is no doubt that a treaty exists, since the parties do not dispute that they had the capacity to treat, they intended to create obligations, they were engaged in proceedings that involved a measure of solemnity, and, in fact, they created mutually binding obligations. The real question is the extent of Canada’s obligation under the treaty. Nevertheless, much of the reasoning in the Moose Deer Point report relating to the existence and force of oral treaty terms applies equally in this inquiry.

In that report we found that the courts have repeatedly referred to the sui generis nature of treaties, and the unique circumstances that surround them, at times implying that an oral agreement might well constitute a treaty or part of a treaty. In R. v. Badger, for example, Cory J in the Supreme Court of Canada held that “treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had already been reached orally and they did not always record the full extent of the oral agreement.” In a separate concurring judgment, Sopinka J (Lamer CJ concurring) stated: “[T]he principles ... [of treaty interpretation] arise out of the nature of the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples[,...] with the result that whatever the document in which that relationship has been articulated, the principles should apply to the interpretation of that document.” In other words, the principles of treaty interpretation will apply to any document articulating the relationship between the Crown and Indian peoples. Based on Justice Cory’s words, the agreement exists before being recorded in written form; presumably, such an agreement, once formed, can continue to exist even if the parties fail in whole or in part to reduce it to writing, but instead record some or all of it by other means. If, in fact, the defining feature of a treaty is the substance of the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples, rather than the nature of the medium in which that relationship is articulated, then, provided the requisite conditions of treaty making are met, there would seem to

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be nothing to preclude any instrument that records that relationship from being properly construed as a treaty, whatever form that instrument may take.

Another significant case on this point is R. v. Côté, in which Baudouin JA of the Quebec Court of Appeal stated:

Concerning the proof of such treaties, the situation in aboriginal law is different from what we usually encounter. In the first place, a number of these agreements were not always reduced to writing and, in many cases, the common aboriginal custom was to acknowledge their existence through a mere exchange of wampum and to commit them to the collective memory. Furthermore, the colonizer was in most cases in a position of superiority, if only because the legal concepts used were in some cases unknown to the aboriginal people or hard to understand or grasp in their cultures. That is why the Supreme Court has established some exceptional but nevertheless precise rules in such matters, rules that are binding on the lower courts.

The first such rule is that any agreement made in principle be considered to be a true treaty even if it does not have the form of one, notwithstanding some reluctance on the part of some lower courts: see Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra. Thus any pact, alliance, agreement or arrangement may constitute a treaty within the meaning of s. 88 of the Indian Act: R. v. Simon, supra; R. v. Sioui, supra, at p. 441 et seq. As Lamer J. wrote, in Sioui (at p. 441): “... what characterizes a treaty is the intention to create obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain measure of solemnity.”...

The second such rule is that it is sometimes necessary, in the absence of a written text acknowledging the agreement, to be content with secondary evidence, of lesser quality, hearsay evidence, and thus to derogate consciously from the ordinary rules.198

It seems beyond question at this point that a treaty may exist either wholly or in part in the absence of a written instrument documenting the understandings reached by the parties in negotiating the agreement between them. In the present inquiry, these authorities mean that it is open to me to conclude that the outside promises formed part of Canada’s treaty obligation to Roseau River and the other signatory bands of Treaties 1 and 2. In fairness to Canada, it should be noted that the Crown’s representatives recognized at an early date that the government’s obligations constituted more than just the written form of Treaty 1 adopted by Order in Council on September 12, 1871.

To those who might argue that the combined effect of the documentary evidence and the promise keeper’s recollections still does not lead unequivocally to a finding that medical aid constituted an oral promise under Treaty 1, I still believe that principles of treaty interpretation direct me to such a conclusion in any event.

Having regard for the language barriers and the disparity in bargaining power that existed between the Crown and aboriginal peoples at the time of the treaty negotiations, the courts have expressed a willingness to go beyond the strict rules of interpretation developed in contract law to determine the legal effect of Indian treaties. In Badger, for example, Cory J held that uncertain treaty terms should be interpreted generously in favour of First Nations. He formulated several bases for this conclusion:

First, it must be remembered that a treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and the various Indian nations. It is an agreement whose nature is sacred. See R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at p. 1063; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 401. Second, the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Indian people. Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned. See Sparrow, supra, at pp. 1107-8 and 1114; R. v. Taylor (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 367. Third, any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of the treaty or document must be resolved in favour of the Indians. A corollary to this principle is that any limitations which restrict the rights of Indians under treaties must be narrowly construed. See Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 36; Simon, supra, at p. 402; Sioui, supra, at p. 1035; and Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, at pp. 142-43. Fourth, the onus of proving that a treaty or aboriginal right has been extinguished lies upon the Crown. There must be “strict proof of the fact of extinguishment” and evidence of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government to extinguish treaty rights. See Simon, supra, at p. 406; Sioui, supra, at p. 1061; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at p. 404.199

Later in the same judgment, in applying the foregoing principles, Cory J added:

When considering a treaty, a court must take into account the context in which the treaties were negotiated, concluded and committed to writing.... The treaties were drafted in English and by representatives of the Canadian government who, it should

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be assumed, were familiar with common law doctrines. Yet, the treaties were not translated in written form into the languages (here Cree and Dene) of the various Indian nations who were signatories. Even if they had been, it is unlikely that the Indians, who had a history of communicating only orally, would have understood them any differently. As a result, it is well settled that the words in the treaty must not be interpreted in their strict technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of construction. Rather, they must be interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by the Indians at the time of the signing. This applies, as well, to those words in a treaty which impose a limitation on the right which has been granted. See Nowegijick, supra, at p. 36; Sioui, supra, at pp. 1035–36 and 1044; Sparrow, supra, acting p. 1107; and Mitchell, supra, where La Forest J. noted the significant difference that exists between the interpretation of treaties and statutes which pertain to Indians.200

In Sioui, Lamer J set forth the basis for these conclusions, which, in his view, are rooted in the historical relationship of the Crown and the Indians:

Finally, once a valid treaty is found to exist, that treaty must in turn be given a just, broad and liberal construction. This principle, for which there is ample precedent, was recently reaffirmed in Simon. The factors underlying this rule were eloquently stated in Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), a judgment of the United States Supreme Court, and are I think just as relevant to questions involving the existence of a treaty and the capacity of the parties as they are to the interpretation of a treaty (at pp. 10–11):

In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it must always ... be borne in mind that the negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating the various technical estates known to their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them and in their own language; that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, who have no written language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.201

In R. v. Van der Peet, Lamer CJC was more explicit in attributing the generous interpretation of Indian treaties to the existence of the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians:

General Principles Applicable to Legal Disputes Between Aboriginal Peoples and the Crown

Before turning to a purposive analysis of s. 35(1), however, it should be noted that such analysis must take place in light of the general principles which apply to the legal relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. In Sparrow, supra, this Court held at p. 1106 that s. 35(1) should be given a generous and liberal interpretation in favor of aboriginal peoples:

When the purposes of the affirmation of aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is commanded. [Emphasis added.]


As for interpreting the treaty’s meaning and the nature of the rights flowing from it, the Supreme Court of Canada in Sioui, relying on the reasons of MacKinnon JA in R. v. Taylor and Williams, held that the broader historical context of a treaty is always a relevant line of inquiry. Similarly, other recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada have also concluded that such evidence is both relevant and admissible as an aid to interpretation of a treaty. In Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, after quoting from the Nowegijick case, Dickson CJ commented:

Two elements of liberal interpretation can be found in this passage: (1) ambiguities in the interpretation of treaties and statutes relating to Indians are to be resolved in favour of the Indians, and (2) aboriginal understandings of words and corresponding legal concepts in Indian treaties are to be preferred to more legalistic and technical constructions. In some cases, the two elements are indistinguishable, but in other cases the interpreter will only be able to perceive that there is an ambiguity by first invoking the second element. 203

202 R. v. Van der Peet (1996), 137 DLR (4th) 289 at 301-2 (SCC), Lamer CJ.
In other words, Dickson CJ recognized that in some cases the plain and ordinary meaning of a clause in an Indian treaty might reflect the true understanding and intentions of both the Crown and the First Nation, but in other cases a seemingly clear and unambiguous treaty provision might be entirely inconsistent with the true intentions of the parties. Therefore, a treaty interpretation that considers only the written terms of the treaty on its face might lead to unfairness if evidence of the broad historical context confirms that the aboriginal understanding of the treaty differed substantially from what government officials set out in the written treaty.

A strict application of the parol evidence rule in such cases could frustrate the ability of the courts to give legal effect to the true intentions of the parties because the understanding of aboriginal people can sometimes only be ascertained by examining evidence of the broad historical context leading up to the signing of the treaty. Therefore, when a First Nation asserts that the written terms of the treaty do not properly reflect the true understanding and intentions of the parties at the time the treaty was executed, it becomes useful to consider the oral discussions between representatives of the Crown and the First Nation and other extrinsic evidence relevant to the interpretation of the clause in question.

This interpretive approach has recently been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Marshall*. Binnie J, writing for the majority, rejected on three grounds the application of the parol evidence rule and the "narrow approach" to treaty interpretation:

Firstly, even in a modern commercial context, extrinsic evidence is available to show that a written document does not include all of the terms of an agreement. Rules of interpretation in contract law are in general more strict than those applicable to treaties, yet Professor Waddams states in *The Law of Contracts* (3rd ed. 1993), at para. 316:

> The parol evidence rule does not purport to exclude evidence designed to show whether or not the agreement has been “reduced to writing”, or whether it was, or was not, the intention of the parties that it should be the exclusive record of their agreement. Proof of this question is a pre-condition to the operation of the rule, and all relevant evidence is admissible on it. This is the

204 “Parol evidence” is essentially oral or verbal evidence, given by word of mouth, but, as a rule – known as the “parol evidence rule” – “parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary or add to or subtract from a written document”: The Canadian Law Dictionary (Toronto: Law and Business Publications, 1980), 276. “This evidence rule seeks to preserve [the] integrity of written documents by refusing to permit contracting parties to attempt to alter [the] import of their contract through use of contemporaneous oral declarations”: Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1979), 1006.
view taken by Corbin and other writers, and followed in the Second Restatement.


Secondly, even in the context of a treaty document that purports to contain all of the terms, this Court has made clear in recent cases that extrinsic evidence of the historical and cultural context of a treaty may be received even absent any ambiguity on the face of the treaty. MacKinnon A.C.J.O. laid down the principle in Taylor and Williams, supra, at p. 236:

... if there is evidence by conduct or otherwise as to how the parties understood the terms of the treaty, then such understanding and practice is of assistance in giving content to the term or terms.


Thirdly, where a treaty was concluded verbally and afterwards written up by representatives of the Crown, it would be unconscionable for the Crown to ignore the oral terms while relying on the written terms, per Dickson J. (as he then was) in Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. Dickson J. stated for the majority, at p. 388:

Nonetheless, the Crown, in my view, was not empowered by the surrender document to ignore the oral terms which the Band understood would be embodied in the lease. The oral representations form the backdrop against which the Crown’s conduct in discharging its fiduciary obligation must be measured. They inform and confine the field of discretion within which the Crown was free to act. After the Crown’s agents had induced the Band to surrender its land on the understanding that the land would be leased on certain terms, it would be unconscionable to permit the Crown simply to ignore those terms.

The Guerin case is a strong authority in this respect because the surrender there could only be accepted by the Governor in Council, who was not made aware of any oral terms. The surrender could not have been accepted by the departmental officials who were present when the Musqueam made known their conditions. Nevertheless, the Governor in Council was held bound by the oral terms which “the Band understood would be embodied in the lease.”

To assist the Commission in determining whether the parties to Treaty 1 intended to include medical aid as one of its provisions, Canada and the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation have tendered extrinsic evidence relat-

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ing to the historical context of the period, the specific circumstances associated with the negotiation and implementation of Treaty 1, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. From this evidence, it can be seen that the treaty arose out of the creation of the province of Manitoba in the context of Canada’s desire to open up new areas of population growth and economic development. With the arrival of the fur trade and the later influx of European settlers, however, came the decimation of the buffalo as the staple of prairie Indian subsistence and the introduction of new diseases that claimed many aboriginal lives. Indeed, in the days preceding Treaty 1, negotiations at the North-West Angle were suspended, in part to allow the Indians of what became the Treaty 3 area to disperse to minimize the effects of a serious smallpox outbreak. It is clear from the historical record that the negotiation of Treaty 1 took place in the immediate aftermath of the epidemic, and it is reasonable to assume that the Indian negotiators would have been concerned with matters of disease and medical care in the course of striking their bargain.

Within a few short months following the treaty’s consummation, the Pembina bands appeared before Molyneux St John, claiming medical assistance as a treaty promise, and the St Peter’s Band delivered the Prince affidavit, seeking “medical aid” on the same grounds. Moreover, Deputy Superintendent Spragge noted on July 18, 1873, that “St. John particularized the presents which it was understood that Governor Archibald & Commr. Simpson had promised should be given,” and, in accordance with the recommendation set forth in St John’s letter, Spragge directed Indian Commissioner Provencher to provide “[m]edicines for the sick.”

Similarly, it will be recalled that, in seeking an end to the dispute over the outside promises, the Board of Indian Commissioners acknowledged, on March 13, 1874, while being careful not to recognize the alleged promises “in their entirety,” that “there were some promises made which were not included in the Treaty.” Accordingly, the board recommended that the Crown provide the Indian parties to the treaty with, among other things, “[a] supply of simple medicines ... for each Reserve ... placed in the custody of some suitable person.”

I find it difficult to conceive that Spragge or the Board of Indian Commissioners would have volunteered medical aid as a means of resolving the outside promises if there had not been some understanding that medical aid was already on the table in some shape or form. It is reasonable to assume that Canada would have sought to limit its liability, not further extend itself
by taking on additional obligations that had not previously been discussed. I consider these points to be consistent with Roseau River’s view of the case.

On the basis of all the evidence, and in particular the approaches made by the Pembina Indians and the St Peter’s Band, I have no doubt that the members of those bands understood medical aid in some form or other to have been included among the terms of Treaty 1. Accordingly, when Treaty 1 is interpreted not in its strict technical sense or subject to the rigid modern rules of construction, but in the sense that the Indians clearly understood it at the time of signing, a right to medical aid represents a realistic interpretation of the treaty. Even if it might be said that there is some question whether such a promise would have expressed the “common intention” of the parties, to use the words of Lamer J in R. v. Sioui,206 it is my view that, as Cory J later wrote in R. v. Badger,207 the treaty provisions must be interpreted generously, with ambiguities or doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.

In the result, I find that the documentary record regarding medical aid corroborates the recollections of Assiniwinin. It is also my view, based on principles of treaty interpretation, that construing the treaty as it would naturally have been understood by the Indians at the time of signing supports the same conclusion: that medical aid should be considered to have been a treaty right following the execution of Treaty 1 in 1871.

The 1875 Amendment of Treaty 1

The parties to this inquiry attach quite different interpretations to the fact that the 1875 amendment made no express reference to medical aid.

Roseau River concedes that the Indian signatories took the benefit of the increase in annuities from $3 to $5 per person contemplated by the 1875 amendment, so the amendment cannot be treated as void.208 Nevertheless, the First Nation contends that, as a result of Spragge’s letter of July 18, 1873, medical aid ceased to be a mere “outside promise” and became “a fully recognized and implemented treaty right.”209 As a result, medical aid was not even contemplated by the term in the 1875 amendment by which the Indians were “held to abandon all claim whatever against the Government in connection with the so-called ‘outside promises’ other than those contained in the

208 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, pp. 42 and 45.
memorandum [of outside promises] attached to the Treaty." Moreover, the fact that the treaty right to medical aid had already been implemented by 1875 creates, in the First Nation’s view, an ambiguity, or at least raises doubt about the effect of the amendment. In such circumstances, counsel submits that it is appropriate to construe the amendment contra proferentem – that is, against the interest of the party who drew the document.

Perhaps more significant, the First Nation contends that, given the ambiguity in the treaty amendment, it would not be fair or reasonable to attribute to the Roseau River Band in 1875 the intention that the waiver in the amendment should apply to the implemented treaty right of medical assistance, nor in counsel’s view is there any evidence to support such a conclusion. Because the Band had no independent representation, it fell to Canada as a fiduciary, according to counsel, to ensure that band members were fully informed of what they were giving up to acquire the $2 increase in annuities. Since Canada failed to do so, and in clear language, “it could not then be fairly said that the Indians knew when they signed [the amendment] that their right to medical aid under the Treaty was being extinguished.” Ultimately, the First Nation submits that it would be unconscionable for Canada to claim that the treaty right to medical aid was waived by the 1875 amendment, given

- the disparity in bargaining power between the Crown and the Indians resulting from the unfamiliarity of the latter with the English language and the Crown’s failure to have the amendment translated into Ojibway, as it had done with Treaty 1;
- the absence of proof that the Indians were informed of the specific promises the Crown would claim were being waived; and
- the “severe disparity between the $2.00 increase in annuity on the one hand and the other benefits purportedly being waived.”

Accordingly, the onus resides with Canada as the party seeking to enforce the 1875 amendment to demonstrate that the bargain was, in the circumstances,

211 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 46.
212 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 47.
213 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 53.
fair, just, and reasonable - an onus Canada is unable to meet, in the First Nation’s view, since the Crown was arguably already obliged to perform the majority of the treaty promises referred to in the memorandum of outside promises.\textsuperscript{215} This means that the amendment must be “read down” to waive only those promises that the Indians would have understood to have been waived “and not ... other promises not expressly contained in the ‘memorandum’ [of outside promises].”\textsuperscript{216} In the result, assuming that a treaty right to medical assistance existed and was not waived, surrendered, or extinguished by the 1875 amendment, the First Nation takes the position that the right continued to exist after 1875, thereby rendering the deductions from the Band’s interest account improper.\textsuperscript{217}

In response, Canada agrees with the First Nation’s statement that the 1875 amendment was effective, but, unlike the First Nation, it sees no evidence to contradict the conclusion that the amendment was explained to the Indians and signed with the same formality that characterized the execution of the treaty in 1871.\textsuperscript{218} Rather, the 1875 amendment was intended, in Canada’s view, to clarify and bring closure by providing an increase in the benefits paid to the Indians in consideration for their releasing Canada from any unrecorded promises; in counsel’s words, “[t]he 1875 amendment to the treaty which is part of the treaty is crystal clear in that if the promise is not on the attached list, the Crown is released from that promise.”\textsuperscript{219} Moreover, Canada argues that there is no basis for limiting the scope of the amendment to “unfulfilled” outside promises, as the First Nation has urged.\textsuperscript{220}

As for the First Nation’s assertions that the 1875 amendment was unconscionable or improvident, or that it was secured through undue influence or breach of fiduciary obligation, Canada denies that the amendment worked an unfairness in terms of the Indians being unduly disadvantaged or the government inordinately benefiting:

The facts of the case demonstrate conclusively that the band argued for and won a concession from the government of the day [of] a 66 per cent increase in annuity payments in exchange for a release of promises alleged to [have been] made at the time of treaty. The band then signed the Order in Council. That is undisputed, uncon-
tradicited and persuasive evidence that none of the tests for undue influence and ine-
quality of bargaining power resulting in lack of consent have been met.221

Similarly, Canada takes the position that, although its relationship with
aboriginal peoples is fiduciary in nature, not every aspect of such a relation-
ship takes the form of a fiduciary obligation. In this case, according to coun-
sel, no fiduciary or other duty existed from 1909 to 1934 that would require
Canada to pay for medical aid or to provide notice of the deductions for
medical aid from the Band’s interest account.222

I agree with the First Nation that the treaty right to medical aid should not
be considered to have been extinguished by the 1875 amendment. As I have
already stated, I start with the proposition, based on the evidence of Oliver
Nelson and the recollections of Assiniwinin, that medical aid became a treaty
right as of 1871, and its status as a treaty right should not be considered to
have been in doubt between 1871 and 1875. Deputy Superintendent
Spragge’s letter of July 18, 1873, and the recommendations of the Board of
Indian Commissioners did nothing to limit or expand this already existing
right. The evidence is sufficient to substantiate that the right arose in 1871,
and this conclusion is supported by the legal principles of treaty interpreta-
tion. The only question is whether medical aid continued as a treaty right
after 1875 in the wake of the amendment to Treaty 1.

There can be no doubt that medical aid represented an outside promise.
As Oliver Nelson has written, “from the point of view of the Roseau River
Anishinabe First Nation and the other Treaty One First Nations, any agree-
ments made and agreed to in the negotiations of the Treaty of 1871 that
were outside the draft treaty document, were the outside promises.”223
Moreover, the 1875 amendment was concluded “on the express understand-
ing ... that each Chief or other Indian who shall receive such increased annu-
ity or annual payment, shall be held to abandon all claim whatever against
the Government in connection with the so-called ‘outside promises’ other
than those contained in the memorandum [of outside promises] attached
to the Treaty.”224 It would seem that, on a straightforward interpretation of
the language, medical aid – as an outside promise not contained in the

223 Oliver J. Nelson (Ka-no-nace, Ma-ka-wa [Bear Clan]), “Presentation to the Indian Specific Claims Commission
Emphasis added.
memorandum of outside promises - must be deemed to have been abandoned as a basis for claim against Canada.

In this context, how should medical aid be treated? As I have already commented, I feel comfortable in assuming that, in preparing the 1875 amendment, Canada’s officials knew medical aid was still a concern to the Indians even if Canada was not fully prepared to accept it as a term of treaty. Canada knew that the treaty amendment proposed by Minister of the Interior David Laird would have the effect of foreclosing any future claim that the Indian signatories to Treaty 1 would have in relation to medical aid and any other outside promises not specifically mentioned in the memorandum of outside promises. They also knew in 1875 that the amendment offered very little in the way of real consideration by Canada to the bands. The $2 increase in annuities depicted nothing more than the rate of annuities already promised to the Indians of Treaties 3 and 4 in 1873 and 1874 (and soon to be granted to their counterparts in Treaties 5, 6, and 7); as such, it represented not a revision of the treaty terms, but the mere administrative implementation of what had already become a political reality. Since the level of treaty annuities being paid had already been raised, Canada knew that the Indians of Treaty 1 would not accept an amendment that did not increase annuities when members of neighbouring bands were already receiving $5 – and more for Chiefs and headmen – each year.

It must be remembered that the negotiation of Treaties 1 through 7 took place in the short span of six years. In 1875, both Canada and the First Nations must have been aware that other treaty negotiations had taken place or were likely to take place, and by then they knew the terms that typically formed the subject matter of discussions. In this context, I find it significant that the individual charged by Canada with the responsibility for securing the acceptance of the 1875 amendment was Alexander Morris, Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories and Canada’s representative in the negotiation of Treaties 4, 5, and 6. It was Morris who, in the course of negotiating Treaty 6 the following year, agreed to make provision for medical care in the form of the “medicine chest” clause. Furthermore, according to Canada’s researcher, Frances Foley Smith, “[d]uring the treaty negotiations, he [Morris] assured the Indians that emergency medical care would be provided because this was the ‘Queen’s way’.”225 It seems remarkable that Canada should now claim medical aid to have been extinguished by the 1875

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amendment to Treaty 1 when Canada’s own representative, just one year later, was prepared to extend the very same right to the signatories of Treaty 6.

It is also important to realize that the terms of the 1875 amendment were not the product of hard bargaining by the parties culminating in points being won and concessions granted. Instead, the 1875 amendment merely incorporated the memorandum of outside promises, which had been drafted in 1871. That document reflected the recollections of Indian Commissioner Wemyss Simpson, Lieutenant Governor Adams G. Archibald, Indian Agent Molyneux St. John, and Métis businessman James McKay of what had already been promised. Given the likely embarrassment of those four over their own uncertainty regarding the terms of Treaty 1, it is to be expected that the memorandum would have been a conservative accounting of the outside promises. As St John admitted:

It is but common honesty to say that ... the things which were promised, and those which were refused, mentioned as they were by three apparent authorities and spoken of in no regular communication, were so mixed up that it is little wonder if even the four persons most likely to know the exact state of the case, could hardly agree in the precise definition, when that was attempted to be made [in the memorandum of outside promises], within a month after the Treaty; and not at all surprising that the Indians believe their demands were complied with at the time, and that we are now trying to shuffle out of our obligations.226

Like the memorandum of outside promises, the 1875 amendment was drafted by Canada’s officials in isolation from, and without the input of, their Indian treaty partners. Unlike Treaty 1 in 1871, the 1875 amendment was approved by order in council before being taken to the Indians for “negotiations” – meaning that the Indian signatories were presented with a finished document and had little, if any, opportunity to engage in meaningful discussions to amend its terms. Moreover, when Lieutenant Governor Morris and Indian Commissioner Provencher convened with the Indians to execute the amendment, they did so not in a collective meeting of all bands, as Simpson and Archibald had done in 1871, but on a band-by-band basis. This approach prevented the bands from acting in unison to protect their interests and amounted to nothing more than Canada imposing its own position

regarding the outside promises. For all its shortcomings, Treaty 1 was a shining example of treaty negotiation when compared with the flawed process of the 1875 amendment.

In all these circumstances, I believe that Canada as a fiduciary owed a duty to the Indians signing the 1875 amendment to disclose in express terms which of the various items claimed by the Indians to have been promised during the negotiation of Treaty 1 would be terminated by the amendment. This obligation is particularly so with regard to a right, such as medical aid, that, by 1875, had already been settled and implemented. There is no doubt that considerable effort would have been involved in assembling a list of terminated outside promises, in addition to further embarrassment on the part of Canada’s representatives. Similarly, placing such a list before the Indians would probably have made the task of securing their consent to the amendment more awkward and time-consuming.

However, I find considerable force in Roseau River’s contention that, since the Indians understood medical aid to have been settled, they believed it was not necessary to deal with the matter in 1875; similarly, they would not have perceived that it formed part of the amendment when it was not expressly mentioned. I believe that Canada’s duty as the fiduciary in this situation would have been to disclose to its principals sufficient information to allow them to consider their alternatives and to make an informed decision. Without a clear and realistic understanding of what they would be forgoing – and, perhaps more significant, of what little they would be gaining – by agreeing to the 1875 amendment, the Indians were not in a position to be able to assess effectively the “rearranged” bargain into which they were being lured. There is no indication that Canada’s representatives in 1875, or at any later date, informed the Indians that they would no longer be able to look to the federal government for medical aid. I believe that it would be unconscionable for Canada to rely on such a one-sided transaction as the basis for denying such aid.

I find further support for this conclusion in the reasons of the Commission in its inquiry into the Pottawatomi rights claim of the Moose Deer Point First Nation.227 There, after reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Horseman, Sioui, Badger, and Van der Peet cases on the question of what is required to terminate a treaty right, the Commission stated:

In the Commission’s view, the cumulative effect of these decisions is that, before
the implementation of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Crown could unilaterally extin-
guish treaty rights as long as it expressed a “clear and plain” intention to do so. To
borrow from McLachlin J in Van der Peet, such a “clear and plain” intention is
evident where the government actually considers the conflict between its intended
action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other and chooses to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty.  

Given the absence of any wording in the 1875 amendment dealing with the
termination of medical aid as a treaty right, I see no such evidence of the
requisite “clear and plain” intention in this case. In particular, since Canada
in 1875 apparently did not regard medical aid as a term of the 1871 treaty, it
seems unlikely that its representatives would have considered their actions to
be in conflict with Treaty 1, much less that the amendment would abrogate a
treaty right to medical aid.

Since the treaty right to medical aid was not expressly extinguished by the
1875 amendment, that right continued to exist after 1875. Against this back-
drop, I conclude that the deductions for medical aid from Roseau River’s
interest trust account from 1909 to 1934 were improper and that Canada
owes the First Nation an outstanding lawful obligation under the terms of the
Specific Claims Policy. Accordingly, Canada should open negotiations with the
First Nation to determine appropriate compensation.

In this context, one further matter must be considered.

Nature and Scope of the Treaty Promise
I must now consider the nature and scope of the treaty right - specifically,
whether Canada’s treaty promise was limited to drugs and medicines or
whether it also included hospitalization charges and physicians’ fees.

The evidence on this point is mixed. St John’s report of his meeting with
the Pembina bands on September 6, 1872, indicates that the Indians made
demands regarding their “sick men” - to which St John replied that they
would have to take care of their own sick. Nothing in this demand suggests
that the Indians were limiting their demands to drugs and medicines,
although, in the context of those times, it might seem reasonable to impose
such limits, since doctors and hospitals may have been beyond the reach of
even the local non-aboriginal population. Three months later, the St Peter’s
Band claimed, in the Prince affidavit, to have been promised “medical aid” -
which, broadly construed, could be read to include expenses for both hospitalization and doctors. Spragge’s letter of July 18, 1873, however, refers to “medicines for the sick,” and the Board of Indian Commissioners similarly restricted its recommendation to “[a] supply of simple medicines to be provided for each Reserve.”

In determining whether the treaty right should be broadly or narrowly construed, it is possible to draw assistance from jurisprudence spawned by the “medicine chest” clause in Treaty 6. The first such decision was handed down by Angers J of the Exchequer Court in 1935 in Dreaver v. The King.229 In that case, the Chief and councillors of Saskatchewan’s Mistawasis Band claimed, among other things, reimbursement of $4,489.95 applied by the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from band funds towards the purchase of drugs, medical supplies, and medicines on behalf of the Band. Chief Dreaver testified that, following the signing of the treaty, medicines were supplied to the Band free of charge until the Band surrendered land to the Crown in 1918 or 1919, at which time the deductions commenced. Although the circumstances were remarkably similar to the facts in the present case, a unique aspect of the Dreaver case is that it was decided in the context of Treaty 6, which contains an express provision stipulating “[t]hat a medicine chest shall be kept at the house of each Indian Agent for the use and benefit of the Indians at the direction of such agent.”230 There is no parallel provision in the written form of Treaty 1. Commenting on the “medicine chest” clause, Angers J stated:

This [clause], in my opinion, means that the Indians were to be provided with all the medicines, drugs or medical supplies which they might need entirely free of charge. The proof does not elicit what the medicines, drugs or medical supplies, mentioned in the statement inserted in paragraph 4 of the petition, were nor does it show the reason why they were charged. Do they constitute all the medicines, drugs and medical supplies furnished to the Indians of the Mistawasis Band by the Department of Indian Affairs or do they only represent a part of what was supplied to them, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate it. Be that as it may, I do not think that the Department had, under the treaty, the privilege of deciding which medicines, drugs and medical supplies were to be furnished to the Indians gratuitously and which were to be charged to the funds of the band. The treaty makes no distinction; it merely states that a medicine chest shall be kept at the house of the Indian Agent for the use

229 Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
230 Treaty No. 6 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Plain and Wood Cree Indians and Other Tribes of Indians at Fort Carlton, Fort Pitt and Battle River, with Adhesions (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1964), 4.
and benefit of the Indians. The clause might unquestionably be more explicit but, as I have said, I take it to mean that all medicines, drugs or medical supplies which might be required by the Indians of the Mistawasis Band were to be supplied to them free of charge.231

In the result, Angers J ordered Canada to repay the funds to the Band.

Canada submits that Dreaver, insofar as it is based on the “medicine chest” clause of Treaty 6, is irrelevant to a claim under Treaty 1 and has, in any event, been overturned by subsequent decisions of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Johnston and R. v. Swimmer.232 Moreover, Canada argues that, in Manitoba Hospital Commission v. Klein and Spence,233 Wilson J of Manitoba’s Court of Queen’s Bench concluded that “Indian treaties Nos. 1 and 2, applicable to Indians in Manitoba, say nothing about medical or hospital care or services,” that the “medicine chest” clause of Treaty 6 is not relevant in cases involving Treaty 1, and that, in any event, the clause did not contemplate “provision of all medical services, including hospital care.”234

In reply, the First Nation questions the result in Klein and Spence, given that “there was no evidence put before the Court of an extrinsic nature that is admissible in these types of proceedings” to demonstrate that medical aid was an oral treaty right beyond the four corners of the written treaty document.235 Counsel further challenged the applicability of the Johnston and Swimmer cases in the present inquiry:

[I]t’s important to understand that the reasons why those cases were limited or narrowed had everything to do with the language of Treaty No. 6. Those cases had to do with interpreting what a medicine chest meant. At no point were they ever asked to address something as broad as what we suggest exists in the Treaty 1 situation, which is medical aid, which is quite a different thing, and a much broader thing.236

The Johnston and Swimmer cases were factually identical. Canada and Saskatchewan entered into an administrative arrangement providing that

231 Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 at 115 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
Canada would pay hospitalization taxes pursuant to the Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act on behalf of only those Indians residing on a reserve or those who had been residing off-reserve for a period of less than 12 months. In each case, the respondent, a treaty Indian, had lived off-reserve for more than 12 months and had failed to pay hospitalization tax, claiming to be exempt from such taxes under the Treaty 6 “medicine chest” and “pestilence” clauses. The “pestilence” clause states:

That in the event hereafter of the Indians comprised within this treaty being overtaken by any pestilence, or by a general famine, the Queen, on being satisfied and certified thereof by Her Indian Agent or Agents, will grant to the Indians assistance of such character and to such extent as Her Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs shall deem necessary and sufficient to relieve the Indians from the calamity that shall have befallen them.

In each case, on being charged with failing to pay the tax, the respondent was acquitted by Policha J of Magistrate’s Court, who stated in Johnston:

Referring to the “medicine chest” clause of Treaty No. 6, it is common knowledge that the provisions for caring for the sick and injured in the areas inhabited by the Indians in 1876 were somewhat primitive compared to present day standards. It can be safely assumed that the Indians had limited knowledge of what provisions were available and it is obvious that they were concerned that their people be adequately cared for.

With that in view, and possibly carrying the opinion of Angers, J., [in Dreaver] a step farther, I can only conclude that the “medicine chest” clause and the “pestilence” clause in Treaty No. 6 should properly be interpreted to mean that the Indians are entitled to receive all medical services, including medicines, drugs, medical supplies and hospital care free of charge. Lacking proper statutory provisions to the contrary, this entitlement would embrace all Indians within the meaning of the Indian Act, without exception. In my opinion, the accused falls within the exemption from taxation set forth in s. 23(1)(iv) of the Regulations and is not required to pay the tax. I find the accused not guilty as charged.

On the appeal in Johnston, Culliton CJS prefaced his analysis with the comment that the issue before the courts in that case was “not one relating to the general responsibility of the Government of Canada to Indians, but simply

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238 Treaty No. 6 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Plain and Wood Cree Indians and Other Tribes of Indians at Fort Carlton, Fort Pitt and Battle River, with Adhesions (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1964), 4.
239 Policha J, as quoted in R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 751, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJS.
whether the learned trial Judge was right in his interpretation of the ‘medicine chest’ and ‘pestilence’ clauses of the Treaty.”

Accordingly, in the later Swimmer case – undoubtedly in response to Chief Justice Culliton’s remark – Policha J added that “only the Parliament of Canada could legislate in respect of Indians and consequently s. 21 of the Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act Regulations, and s. 21(1)(v) of the Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act Regulations, were ultra vires” – that is, beyond the legislative competence of the province.

In both Johnston and Swimmer, Culliton CJ, on behalf of an identical five-member panel of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, allowed the appeals. With regard to the Johnston case, he stated:

In the interpretation of the clauses of a treaty, one must first look to the words used and give to those words the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to them at the time the treaty was made. To do so, too, it is both proper and advisable to have recourse to whatever authoritative record may be available of the discussions surrounding the execution of the treaty. I agree with the opinion expressed by Norris, J.A., in R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 [affd 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481n, [1965] S.C.R. vi], when, at p. 629, he said:

The Court is entitled “to take judicial notice of the facts of history whether past or contemporaneous” as Lord du Parcq said in Monarch Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B), [1949] A.C. 196 at p. 234, [1949] 1 All E.R. 1 at p. 20, and it is entitled to rely on its own historical knowledge and researches, Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, [1892] A.C. 644, Lord Halsbury, L.C., at pp. 652–4. Culliton CJ then examined Alexander Morris’s account of the negotiations preceding Treaty 6, noting that the treaty had been concluded in the shadow of the virulent smallpox epidemics of the early 1870s. He remarked that the Indians had clearly approached the talks greatly fearing both pestilence and starvation, with the Crown’s response to those fears manifested in the “pestilence” clause. With regard to the case before him, Culliton CJ concluded that the “pestilence” clause was irrelevant. On the subject of the “medicine chest” clause, however, he commented:

240 R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 752, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJ. 
241 Policha J, as cited in R. v. Swimmer (1970), 17 DLR (3d) 476, [1971] 1 WWR 756, 3 CCC (2d) 92 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJ.
242 R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 752, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJ. 
There is nothing in Morris’ treatise to suggest that any meaning should be given to the words “medicine chest” other than that conveyed by the words themselves in the context in which they are used. The only reference I can find in the treatise is at p. 218, where the author states: “A medicine chest will be kept at the house of each Indian agent, in case of sickness amongst you.” The “medicine chest” clause in the Treaty incorporates this undertaking.

Again, on the plain reading of the “medicine chest” clause, it means no more than the words clearly convey: an undertaking by the Crown to keep at the house of the Indian agent a medicine chest for the use and benefit of the Indians at the direction of the agent. The clause itself does not give to the Indian an unrestricted right to the use and benefit of the “medicine chest” but such rights as are given are subject to the direction of the Indian agent. Such limitation would indicate that the obligation was to have physically on the reservations, for the use and benefit of the Indians, a supply of medicine under the supervision of the agent. I can find nothing historically, or in any dictionary definition, or in any legal pronouncement, that would justify the conclusion that the Indians, in seeking and accepting the Crown’s obligation to provide a “medicine chest” had in contemplation provision of all medical services, including hospital care.  

In an article entitled “The Medicine Chest Clause in Treaty No. 6,” Peter Barkwell comments that, although Culliton CJS recited the appropriate principle from White and Bob before relying on the Morris text, the Court of Appeal’s application of the White and Bob principle may, in fact, have paid only “lip service” to the words of Norris JA in that earlier case:

He [Culliton CJS] then considered the account of the treaty negotiation contained in Lieutenant Governor Morris’s work. This is the only historical work to which His Lordship referred. It is not possible to tell whether this reference was the result of his own research, whether it was the only historical account submitted by counsel, or whether it was the sole work that His Lordship considered authoritative. Nothing in the volume referred to indicates what the Indians thought they had obtained during the negotiations. Morris says nothing which would indicate the degree of Indian comprehension of the treaty terms, and it might be naive to expect that the chief government negotiator would present a totally objective account of the proceedings.

Finally, after considering Justice Angers’s decision in Dreaver that the Indians of Treaty 6 were entitled to be supplied with all medicines, drugs, and medical supplies free of charge, Culliton CJS concluded:

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244 R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 753, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJS.
In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the learned Justice [Angers] appears to have relied on the evidence of the suppliant Dreaver, who testified he was present during the negotiation of the Treaty and that it was understood that all medicines were to be supplied free to the Indian. There appears to be nothing in his evidence to support any wider interpretation of the clause than that given to it by Mr. Justice Angers. While I express no opinion as to the correctness of the interpretation of the clause as made by Mr. Justice Angers, I do not think, with respect, that the interpretation so given justifies the extended meaning attributed thereto by the learned Judge [Policha] of the Magistrate’s Court.246

In his own words, Culliton CJS did not overrule the decision of Angers J in Dreaver. Rather, he merely concluded that it did not extend beyond medicines, drugs, and medical supplies to other medical services, including hospitalization. However, Barkwell suggests that the implications of Chief Justice Culliton’s decision went much further:

Although the learned Chief Justice stated in that case that he was expressing no opinion on the decision reached in Dreaver, by ruling that the medicine chest clause means “no more than the words clearly convey”, it is respectfully submitted that he ignored, if not overruled, Dreaver. In Dreaver, Mr. Justice Angers, after hearing the evidence, moved beyond the “plain reading” of the clause and held that it covered all medicines, drugs and medical supplies. He did not go so far as to include hospital care, but there is no reason why, given the appropriate evidence, he might not have done so. Chief Justice Culliton, on the other hand, apparently using only Alexander Morris as a historical source, shut the door to any liberal interpretation of the clause.247

Four years later, in the Swimmer appeal, Culliton CJS adopted his earlier reasons from Johnston, adding somewhat icily that there was “nothing in the present case that justified the rejection of this view by the learned Judge [Policha J] of the Magistrates’ Court.” As to the constitutional question of whether the regulations under the Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act and the Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act were beyond the scope of provincial jurisdiction, he remarked:

As I have already stated, the terms of Treaty No. 6 do not impose upon the Government of Canada the obligation of providing, without cost, medical and hospital services to all Indians. Moreover, I know of no Act of Parliament that purports to do so. Under these circumstances, the respondent was subject to the provisions of the

246 R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 754, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJS.
Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act and the Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act, being laws of general application, and liable for the tax thereunder. 248

Meanwhile, at about the same time, the Manitoba courts, on a somewhat different set of facts in Klein and Spence, were addressing the extent of an Indian’s right to hospital care under Treaty 1. In that case, Spence was a treaty Indian and a member of the Peguis Band who had been struck by a car operated by an uninsured driver. Klein, a lawyer, successfully collected the full amount of the judgment plus interest and costs from the provincial treasurer under the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Act. 249 After Klein deposited the proceeds of judgment in his trust account, the Manitoba Hospital Commission claimed to be entitled to the sum of $4,290 from that account to cover Spence’s hospital costs. On advice from her Band, Spence objected to the Commission’s claim “on the grounds that she was a Treaty Indian.” Caught in the middle, Klein proceeded by interpleader to obtain the court’s instructions on how the challenged amount should be distributed.

In Manitoba’s Court of Queen’s Bench, the equities were decidedly against Spence, given that she had provided written authorization of the settlement with the provincial treasurer, including the $4,290.00 in “hospital accounts” payable as an item of “special damages.” 250 In other words, since Spence had not paid the hospitalization costs herself, she would have profited had she been allowed to keep the reimbursed costs, and the Hospital Commission would have been out of pocket. Nevertheless, one of the issues facing the Court was whether Spence, as a treaty Indian, was entitled as of right to hospital services. Wilson J wrote:

As to that, I can only say that I saw no evidence to demonstrate this absolute right to hospital care. To the extent that the Indian Act touches the question at all, sec. 72(1)(g) [which authorized the Governor in Council to make regulations to provide medical treatment and health services for Indians] is permissive only. Indian treaties Nos. 1 and 2, applicable to Indians in Manitoba, say nothing about medical or

248 R. v. Swimmer (1970), 17 DLR (3d) 476 at 480–81, [1971] 1 WWR 756, 3 CCC (2d) 92 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJS.
249 Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Act, SM 1965, c. 89.
250 “Damages may be either ‘general’ or ‘special’. General damages are such as the law will presume to be the direct, natural and probable consequences of the act complained of. Special damages, on the other hand, are such as the law will not infer from the nature of the act for they do not follow in the ordinary course but are exceptional in character. These damages should be specifically pleaded and proved. Sometimes it is said that special damages are those which permit of exact computation of a definite sum of money”: The Canadian Law Dictionary (Toronto: Law and Business Publications (Canada) Inc., 1980), 107.
hospital care or services. Indian treaty No. 6 relates to Indians in what is now the province of Saskatchewan and would not seem applicable...

As Canada notes in its argument in the present inquiry, Wilson J went on to adopt Justice Culliton’s conclusion in Johnston that even the “medicine chest” clause in Treaty 6 did not convey the provision of all medical services, including hospital care.

In its own review of the law on this issue, the Commission has learned that Klein and Spence was appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, where Smith CJM held on behalf of a unanimous panel:

Counsel argued ... that, as a Treaty Indian, Mrs. Spence was not “legally liable to pay to a hospital for care, treatment ...” that she received. He submitted that an obligation to pay for hospital services, in the absence of an express agreement, may only be implied from the circumstances, and that since for a long period of time Indians had been supplied with hospital services at the expense of the federal Government, without such Indians ever being asked or expected to pay for them, no agreement to pay could be implied on the part of Mrs. Spence in this case.

Whether prior to the Hospital Services Insurance Act a Treaty Indian was not liable for the payment of hospital services, or whether the true position was that he was liable for them but was being indemnified by the federal Government, is not a matter we need to decide in this case.

The present position must be decided in the light of the Hospital Services Insurance Act. That Act applies to all residents, including Indians. See s. 7 of the Act and also s. 87 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149.

Dominion Order-in-Council, P.C. 1958-15/879, authorized the Minister of National Health and Welfare to pay on behalf of Indians premiums “required to be paid as a condition of eligibility for receiving hospital care under the plan in operation in the province...”. This indicates that Indians were to be in the same position as other persons in the Province with respect to hospital services. In the present case such premiums were so paid for Mrs. Spence during such period as she was not employed. When she was employed her premiums were deducted by her employer and remitted to the Manitoba Hospital Commission in the same way as for any other employee in the Province.

Considered in isolation, the foregoing authorities, with the exception of Dreaver, would tend to steer me towards the conclusion that the treaty right

253 Re Manitoba Hospital Commission and Klein and Spence (1969), 9 DLR (3d) 423 at 423–24 (Man. CA), Smith CJM. Emphasis added.
to medical aid will be narrowly confined to drugs, medicines, and medical supplies under the “medicine chest” clause of Treaty 6. However, the Johnston, Swimmer, and Klein and Spence cases were all decided before the development of the more recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of treaties, and for this reason I question whether they remain good law.

My reservations are further underscored by the recent decision of Prothonotary Hargrave of the Federal Court, Trial Division, in Wuskwi Sipihk Cree Nation v. The Queen,254 handed down a few weeks before the oral submissions by counsel in the present inquiry. In that case, several First Nations objected to an agreement between the federal Department of National Health and Welfare and Manitoba’s Department of Health to divide jurisdiction and responsibility for public health services among several communities, including First Nations, in the province. Relying on, among other things, “various treaties, including Treaty No. 6 [and] a general understanding that the federal government has provided and will continue to provide health care where treaties are silent,” the First Nations argued that this delegation was improper. Consequently, they sought declaratory and mandatory relief with a view to obtaining adequate and continuous health care. In the course of an interim application to determine whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, Hargrave P referred to the “medicine chest” clause in Treaty 6 and its consideration by Angers J in Dreaver before turning to the comments of Culliton CJ in Johnston:

Now the Johnston case stands for the proposition that in 1966 the medicine chest clause did not entitle an Indian, not living on a reserve, to claim exemption from the payment of the hospitalization tax. The Court of Appeal went on to question the broad interpretation given to the medicine chest clause by Mr. Justice Angers in the Dreaver case, but that is a gratuitous comment, which was unnecessary to the decision in the Johnston case. However, of importance is the comment by the Court of Appeal in Johnston that treaty provisions must be given a literal meaning and essentially that the Crown only undertook to maintain a medicine chest for the benefit of Indians at the direction of the Indian Agent. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the clause did not contemplate the provision of medical services, including hospital care. In the light of The Queen v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, a decision in which the Court was able to take into account the Constitution Act of 1982, concluding that aboriginal rights ought to be interpreted in a flexible manner in order to permit their evolution rather

254 Wuskwi Sipihk Cree Nation v. The Queen (unreported, January 21, 1999, Docket No. T-383-98) (FCTD). As of the date of this report, the decision of Hargrave P in this interim application had not been appealed and the parties were apparently seeking to resolve the dispute through mediation.
than leaving such rights frozen at a past time, this dicta in Johnston is now in all
probability wrong.\(^{255}\)

In Sparrow, Dickson CJ and La Forest J, writing on behalf of the entire
Court, had been called upon to consider aboriginal fishing rights – specifi-
cally, whether the restriction in the federal Fisheries Act regarding the per-
mitted length of a drift net was inconsistent with section 35(1) of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, and therefore invalid. Section 35(1) states:

35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.

As to the implications of the word “existing” in this section, the Court ruled:

The word “existing” makes it clear that the rights to which s. 35(1) applies are
those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. This
means that extinguished rights are not revived by the Constitution Act, 1982....

Further, an existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate the spe-
cific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. The notion of freezing existing
rights would incorporate into the Constitution a crazy patchwork of regulations.... As
noted by Blair J.A., academic commentary lends support to the conclusion that
“existing” means “unextinguished” rather than exercisable at a certain time in
history....

Far from being defined according to the regulatory scheme in place in 1982, the
phrase “existing aboriginal rights” must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their
evolution over time. To use Professor Slattery’s expression, in “Understanding Abor-
iginal Rights,” supra, at p. 782,\(^{256}\) the word “existing” suggests that those rights are
“affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vig-
our”. Clearly, then, an approach to the constitutional guarantee embodied in s. 35(1)
which would incorporate “frozen rights” must be rejected.\(^{257}\)

Similar statements have been made by Dickson CJ in Simon v. The Queen,\(^{258}\)
Sundown,\(^{260}\) and, most recently, with specific application to treaty rights, by
Binnie J in R. v. Marshall.\(^{261}\)

(FCTD).
\(^{257}\) R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1091–93, Dickson CJ and La Forest J.
\(^{258}\) Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 402, Dickson CJ.
\(^{259}\) R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at 584, L’Heureux-Dubé J.
\(^{260}\) R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 at 410, Cory J.
After reviewing Sparrow, Hargrave P in Wuskwi Sipihk concluded that the philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada means that Johnston must be considered to have been overruled to the extent of the decision by Culliton CJS that the “medicine chest” clause should be given a narrow literal meaning:

To sum up this aspect, Mr. Justice Angers took a proper approach in his 1935 decision in Dreaver (supra), reading the Treaty No. 6 medicine chest clause in a contemporary manner to mean a supply of all medicines, drugs and medical supplies. Certainly, it is clear that the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took what is now a wrong approach in its literal and restrictive reading of the medicine chest clause in the 1966 decision in Johnston (supra). In a current context the clause may well require a full range of contemporary medical services. 262

Therefore, I conclude that, even if the parties to Treaty 1 contemplated only drugs and medicines during their negotiations - as their counterparts in Treaty 6 apparently did - the treaty must still be interpreted in a way that will not cause the right to be frozen in time, but will permit it to evolve into a contemporary form. In my view, this means that the treaty promise must be construed as including a right to all medical services for which deductions were made from Roseau River between 1909 and 1934, including hospitalization and the attendance of physicians.

Conclusion
In closing, I wish to make one comment with regard to the reasons prepared by Commissioner Corcoran. While I differ with her on whether medical aid constituted an ongoing treaty right after 1875 and whether the deductions from the First Nation’s interest account gave rise to an outstanding lawful obligation, I fully agree with her analysis on the question of the Commission’s supplementary mandate. In my view, that analysis forms an alternative basis for Canada’s liability to the First Nation. In particular, I believe that Canada’s actions, in addition to being inconsistent and unfair, were paternalistic and inconsistent with the government’s duties as a fiduciary and trustee of the First Nation’s interest trust account. Given that the deductions were made unilaterally by Canada for decades, in isolation from its treaty partner and without notice, I believe that Canada’s administration of the trust was flawed.

That being said, it is important, in my view, to exercise caution in comparing the delivery of medical aid under the numbered treaties of western Canada— which typically involved the extinguishment of aboriginal title in what might be viewed as an ongoing and relatively homogeneous process—and under the many highly individualized treaties of peace and friendship that characterized various areas of central Canada and the Maritime provinces. Canada takes the position that, regardless of the treaty area involved, it has always provided medical aid to Indians as a matter of policy, not treaty, and that those bands with the financial resources to pay have been called upon to do so. Although I agree with Commissioner Corcoran that, notwithstanding Canada’s position, the evidence before us suggests inconsistencies and unfairness in the delivery of medical aid to Roseau River and perhaps other First Nations, I believe that weighing the differences in the medical treatment of bands in various treaty areas, and indeed even of other bands in Treaty 1, is beyond the scope of what the Commission can hope to accomplish in the context of the present inquiry. For this reason, I have chosen to limit my comments to the facts of this specific case. Nevertheless, I agree that this important subject of medical aid warrants a comprehensive joint review by Canada and the First Nations.

For all the foregoing reasons, I find that the deductions from Roseau River’s interest trust account from 1909 to 1934 were improper. As I have already stated, Canada should open negotiations with the First Nation with a view to compensating it for those inappropriate deductions. Compensation should be fixed on the basis that the First Nation was, and is, entitled, under Treaty 1, to full medical services available, including drugs, medicines, hospitalization, and doctors’ services.

REASONS OF COMMISSIONER CORCORAN

I have had the opportunity to review the decision of my colleague, Commissioner Bellegarde. With respect, I differ with his view of the evidence and the application of the legal principles of treaty interpretation. I also differ on the application of the “medicine chest” case law that arises under Treaty 6. As a result, because I cannot concur that Treaty 1, as amended in 1875, gave rise to a treaty right to medical aid, it becomes necessary for me, unlike my colleague, to address the remaining issues argued by the parties: whether the deductions constituted a breach of the Indian Act or the 1903 surrender, and whether the Roseau River people relied on government-funded medical aid to the detriment of their own healing methods. In addition, I believe it is
necessary to examine whether, in the circumstances of this inquiry, the Commission should tender a recommendation under its supplementary mandate.

**Issue 1 Breach of Treaty Promise**

Did the terms of Treaty 1 include a promise to provide “medical aid” and, if so, has that promise survived the 1875 amendment to the treaty?

For the purposes of my analysis on the treaty issue, it is necessary for me to consider three questions. First, does the evidence in this inquiry or do principles of treaty interpretation permit the conclusion that medical aid was promised during the negotiation of Treaty 1? Second, what was the effect of the amendment of 1875? Third, even if there is no treaty right to medical aid under Treaty 1, can it be said that the right to a “medicine chest” under Treaty 6 extends to Treaty 1 territory?

**Medical Aid as a Term of Treaty**

The first issue placed before the Commission is whether the terms of Treaty 1 included a promise of medical aid and, if so, whether that promise survived the 1875 amendment. Clearly, the initial inquiry must be whether such a promise was made in 1871, but there is no provision in the written form of the treaty to that effect. The second aspect of this issue – whether the promise, if made, survived the 1875 amendment – will be irrelevant if no promise was made in the first place. As no express promise is evident from either the treaty or the 1875 amendment, I must look to extrinsic evidence and liberal principles of treaty interpretation to determine whether such a promise was intended or can be implied from the parties’ prior or subsequent conduct.

First, I will examine the principles of treaty interpretation and the scope of their application. Second, I will review the evidence presented by the parties to determine what conclusions can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the making of the treaty promises. Finally, I will apply the tests established by the case law to the facts in this case to determine whether medical aid should properly be considered a right promised under treaty.

**Principles of Treaty Interpretation**

I agree with Commissioner Bellegarde that the cases dealing with treaty interpretation instruct us to apply three principles: first, to interpret treaty terms liberally; second, to resolve ambiguities in favour of the Indians; and, third, to have regard to extrinsic evidence. I propose to apply the first and second
principles in the third part of my analysis where I will consider those principles in the context of the facts before the Commission.

In applying these principles, it is also important to keep in mind the caution expressed by Lamer J in R. v. Sioui:

Even a generous interpretation of the document ... must be realistic and reflect the intention of both parties, not just that of the Hurons. The Court must choose from among the various possible interpretations of the common intention the one which best reconciles the Hurons’ interests and those of the conqueror.263

Similar cautions were expressed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Marshall:

Lamer J. confirms that the goal is to deduce the common intention of the parties by interpreting the treaties in their historical context....

In ascertaining the common intention the court must take into consideration the context in which treaties were negotiated and committed to writing, including the limitations of the parties. The resulting interpretation must, however, be a realistic one.264

On the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Binnie J in Marshall clearly advocated a reasonable approach to interpretation:

“Generous” rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-the-fact largesse. The special rules are dictated by the special difficulties of ascertaining what in fact was agreed to. The Indian parties did not, for all practical purposes, have the opportunity to create their own written record of the negotiations. Certain assumptions are therefore made about the Crown’s approach to treaty making (honourable) which the Court acts upon in its approach to treaty interpretation (flexible) as to the existence of a treaty (Sioui, supra, at p. 1049), the completeness of any written record (the use, e.g., of context and implied terms to make honourable sense of the treaty arrangement: Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, and R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393), and the interpretation of treaty terms once found to exist (Badger). The bottom line is the Court’s obligation is to “choose from among the various possible interpretations of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made] the one which best reconciles” the Mi’kmaw interests and those of the British Crown (emphasis added) (Sioui, per Lamer J., at p. 1069). In Taylor and Williams, supra, the Crown conceded that points of oral agreement recorded in contemporaneous minutes were included in the treaty (p. 230) and the court concluded

that their effect was to “preserve the historic right of these Indians to hunt and fish on Crown lands” (p. 236). The historical record in the present case is admittedly less clear-cut, and there is no parallel concession by the Crown.265

As in Marshall, the record in the present case is not clear-cut and the Crown has not conceded that the verbal promises included the term alleged by the First Nation.

Having determined that extrinsic evidence of the historical context surrounding the negotiation of a treaty may be relevant where a First Nation contends that the written terms do not reflect the true intentions of the parties, Lamer J in Sioui stated that the following factors, first enumerated in R. v. Taylor and Williams, are relevant to an analysis of the historical background and may assist the Court in determining the intent of the parties:

1. continuous exercise of a right in the past and at present,
2. the reasons why the Crown made a commitment,
3. the situation prevailing at the time the document was signed,
4. evidence of relations of mutual respect and esteem between the negotiators, and
5. the subsequent conduct of the parties.266

In Sioui, a preliminary issue was whether a treaty existed at all, and Lamer J held that “the factors mentioned may be just as useful in determining the existence of a treaty as in interpreting it.” In the present case, I have no doubt that the parties intended to enter into a treaty. It seems clear that they approached each other with mutual respect and esteem. Moreover, although the delivery of medical aid would not have constituted a continuous exercise of a right because Canada had just acquired responsibility for the aboriginal and other inhabitants of Manitoba, it is nevertheless safe to conclude that a treaty resulted because the parties sought to establish a framework for future relations between Canada and the Indians in a manner that was characterized, to use Justice Lamer’s words in Sioui, by “the intention to create obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain measure of solemnity.”267

The Evidence
It is less certain whether the parties to Treaty 1 intended to include medical aid as one of its provisions. In an effort to resolve this question, the parties have introduced extrinsic evidence relating to the historical context of the period, the specific circumstances associated with the negotiation and execution of Treaty 1, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. Each party insists that there is evidence to support its position, and neither is entirely wrong in making this claim.

The negotiation of the early numbered treaties in the Canadian west coincided with the devastation of many Indian communities by smallpox and other virulent infectious diseases, the decline of the buffalo, and the onset of widespread starvation and turbulence in the lives of prairie bands. It is significant that, by the time Treaty 1 was signed in 1871, Canada’s representatives had already responded to the smallpox epidemic in 1870 without any treaty stipulation requiring them to do so. Moreover, as we have seen, the Annual Report of Indian Affairs for the year ending June 30, 1872—the fiscal year during which Treaty 1 was executed—shows expenses for “medical relief” charged against the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick “Indian Funds,” the services of medical attendants assessed against the “Lower Canada [Quebec] Indian Fund,” and “medicines,” “medical services,” and “medical comforts” charged to the Indian Land Management Fund and the Chippewas of Sarnia, the Mohawks of Bay of Quinté, and the Six Nations of Grand River in Ontario.268 Clearly, in other parts of Canada, some bands with resources were already paying at least part of their own medical expenses.

Remarkably, however, while accounts of the Treaty 6 negotiations as highlighted by Culliton CJS in Johnston269 clearly demonstrate the desire of the Indians in that territory to be fed and given such assistance as might be necessary in times of pestilence or general famine, there are no such references in the Manitoban or in other contemporary accounts of the discussions preceding Treaty 1. Significantly, there is little evidence before the Commission to indicate that the Indians of Treaty 1 were ravaged by the

269 R. v. Johnston (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749 at 752–53, 56 WWR 565, 49 CR 203 (Sask. CA), Culliton CJS.
epidemics preceding the treaty in the manner that the Indians of other treaty areas were. Indeed, the oral history recounted by Oliver Nelson stated that Roseau River’s leaders did not want Canadian medical aid, and that they accepted it only to satisfy the members of other bands.

Furthermore, there are sound reasons for suggesting that medical aid was likely not contemplated by the parties to Treaty 1. At the forefront of the Indians’ concerns during the negotiations were matters such as land, annuities, ongoing hunting, fishing, and trapping rights, and the provision of farming implements to ease the conversion from the traditional way of life based on the buffalo hunt to an agrarian-based economy. Unlike hunting, fishing, and trapping, medical aid in the sense contemplated by this inquiry was not the product of long-practised traditional pursuits of an aboriginal people; if it existed at all in 1871, Canadian medical aid on the prairies was virtually non-existent and, in all probability, not something that the Indian negotiators would have fought assiduously to acquire as a promise from Canada. It is inappropriate to impose modern-day notions of medical aid on the parties bargaining in 1871 when there were likely no hospitals, few if any doctors, and limited access to medicines of any sort in Manitoba at that time. Any medical aid that might have been available would have had to be provided by the newly arrived Canadian authorities, who themselves would have had little or no capability of delivering it.

While I appreciate the First Nation’s arguments regarding the significance of the approach made by the Pembina bands to Molyneux St John in September 1872, the delivery of the Prince affidavit in January 1873, and Deputy Superintendent Spragge’s letter of July 18, 1873, directing the delivery of “[m]edicines for the sick,” I do not consider any of these facts to be decisive. Although the Pembina bands claimed medical assistance under treaty, St John recalled no promise of this sort when the treaty was made, and he reportedly advised the Indians that they “[m]ust take care of their own sick.” Similarly, when Spragge’s instructions are considered in the context of his statement that “St. John [had] particularized the presents which it was understood that Governor Archibald & Commr. Simpson had promised should be given,” I see Canada’s point that it is not clear whose understanding was being identified. Spragge’s letter is inconclusive; it is not the express confirmation of medical aid as a treaty promise that the First Nation would have the Commission find it to be. It is true that the Roseau River Band did not pay medical expenses from its own trust funds for some 38 years following the treaty, but in the early years, before the arrival of non-aboriginal
doctors and hospitals, band members may have continued to rely on traditional healing practices. Later, when Canadian medical aid became available, the people of Roseau River may have paid for such services from their personal financial resources on hand, or the Crown may have paid medical expenses from general appropriations until it considered, after the 1903 surrender, that the Band’s trust accounts contained sufficient funds to pay some of those expenses.

Even if St John’s recommendation did include medical aid, I would find it surprising for him to have made such a recommendation as a proposed fulfilment of a treaty promise when that would have directly and expressly contradicted his earlier statements. I consider it more probable that, if St John recommended medical aid, he would have done so in the spirit of the recommendations of the Board of Indian Commissioners in 1874, on which he participated as secretary and as the only person who had actually attended the treaty negotiations. At that time, the board members sought to prepare a new list of concessions on a “without prejudice” basis that, had it been placed before and accepted by the Indians, would have resolved the outside promises problem. In my view, the Board’s recommendations represented a proposal for settlement rather than an enumeration of treaty promises. As such, those recommendations went beyond the scope of the written form of the “treaty,” but also beyond the memorandum of outside promises prepared by Archibald, Simpson, McKay, and St John in the fall of 1871. I consider the idea of a settlement proposal entirely consistent with St John’s report on October 22, 1873, that the Indians, having by that time learned of the more favourable terms granted under Treaty 3, “said there could be no satisfaction about the matter until I or some one else was authorized to re-arrange the bargain.”

Application of Legal Principles to the Facts of This Case
Where does this reasoning leave us? Under general principles of law, a claimant must adduce sufficient evidence to make his or her case, in the absence of which the claim will fail. Similarly, the Specific Claims Policy stipulates that “the actual amount which the claimant is offered will depend on the extent to which the claimant has established a valid claim, the burden of which rests

with the claimant.” 271 Given the equivocality of the evidence, I cannot conclude that the First Nation has established medical aid to have been a treaty promise.

What, then, am I to make of the principles of treaty interpretation that direct me to interpret treaty provisions generously, with ambiguities or doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians? Do these principles apply only where there is an express written or oral statement, the meaning of which the parties dispute, or do the principles extend to situations in which there is doubt whether a promise was made in the first place? In other words, do the principles mean that, where the evidence is not clear whether a treaty includes a particular term, the scales are to be tipped in favour of a First Nation to find that a treaty obligation exists?

I do not think the cases go that far. In my view, although Lamer J in Sioui stated that the five factors mentioned in R. v. Taylor and Williams “may be just as useful in determining the existence of a treaty as in interpreting it,” I have already applied those factors with a view to determining whether a treaty term of medical aid existed. The factors did not resolve that question. I believe that it is only once a term has been found to exist, albeit ambiguously, that the liberal principles of treaty interpretation can be applied to resolve the ambiguity and give meaning to that term. Ambiguity can arise either on the face of the document or, even if it appears that the document is clear on its face, from the historical context. However, liberal principles of interpretation are not meant to create treaty terms where it has not been established that such terms were intended. As Binnie J wrote in Marshall, it is only because of the “special difficulties of ascertaining what in fact was agreed to” in cases involving Indian treaties that the courts are permitted to employ a flexible approach to treaty interpretation to determine “the existence of a treaty ... the completeness of any written record ... and the interpretation of treaty terms once found to exist.” 272

Even if it might be argued, however, that a generous interpretation of Treaty 1 in favour of the Indians would give rise to a treaty right to medical aid as of 1871, such a finding would not aid the First Nation’s cause, given my view of the 1875 amendment.

The 1875 Amendment
The 1875 amendment stipulated that Canada would

... raise the annual payment to each Indian under Treaties 1 and 2 from $3.00 to
$5.00 per annum, and make payment over and above such sum of $5.00 of $20.00
each and every year to each Chief and a suit of clothing every three years to each
Chief and each Headman, allowing two Headmen to each Band, on the express
understanding, however, that each Chief or other Indian who shall receive such
increased annuity or annual payment, shall be held to abandon all claim
whatever against the Government in connection with the so-called “outside
promises” other than those contained in the memorandum [of outside promises]
attached to the Treaty.273

By Roseau River’s own admission, medical aid was, at least initially, an
outside promise. There is no mention of medical aid in the written form of
Treaty 1 as approved by the Order in Council dated September 12, 1871, and
Oliver Nelson acknowledged that “any agreements made and agreed to in the
negotiations of the Treaty of 1871 that were outside the draft treaty docu-
ment, were the outside promises.”274 Similarly, by arguing that medical aid
ceased to be an outside promise by virtue of its being recognized and imple-
mented as a treaty right by Deputy Superintendent Spragge, counsel has tac-
itly conceded that medical aid started out as an outside promise.275

Since the 1875 amendment clearly and unambiguously provided that all
promises other than those contained in the memorandum of outside
promises were deemed to be abandoned, and since medical aid was not
referred to in the memorandum of outside promises, medical aid ceased to
exist as a treaty promise (if it ever did exist) after 1875. In fact, the precise
nature and effect of the 1875 amendment turns on whether medical aid is
considered to have been a treaty promise in 1871. In my view, the status of
medical aid as a treaty right was unclear between 1871 and 1875 because
the parties failed to identify the outside promises adequately. In 1875, the
parties resolved the confusion by agreeing, in consideration for a $2 increase
in annuities, that only those outside promises expressly listed in the memo-
randum of outside promises would be treated as treaty promises. It was only
at that time that the memorandum of outside promises became part of the
treaty. As a result, the 1875 amendment amounted to a clarification of
uncertain treaty terms rather than an extinguishment of existing treaty
terms.

Emphasis added.
274 Oliver J. Nelson (Ka-no-nace, Ma-ka-wa [Bear Clan]), "Presentation to the Indian Specific Claims Commission
275 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, pp. 46–47.
In so saying, I have carefully considered Roseau River’s arguments regarding the significance of the fact that the April 30, 1875, Order in Council signed by the Indians made no explicit reference to a treaty right to medical aid being terminated as a result of the amendment. I have also considered the First Nation’s submissions challenging the efficacy of the 1875 amendment. With respect, I cannot agree with those submissions. I see no evidence to suggest that the transaction was unconscionable or that it was procured through undue influence. It is difficult to reconcile the First Nation’s submission that the Indian negotiators – who, with the experience gained in previous treaty discussions in the United States, had been able to push Canada’s negotiators to make various concessions on the evening of August 2, 1871 – were nevertheless unaware of and unable to protect their own interests when the time came to amend Treaty 1. They knew that the 1875 amendment was intended to settle what constituted a treaty right, they knew the issues they wanted resolved in reaching such a settlement, and they must be presumed to have known that, for any particular item to remain as a treaty right, it would have to be included in the finite list of promises contained in the 1871 treaty and the memorandum of outside promises.

As for the “severe disparity” between the $2 per capita increase in annuities – which counsel for the First Nation conceded to be “a sizeable sum in that day”\textsuperscript{276} – and the benefits purportedly being waived, with respect, it must be remembered, as I have already stated, that the term “medical aid” would have had a very limited meaning in the newly created province of Manitoba. Unlike a pre-existing aboriginal right, medical aid came into existence, if at all, only in 1871 and was dependent on Canada for delivery. Moreover, medical aid was completely undefined in 1871 and, as of 1875, when the treaty was amended, there would have been little opportunity for it to have evolved. It was clearly not front and centre during the treaty negotiations, and the parties plainly did not consider it to be a key bargaining point like land or annuities. Medical aid, if it was considered at all, appears to have been an item of much less significance, given that there were few, if any, hospitals or doctors in the region at that time available to either the aboriginal or the non-aboriginal population. Oliver Nelson stated that the members of the Roseau River Band, and even some non-aboriginals, considered Indian medicines superior to those of the white men, and that they agreed to accept medical aid as a treaty term only to satisfy the missionaries and the members

\textsuperscript{276} Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 45.
of other bands.\textsuperscript{277} Therefore, it is not appropriate to suggest that the parties in 1875 would have considered the Indian signatories to Treaty 1, in giving up their treaty right, if any, to medical aid, to be forgoing the broad range of products and services that exist today. Assuming that medical aid had been a treaty term and survived the 1875 amendment, it might then make sense to consider how medical services might have evolved to the present, but in my view those are not the facts before us.

The First Nation also suggests that, by failing to be candid and honest or to disclose that the 1875 amendment “extinguished” a treaty right to medical aid, Canada breached fiduciary duties to the Roseau River Band. However, as I have already stated, in my view it was less than clear that medical aid had been recognized and enforced as a treaty right as of 1871. Given St John’s statements to the Pembina bands and to Howe, there may have been no reason for Canada’s representatives to think that medical aid had even been promised in 1871, much less that the 1875 amendment would have the effect of terminating it.

Moreover, I do not believe it is necessary to interpret the 1875 amendment against Canada as the party that drafted it because I do not consider it to be ambiguous. The signatories to Treaty 1 – the Indians and Canada alike – knew that there were disputed terms and that there could be no “satisfaction” until the treaty was “rearranged.” For this reason, the amendment was drafted in a positive way to enumerate the rights to be conferred by the treaty – from that point constituted by the 1871 document as supplemented by the memorandum of outside promises – rather than by attempting to exhaustively exclude those items to which the parties may or may not have agreed in the first place. It is difficult to comprehend how Canada could have agreed on specific promises to be terminated in 1875 without, at the same time, implicitly acknowledging that those promises had been made in 1871.

In addition to seeing nothing confusing in the language of the 1875 amendment, I am aware of no evidence to suggest the presence of further oral promises at that time which might be viewed as altering the terms of the 1875 amendment. By all accounts, the Indians with whom Morris and Provencher met in 1875 to execute the amendment celebrated its signing, and I see no reason to “read it down” or interpret it other than in accordance with its plain meaning.

\textsuperscript{277} Oliver J. Nelson (Ka-no-nace, Ma-ka-wa [Bear Clan]), “Presentation to the Indian Specific Claims Commission on the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation’s Claims,” July 14, 1998, p. 13 (ICC Exhibit 5).
I do not consider the Crown’s approach to drafting the amendment to have been intellectually dishonest or to have lacked the sort of candour and honesty that marks the honourable relationship of a fiduciary to his principal. In my view, Spragge’s letters in 1873 did not have the effect of transforming medical aid from a simple outside promise to an implemented and enforceable term of treaty. If medical aid was a treaty term, it would have been a treaty term as of August 3, 1871, and nothing Spragge did in 1873 would have changed that fact. Similarly, the recommendation by the Board of Indian Commissioners in 1874, although stipulating “[a] supply of simple medicines to be provided for each Reserve, and placed in the custody of some suitable person,” merely represented a proposal for settlement in which the outside promises were expressly not recognized “in their entirety.” I do not consider the Board’s recommendation to have sufficiently “confirmed” medical aid as a treaty promise such that it could be said, without reservation, that medical aid would no longer have been one of the terms contemplated and terminated by the 1875 amendment. To the contrary, the fact that the Board of Indian Commissioners even referred to medicines implies that, from Canada’s perspective at least, the issue of medicines and medical aid did not yet constitute a treaty promise.

In summary, I conclude that the 1875 amendment was implemented to resolve the confusion surrounding the terms of Treaty 1, and that the effect of the amendment was simply to clarify the treaty. However, even if Treaty 1 and the circumstances surrounding it are liberally interpreted in a manner in which the Commission might be prepared to find a treaty obligation on Canada’s part to provide medical aid, the clear and unambiguous terms of the 1875 amendment, as executed by the Band, nevertheless had the effect of terminating that obligation. Subject to my comments below regarding the manner in which Canada has handled medical aid under the terms of the Indian Act, the facts appear to support Canada’s contention that it has always treated medical aid as a matter of policy, with those bands having financial means being required to some extent to pay for their own medical care.

Applicability of the Treaty 6 “Medicine Chest” Clause to the Treaty 1 Area
Before turning to the issues arising out of the Indian Act, the 1903 surrender, and detrimental reliance, it now remains to determine whether the right to a “medicine chest” under Treaty 6 might be considered to extend beyond the boundaries of Treaty 6 to another treaty area such as Treaty 1.
Perhaps the strongest basis for concluding that the “medicine chest” clause should have extraterritorial application is Lieutenant Governor Archibald’s opening statement at the treaty negotiations:

First, your Great Mother, the Queen, wishes to do justice to all her children alike. She will deal fairly with those of the Setting Sun, just as she would with those of the Rising Sun.... In everything else that the Queen shall do for you, you must understand that she can do for you no more than she has done for her children in the East. If she were to do more for you, that would be unjust to them. She will not do less for you, because you are all her children alike, and she must treat you all alike.278

The following day – July 28, 1871 – after much discussion, Archibald asked the assembled Indians whether they were prepared “to accept the terms offered, which were the same as those given Canadian Indians already treated with, viz. a small annuity to each family, to last as long as the sun shines, as much land as is allowed to their brethren in Canada, the reserves to be chosen by the Indians themselves.”279 When the treaty negotiations had not concluded by July 31, Commissioner Simpson remarked that, “[a]s to dealing with those Indians on the same terms as their brethren in the East, not only did they propose to do that, but actually the terms offered were if anything more favorable than any before offered for Indian land by the Government of Canada.”280 Archibald added:

The Queen wants her red subjects to have a home and offers them one, and offers them, besides, advantages which she does not give to her white subjects. If a white man comes here to cultivate a farm, he gets nothing from the Government, whereas the Indians are not only promised farms, but also get a bounty from the Government. We have offered here terms which has [sic] been accepted by all the Indians in the East, who are ten times as numerous as these here. Is the Indian in this country so much better than the Indian of the Lake of the Woods, or Lake Superior, that he must receive better terms? Is the Indian of this Province better than the Indian in Minnesota or elsewhere in the States? We are, in fact, offering here better terms than are offered

278 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, July 27, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 5, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 338–39 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).

279 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, July 28, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 344–5 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).

280 Wemys Simpson, Indian Commissioner, July 31, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 350 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
to Canadian Indians, and to those of the United States, and our Indians will not, unless they are foolish, receive [sic] the offer we make them.281

Correspondence shows that Archibald and Simpson merely promised the Treaty 1 Chiefs that their people would be treated at least as well as the Indians with whom Canada had already treated in Ontario and points eastward. Although it might be inferred from their comments that all Indians were to be treated alike, I cannot believe that Archibald and Simpson would have been prepared to assume an obligation of that sort when they were obviously not in a position to know the future terms to which Canada might commit. Moreover, some treaty terms simply do not translate well from one treaty area to another, given the wide variations in the types of land being ceded, where land was ceded at all, and the disparate needs and desires of the aboriginal parties to the various treaties.

The foregoing comments might suggest that the signatories to later treaties would benefit from the groundwork laid in earlier negotiations. However, the cases also suggest that treaty terms may be limited in their geographic extent. On this point, I note the following comments of Cory J in Badger in distinguishing the rights of Indians under various treaties:

Second, because the various treaties affected by the NRTA [Natural Resources Transfer Agreement] contain different wording, the extent of the treaty right to hunt on privately owned land may well differ from one treaty to another. While some treaties contain express provisions with respect to hunting on private land, others, such as Treaty No. 8, do not.282

The implication is that the “medicine chest” clause should not be considered portable from Treaty 6 territory to the Treaty 1 area because of the differences in wording between the two treaties.

Finally, I note that, in Beattie v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), the plaintiffs sought to be reimbursed for certain costs of their children’s education under the education clause of Treaty 11. However, Tremblay-Lamer J of the Federal Court, Trial Division, held that the benefits conferred by the clause do not extend beyond the boundaries of the treaty area:

281 Adams G. Archibald, Lieutenant Governor, Province of Manitoba, July 31, 1871, as quoted in the Manitoban, August 12, 1871 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 4); see also the appendix in D.J. Hall, “‘A Serene Atmosphere’? Treaty 1 Revisited” (1984), 4 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 321 at 351 (ICC Exhibit 8, tab 3).
It is clear from Commissioner Conroy’s remarks in the foregoing paragraph that the bands’ main concern was to obtain both medical attendance and schools at each post. It was certainly not expected that the children would go to school in a distinct area or a different country. The benefits were negotiated by the bands at each post for the benefit of the respective communities.

It can properly be inferred, in my opinion, given the context in which Treaty No. 11 was negotiated, that the schools as well as the medical attendance were required in the geographical area defined in the treaty. This view is reinforced by an overview of the other provisions of Treaty No. 11. The key provisions in the treaty all relate to the geographical boundaries as described therein:

Paragraph 1  The parties are the Crown and the Indians.
Paragraph 3  Inhabitants of the territories within the defined area.
Paragraph 5  Surrender of rights title and privileges to the lands included in the defined area.
Paragraphs 6 and 17  The defined area.
Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11  Reserves within the boundaries.
Paragraph 19  Obey the law within the defined area.

I agree with Counsel for the Defendant that, in view of these provisions, one must conclude that the logical interpretation of the education provision is that benefit would be provided only within the defined area. 283

I perceive from a review of Treaty 6 a similar intention to restrict the application of its terms to the geographic limits of the territory described in it.

In conclusion, I cannot find that medical aid constituted a treaty right. In so saying, I should not be taken as concluding that some entitlement to medical aid has not grown up over time as a matter of prescriptive right, given Canada’s long history of providing medical aid without charge and the resulting expectation among First Nations that such services would continue to be provided at no charge to the Indians. However, the Commission has not been asked to address this question, and I therefore make no further comment on it.

**Issue 2  Breach of the Indian Act**
Did the deductions constitute a breach of any statutory provision by Canada?

283 Beattie v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1998] 2 CNLR 5 at 15. Emphasis added.
During the entire period to which this claim relates, payments for medical aid from band funds have been governed by various statutory provisions in force from time to time. As noted, these provisions, which have remained remarkably consistent over the years, first appeared in 1869 with An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42 – the legislation in effect when Treaty 1 was signed. Section 8 of that statute stated:

8. The Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in cases where sick or disabled, or aged and destitute persons are not provided for by the tribe, band or body of Indians of which they are members, may furnish sufficient aid from the funds of each tribe, band or body, for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute persons.284

The 1869 legislation was replaced in 1876 by the Indian Act. The new section 73 dealing with medical aid was virtually identical to the former section 8, except that the references to “tribe” and “body of Indians” were subsumed in a broader definition of the term “band.”285 When the Revised Statutes of Canada appeared in 1886, the wording of the new section 74 changed slightly, but the meaning and intent appear to have remained unaltered.286

By 1909, when Canada commenced deductions for medical aid from the Roseau River Band’s interest account, the Indian Act had been subject to further amendment in the 1906 statute. The provision for medical aid, however, continued in much the same form:

92. The Superintendent General may ...  
(d) whenever sick or disabled, or aged or destitute Indians are not provided for by the band of which they are members, furnish sufficient aid from the funds of the band for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute Indians.287

Section 95(d) of the 1927 Indian Act, which still governed when the deductions from Roseau River’s interest account ceased in 1934, repeated the 1906 legislation word for word.288

284 An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, SC 1869, c. 6, s. 8.
285 Indian Act, SC 1876, c. 18, ss. 3(1) and 73.
286 Indian Act, RSC 1886, c. 43, s. 74.
287 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 92(d).
288 Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 95(d).
In the context of these statutory terms, Roseau River contends that Canada’s submissions disclose the government’s acceptance of the principle that it must have legislative authority to deal with the funds in a band’s trust accounts. However, counsel argues that, although Canada claims to have been authorized by the Indian Act to use the Band’s trust funds for medical expenses, the legislation does not support such a claim. The implication of this position is that, “[b]ecause these monies were held in trust for the benefit of the Band and could not be used or removed by the Government of Canada except pursuant to legislative authority, Canada acted unlawfully and in breach of the specific terms of the Indian Act and amendments thereto.”

Counsel characterizes Canada’s relationship with the First Nation vis-à-vis these funds as “trustee-like,” and submits that the onus lies with Canada to justify its actions in dealing with the funds. Ultimately, assuming that Canada is unable to establish legislative authority for the deductions, the First Nation urges the Commission to conclude that those payments were unlawful and should be returned to the First Nation in present-day dollars, together with interest.

Looking specifically at section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act, counsel submits that it is limited to emergencies and is not intended to provide for the systematic delivery of medical services to a band. Moreover, although Roseau River acknowledges that requiring Indians or bands to pay for their own medical services when they could afford to do so was, in fact, government policy when the deductions were made from the First Nation’s interest account between 1909 and 1934, the First Nation denies that this policy was based on or authorized by section 92(d). Relying on Dreaver, in which Angers J concluded that a “deaf and dumb” child was not a sick or disabled person within the meaning of section 92(d), the First Nation submits that the manner in which Angers J applied the legislation demonstrates that “the section has specific application on a case-by-case basis to specific circumstances and specific individuals.” In the present case, counsel argues that Roseau River was never asked to pay for, nor indeed was even notified of, any of the deducted medical expenses; rather, the deductions were simply made in fur-

293 ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 56 (Andrew Kelly).
therance of “a policy of paying for medical services and where the money was in the account, deducting it, or paying it straight from the account.”

Highlighting the “attractive coincidence” between the release of the Dreaver decision in 1935 and the termination of deductions from Roseau River’s interest account – given that the account’s balances remained high even after the deductions stopped – counsel notes that Angers J ordered Canada to repay the sum charged to the Mistawasis Band “based entirely on what is a proper interpretation of Section 92 [and] ... without regard to whether or not there was a treaty right to medical assistance under Treaty No. 6.”

Canada takes quite a different view of section 92(d), arguing that the language of the section was clear and unambiguous in stipulating that the government could provide assistance to sick Indians. Moreover, counsel adds, the legislation included “no requirement ... to provide notice to a band before, during or after using such funds for medical aid.” As for the First Nation’s submission that section 92(d) is limited to assisting “individuals” in “emergencies,” counsel contends that the word “individual” does not appear in the section; rather, “[w]hat appears is a clear provision that whenever sick Indians are not provided for, sufficient aid from the funds of the Band can be utilized.”

Finally, with respect to Dreaver, Canada submits that the case merely applied to an “arguable set of facts” in which the Exchequer Court was asked to decide whether the deaf girl was a sick or disabled Indian.

The Indian Act sections contain a number of elements that require discussion.

“Sufficient Aid from the Funds of the Band for ... Relief”

Although Canada submits that the “statutory language sets out clearly and with no ambiguity Canada’s authority to furnish medical aid to sick Indians,” the relevant sections actually speak in terms of “sufficient aid from the funds of the band for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute Indians” and do not use the term “medical aid” at all. With regard to the

294 ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 57 (Andrew Kelly).
296 ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 59 (Andrew Kelly).
phrase “sufficient aid from the funds of the band,” I have little doubt that the legislative draftsmen meant “band trust money.” It is notable, however, that “relief” is intended to assist not just sick Indians but others who, by virtue of being disabled, elderly, or simply too poor, are similarly unable to provide for themselves. The question, then, is whether the legislation really contemplated medical aid at all, or whether it was intended merely to assist Indians incapable of meeting their day-to-day needs for staples such as food, clothing, and shelter.

Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defines relief as “[t]he public or private assistance or support, pecuniary or otherwise, granted to indigent persons,” and the Canadian Law Dictionary speaks in terms of “[t]he assistance or support granted to indigent persons pursuant to appropriate enactments.” Likewise, the Canadian Oxford Dictionary gives one interpretation of relief as “financial and other assistance given to the poor from government funds,” and the New Oxford Dictionary of English explains the term to mean “assistance, especially in the form of food, clothing, or money, given to those in special need or difficulty.”

Considered in isolation, these definitions project images of government-funded welfare for lower-income members of society. However, the Indian Act is more broadly worded to provide assistance to sick, disabled, and aged Indians as well as the poor. In these circumstances, alternative definitions may be more appropriate. The Canadian Oxford Dictionary also defines relief in more general terms as “the alleviation of or deliverance from pain, distress, anxiety, etc.” and “assistance given to those in special need or difficulty (disaster relief fund),” while the New Oxford Dictionary of English employs similar terminology, referring to “the alleviation of pain, discomfort, or distress.” In Coalition of Manitoba Motorcycle Groups Inc. v. Manitoba (Public Utilities Board), Twaddle JA of the Manitoba Court of Appeal distinguished relief in the legal context, where it typically signifies the remedies sought by a party to an action, from relief in a more general sense: “the word [relief] also means ‘alleviation of some burden’ and ‘deliverance from some hardship, burden, or grievance; remedy, redress’” and “anything that offers a
pleasing change’ (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 3rd College Ed. 1988).”309 Moreover, in considering the conceptually similar “relief grant” in the context of social assistance legislation, Linden JA on behalf of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v. Fillion wrote:

The phrase “relief grant” ... suggests financial assistance that is given to alleviate hardship. Hardship certainly includes, but is not confined to, circumstances of personal destitution, emergency, or disaster. Hardship may also comprise the broader circumstances of financial or other adversity, not necessarily amounting to destitution, emergency or disaster.310

What I take from these sources is that relief can have “specialized” meanings applying in particular circumstances such as law or welfare, but it can also have a broader application. In the present case, in my view, the legislation speaks not of providing Indians with “relief” in a specialized sense, but in the more general sense of providing “sufficient aid from the funds of the band for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute Indians.” Accordingly, I see this case as one in which the term “relief” can include relief in a medical sense.

**Relief for Emergencies on a Case-by-Case Basis**

The First Nation has relied on Dreaver as authority for the proposition that section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and section 95(d) of the 1927 statute were intended to apply on a case-by-case basis to Indians in emergency situations, and not under a general policy of providing medical services at the expense of the band. A review of the legislation shows that it permitted the Superintendent General to apply band funds for relief purposes “whenever sick or disabled, or aged or destitute Indians are not provided for by the band of which they are members.”

Assuming that there is no treaty right to medical aid, this provision implies that the initial responsibility for assuring the health and welfare of band members – in the late 1800s and early 1900s – rested with the band. I consider that the use of the term “band” in this context meant not simply the band’s “corporate entity,” for want of a better term, but also the group of individuals – including the sick, disabled, aged, or destitute person – making up the band’s membership. The needy Indian contemplated by the legislation

309 Coalition of Manitoba Motorcycle Groups Inc. v. Manitoba (Public Utilities Board) (1995), 102 Man. R (2d) 155 at 159 (CA), Twaddle JA.
310 Canada (Attorney General) v. Fillion (1995), 189 NR 308 at 313 (Fed. CA), Linden JA.
had to look first to his own resources and to those of his family and fellow band members. It was only when the individual’s resources proved insufficient to address his needs that the Crown was permitted to apply the band’s trust funds to the relief of that individual. As counsel for the First Nation states, section 92(d) “anticipates someone being left out in the cold by a Band that actually has the money to provide support, and in those circumstances, it allows the Government to step in and provide aid or relief from the Band’s funds.”

Thus, the legislative requirement simply meant that, before a band’s trust funds could be employed to pay for medical services, the band had to have insufficient means on hand to assist the needy person; the section did not require that relief be made available only in emergency situations. I note, for example, that, in Dreaver, Angers J required the repayment of deductions for “care and tuition” made on behalf of Charlotte Sanderson, “who, in 1922, when about 8 1/2 years of age, was placed in a deaf and dumb institute in Manitoba, where she stayed until 1931 or thereabout.” Angers J relied solely on the basis that the child, although “deaf and dumb,” was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. I might have been reluctant, in similar circumstances, to come to the same conclusion regarding the meaning of the term “disabled,” but the more significant point is that Angers J said nothing about expenses for “care and tuition” falling outside the scope of the legislation. Clearly, “care and tuition” would not have constituted emergency expenditures, and I am not prepared to conclude that the legislation was so limited.

As for the First Nation’s argument that the legislation required expenses to be considered and approved on a case-by-case basis, I am not convinced that Dreaver’s implications are so far-reaching. Of course, each expense must meet the requirements of the section, and it is certainly open to a band to challenge the deductions made by Canada in a given case, just as the Mistawasis Band did in Dreaver. However, in my view, it was within Canada’s legislative discretion to fund a general program of medical care for the members of a given band from the band’s trust account, provided the other requirements of the legislation were met.

Finally, even if Roseau River is correct in its submission that the expenses must have been for emergency medical purposes assessed on a case-by-case basis, I would have difficulty impugning the deductions in this case. There is

311 ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 56 (Andrew Kelly).
312 Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 at 118 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
no evidence of the Crown having undertaken such case-by-case assessments, but, with the exception of one or two minor expenses for items such as eyeglasses, virtually all the expenses related to drugs, medicines, medical supplies, physicians’ attendances, and hospitalization charges. Although the evidence is not entirely clear, it does not appear that any of the expenses charged to Roseau River’s interest account related to the annual retainer of $80 paid to the various doctors designated to act as the Band’s physicians from time to time. In my view, the physicians’ attendance fees, hospitalization charges, and the costs of drugs and medicines must all be regarded as having been paid in response to perceived medical needs at the time, and, as such, they appear to satisfy the tests proposed by the First Nation in any event. This seems particularly true given Inspector Marlatt’s account of the Indian agents’ somewhat tightfisted approach in limiting doctors’ visits to the reserves to circumstances in which the agents – rather than the doctors or their patients – considered it “necessary.”

Consent

As we have seen, Roseau River contends that Canada deducted payments for medical aid from the Band’s interest account without consulting the Band or notifying it of those deductions. The question of whether Canada was obliged to consult or notify the Band before making those deductions arises not only in the context of the statutory provisions but also when considering Canada’s fiduciary relationship with the Band.

I have reviewed the legislative context and history of section 92(d) to determine whether the provision contemplates consent, consultation, or notice. In doing so, I have kept in mind the following comments of La Forest J in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band when he compared the principles involved in the construction of statutes with those relating to the interpretation of treaties:

I note at the outset that I do not take issue with the principle [in Nowegijick and other cases] that treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians. In the case of treaties, this principle finds its justification in the fact that the Crown enjoyed a superior bargaining position when negotiating treaties with native peoples. From the perspective of the Indians, treaties were drawn up in a foreign language, and incorporated references to legal concepts of a system of law with which Indians were unfamiliar. In the interpre-

tation of these documents it is, therefore, only just that the courts attempt to construe various provisions as the Indians may be taken to have understood them.

But as I view the matter, somewhat different considerations must apply in the case of statutes relating to Indians. Whereas a treaty is the product of bargaining between two contracting parties, statutes relating to Indians are an expression of the will of Parliament. Given this fact, I do not find it particularly helpful to engage in speculation as to how Indians may be taken to understand a given provision. Rather, I think the approach must be to read the Act concerned with a view to elucidating what it was that Parliament wished to effect in enacting the particular section in question. This approach is not a jettisoning of the liberal interpretative method. As already stated, it is clear that in the interpretation of any statutory enactment dealing with Indians, and particularly the Indian Act, it is appropriate to interpret in a broad manner provisions that are aimed at maintaining Indian rights, and to interpret narrowly provisions aimed at limiting or abrogating them. Thus if legislation bears on treaty promises, the courts will always strain against adopting an interpretation that has the effect of negating commitments undertaken by the Crown; see United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939), at p. 533.

At the same time, I do not accept that this salutary rule that statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favour of the Indians implies automatic acceptance of a given construction simply because it may be expected that the Indians would favour it over any other competing interpretation. It is also necessary to reconcile any given interpretation with the policies the Act seeks to promote.314

As the Commission commented in its report on the 1958 enfranchisement claim of the Friends of the Michel Society:

Thus, the principle is not simply that any construction favouring the Indians ought to be accepted, because we still, of course, demand fidelity to the language and purpose of the statute. Statutes relating to Indians should be construed liberally, having regard for parliamentary intent as embodied in the text...

In [R v.] Lewis, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the canons of interpretation of statutes relating to Indians, beginning with Nowegijick and Mitchell. The issue in Lewis was whether a band’s power under the Indian Act to make by-laws for the management of fish “on the reserve” extended to a river immediately adjacent to the reserve. Iacobucci J. for the Court, approached the task by analyzing the wording, context, and purpose of the statutory provision. Making the point that these three elements must be reconciled, he rejected the argument that a broad, purposive construction of the phrase “on the reserve” was justified because the fishery is critical to the economic and cultural well-being of aboriginal people, and the general goal of the Indian Act is to protect the “sustaining practices” of aboriginal people. Iacobucci J. stated that, although the suggested interpretation “goes further towards achieving Par-

314 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85 at 142-43, La Forest J.
liament’s objective of protecting and maintaining Indian rights, it is not an interpretation supported on the language or goal of the section. 315

In summary, then, while statutes dealing with Indians must be liberally construed, an interpretation that furthers the protection of Indian rights can be accepted only if the language and purpose of the statutory provision can support such an interpretation. 316

Section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and section 95(d) of the 1927 legislation both fell within the parts of the respective statutes entitled “Management of Indian Moneys” in which the powers of the government to deal with band funds were set forth. Section 90 of the 1906 Act, in the same part of the statute, provided for the expenditure of a band’s capital moneys, and required that such expenditures be made only with the band’s consent:

90. The Governor in Council may, with the consent of a band, authorize and direct the expenditure of any capital moneys standing at the credit of such band, in the purchase of land as a reserve for the band or as an addition to its reserve, or in the purchase of cattle for the band, or in the construction of permanent improvements upon the reserve of the band, or such works thereon or in connection therewith as, in his opinion, will be of permanent value to the band, or will, when completed, properly represent capital. 317

By 1927, in the interests of promoting progress, the section had been broadened to include the purchase of implements and machinery and to permit loans of up to one half of the value of lands held by a band member. Moreover, a new subsection was added to allow the Governor in Council to authorize expenses without the band’s consent:

93. ... 2. In the event of a band refusing to consent to the expenditure of such capital moneys as the Superintendent General may consider advisable for any of the purposes mentioned in subsection one of this section, and it appearing to the Superintendent General that such refusal is detrimental to the progress or welfare of the band, the Governor in Council may, without the consent of the band, authorize and direct the expenditure of such capital for such of the said purposes as may be considered reasonable and proper. 318

317 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 90. Emphasis added.
318 Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 93. Emphasis added.
By way of contrast, section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and section 95(d) of the 1927 version contain no similar stipulations regarding consent or the power to override a refusal of consent.

As we have seen, the first version of section 92(d) arose in 1869, but the Commission has been unable to find anything in the parliamentary Debates relating specifically to the genesis of that provision. Section 90 did not appear until 1894, when, as section 139, it was added as an amendment to the 1886 revised statutes. In explaining the rationale for the amendment, the legislative draftsmen wrote:

Section 139 is intended to remove doubt as to whether the Capital moneys, or part thereof, at the credit of a band can be expended even with the consent of the band and the authority of the Governor in Council. The Department has with such consent and authority been expending Capital for works of a permanent nature; but the point, it appears from the records of the Department, was taken in Council that the Governor in Council had no legal authority for sanctioning such payments, and the following section was drafted pursuant to the Minister’s directions.319

From these comments, it can be seen that Canada sought to fill a perceived gap in the Indian Act by enacting legislation to authorize capital expenditures already being made with the approval of both the band and the Governor in Council, but without legislative sanction. The matter of requiring the band’s consent in such circumstances appears never to have been questioned, given that such consent was solicited even before the legislation requiring it was enacted.

In 1895, Canada revised another provision of the Act – section 70 - dealing with the government’s expenditure of band funds. The amendments, in italics, provided that “[t]he Governor in Council ... may authorize and direct the expenditure of such moneys [arising from the disposal of Indian lands, and of property held or to be held in trust for Indians, or timber on Indian lands or reserves,) for the construction or repair of roads, bridges, ditches and watercourses on such reserves or lands, for the construction of schools, and by way of contribution to schools attended by such Indians.”320 The authors of the bill elaborated on the reasons for the amendment by stating:

320 An Act further to amend the Indian Act, SC 1895, c. 35, s. 2. Emphasis added.
It is necessary that the Governor in Council should have the power to expend the capital of a band in doing such work without the consent of the band; for otherwise roads leading through reserves might be allowed to get into such a condition as to detrimentally effect the interests of dwellers in neighboring settlements. And, if the Governor in Council has not power to build and support schools out of such money without the consent of the Indians, it will be in the hands of the Indians to impede the Indian educational policy of the Government.321

It can be seen by juxtaposing the commentary with the proposed amendment that the draftsmen considered it unnecessary to include wording such as “without the consent of the band,” provided the Governor in Council was given explicit power to authorize and direct the expenditure of capital. This view is in contrast with the addition of subsection (2) to section 93 of the statute in 1927, in which case the words “without the consent of the band” were needed to override the requirement in subsection (1) that the Governor in General should first attempt to obtain the band’s consent before spending capital moneys.

In 1897, recognizing that sections 70 and 139 each dealt with expenditures of a band’s capital moneys, the government proposed combining the two sections with section 74, the predecessor to section 92(d) of the 1906 Act. Had the amendment proceeded, it would have provided, among other things, as follows (excluding the words in italics):

[t]he Governor in Council ... may authorize and direct the expenditure of such mon- eys [arising from the disposal of Indian lands, and of property held or to be held in trust for Indians, or timber on Indian lands or reserves,] for the construction or repair of roads, bridges, ditches and watercourses, school or other buildings, or other permanent improvements upon the reserve of the band, or for such works including surveys thereon or in connection therewith as in his opinion will be of permanent value to the band or will when completed properly represent capital and may upon the refusal of a Band to sanction the same authorize such expenditure from Capital as will be of permanent value to the Band, or will when completed, properly represent Capital, or for the purchase of cattle for the band, or by way of contribution to schools attended by its children, and with the consent of the band for purchase of land as a reserve for the band or as an addition to its reserve; and the Superintendent General may, whenever sick or disabled, or aged or destitute Indians are not provided for by the band of which they are members, furnish sufficient aid from the funds of the band for the relief of such sick, disabled, aged or destitute Indians; and he may at any time authorize expenditure for general purposes from the

funds of the band of any sum not to exceed $500 when in his opinion it is in the best interests of the band to do so.\textsuperscript{322}

Another version of this proposed amendment – prepared by Duncan Campbell Scott as secretary of the department on November 15, 1897 – would have added the italicized words and, in substitution for the closing clause of the foregoing provision, language to the effect that, “[f]or general purposes of expenditure no sum under the amount of fifteen hundred dollars, standing at the credit of any Indian Band in the Books of the Department of Indian Affairs, shall be accounted as Capital, and expenditure from such sums under the amount of fifteen hundred [dollars] may be authorized by the Superintendent General for the benefit and in the interest of the Bands owning such sums.” In commenting on the first of these proposals, the legislative draftsman wrote:

There seems an unnecessary distinction between the nature of the expenditure which under Section 70 may be authorized by the Governor in Council without consent of the band, and that which under Section 139, requires such consent, the necessity for obtaining which might result in Indians blocking important works, required in the best interests of the band. It is proposed therefore to amalgamate these sections, and empower the Governor General in Council to authorize without the Band’s consent expenditure of capital on permanent improvements or other works which in his opinion will be of permanent value to the band, or when completed properly represent capital, also on surveys and other as well as school buildings.\textsuperscript{323}

Scott’s commentary on the second proposal also addressed the provision for needy Indians:

The reasons for these suggestions are briefly as follows. The occasion might arise when most important improvements of a public character on an Indian reserve might be opposed and altogether prevented by the Indians. In such a case I think the Governor General in Council should have power to authorize the expenditure without the consent of the Band. I think it advisable to submit expenditures for all purposes except those specially mentioned in the clause to the Band, as it will then be evident that the Superintendent General or the Governor in Council do not wish to act in an arbitrary way; but in cases of special need, where a Band refuses to vote money in its

\textsuperscript{322} The first proposed amendment is found in “Memorandum for the Minister in re Proposed Amendment of the Indian Act,” undated, NA, RG 10, vol. 6809, file 470-2-3, pt 4, pp. 9 ff. The second proposal is located in D.C. Scott, Secretary, “Suggestions as to Amendments to the Indian Act,” November 15, 1897, NA, RG 10, vol. 6809, file 470-2-3, pt 4, pp. 2–3.

own interests the Governor in Council should have power to take it without their consent.

The only cases in which the clause provides for action by the Superintendent General without the consent of his Excellency in Council or the Indians are the provision of relief and aid for sick and destitute Indians and the expenditure of amounts for general purposes out of Indian funds not aggregating more than $1500.00. The reason for the 1st authority is self-evident. The reason for the 2nd is that the Department is constantly receiving from various sources, principally from Manitoba and the N.W.T. small amounts for deposit for the credit of Indian Bands. It is desirable to spend these amounts from time to time in the purchase of implements and cattle, or in some other way conducive to the general welfare of the Band. At present where the amount arises from timber or any source which represents Capital, the amount cannot be spent without the consent of the Band, and the authority of His Excellency in Council. It would greatly simplify matters if the Department were able to spend such sums for the improvement of the Indians without such routine, and fixing the amount over and above which the sums standing at the credit of Indian Band shall be considered Capital would bring all amounts under that figure within the general usage of the Department, and they could then be spent with Departmental authority.324

Although these legislative proposals never received parliamentary approval, it seems evident from the tone of the comments that the government differentiated expenditures on certain capital items from expenditures to provide for needy band members. Clearly, the enumerated capital expenditures required band approval unless the Governor in Council authorized a band’s refusal to be overridden, but just as clearly Parliament never intended to require a band’s consent for expenditures on relief of sick, disabled, aged, or destitute Indians. Indeed, Scott considered it “self-evident” that approval should not be required, presumably given that, in such cases, the health and welfare of the band member – and possibly the need for immediate action – were the primary concerns.

In conclusion, although the interpretation suggested by Roseau River for section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and the succeeding section 95(d) favours the First Nation’s position in this case, care must be taken, as La Forest J directs in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, to reconcile the interpretation of the legislation with the policy that the statute seeks to promote. Moreover, to use the words of Iacobucci J in Lewis, I must also ensure that my interpretation is supported by the language and purpose of the legislation.

In my view, Parliament’s intent in enacting the legislation was to provide for sick, disabled, aged, and destitute band members out of the band’s trust

funds when the band was otherwise unable to provide for those band members out of its resources on hand. It is apparent that, when considered in its historical context, the legislation did not require the Superintendent General to seek a band’s consent to employ the band’s trust funds for such purposes.

In reaching this result, it is important to point out that Canada did not misappropriate band funds for non-band purposes: the expenses challenged in this case were applied strictly for the care of sick members of the Roseau River Band. For these reasons it is difficult to conclude other than that the deductions were in the best interests of the Band – and, without doubt, in the interests of those sick band members for whom the expenses were incurred. Accordingly, I find that the deductions were authorized by, and consistent with the intent of, the legislation.

That being said, however, I am not without concern regarding the manner in which Canada purported to exercise its statutory powers. In particular, I would note that, although section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and section 95(d) of the succeeding statute did not require a band’s consent to expenditures for medical aid from its trust account, the deductions in this case were made without even providing notice to the Roseau River Band; members of the First Nation did not discover the deductions until the early 1980s, when they inadvertently stumbled across the medical aid expenses from their trust accounts while researching their claim arising from the 1903 surrender of reserve land. Although the deductions were recorded in the public accounts, those accounts were never brought specifically to the First Nation’s attention, nor do I understand them to have been readily available to band members at the time. Even if they had been readily available, band members had no reason to ask to see records of the medical expenses being charged to their trust accounts if they had no inkling that such deductions were being made in the first place.

There are other concerns as well. As I will discuss further below, there is evidence to suggest that, while Canada has often articulated a policy – apparently based on the legislation – of making bands with financial resources pay for their own medical expenses, the federal government has not consistently applied that policy at all times or with regard to all bands. In most cases, Canada appears to have paid for medical aid without charge to the bands, and still pays medical expenses for even those Indians who appear able to pay their own way. Moreover, Canada seems to have been reluctant to advise bands that, from the federal government’s perspective, medical services have been provided not as a treaty right, but as a matter of policy. Even assuming
that Canada is correct in this view, this approach to the delivery and communication of government policy has fostered an environment reinforcing the Indian position that medical aid is a treaty right to be provided by the government at no cost to bands or the aboriginal population.

I will address these concerns more fully later in my reasons. First, I must consider the First Nation’s arguments that the deductions constituted a breach of the terms of the 1903 surrender or that, in the alternative, the deductions were improper, given that the Band had come to rely on government-funded medical care to the detriment of its own traditional healing practices.

**Issue 3 Breach of the 1903 Surrender**

Did Canada breach the terms of the 1903 surrender by deducting amounts for medical aid from the Band’s interest account?

From a review of the trust records, it seems evident that the primary source of revenue in Roseau River’s interest account from 1906 to 1945 was interest on the proceeds of the 1903 surrender of a portion of IR 2. Apart from the medical aid claim arising in this inquiry, another issue raised by the First Nation in relation to the surrender is whether the surrender conformed with the technical requirements of the Indian Act or gave rise, by some other means, to an outstanding lawful obligation by Canada to the First Nation.

For the purposes of the present inquiry, the Commission has not been asked to rule on the validity or lawfulness of the 1903 surrender, and I will refrain from doing so. In the meantime, to enable me to consider whether the scope of the surrender would have permitted the deductions for medical aid, I must proceed on the assumption that the surrender was valid.

As we have seen, Roseau River surrendered reserve land in 1903 on the following terms:

> AND WE, the said Chief and Principal men of the said Roseau River Bands of Indians do, on behalf of our people and for ourselves, hereby ratify and confirm, and promise to ratify and confirm, whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered.\(^{325}\)

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In 1906, Superintendent General Frank Oliver directed that, to fulfill an implied promise made during the surrender negotiations, all future interest accruals on unpaid sale proceeds from the surrendered lands were to be deposited in the Band’s interest account for distribution to band members rather than capitalized.

From Roseau River’s perspective, the funds in the Band’s interest account were primarily interest accruals arising from the sale of the 12 square miles of reserve land surrendered in 1903. To the extent that the surrender was valid, the First Nation argues that such validity still does not signify the Band’s consent to Crown representatives using funds from the interest account to do with “as they wish ... including, using same to pay for the medical expenses of the Band.” Indeed, the First Nation contends that funding medical services using cash from the interest account represented a breach of the surrender, for three reasons: first, there were no written surrender terms expressly authorizing the use of surrender proceeds for medical expenses; second, to the extent that the surrender involved oral terms, Canada did not even argue that there was an oral term allowing surrender proceeds to be used for such purposes; and, third, the legislation of the day did not permit Canada to spend interest on the surrender proceeds on medical services.

Canada responds that the broad language of the surrender states, in clear and unambiguous terms, that the Band prospectively ratified and confirmed “whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered.” Counsel contends that Canada was given an extremely wide discretion as to how it might employ the proceeds of surrender, adding, with the support of Public History Inc., that “there is absolutely nothing in the surrender that prohibits anything, much less deduction of amounts for medical assistance.” Counsel also argues that the First Nation has failed to demonstrate that the proceeds of the surrender were, in fact, the funds from which the government drew for medical aid – the Public History Inc. report was inconclusive on this point – but that, even if they were, the deductions were authorized by the clear language of the surrender.

327 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 60.
328 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 60.
The First Nation replies that, while there was some money in the Band’s interest account before the surrender, by the time the deductions commenced in 1909, most of the money in the account would have come from the surrender.\footnote{ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 62 (Rhys Jones).} Although acknowledging that it cannot confirm whether the surrender proceeds formed the source of the deductions for medical aid – and that it cannot even differentiate among the sources of the funds in its trust account – the First Nation counters that, owing to Canada’s position as fiduciary vis-à-vis the First Nation and its trust funds, the responsibility for this inability to account for the commingled funds lies with Canada. In counsel’s submission,

it is the commingling that creates the situation out of which we say the Government of Canada no longer has the right to define its management or expenditure of money in the Band’s capital account just through the standard imposed by Section 92 of the Indian Act. It must now comport itself in such a way as to discharge the duties of a fiduciary in relation to that money, and that requires disclosure with respect to which there is no evidence on the record.\footnote{ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 64–65 (Rhys Jones).}

In other words, the First Nation contends that, if Canada cannot identify the various sources of the funds in the Band’s trust account, then, as a fiduciary dealing with those funds, Canada is impressed with the higher standard of conduct required of a fiduciary, rather than the less onerous standard contemplated by section 92(d) of the Indian Act.\footnote{Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.} That higher standard is derived from Guerin v. The Queen,\footnote{Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.} which, in counsel’s submission, establishes that, after the use and benefit of reserve land has been released to the Crown, Canada, as a fiduciary, is subject to “an enforceable duty to deal with the proceeds of sale or lease in strict observance to the nature of the arrangement between the Band and the Government in the procuring of the surrender.”\footnote{ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 63 (Rhys Jones).} Alternatively, even if the terms of the surrender ratified and confirmed whatever Canada “may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered,” the First Nation asserts that Canada’s actions still had to be lawful. As counsel stated:

\begin{enumerate}
    \item ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 62 (Rhys Jones).
    \item ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 67 (Rhys Jones).
    \item ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, pp. 64–65 (Rhys Jones).
    \item Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.
    \item ICC Transcript, March 25, 1999, p. 63 (Rhys Jones).
\end{enumerate}
But in the surrender itself, it says that the Roseau people are only going to ratify and confirm what the Government of Canada may do or cause to be lawfully done. So it takes us right back to the issue of whether or not deductions from the account under Section 92 were lawful or not.

If indeed it is the understanding of the Commissioners that Section 92 is a very specific and narrow authority for the Government to step in and make deductions in situations of extremis and is not a general authority to take money out in pursuit of its own policy to provide medical assistance to all Indians in the country, then we have also answered the question of whether or not the 1903 surrender was breached. Because if it’s not statutorily permitted, it also therefore constitutes a violation of the surrender, because the only thing the Roseau Indians are permitting them to do with it is something that is otherwise lawful.336

In reply, Canada submits that, even if a fiduciary duty did arise when the funds were commingled, that fact does not relieve the First Nation of the burden of establishing that the funds deducted for medical aid purposes were proceeds of the surrender, something even the Public History Inc. report was unable to resolve.337

The Commission has undertaken a thorough review of the interest account ledgers, and the results of this review are set forth in the table attached as Appendix B to this report. It can be seen from this table that, in each year during the period when deductions for medical aid were made from the interest account, interest represented the account’s largest source of income. Although it appears that, over the 43-year period covered by the table, there may have been sufficient “other” sources of revenue to fund the medical expenses incurred during that same period, such revenues were not sufficient to cover medical and “other” expenses, and, in four fiscal years, medical expenses alone exceeded “other” (non-interest) revenues. For these reasons, I conclude that interest on surrender proceeds was the primary source of the deductions for medical aid.

Having assumed that the surrender was valid and lawful, and having concluded that the medical aid deductions were funded largely from interest on the proceeds of the 1903 surrender, I must next address the scope of Canada’s authority to make the deductions under the terms of the surrender. Specifically, I must assess the ambit of the words “whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered.”

The Dreaver case provides a useful starting point for my analysis. In Dreaver, under two separate deeds of surrender dated August 8, 1919, the Mistawasis Band agreed to surrender a total of 16,548 acres of reserve land for sale at a combined price of $198,000 to such persons and on such terms as Canada might deem most conducive to the welfare of the Band. After the deduction of management fees, the sale proceeds were to be distributed in the following manner:

- $150 to be paid to each band member at the time of signing the surrender;
- 50 per cent of the sale proceeds to be deposited on account of capital to be used for the benefit of the Band by the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs;
- the remaining sale proceeds to be “placed to the credit of an account to be used at the discretion” of the Superintendent General to provide rations to old, sick, and destitute band members; to provide suitable houses, furniture, and clothing for old and destitute band members; to acquire houses, animals, and implements for young band members who might start farming; to provide compensation to any band member owning buildings or other improvements on the surrendered land; and to make interest-free loans to returning Indian soldiers to acquire homes, stables, animals, or implements; and
- interest accruing on all funds held in trust by the department for the Band to be distributed annually on or about February 1.

The evidence demonstrated that, among other things, Canada had used the Band’s trust funds to cover the salary of the Band’s farm instructor as well as police expenses for arresting trespassers and transporting prisoners to jail. In considering whether Canada should be ordered to repay these amounts to the Band, Angers J held that, although the 1906 Act “confers on the Governor General in Council very broad powers with regard to the investment of monies arising from the disposal of Indian lands ... it is subordinate in each case to the terms of the deed of surrender.” Nevertheless, he concluded that the challenged expenses were not authorized by the Indian Act, the treaty, or the surrenders, and he directed Canada to repay those amounts to the Band.338 He further held that the terms of the 1919 surrenders were “quite explicit and indicate[d] clearly the purposes for which the funds [were] to be used;

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338 Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 at 117 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
they contain[ed] no stipulation whatever concerning the payment of the salary of a stockman, farm instructor or farmer."\textsuperscript{339} Indeed, the department's own correspondence in 1928 suggested that it was not convinced that it was entitled to deduct the farm instructor's salary and intended to discontinue the practice.

In Dreaver, the surrenders specifically provided for "rations" for old, sick, and destitute band members, whereas the present surrender makes no such reference. Presumably because the surrenders in Dreaver referred only to "rations," whereas the Indian Act used the term "relief," Angers J considered that the provisions in the 1919 surrenders were "narrower" and, consequently, afforded less flexibility to the Crown than section 92(d).\textsuperscript{340} I agree. However, although the language of the surrender in the case before me makes no express reference to providing assistance to the sick, I see nothing in it to narrow the broad discretion conferred on the government in the earlier words of the surrender to apply the capital and interest arising from the sale of the surrendered lands. In my view, the present surrender is much broader and provides even more flexibility to the Crown than either section 92(d) or the surrender in Dreaver.

However, I must also have regard to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin,\textsuperscript{341} a case in which reserve land was surrendered to the Crown "to lease the same to such person or persons, and upon such terms as the Government of Canada may deem most conducive to our Welfare and that of our people." The surrender carried on to provide that the "Chief and Councillors of the said Musqueam Band of Indians do on behalf of our people and for ourselves, hereby ratify and confirm, and promise to ratify and confirm, whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done, in connection with the leasing thereof." It can be seen that the language of the Guerin surrender was similar to that in the present case, subject to one difference: whereas the words in Guerin were directed to Canada's discretion to manage the surrendered land for leasing purposes, under the Roseau River surrender the promise by the Chiefs and principal men to ratify and confirm "whatever the said Government may do, or cause to be lawfully done" related to "the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered." In my view, this difference is not significant. The Crown's broad discretion in the present case

\textsuperscript{339} Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 at 117 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
\textsuperscript{340} Dreaver v. The King (1935), 5 CNLC 92 at 120 (Ex. Ct), Angers J.
\textsuperscript{341} Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 355 at 369, Dickson, CJ.
relates to the capital and interest arising from the sale of the surrendered land and held by Roseau River in substitution for that land, so the same principles should apply.

In Guerin, Dickson CJ held:

[T]he Crown, in my view, was not empowered by the surrender document to ignore the oral terms which the Band understood would be embodied in the lease. The oral representations form the backdrop against which the Crown’s conduct in discharging its fiduciary obligation must be measured. They inform and confine the field of discretion within which the Crown was free to act. After the Crown’s agents had induced the Band to surrender its land on the understanding that the land would be leased on certain terms, it would be unconscionable to permit the Crown simply to ignore those terms. When the promised lease proved impossible to obtain, the Crown, instead of proceeding to lease the land on different, unfavourable terms, should have returned to the Band to explain what had occurred and seek the Band’s counsel on how to proceed. The existence of such unconscionability is the key to a conclusion that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty. Equity will not countenance unconscionable behaviour in a fiduciary, whose duty is that of utmost loyalty to his principal.342

In the context of these principles, I must consider the written words of the surrender document and any oral representations at the time of the surrender to determine what the Crown was permitted to do with interest accruals on the surrender proceeds. With regard to the surrender document, it will be recalled that, in addition to the broad language in which the Chiefs and principal men of the Roseau River Band ratified and confirmed “whatever the said Government may do, or cause lawfully to be done, in connection with the capital, and interest that may accrue from said capital secured from the sale of lands herein surrendered,” the surrender stated:

It is further understood and agreed that a survey shall be made of the lands surrendered and the lands sold at the earliest possible date. It is further understood and agreed that one tenth of the amount realized from said sale shall be expended [as] soon as available for such articles or commodities as the Indians may desire and the Department approves of. Any advances made at this time, or at any time subsequent to the sale of said land [are] to be repaid from the 10% before mentioned. It is further agreed that the Department shall purchase for the Bands two sections of land adjacent to the reserve known as Reserve No. 2a, or Roseau Rapids, said lands to be purchased as soon as funds are available.343

342 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 388–89, Dickson CJ. Emphasis added.
As for oral representations at the time of the surrender, elder Oliver Nelson provided the Commission with evidence regarding the manner in which the proceeds of sale of the surrendered land - a sum totalling $99,822.50, according to Nelson - and interest on those proceeds would be allocated:

The interest payments would be expended in the following manner; (the annual interest rates in 1903 was [sic] five percent.)

I remember very distinctly my grandfather Okima telling us, his grandchildren, that out of $5,000.00, interest that would be accrued from the capital,

i. $2,000.00 would be taken and put back towards the principal for the future generations, or 40 percent of the earned interest would be returned to capital to increase the principal for future generations and accommodate the increased populations anticipated.

ii. $3,000.00 or 60 percent of earned interest would be distributed to the band membership annually. With a band population of 196 band members back in 1909, distribution would have amounted to 3,000 divided by 196, $15.30 per year per man and woman and child. You will hear later on today, a lot of elders still remember on Treaty Payment Day, every man, woman and child here in Roseau used to get $20.00; $5.00 Treaty money and $15.00 interest money.

4. Once the payment of these lands was made, the band would get 10 percent of the proceeds of the sale or $9,982.25. It would be used to purchase supplies for the band and the balance would be distributed to band members.

5. A portion of the proceeds of the sale would be used to purchase two sections of the land at the Roseau Rapids.

6. No other conditions were attached to the proceeds of this land sale.

7. With these sale conditions Roseau River Indians would be well off and be able to purchase farm equipment, farm animals and seed for their farms and would never be in want again.

8. No other deductions would ever be taken from this account in Ottawa, other than for the following as offered by the department;

i. 10 percent from the proceeds of the sale of these lands would be distributed immediately after the auction.

ii. Annually the earned interest would be distributed on the following basis, 40 percent to capital and 60 percent distributed to band members. No other conditions were ever agreed to.344

Nelson’s evidence is consistent with the written terms of the surrender with regard to the immediate application of one-tenth of the sale proceeds to the purchase of articles or commodities for the Band, although the written form of the surrender says nothing in relation to the distribution to band

members of the balance of the 10 per cent not so spent. However, the letter from S.R. Marlatt, the Inspector of Indian Agencies, to Commissioner Laird confirms Nelson’s remarks to some extent:

My idea of the expenditure of the money [the 10 per cent of the sale proceeds] is as follows: – As the lands were held in common by the Indian’s [sic] all members of the bands are justly entitled to share equally in the distribution. I would take them up by families as is done at the annuity payments giving to each member through the head of the family the share entitled to on a per capata [sic] basis, I would give them say $3.00 per head in cash, the balance I would expend for them in such articles or commodities as could be mutually agreed upon and that would be of greatest benefit to them. Any outstanding legitimate debts they owe should be paid on obtaining the consent of the debtor. In the case of old men and women, orphans, adult cripples, and invalids unable to provide for themselves I would make them monthly or quarterly allowances in supplies to the amount of their share. I would try to retain about $1000.00 to be expended later, and before their interest account will be available, probably next March or April when they are sure to be hard up.345

The surrender document further corroborates Nelson’s account of the use of sale proceeds to purchase two sections of land near IR 2A at Roseau Rapids. Moreover, although the surrender itself says nothing of annual distributions of interest, Nelson’s evidence regarding such distributions brings to mind Superintendent General Frank Oliver’s advice to the Governor General in Council in 1906 relating to Marlatt’s assertion to the Indians during the surrender negotiations that a “considerable amount of interest [would be] available for distribution” following the settlement. Oliver commented that Marlatt’s statement “was in the nature of a promise that such interest would be forthcoming and would be distributed annually in the future.”346 In the days immediately following the surrender, Marlatt himself had advised J.D. McLean, the Secretary of Indian Affairs, of his trust that “the terms of surrender will be closely observed, I had very considerable difficulty in getting it, and only after repeated promises that the Department would carry out the terms of agreement to the letter.”347 It was in the wake of Marlatt’s oral promise regarding interest distributions that Oliver recommended the direc-

345 S.R. Marlatt, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, June 19, 1903, NA, RG 10, vol. 3565, file 82, pt 29, reel C-10100 (ICC Exhibit 4, pp. 73–74).
346 Frank Oliver, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to Governor General in Council, February 21, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3731, file 26306-2, reel C-10127 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 88).
tion of interest accruals to the Band’s interest account to permit this promise to be implemented.

There are also some inconsistencies between the First Nation’s version of events and the historical documents on record. For example, according to counsel for the First Nation:

Some hint of the terms and conditions necessary to persuade the Indians to surrender after years of firm refusals can be found in the correspondence of Marlatt following the surrender. Marlatt indicated in various correspondence that he had great difficulty in obtaining the surrender, that he promised the Indians $500.00 for supplies to be available immediately after the surrender, that 10% of the proceeds of the land sale would be available immediately after the sale, none of which can be found in the surrender document itself.\textsuperscript{348}

On these points, Marlatt wrote:

I experienced very considerable difficulty in getting the surrender, and only succeeded after promising to advance the sum of $500.00 [as] soon as the surrender was signed, with the understanding that it would be deducted from the 10% before mentioned.

The Bands already have several hundred dollars to their credit of capital funds, I would suggest that these funds be borrowed from to pay the accounts, and the amount recredited [as] soon as funds are available from the sale of lands.\textsuperscript{349}

This document clearly confirms the difficulty Marlatt experienced in obtaining the surrender. However, although counsel for the First Nation submits that the surrender document says nothing about $500 and 10 per cent of the sale proceeds being made available immediately after the surrender, that document, in fact, plainly stipulates that “one tenth of the amount realized from said sales shall be expended [as] soon as available for such articles or commodities as the Indians may desire and the Department approves of,” and that “[a]ny advances made at this time, or at any time subsequent to the sale to be repaid from the 10% before mentioned.” With regard to the immediate expenditure of 10 per cent of the sale proceeds and the advance of $500, it appears, in my view, that the surrender document contemplates precisely what counsel for the First Nation claims it does not.

\textsuperscript{348} Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, pp. 26–27. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{349} S.R. Marlatt, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, March 25, 1903, NA, RG 10, vol. 3731, file 26306-2.
Oliver Nelson also suggested that the sale proceeds were to have been $99,822.50, whereas, according to Frank Oliver, the figure was $82,000. In either event, at an interest rate of 5 per cent, neither figure would have generated annual interest proceeds of $5,000 after the initial expenditure of 10 per cent of the sale proceeds. Moreover, although Nelson referred to annual interest distributions of $3,000, or roughly $15 per band member, representing 60 per cent of the Band’s interest income each year, there is no record of any systematic allocation of this proportion of the interest proceeds to band members each year. My review of the Band’s annual interest account ledgers indicates that the proportion of interest distributions to overall expenditures from the account varied widely, ranging in different years from zero to 100 per cent, with an average from 1902 to 1945 of 75 per cent. Similarly, once interest distributions commenced in the 1905–6 fiscal year and the Band’s interest account began consistently to show credit balances, the ratio of interest expenditures to interest revenues in particular years ranged from a low of 45 per cent to a high of 215 per cent — including a total of eight years in which interest distributions exceeded interest revenues — with an overall distribution average of 85 per cent over that 40-year period. Band members may have received interest distributions of $15 per person, but, in many years, based on a population of 196, distributions of that size would have represented more than 60 per cent of the Band’s interest income and, likewise, more than 60 per cent of overall expenditures from the interest account.

Neither the written surrender nor Oliver’s 1906 letter to the Governor General in Council makes any reference to splitting the interest proceeds between interest distributions and contributions to capital in the 60/40 ratio alleged by Nelson. Oliver did mention, however, that directing interest accruals to the Band’s interest account represented a departure from the usual practice of capitalizing both principal and interest to build up “capital which might from time to time, be used in permanent improvements on the reserves [that] would better conserve the interests of those interested in the fund.”

Therefore, although it seems clear that Nelson’s evidence is somewhat consistent with the general departmental practice of capitalizing interest at the time of the surrender, that evidence contradicts Oliver’s recommendation in the specific circumstances of the Roseau River Band that the interest proceeds be credited to the interest account to satisfy Marlatt’s promise regarding

350 Frank Oliver, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to Governor General in Council, February 21, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3731, file 26306-2, reel C-10127 (ICC Exhibit 4, p. 89).
interest distributions. Nevertheless, it is also clear that, if Oliver’s intent was
to distribute all interest income to band members, interest distributions
never did match interest income precisely in any one year, and, during the
entire 1902–45 period, land-related interest income totalled $162,156.85,
whereas interest distributions were $137,556.96.

These contradictions raise the question of how the Commission should
proceed where there is limited contemporary documentation disclosing how
interest income was to be allocated, but where there is oral testimony
regarding the recollections of now-deceased band members who have passed
on their memories of events to their children and grandchildren. I am mindful
of the decision of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v. British Colum-
bia,351 in which Chief Justice Lamer stated:

Many features of oral histories would count against both their admissibility and
their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional approach to
the rules of evidence. The most fundamental of these is their broad social role not
only “as a repository of historical knowledge for a culture” but also as an expression
of “the values and mores of [that] culture”: Clay McLeod, “The Oral Histories of
Canada’s Northern People, Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada’s Fiduciary
Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers of the Past” (1992), 30 Alta. L.
Rev. 1276, at p. 1279. Dickson J. (as he then was) recognized as much when he
stated in Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, at p. 109, that “[c]laims to
aboriginal title are woven with history, legend, politics and moral obligations.” The
difficulty with these features of oral histories is that they are tangential to the ultimate
purpose of the fact-finding process at trial – the determination of the historical truth.
Another feature of oral histories which creates difficulty is that they largely consist of
out-of-court statements, passed on through an unbroken chain across the generations
of a particular aboriginal nation to the present-day. These out-of-court statements are
admitted for their truth and therefore conflict with the general rule against the admis-
sibility of hearsay.

Notwithstanding the challenges created by the use of oral histories as proof of
historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evi-
dence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of histori-
cal evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical docu-
ments. This is a long-standing practice in the interpretation of treaties between the
C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 232. To quote Dickson C.J., given that most aborigi-
nal societies “did not keep written records”, the failure to do so would “impose an
impossible burden of proof” on aboriginal peoples, and “render nugatory” any rights

that they have (Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 408). This process must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.

Although the Commission has accepted and applied the above principle in previous inquiries, I also take the view that the "equal footing" referred to by the former Chief Justice does not amount to special status, nor does it have the effect of assigning greater weight to oral history than to any other evidence. Accordingly, any oral evidence submitted in this inquiry should be weighed and considered along with all the other evidence in the determination of this issue.

The question in this case is whether one of the oral terms of the surrender was that the Band’s interest income should be divided, with two-thirds distributed to band members and the remaining one-third deposited on account of capital. I find that the evidence does not support such a conclusion.

I consider it significant that Canada’s representatives at the time of the surrender frankly acknowledged the existence of the oral term regarding the annual distribution of interest to band members and put mechanisms in place to implement that term. Marlatt expressed his trust that, given the difficulty he had experienced in obtaining the surrender, its terms would be observed “to the letter.” I see no reason why, if there had been a similar undertaking to allocate interest proceeds between distributions to band members and deposits to capital, Canada would have denied that such a term existed. The division of interest income between distributions and capital seems no more or less onerous than allocating all of it to capital, as was Canada’s usual course. I find that Canada’s eventual distribution of 85 per cent of the interest income to band members was consistent with, first, Marlatt’s promise that “a considerable amount of interest [would be] available for distribution” and, second, Oliver’s report that “the Department [finding] itself in the position of being unable to make good the statement made at the time of the surrender ... the Indians of the Rosseau [sic] River are, therefore, in a state of dissatisfaction and threaten to re-possess themselves of the lands, which have been sold, unless the estimated payments of interest are forthcoming.”

The evidence suggests that, first and foremost, band members wanted their distributions of interest money.

I turn now to the First Nation’s argument that, even if Canada’s actions satisfied the test required by section 92(d) of the Indian Act, the use of commingled interest accruals on the proceeds of surrender failed to meet the standard of conduct required of a fiduciary. A fiduciary’s responsibility is to manage his principal’s assets in the way that a prudent man would manage his own affairs. However, Canada’s role as a fiduciary does not mean that, because it would be most advantageous to the Band, Canada should fund medical aid out of its own pocket rather than from the Band’s resources. In this case, while it is true that Canada did not expressly advise the Band that the expenses for medical aid would be funded from the Band’s own interest account, I see no evidence of conflicting interests, secret profits, or any conduct by Canada to suggest that it breached any duty of loyalty to the Band. Moreover, I find it difficult to see how expenses for the personal well-being of individual band members can be said to have been incurred for purposes other than the best interests of the Band.

In summary, I conclude that the written surrender, as supplemented by oral promises made at the time, provided for Canada’s annual distribution of the lion’s share of the Band’s interest revenues to band members. This was, in fact, done. I further conclude that the surrender conferred a broad discretion on Canada that permitted the federal government to make a wide range of expenditures, including medical care, on the Band’s behalf. Further, even though the surrender does not say anything about the expenditures having to be made in the best interests of the Band, I conclude that the deductions for medical aid would satisfy this requirement in any event. In short, the evidence does not support the First Nation’s contention that Canada failed to deal with the surrender proceeds “in strict observance of the nature of the arrangement between the Band and the Government in the procuring of the surrender.”

I would conclude that Canada did not breach the terms of the 1903 surrender or any fiduciary obligations arising from it when making the deductions for medical aid.

**Issue 4 Detrimental Reliance**

Did Canada induce Roseau River to rely on free medical aid to the detriment of the Band’s own traditional healing methods, and, if so, does Canada owe Roseau River a lawful obligation for unilaterally withdrawing medical aid by charging medical expenses to the Band’s trust account from 1909 to 1934?
Roseau River argues that, even if medical aid did not amount to a treaty promise, the fact that the government provided medical aid at no cost to the Indians – commencing with Spragge’s 1873 directive to Provencher and lasting until the commencement of deductions in 1909 – nevertheless constituted an enforceable promise. Counsel contends that, given Canada’s systematic suppression of traditional religious and healing practices, the Band came to rely on government-supplied medical services, to the detriment of the Band’s own healing methods and its ability to care for the sick when the government later withdrew free medical aid. According to the First Nation, such detrimental reliance – where a promise has been made and the promisee relies on the promise to his detriment – constitutes an exception to the basic premise of contract law that all contracts require consideration. The consequence of this principle, in the First Nation’s submission, is that, once Canada undertook by its actions to provide medical services and the Band relied on that promise, it was no longer open to Canada to withdraw the promised services or payment. Rather, Canada was bound to continue providing medical aid at its own expense from 1909 to 1934, and its failure to do so constituted a breach of lawful obligation, entitling the First Nation to compensation.

Canada denies that detrimental reliance can be used in the manner suggested by the First Nation, countering that the concept simply operates as an equitable defence to the strict enforcement of an existing contract and does not represent an independent cause of action. In counsel’s words, “the test for detrimental reliance is that one party, by his unambiguous words or conduct, assures the other party that the strict contractual relations between them will not be insisted upon and the other party acts upon the assurance to his detriment.” That test has not been met on the facts of this case, counsel suggests, because there was no promise – no contract existed to provide medical services to the Band, and the government did not promise that it would never exercise its discretion under section 92(d) of the Indian Act to make deductions for medical aid. Moreover, according to counsel, there was no detriment – the Band continued to receive medical aid to its benefit and “did not act to its detriment as a result of medical aid being provided pursuant to Government policy.” The First Nation has mischaracterized the gov-
Government's policy of providing medical aid as a promise or unilateral contract, while, in counsel's submission, Canada has always retained the discretion to change its policy under the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  

Regardless of whether Canada is correct in its view of detrimental reliance as merely a legal defence and not an independent cause of action, I must conclude that Roseau River has not tendered any evidence that would substantiate its claim on this ground. Counsel for the First Nation refers to Canada's "policy of suppression of Indian religious and healing practices," but, other than a broad reference to a textbook by Katherine Pettipas entitled Severing the Ties that Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies, he provides no examples of Roseau River's traditional healing practices before this suppression, nor any evidence of how Canada's policies disrupted or operated to the detriment of those practices. The only other information I have been able to find is in statements made by elders of the First Nation during the July 14, 1998, community session. Roland Martin commented:

What I wanted to add, because of the promises of medical aid, and they didn't come. And so the portion where we helped ourselves to heal ourselves was dropping off, because of the promises that were given by Treaty. And this was part of his, what he was saying was we helped ourselves to heal ourselves, but when the promises came, we kind of let go a little bit because of the promises.

Ed Hayden, now the First Nation's Chief, added:

I want to go back to traditional practices. I guess before the European contact I believe that our people had ways of healing and dealing with the sickness that they encountered before European contact. Some of the things they had were things like sweats - I am just mentioning a few things here, and I want to make comment too that I want to reinforce what some of the speakers were saying. The Sundance, shake tent, and of course you mentioned, the previous speakers mentioned the herbal medicines that they gathered....

When we are talking about the promises to health and the practices done, the churches were neglected in being mentioned in this, participating in suppressing our people from practicing the traditional healing practices. There were a number of

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359 Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, March 10, 1999, p. 27.
360 Written Submission on Behalf of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, February 26, 1999, p. 57.
churches that participated in calling our practices pagan, witch craft, just to get this stopped. And our practices were outlawed....

I have heard our tribal, our members in the past say that when they tried to practice healing our own tribal members in their own way, at times the police would come into the community just trying to find somebody practicing the sweat lodges and all the healing practices that took place there.363

Alfred Smith continued the narrative in these terms:

Going back to that time when I was young, before going to school, I asked questions, as I said before. And I was told the statement, and you can draw your own conclusions, that the medicine men were outlawed in the late 1800s, beginning of the 20th century. Some went to jail for practising.

At that time when I was told that the whitemen had promised medical care, medicine, and one of the reasons why the medicine men were outlawed, one of the reasons I suppose. But today, at this point in time, that remains a question.

Later on, as I sit here today listening, I come to realize something else is more sinister than that. One of our Councillors has stated a form of genocide, and today I am beginning to believe that’s part of that. Led us to die. Maybe for you it would be hard to believe. Take away all the whitemen medicine, and what we are left with?

And at that time, when our medicine men were outlawed but had they still kept practising, when the police arrived, they were arrested, jailed, there are documents on that. I have had the opportunity to see one, where an old man was jailed for 30 days of hard labour for practicing.364

While I recognize the close relationship between traditional aboriginal religious and healing practices, I would need specific evidence of the impact of government policies on this First Nation to be able to base a decision on principles of detrimental reliance, even assuming that those principles can operate as an independent cause of action. In so saying, I should not be taken to mean that the department, the police, the churches, and even the medical profession did not attempt to suppress traditional healing practices and, in so doing, may have caused the Band to abandon or modify some of those customs. However, as I have said, there is no evidence before the Commission to establish what the practices were or how they may have changed or ceased in light of Canada’s policies.

Indeed, a careful review of the entire Pettipas book suggests that government policies may not have had much effect on traditional healing practices in any event, as the following excerpt illustrates:

With the expansion of federal medical services to reserve communities, the Department subjected another class of people to close scrutiny. Attacks against those referred to as medicine men (shamans and healers) were forthcoming from missionaries and medical professionals who believed that indigenous healers were responsible for the physical, moral, and spiritual deterioration of Indian communities. A statement that typified this attitude was contained in a report submitted to Ottawa by the nursing field matron at the Cree reserve of Little Pine. The medicine men were accused of being the “laziest” men on the reserve, who used their cunning for their personal gain “by working on the credulity and ignorance of their brethren.” The medicine men were also blamed for the reluctance of the relatives of the sick to allow the Department’s medical officer to visit them.

Since no federal legislation referred to indigenous medical practitioners, agents had little recourse other than personal influence. This approach had limited effect for a number of reasons. In the first place, most healing ceremonies were not overtly practiced and thus escaped detection. In the second place, adequate federal medical facilities and medicines were simply not readily available to reserve populations. Like many European immigrant groups who had settled in the prairie region, Indian communities continued to depend on their own resources for dealing with illness. At this time, the Department could not resort to provincial medical acts since Indian healing activities were not illegal as long as they were practiced within reserve boundaries. In the absence of prohibitive legislation, officials resorted to “informal” methods to discourage healers and their patients. These methods included the withholding of government rations and opportunities for government employment, the denial of more general types of aid, and “vaguer threats of official sanction.”

Later, Pettipas concluded that “[t]he lack of effective medical services (until the 1940s in Canada), impoverished living conditions, under-nourishment, and disease (especially the post–World War One influenza epidemic and tuberculosis) undoubtedly contributed to the persistence of those indigenous ceremonies that were believed to have significant healing powers.” In other words, Pettipas appears to believe that traditional healing practices, although intended to be suppressed and, in fact, inhibited to some extent, were not replaced, to the detriment of First Nations, by government officials and programs; rather, those practices persisted because they were practised privately and because government medical services were not yet sufficiently extensive to supplant them. Alfred Smith’s evidence suggests that traditional healing

practices never disappeared entirely and that today they are experiencing something of a renewal:

But today it is coming back, medicine men are growing in number, practising medicine, healing through the Sundance, shake tent, sweats. And I have become a part of that scene, it is a gift, spiritual gift.

And yet somehow our people still lack medical help. I have seen within the last few years people being healed through our way, through our custom, our medicine men. Why doesn’t the government live up to that obligation they made years ago? That is one question I guess that remains here today. Only you, I guess will be able to answer that question for us, for the government. Whether it’s in the positive side or the negative side remains to be seen, but we will continue to practice what has been given to us by the spirits and mother nature herself.367

Similarly, through translator Ed Hayden, elder Rosie Nelson spoke of traditional healing practices being performed as late as 1937:

She [Rosie Nelson] said in 1937 she left school and married Edward, and they had a child, a boy, and he took sick. And the child used to have convulsions. So she went to Letellier to try to find help or whatever. In town, or where she was, the little child was having convulsions in front of the people at the store. And she was told there was a doctor in town so she took him over there.

And she was informed that the child would only live two months because she didn’t have any money to get him whatever he needed to, she had to pay for his medicine or whatever care that he needed.

When she brought the child back from the [sic] Letellier, she took him to the traditional healers who were living in the north end of the reserve, and she told them what the doctor was telling her in town about her boy living just for the two months. And apparently the elder and the healer, traditional healer got mad and said the doctor is trying to play God, and said we will take care of him, we will give him some medicine.

What she is saying, there was a promise made by the government that they would provide us the medicines that we needed to take care of us and those things, and that’s what he was mad about I guess.368

Oliver Nelson confirmed that Rosie Nelson had taken the boy to Okima and Baybameegeesick, who were medicine men, and that “[t]he gentleman that was upset [and] said that was a promise made in the Treaty for health was Assiniwinin, Okima’s older brother, [who] I was mentioning earlier this

morning ... was the promise keeper.” The significant aspect of this evidence is that the community’s medicine men and healers continued to practise traditional methods in 1937 even after Canada’s deductions for medical aid from the First Nation’s interest account had ceased in 1934.

In any event, the analysis proposed by counsel for the First Nation presupposes the existence of a promise of medical aid to be provided by Canada to the Roseau River Band. As I have already stated, although I am reluctant to conclude that such a promise was not made, the First Nation has not tendered sufficient evidence to establish that one was made. Principles of treaty interpretation require Treaty 1 to be interpreted liberally, with ambiguities or doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians. Even so, I do not believe that a promise of medical aid, if it were found to have existed as of 1871, would have survived the amendment of Treaty 1 in 1875.

Moreover, I have difficulty seeing how it can be said that band members relied on a promise of medical aid when the evidence of the elders suggests that band members persisted in consulting their traditional healers, who were still practising in 1937 and apparently continue to do so today. Even if there was reliance, the fact that traditional healing practices still endure further implies to the Commission that the detriment alleged by the First Nation has not been established.

In these circumstances, I must conclude that, since one or more of the underlying promise, reliance, and detriment have not been established, the First Nation’s claim on the basis of detrimental reliance must fail.

That being said, I reiterate my earlier comment that, in light of Canada’s delivery and articulation of Indian medical services, perhaps some right to medical aid has grown up prescriptively over time. Although the Commission has not been asked to address the question of medical rights by prescription, and I have refrained from doing so, my comments below regarding the Commission’s supplementary mandate deal to some extent with the fairness of charging medical expenses to Roseau River’s interest account, given Canada’s track record in implementing the policy of requiring bands with financial resources to fund their own medical services.

The Commission’s Supplementary Mandate

If the Commission concludes that the deductions for medical aid were not contrary to Treaty 1, statute, or the 1903 surrender and did not give rise to detrimental reliance by the Band, were the deductions nevertheless unfair?

When the original mandate of the Commission was still under discussion, Tom Siddon, at that time the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, wrote to then National Chief Ovide Mercredi of the Assembly of First Nations setting out the basis for what the Commission has previously referred to as its “supplementary mandate”:

If, in carrying out its review, the Commission concludes that the policy was implemented correctly but the outcome is nonetheless unfair, I would again welcome its recommendations on how to proceed.370

Having concluded that the evidence before it does not establish that the deductions for medical aid from Roseau River’s trust accounts from 1909 to 1934 constituted a breach of treaty, the governing legislation, or the 1903 surrender, or that the Band relied to its detriment on a promise of medical aid, I must now consider whether, under the Commission’s supplementary mandate, the otherwise correct implementation of the Specific Claims Policy in this case would nevertheless result in unfairness to the First Nation.

During the course of this inquiry, Canada has placed great emphasis on the position that it has employed a consistent policy of requiring those bands with sufficient financial resources to pay their own medical expenses. This policy is perhaps best illustrated by the following excerpt from the report by Frances Foley Smith:

A clear piece of evidence which reveals that the government expected bands with the capacity to pay their own medical cost[s] is a letter dated November 30, 1888 from the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to the Auditor General. He describes a situation whereby two bands were sharing one reserve; one band received free medical aid because “they have very little money at their credit with the government, not sufficient warrant thereof of the salary of a medical man;” the other band was required to pay its own medical expenses, since it had “sufficient capital ... to admit of paying from the interest thereof the salary of a medical man.” (T.H.R.C. Health Care Correspondence File, 1873–1978). This policy appears to have been

370 Hon. Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to Ovide Mercredi, National Chief, Assembly of First Nations, November 22, 1991; reproduced in (1995) 3 ICCP 244.
applied to all bands, regardless of treaty, including those bands covered by Treaty Six which guaranteed a “medical chest”. (See Annual Reports under Battleford, Carlton agencies).

That the government drew upon Indian funds to defray medical costs is not surprising in view of the frequently stated departmental objective of bringing the Indian to a state of self-reliance.

By 1913 in so far as medical aid was concerned an articulated policy had emerged. The following documents express that policy:

1) ... 1913. [Deputy Superintendent General] D.C. Scott’s “General Instructions to Indian Agents in Canada”. Sections 46 and 47 - Medical Attendance.

“The Department’s policy ... of developing self-dependence in the Indian, is to be borne in mind when medical attendance becomes necessary; no gratuitous attendance is to be given Indians who are able to pay for a physician’s services or for medicines.” p. 247

2) ... 1922. Indian Commissioner Graham re: medical payment:

“When Indians are not in a position to make payment promptly of the Doctor’s accounts, which have been authorized by the Indian Agent, the Department should liquidate the accounts, and make collection from the Indians concerned when they are in possession of funds.” p. 246

3) ... 1934. House of Commons Debates. The Hon. Mr. Murphy (Indian Dept.):

“These interest funds are used for the benefit of the Indians... [T]he Indian should be in a position to stand on his own feet and through his own efforts provide for himself... [I]n some instances the bands hold funds running up to hundreds of thousands of dollars.... [I]t could hardly be argued that a band with such valuable assets should be kept on relief from parliamentary appropriation.” p. 266

4) ... 1934. Annual Report on Indian Health Supervision stating division of payment between Dept. and band funds:

“The costs of the Indian health service is approximately $7.20 per capita from public funds, to which must be added the outlay from band trust funds, which would bring the total cost to just under $10 per Indian per year.” p. 268

5) ... 1956. House of Commons Debates. The Hon. Mr. Martin (Indian Dept.):

“The policy in this particular has never changed. The policy has always been that those who can pay should pay. That is the only policy.” p. 301

6) ... 1957. House of Commons Debates. Referring to a directive from the Department of National Health and Welfare, 31 January 1957:

“Since the funds at the disposal of the Indian and Northern health services are limited, the Indian people who can pay should pay for their transportation, medical care, hospitalization, drugs, glasses, and dental care. Those who cannot
pay the full amount should contribute at least a part of the costs of these services." p. 302

7) ... 1968. House of Commons Debates. Referring to a directive from the Department of National Health and Welfare, 4 March 1968:

“The basis policy of our department is that there is no statutory federal responsibility for our department to provide funds for personal health care services for Indian people.... [O]ur department will assist only in those instances where the Indian people can demonstrate that they do not have private resources, cannot obtain assistance from their band or [from] a provincial welfare or health agency.” p. 309

A second directive of 6 March 1968:

“We must ask all those Indian people and bands who have a source of income to pay for their own health services.... [I]f an Indian person cannot pay for such services, he should first of all request his band for assistance.” p. 312

Note: the above documents show that the policy of charging bands for medical expenses continued long after the debits to the Roseau River accounts ceased in 1934. Moreover, they began earlier. The more affluent bands in Ontario and Quebec had begun paying for medical services at least as early as 1868 (Annual Report 1868, pp. 16–20), while the first medical charges to Manitoba bands dates to 1909 (Annual Report, p. 118).371

Smith then attempted to apply the policy as articulated to the particular circumstances of the Roseau River Band:

It is evident that the decision to charge the Roseau River Band for some medical services (i.e. physicians’ visits and medicines) in 1909, and to discontinue these charges in 1934, did not reflect any change in policy or departure from established practice on the part of the government. The charges appear to relate strictly to the level the band’s interest account warranted. For example, the year before the debits began the accounts was [sic] in deficit; the year the debits ended it had shrunk to $1,796.22. Between 1909 and 1934, there were several years when the band was not charged for medical expenses, presumably because its interest account decreased: 1915–16 the balance shrank to $552.10; 1916–17 in deficit by $1,534.17; 1929–30 balance of $231.85. Accordingly, no medical expenses were charged to the band fund in these years.

The only year for which the absence of medical debits cannot be explained was 1920–21, when the balance in the interest accounts was $2,603.85. There is no explanation as to why this occurred....372

With all due respect to Frances Foley Smith and the submissions of counsel for Canada, I am not convinced that these statements illustrate a consistently articulated and applied policy. Indeed, the circumstances of the Roseau River Band amply demonstrate the arbitrary manner in which the policy was implemented. As Smith suggests, the Band had insufficient funds before 1909 to warrant deductions before that time, and there were three other years when, because of low account balances, it might have appeared imprudent to make deductions. Yet there were other years, such as 1922–23, 1923–24, 1924–25, 1926–27, and 1931–32, when the closing balance for the fiscal year was less than $1,000.00 – and indeed 1928–29 when the closing balance was a mere $340.33 – during which Canada nevertheless determined that the Band was sufficiently solvent to be able to afford its own medical expenses. Nowhere in the evidence is there any indication of a threshold, on a per capita basis or otherwise, below which expenditures could not be justified.

On their own, these facts raise real concerns about Canada’s administration of its Indian health policy. These concerns become magnified when one considers that deductions were not made in other years when there were apparently adequate funds in the interest account to merit deductions for medical aid. When the 1921–22 fiscal year is considered on its own, as Smith appears to have done, it might be dismissed as an anomaly, in the event that the Band experienced a year of relatively minor health issues such that medicines, hospitalization, and physicians’ services were not required. However, such an explanation would not appear reasonable in relation to 1934–35 and the following decade. During that period, the Band’s account balance never fell below $1,796.22 and, during the last six years, annually exceeded $5,000.00, twice surpassing $6,000.00. Despite these balances being the highest ever achieved by the account for the entire 1902–45 reporting period, no medical expenses were charged to it in these latter years. The parties have not tendered evidence of the Band’s interest account balances after 1945, although it has been intimated that there have been no further deductions for medical aid from the account right up to the present day. Nevertheless, the evidence for the period preceding 1945 undermines Smith’s conclusion that “[t]he charges appear to relate strictly to the level the band’s interest account warranted.”

Canada cannot explain why the deductions from Roseau River’s interest account abruptly ceased after the 1933–34 fiscal year. Although the First Nation speculates that the timing relates to the emergence of the Dreaver
case, the Smith report intimates, without specific examples, that deductions from other bands continued after 1934. Nevertheless, Canada's inability to explain its change of course with regard to Roseau River makes it impossible for Canada to assert that it has invariably applied a policy of holding bands with the ability to pay to be responsible for their own medical expenses when it cannot consistently make this assertion with regard to Roseau River alone. From my review of the public accounts, it appears that, while deductions were being made from Roseau River's account, other bands may not have been charged for medical expenses when they apparently could afford to do so. It is also difficult to state without reservation that deductions were made from other bands' interest accounts, but not from Roseau River, after 1934, when Roseau River apparently could have afforded to do so. In attempting to undertake this analysis, I have been hampered by the limitations in the government's record-keeping practices, which (a) provide little or no information of this sort in some years, (b) do not disclose whether bands or individual Indians paid medical expenses out of funds on hand (as opposed to band trust funds), and (c) do not provide a breakdown below the agency level - that is, on a band-by-band basis - of medical expenses charged to government appropriations.

For this reason, the Commission is restricted by the scope of the evidence before it from categorically determining whether Roseau River was in fact treated differently from other bands in the application of the policy. For example, wealthier bands may have paid their own medical expenses, notwithstanding a lack of evidence showing such expenses being deducted from their interest accounts, if in fact they had sufficient funds on hand to pay those bills without resort to their trust funds. Alternatively, poorer bands may have had the major portion of their medical expenses paid from government appropriations, notwithstanding that records of their trust accounts may show some minor medical expenses being deducted. The record in this regard is incomplete and may never be sufficient to establish precisely what transpired.

However, as the First Nation has established at least a prima facie case for concluding that a policy of making well-to-do bands foot their own medical expenses has not been evenly applied in the First Nation's case alone, I believe that the burden should shift to Canada to establish that the policy was consistently applied to the First Nation over the years, and that it was fair as between the First Nation and other bands. As the party charged with keeping the records required to determine whether the policy was evenly applied, in
addition to being the party asserting that the policy has been consistently applied since as early as 1888, Canada should be required to furnish the evidence necessary to establish that position. I recognize that providing such evidence may necessitate a far-reaching inquiry into the payment of medical expenses from the interest accounts of virtually every band in Canada, and that such an inquiry may not even yield the information required to settle the issue, but fairness demands that such an inquiry be undertaken. The broad issue of equity is not something that can be resolved by considering the circumstances of just one band. Unless Canada can show the payments made by the various bands within the context of their respective financial means, I see no other basis for justifying deductions being made from the trust funds of one band, but not from those of another.

Absent such an inquiry or some other means by which Canada can overcome the First Nation’s prima facie case that the Crown has failed to act consistently and fairly in the circumstances, I would recommend, pursuant to the Commission’s supplementary mandate, that Canada enter into negotiations with Roseau River to compensate the First Nation for the medical aid deductions made from its interest account from 1909 to 1934.

Conclusion
In my view, the evidence in this inquiry does not support the conclusion that medical aid constituted one of the promises made by Canada to the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation and the other bands that signed Treaty 1 in 1871. The best that can be said about medical aid is that it was in doubt from 1871 until the date on which the treaty was amended in 1875. At that time, the terms of the treaty were clarified by the incorporation of the memorandum of outside promises, which did not include medical aid. Even if a promise of medical aid was made in 1871, it did not, in my opinion, survive the 1875 amendment, which, in clear and unambiguous terms, terminated all outside promises other than those specifically enumerated in the amendment.

The deductions from Roseau River’s interest trust account from 1909 to 1934 were authorized by section 92(d) of the 1906 Indian Act and section 95(d) of the 1927 statute. Moreover, they were not precluded by the broad terms of the 1903 surrender of a portion of the First Nation’s IR 2, and the evidence of verbal promises at the time of the surrender does not convince me that those terms were narrowed in any material way. Finally, in my view the First Nation has not tendered sufficient evidence to support its claim.
based on detrimental reliance, assuming that such a claim can be pursued as an independent cause of action.

However, the evidence does raise significant concerns about whether Roseau River has been treated fairly within the framework of a policy in which Canada claims to have consistently required those bands with sufficient financial resources to pay for some or all of their medical expenses. Unless Canada can establish that its policy has in fact been consistently applied and that Roseau River has been treated fairly in relation to other First Nations, it is my opinion that Canada should accept this claim for negotiation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The members of the present panel of the Indian Claims Commission differ fundamentally on the terms and implications of Treaty 1. Commissioner Bellegarde considers Treaty 1 to have created a treaty obligation to provide medical aid, with the result that Canada’s deductions from Roseau River’s interest account between 1909 and 1934 must be viewed as improper and as the basis for an outstanding lawful obligation on Canada’s part. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for Commissioner Bellegarde to consider the alternative bases of liability argued by the First Nation - breach of the Indian Act, breach of the terms of the 1903 surrender, and detrimental reliance.

By way of contrast, Commissioner Corcoran concludes that Treaty 1 did not include a written or verbal promise of medical aid, but that, even if it did, that promise did not survive the amendment of the treaty in 1875. By virtue of this conclusion, it became necessary for Commissioner Corcoran to assess whether the deductions from the First Nation’s interest account from 1909 to 1934 triggered an outstanding lawful obligation under the Indian Act or the 1903 surrender, or precipitated a claim based on detrimental reliance. Although she did not find for the First Nation on any of these alternative grounds, Commissioner Corcoran concludes, nonetheless, that the claim should be accepted for negotiation on the basis that, while Canada’s policy may have been correctly implemented, the outcome for the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation is unfair. In this respect, Commissioner Bellegarde concurs with Commissioner Corcoran.

As stated at the outset of our analysis, the Commissioners also agree that the implications of this inquiry extend far beyond the circumstances of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation and the territorial limits of Treaty 1. As a panel, we believe that the subject of medical aid is worthy of a comprehensive review by both Canada and the First Nations to give additional definition.
to the parties’ intentions in the negotiation of the various treaties and in their subsequent dealings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the Commissioners disagree on whether Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation based on the facts of this case, we each make three recommendations. Our respective first recommendations are different, but are nevertheless very similar in effect. Our second and third recommendations are joint recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION 1

Commissioner Bellegarde’s first recommendation is:

That, because Canada breached its lawful obligation to provide medical aid under Treaty 1 by making the deductions from the interest trust account of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation from 1909 to 1934, it should immediately commence negotiations with Roseau River to reimburse the First Nation for those deductions, together with interest.

Commissioner Corcoran’s first recommendation is:

That, unless Canada can establish that the deductions from the interest trust account of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation from 1909 to 1934 were made in a manner that was fair and consistent with its treatment of other First Nations, it should immediately commence negotiations with Roseau River to reimburse the First Nation for those deductions, together with interest.

Commissioners Bellegarde and Corcoran jointly recommend:

RECOMMENDATION 2

That, in the event that the parties are unable to resolve this issue through negotiation, they should be able to return to the Commission, on the motion of either party, to inquire into the compensation payable to the First Nation.
RECOMMENDATION 3

That Canada, in tandem with representative First Nation organizations, should undertake a comprehensive review of medical aid to Indians, with a view to establishing a fair and consistent approach to dealing with this issue, both historically and prospectively.

FOR THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Carole T. Corcoran          Daniel J. Bellegarde
Commissioner and Panel Chair  Commission Co-Chair

Dated this 14th day of February, 2001.
APPENDIX A

ROSEAU RIVER ANISHINABE FIRST NATION INQUIRY
MEDICAL AID CLAIM

1 Planning conferences
   Ottawa, November 27, 1997
   Conference call, February 18, 1998
   Conference call, March 20, 1998
   Conference call, July 6, 1998
   Conference call, December 18, 1998

2 Staff visit
   June 11, 1998

3 Community session
   July 14, 1998
   The Commission conducted a community session at the First Nation’s Ginew School on July 14, 1998. During the course of that session, the Commission received evidence and information from Felix Antoine, at that time Chief of the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, and from current Chief Ed Hayden and elders Oliver Nelson, Roland Martin, Charles Nelson, Marjorie Nelson, Rosie Nelson, Terrence Nelson, Leonard Nelson, Elizabeth Hayden, Alfred Smith, and Richard Hayden.

4 Legal argument
   Winnipeg, March 25, 1999

5 Content of formal record
   The formal record for this inquiry consists of the following materials:
   · the documentary record (1 volume of documents with annotated index)
   · 12 exhibits tendered during the inquiry
   · transcript of community session (1 volume)
   · transcript of oral submissions (1 volume)
written submissions of counsel for Canada and the Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation, including authorities submitted by counsel with their written submissions.

The report of the Commission and letters of transmittal to the parties will complete the formal record of this inquiry.
## APPENDIX B

**INTEREST TRUST ACCOUNT**

**SHOWING REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES (1902-45), BY FISCAL YEAR**

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1 The information in this table is derived from two sources: Roger Townshend, “Roseau River Indian Band Claim for Compensation Arising from Management of Band Funds, Specifically, Band Funds Used to Pay for Medical Care, 1909-1934,” September 1981 (hereafter “Townshend submission”) (ICC Exhibit 1), and Public History Inc., “Roseau River First Nation Medical Aid Claim, 1902-1945: Historical Report,” May 12, 1998 (hereafter “PHI report”) (ICC Exhibit 4). The Commission has carefully reviewed the historical documents included with the PHI report and used them as the basis for the figures set forth in this table. Unless otherwise noted, and in the absence of evidence directing us to do differently, the Commission has included all land-related interest revenues and expenditures - possibly including items other than interest generated by the sale of surrendered reserve lands or distributions of such interest accruals - in the applicable “Interest” columns.

2 It appears that $690.00 of this amount represents a transfer of interest proceeds from the Band’s capital account.

3 Of this sum, $2,000.00 appears to have been distributed to Band members in accordance with Frank Oliver’s memorandum of February 21, 1906, and the remaining $2,000.00 to have been transferred to the Band’s capital account in payment of interest on a loan.

4 The sum of $14.01 has not been accounted for in the ledger and has been arbitrarily assigned by the Commission to “other” expenses.

5 Of this sum, $1,129.45 represents a transfer of interest proceeds from the Band’s capital account.

6 Of this sum, $2,000.00 appears to have been distributed to Band members in accordance with Frank Oliver’s memorandum of February 21, 1906, and the remaining $4,566.30 to have been transferred to the Band’s capital account in payment of interest on a loan.

7 Both this figure of $4,566.30 and the interest revenue of $5,835.83 appear to have been inflated by $2,500.00 as the result of a cheque in that amount being issued for “interest distribution” and then credited back to the account.

8 This sum of $5,235.00 includes a $294.81 payment to R. Logan to reflect an “overpayment of interest” but it is not clear whether the overpayment refers to principal or interest.
9 This figure appears as $135.65 in the Townshend submission, pp. 9 and 22. However, the source documentation in the PHI report (pp. 18 and 109) suggests that $134.65 is the correct figure.

10 The PHI report uses a figure of $75.85 for "drugs" and "medicines," but has apparently overlooked a refund of $41.95 for "drugs" (pp. 18 and 113). For the purposes of providing an accurate portrayal of actual medical expenses, the $41.95 has been treated as an "other" expense.

11 This figure appears as $138.25 in the Townshend submission (pp. 9 and 26), but the historical documents in the PHI report disclose only one expenditure of $103.70 for "drugs" (p. 123).

12 There is a difference of $.03 in the totals reported in the Townshend submission ($825.11, pp. 9 and 27) and the PHI report ($825.14, pp. 18 and 125). From our review of the historical documents, it appears that the Townshend submission is correct.

13 The Townshend submission makes no reference to this amount, but it appears in the PHI report's historical documentation with the notation "relief & drugs" (p. 133). As we have no way of attributing the $18.60 between "relief" and "drugs," we have adopted the approach used in the PHI report of reporting the entire amount under "medicines."

14 This figure appears as $33.29 in the Townshend submission (pp. 9 and 32), but this amount clearly includes a charge of $1.29 paid to the Canadian Pacific Railway for transportation charges. We have thus relied on the figure in the PHI report (pp. 18 and 139).

15 Based on the historical documents in the PHI report, this figure includes $6.00 for "glasses to Ind," but does not include $50.00 paid to Napoleon Hayden in four instalments for "care of Ind" or two additional payments of $10.00 each to Hayden for "care of Wellington" (pp. 18 and 153-55). Similar expenses appear in other years. These may represent additional payments for medical care, but, as neither the Townshend submission nor the PHI report has treated them as such, we have likewise excluded them.

16 The Townshend submission reports this figure as $50.55 (pp. 9 and 37), which appears to exclude a $1.00 charged to the Canadian Pacific Railway for transportation charges. We have relied on the figure in the PHI report (pp. 18 and 139).

17 The Townshend report identifies an expense of $53.30 for "hospitalization" in 1930-31 (pp. 9 and 38), but there is no evidence of this transaction in the PHI report's historical documents (pp. 18 and 139).

18 This charge of $4.00 (not included in the Townshend submission) bears the notation "ambulance services" paid to Kerr's Funeral Chapel in the PHI report's historical documents (pp. 18 and 160), so there is some question whether it should be properly characterized as a medical service or a funeral expense. Nevertheless, like Public History Inc., we have interpreted this figure in favour of the First Nation.

19 A bookkeeping error increased both interest revenues and expenditures by $3,200.00. We have removed these duplicate figures from the table to provide a more realistic representation of the revenues and expenditures for this year.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

In November 1983, the Peguis First Nation1 submitted a claim to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) alleging that the lands set aside as St Peter’s Indian Reserve (IR) 1 were not sufficient to fulfill the Band’s land entitlement pursuant to Treaty 1. The claim, which was filed under the federal Specific Claims Policy, specifically contended that it had been agreed between the signatories to Treaty 1, on the one hand, and representatives of the Crown, on the other, that the Band would receive reserve lands in the amount of 160 acres per family of five in addition to lands already occupied by its members at the time of treaty. It was also alleged that the Band’s entitlement at the date of first survey amounted to 60,000 acres, but that the St Peter’s Reserve, which was set aside for the Band shortly after treaty, comprised only 37,915 acres outside of land already occupied at the time of treaty. The alleged shortfall, according to the First Nation, was 22,085 acres.

The claim was reviewed by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Department of Justice, in accordance with the Specific Claims process. By letter dated July 31, 1991, A.J. Gross, of Specific Claims West, informed the Chief and council of the Peguis First Nation of the federal government’s position with regard to each allegation.2 According to Mr Gross’s letter, the Government of Canada was of the view that the new reserve, which had been set aside for the Band after the 1907 surrender of the St Peter’s Reserve, was intended to satisfy, and did satisfy, the Band’s entire treaty land entitlement (TLE).

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1 Alternatively referred to as “The Peguis Band,” the “First Nation,” or the “Band,” depending on the historical context.
The Peguis First Nation resubmitted its claim to the department in March 1992, on the ground that the terms of the 1907 surrender did not intend to release Canada from its TLE obligations, but only from claims arising under the Manitoba Act and the Indian Act. In the First Nation’s view, no satisfactory reply was received from Canada concerning the resubmitted claim, and, as a result, Chief Louis J. Stevenson wrote to Minister of Indian Affairs Ron Irwin on March 1, 1994, asking him to intervene in the matter. On May 27 of that year, Mr Gross wrote to the Chief and council of the Peguis First Nation to advise that, after reconsideration, Canada had not altered its decision to reject the claim. Shortly afterwards, the Peguis First Nation requested that the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) undertake a preliminary review of the claim to determine whether it fell within the Commission’s mandate. The Commissioners informed the First Nation and Canada of their decision to conduct an inquiry into Canada’s rejection of the claim on September 2, 1994.

As part of the Commission’s inquiry into this claim, five planning conferences were held. At the first conference on January 12, 1995, the parties raised the issue of the interrelationship of this TLE claim with another claim of the First Nation concerning the alleged invalidity of the 1907 surrender of St Peter’s Reserve. Canada took the position that both claims should be addressed simultaneously, and, as a result, the Peguis First Nation undertook to submit the surrender claim formally to the Specific Claims Branch. At a second planning conference held on May 18, 1995, the parties established certain deadlines for the formal submission of the surrender claim, the department’s confirmation research, and Canada’s decision to accept or reject the surrender claim. It was agreed that a community session regarding the TLE claim would be postponed, pending completion of the above phases. The Peguis First Nation submitted the surrender claim to Canada on June 14, 1995, and the department’s confirmation research was completed and forwarded to the Band on September 29 of that year. Although Canada had undertaken to provide a decision concerning acceptance or rejection of the

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3 Chief Louis J. Stevenson to A.J. Gross, Negotiator, Specific Claims West, March 10, 1992 (ICC file 2106-02-01).
4 Chief Louis J. Stevenson to the Hon. Ron Irwin, March 1, 1994 (ICC file 2106-02-01).
7 Dan Bellegarde and James Prentice, Co-Chairs, Indian Claims Commission, to Chief and Council, Peguis Indian Band, September 2, 1994 (ICC file 2106-02-01).
8 Chief Louis Stevenson to Heather Lawrence, Specific Claims West, June 14, 1995 (ICC file 2106-02-02).
9 Heather Lawrence, Specific Claims West, to Chief Louis Stevenson, September 29, 1995 (ICC file 2601-02-02).
surrender claim by January 15, 1996, Canada deferred this decision pending its study of the impact of the surrender claim on the TLE claim.\textsuperscript{10} Dissatisfied with the delays, the Peguis First Nation requested a third planning conference, which was held on October 16, 1996. At that time, dates were tentatively set for a community session and oral submissions before the Commission. At a fourth planning conference held on November 28, 1996, the parties further clarified the issues and identified areas where additional research was required.

In February 1997, Canada informed the Peguis First Nation of its preliminary decision to accept the surrender claim for negotiation,\textsuperscript{11} but advised that it had not yet finalized its position regarding the impact of the surrender on the TLE claim. Subsequently, counsel to the Commission proposed a further conference between the parties to discuss how the above matter could be expedited,\textsuperscript{12} and, as a result, a fifth planning conference was held on April 9, 1997.

At that meeting, the parties agreed that Jim Gallo of DIAND, with the assistance of Ralph Abramson of the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) Centre of Manitoba, would conduct further research concerning the effect of the surrender (in particular, the setting aside of the new 75,000-acre reserve) on the Band's outstanding treaty land entitlement. The Gallo report was provided to the First Nation and the Commission in December 1997.\textsuperscript{13} On June 29, 1998, after a review of the report by the Specific Claims Branch and the Claims Advisory Committee, Canada advised the Peguis First Nation that its TLE claim had been accepted for negotiation within the Specific Claims Policy. For the purpose of negotiations, Canada accepted that it had an outstanding obligation within the meaning of the Policy on the basis that “there is an outstanding TLE shortfall arising from the fact that not all members of the Peguis First Nation appear to have been counted at the date of first survey (DOFS), and/or from the erroneous inclusion of the St Peter’s Parish river lots in calculating the acreage of the St Peter’s Reserve.”\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} Bruce Becker, Department of Justice, to Isa Gros-Louis Ahenakew, Indian Claims Commission, April 15, 1996 (ICC file 2601-02-01).
\textsuperscript{11} Anne-Marie Robinson, Specific Claims Branch, to Chief Louis J. Stevenson, February 3, 1997 (ICC file 2106-02-02).
\textsuperscript{12} Ron S. Maurice, Indian Claims Commission, to Paul Forsyth, Taylor & McCaffrey, February 11, 1997 (ICC file 2106-02-01).
\textsuperscript{13} Jim Gallo, DIAND, to Honourable Robert Reid, Indian Claims Commission, December 8, 1997 (ICC file 2106-02-02).
\textsuperscript{14} John Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister, to Chief Louis J. Stevenson, Peguis First Nation, June 29, 1998 (ICC file 2106-01-2).
Although the surrender claim was not formally before the Commission, Canada’s decision in 1997 to accept this claim for negotiation, followed by Canada’s acceptance the following year of the TLE claim that was before the Commission, directly resulted from a cooperative process agreed to by the parties during the series of planning conferences chaired by Commission staff.

As a result of this process, the Commission suspended its inquiry into the claim and was not required to make any findings. This report is based on historical reports and documents submitted to the Commission by the Peguis First Nation and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The balance of the record of this inquiry is appended as Appendix A.

MANDATE OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

The Commission was established in 1991 to assist First Nations and Canada in the negotiation and fair resolution of specific claims. The Commission’s mandate to conduct inquiries pursuant to the Inquiries Act is set out in federal Orders in Council providing the Commissioners with the authority to conduct public inquiries into specific claims and to issue reports on “whether a claimant has a valid claim for negotiation under the [Specific Claims] Policy where the claim was already rejected by the Minister.”

This Policy, outlined in the department’s 1982 booklet entitled Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy – Specific Claims, states that Canada will accept claims for negotiation where they disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation” on the part of the federal government. The term “lawful obligation” is defined in Outstanding Business as follows:

The government’s policy on specific claims is that it will recognize claims by Indian bands which disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation,” i.e., an obligation derived from the law on the part of the federal government.

A lawful obligation may arise in any of the following circumstances:

i) The non-fulfillment of a treaty or agreement between Indians and the Crown.

ii) A breach of an obligation arising out of the Indian Act or other statutes pertaining to Indians and the regulations thereunder.


iii) A breach of an obligation arising out of government administration of Indian funds or other assets.
iv) An illegal disposition of Indian land.

The Policy also addresses the following types of claims, characterized as “Beyond Lawful Obligation”:

i) Failure to provide compensation for reserve lands taken or damaged by the federal government or any of its agencies under authority.
ii) Fraud in connection with the acquisition or disposition of Indian reserve land by employees or agents of the federal government, in cases where the fraud can be clearly demonstrated.17

The Commission has the authority to review thoroughly the historical and legal bases for the claim and the reasons for its rejection with both the claimant and the government. The Inquiries Act gives the Commission wide powers to conduct such an inquiry, to gather information, and even to subpoena evidence if necessary. If, at the end of an inquiry, the Commission concludes that the facts and law support a finding that Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the claimant First Nation, it may recommend to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development that the claim be accepted for negotiation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND TO THE FIRST NATION’S CLAIM

Chief Peguis and his followers, a group of Ojibwa (or Saulteaux) Indians originating from the Great Lakes area, are believed to have migrated westward to the Red River valley sometime after 1790 in search of greater supplies of game for food.\textsuperscript{18} They settled along the banks of the Red River, upstream from its mouth at Lake Winnipeg, in the vicinity of Netley Creek. Unlike the nomadic Cree and Assiniboine Indians who also inhabited what is today the province of Manitoba, the Peguis Band had a permanent settlement at their new location. Since the early part of the 19th century they had cultivated land at Netley Creek, although not to the exclusion of hunting and fishing.

In 1810, the Earl of Selkirk conceived a philanthropic plan to resettle dispossessed Scottish tenant farmers in Rupert’s Land – the vast expanse of North American territory that had been granted by the British Crown to the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) in 1670. As a major shareholder in the company, Selkirk was in a position to exert influence to bring these plans to fruition. In 1811, the first Selkirk settlers arrived at the Red River Settlement,\textsuperscript{19} a few miles upstream from Peguis’s settlement. Although the company had transferred all its rights in a large tract of land to Selkirk for the establishment of this agricultural colony, the settlers faced violent opposition from fur traders associated with the rival North West Company. These traders interpreted the arrival of the settlers as a further attempt by the HBC to displace its competition from the inland fur trade. As a result, the first decade of the colony’s existence was marked by turmoil and bloodshed.

\textsuperscript{18} Chief Peguis ([Winnipeg]: Manitoba, Department of Culture, Heritage, and Recreation, 1984) (ICC Documents, p. 1379).

\textsuperscript{19} This settlement, the centre of which was the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, was located at the present site of the city of Winnipeg.
Chief Peguis had exchanged gifts of peace and friendship with the colony’s governor in 1813–14 and had offered aid to the settlers during their frequent expulsions from Red River by the “Nor’Westers.”20 In order to secure greater stability for his colony and its inhabitants, however, the Earl of Selkirk entered into an agreement with Chief Peguis and several other local chiefs in 1817, by which some 300,000 square kilometres of land along the Red and Assiniboine Rivers were granted to George III for the use of the colony.21

The ceded territory included land occupied by Peguis and his followers on both sides of the Red River, from “Sugar Point” north to the river’s mouth at Lake Winnipeg. Shortly after the treaty was signed, however, Peguis approached Selkirk to express his Band’s concern over its loss of access to the river. As a result, Peguis and Lord Selkirk agreed that the Band would be granted back the land on both sides of the Red River north of Sugar Point to Lake Winnipeg.22

After the union of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the North West Company in 1821, peace was restored to the colony. Thereafter, it became a haven for retired company officers and servants and their mixed-blood families. As well, the colony eventually became a centre for the distinct and emerging community of French-speaking, mixed-blood descendants of former Nor’Westers and other French traders and explorers. Many of the latter had also settled in the Red River valley, which provided a home base from which to pursue the annual buffalo hunt or other activities such as provisioning or carting. The newly arrived Catholic and Protestant missionaries encouraged the local Métis23 inhabitants, who formed the majority of the population, to adopt a settled lifestyle, and, by the middle of the 19th century, several thousand resided in a number of ecclesiastical parishes that had been carved out of the settlement.24

The most northerly of these parishes was St Peter’s, the location of which corresponded roughly to the lands occupied by Chief Peguis and his followers. Anglican missionaries had first become actively involved with the com-

22 Chief Peguis ([Winnipeg]: Manitoba, Department of Culture, Heritage, and Recreation, 1984) (ICC Documents, p. 1383); Molyneux St John to the Hon. Adams George Archibald, January 17, 1871 (ICC Documents, pp. 6–7).
23 This term will be used to describe both French- and English-speaking mixed-blood descendants of Europeans and Canadians associated with the fur trade or with exploration.
munity, which was sometimes known as the “Indian Settlement,” in the early 1830s, and they eventually constructed a church and a schoolhouse three or four miles downstream from Sugar Point. The church was named “St Peter’s” in 1853, but the parish, unlike the others in the colony, does not appear with delineated boundaries in a map drawn in 1856, although the location is referred to as “St Peter’s Parish” on this map. One source states that the parish was not formally established until the early 1860s, when settlement along the Red River had moved far enough north to warrant its creation.

The Red River parishes, including St Peter’s, comprised narrow river lots, two miles deep, following the traditional Quebec system on which the survey was based. Typical land use, however, followed the Scottish system of cultivating an “infield” adjacent to the river, and leaving the “outfield” portion of each lot for pasture. As a result, if not by design, land tenure at Red River reflected the blended heritage of the colony.

Before the entry of Manitoba into Confederation in 1870, legal title to land was only occasionally a matter of concern to most of the settlement’s inhabitants. The heirs of the Earl of Selkirk had reconveyed the settlement to the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1836, subject to any individual titles granted by the Earl. Thereafter, the HBC conveyed title to individual lots in the form of 999-year leases, although it experienced great difficulty in convincing the Métis inhabitants of the settlement that a purchase from the company was necessary to secure ownership rights. When the HBC proposed that all occupants of land in the colony be required to pay for the land they occupied, failing which the land would be sold to the first interested purchaser, protest meetings took place in several parishes. At these meetings, “the Metis decided that no monies should be paid, that the Hudson’s Bay Company had no right to the land ... and that the Metis had a right to it, being ‘the descend-...” As a result, the company backed down, the mere occupation of land was, for practical purposes, placed on an

equal footing with formal ownership, and squatters were generally left undisturbed.

Some of the above unrest had been precipitated by Chief Peguis, who, in 1860, appeared to repudiate the 1817 treaty concluded between him and Lord Selkirk. He (and subsequently his son Henry Prince) had asserted the right to sell river lots within the Indian Settlement, and there is some evidence that he had authority from the Hudson’s Bay Company to do so. A St Peter’s settler, James Monkman, related many years later:

In the year 1846 the Hudson [sic] Bay Company, being then the Government of the land, sent land surveyors down to ... the Indian Settlement or Chief Peguis settlement, with instructions [to] run two lines from the Red River two miles into the interior, one to be run at the southern boundary of the Peguis settlement, and the other to be run as a side line for the Chief’s property. Base lines were started from these lines, in selling to the purchasers years afterwards, and the said side line is recognised today as the side line of the said property. The Hudson Bay Company authorized Chief Peguis to sell the lands north of the line run at the southern boundary of his settlement at a price set down by the H. B. Co. ... And one Judge T[h]om of the Hudson [sic] Bay Company gave to Chief Peguis a document in the form of a deed of sale, of which he gave a copy to all purchasers shewing the amount of land sold to each purchaser.... This privilege was given to Chief Peguis by the Hudson’s Bay Company in the form of a pension for the active part he took with his Indians in defence of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Selkirk settlers at the fight of the Seven Oaks when Governor Semple met his death.31

As a result, by the time of the Red River Colony’s entry into Confederation in 1870, St Peter’s Parish was occupied in part by white and Métis settlers who had received title to their river lots from Chief Peguis. In addition, some of the followers of Chief Peguis had acquired land for their own use from the Chief and were farming alongside their non-Indian neighbours. This patchwork of ownership within the Indian Settlement would create havoc in the ensuing decades, and would ultimately culminate in the surrender of the St Peter’s lands and the removal of the Peguis Band from the Red River valley.

31 James Monkman to the Minister of the Interior, January 8, 1895, National Archives of Canada (NA), RG 10, vol. 3620, file 4646-7.
THE ENTRY OF MANITOBA INTO CONFEDERATION

A convergence of several important events surrounding the creation of the province of Manitoba would have enormous consequences for the Peguis Band. The 1860s were a decade of great social change in Red River. The old chief had died in 1864 and had been succeeded by his son Henry Prince. The primacy of the Hudson’s Bay Company was coming to an end, owing to political considerations in England and Canada. There was increasing pressure within Canada to secure the annexation of Rupert’s Land, in the face of corresponding aspirations from certain interests in the United States. Canadian agricultural settlers and entrepreneurs, primarily from Ontario, began arriving in the colony in greater numbers, commenced staking out property, and promptly took up the cause of Canadian annexation. These actions were perceived as a threat by some of the long-time inhabitants of the colony, especially by many of the Métis, who held their lands by occupancy only and feared the loss of their homes.

Tensions were aggravated by the attitude of superiority some of the newly arrived Canadians adopted towards the French-speaking Métis. The Métis, long accustomed to forming the majority of the population as well as its social elite, faced the prospect of eventually losing their supremacy in the lands they had occupied for several generations.

Further unrest ensued when annexation negotiations took place in 1869 between the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Government of Canada without the participation of the majority of the settlement’s inhabitants. The arrival of Canadian surveyors, who trespassed on Métis land holdings and attempted to resurvey them without the permission of the occupants, was the final straw. These actions galvanized Louis Riel and his followers into taking the first steps towards the establishment of a provisional government and precipitated the events known as the Riel Rebellion of 1869–70.

Although the resistance was eventually quashed by the Canadian government, it gave the Métis the clout to negotiate better terms for the entry of Manitoba into Confederation, particularly in the area of land rights. Sections 30 to 33 of the Manitoba Act, enacted in 1870, not only provided land scrip for the families of Métis residents of the new province but also validated

34 SC 1870, c. 3.
titles to land that had been granted by the Hudson’s Bay Company or acquired by occupancy. Section 32 of the Act stated:

32. For the quieting of titles, and assuring to the settlers in the Province the peaceable possession of the lands now held by them, it is enacted as follows:-

1. All grants of land in freehold made by the Hudson’s Bay Company up to the eighth day of March, 1869, shall, if required by the owner, be confirmed by grant from the Crown.
2. All grants of estates less than freehold in land made by the Hudson’s Bay Company up to the eighth day of March aforesaid, shall, if required by the owner, be converted into an estate in freehold by grant from the Crown.
3. All titles by occupancy with the sanction and under the license and authority of the Hudson’s Bay Company up to the eighth day of March aforesaid, of land in that part of the Province in which Indian Title has been extinguished, shall if required by the owner, be converted into an estate in freehold by grant from the Crown.
4. All persons in peaceable possession of land at the time of the transfer to Canada, in those parts of the Province in which the Indian Title has not been extinguished, shall have the right of pre-emption of the same, on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Governor in Council.

This legislation, which acquired constitutional force by virtue of its confirmation by the British North America Act of 1871, arguably applied to the landowners holding “Peguis titles” within St Peter’s Parish. The fact that many of the lot owners were band members, however, caused much confusion over the applicability of the Act to Indians. In the years to come, government officials would hold divergent and changing views concerning the rights of band members to sell their lots to outsiders. This state of uncertainty would lead to conflict within the Peguis Band, several investigations by the department, and, ultimately, the surrender of the Band’s lands.

**TREATY 1 AND THE CREATION OF ST PETER’S RESERVE**

Shortly after the entry of Manitoba into Confederation, the dominion government made plans to extinguish the Indian title in anticipation of the expected influx of agricultural settlers into the province. The government’s negotiator, Wemyss Simpson, arrived in the province on July 16, 1871, and immediately issued proclamations to the Indian leaders of the territory to come to Lower
Fort Garry to negotiate the terms of a treaty. The first to arrive was Henry Prince, who had become chief of the Peguis Band on the death of his father, Chief Peguis, in 1864. Negotiations took place on July 26, 27, and 29, 1879, but agreement was not reached until August 3 of that year. In exchange for the Indians’ agreement to cede their aboriginal title to all land in the new province of Manitoba, the government agreed to set aside reserves for each signatory band. The treaty stated:

For the use of the Indians belonging to the band of which Henry Prince, otherwise called Mis-koo-ke-new, is the Chief, so much land on both sides of the Red River, beginning at the south line of St. Peter’s Parish, as will furnish one hundred and sixty acres for each family of five, or in that proportion for larger or smaller families; ... it being understood, however, that if, at the date of the execution of this treaty, there are any settlers within the bounds of any lands reserved by any band, Her Majesty reserves the right to deal with such settlers as She shall deem just, so as not to diminish the extent of land allotted to the Indians.

Although it was not reflected in the written terms of the treaty, it is clear that certain “outside promises” had been made to the representatives of the Peguis Band with regard to the river lots held by their members and others in St Peter’s Parish. Four years after the conclusion of the treaty, Simpson recalled:

In reply I beg to state that the Indians of Henry Prince’s Band, residing at the Indian Settlement below the Stone Fort on the Red River, were known to be in possession of Houses and small plots of ground fenced in at the time of the signing of Treaty No. 1, and that it was agreed that such plots should be considered as their own property and the Reserve to be laid out should comprise enough land to give one hundred and sixty acres to each family of five exclusive of any land held as settlers at the time of signing.

Molyneux St John, later an Indian agent, who was also present at the negotiations, wrote:

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38 Wemyss Simpson to E.A. Meredith, February 15, 1875, NA, RG 10, vol. 3614, file 4311.
I remember the Indians asking the question whether the amount of land set apart for each family; that is 160 acres for every family of five; was meant to include the land already occupied by them. The answer was that the allotment now provided for was irrespective of and in addition to their holdings on the river. These holdings run back two miles in the same way as all the other properties on the river and the Indians were told that the Reserve would be laid out round this line of settlement taking for the southernmost commencement the southern boundary of the Parish of St. Peters, in which most of the Indians lived, and which by reason of an old agreement with Lord Selkirk’s legal successors was sometimes called the Indian Reserve.  

Before any survey of the reserve set apart by Treaty 1, it was considered necessary to survey the river lots as well as the boundary of St. Peter’s Parish. It appears that the parish survey was conducted in the winter of 1872, coincident with the resurvey of the Parish of St. Andrew’s and the creation of the new Parish of St. Clement’s. In the course of these surveys, the southern boundary of St. Peter’s Parish was altered by moving it north of Sugar Point, perhaps as a result of the difficulties associated with determining the boundaries of the old lots surveyed by the Hudson’s Bay Company. As the Indian reserve set aside by treaty had not yet been surveyed, however, the effect of this alteration was to change the future southern boundary of the reserve from the one that had been contemplated in the treaty.

Indian Affairs officials had requested in March 1873 that the reserve be surveyed, but it appears that this work did not begin until the fall. At that time, surveyor A.H. Vaughan, assisted by J.W. Harris, began the survey of the reserve’s eastern, western, and northern boundaries, completing the work in the winter of 1874. The outer boundaries of the reserve completely enclosed the parish river lots. The aggregate of land within those boundaries equalled 55,246 acres, of which the surveyed parish river lots represented 17,331 acres, leaving 37,915 acres of “reserve” land set aside pursuant to Treaty 1. According to an analysis of the 1873 paylist, the population of the

39 Molyneux St John, “Memorandum in Reference to understanding with Indians under Treaties Nos 1 & 2 as to the Proprietary Rights of Indians in Property Held by them prior to the Negotiation of the Stone Fort or No. 1 Treaty,” NA, RG 10, vol. 3614, file 4311. Emphasis in original.
41 Thomas Flanagan, Metis Lands in Manitoba (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1991), 158.
43 William Spragge, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (DSGIA), to J.A.N. Provencher, July 18, 1873 (ICC Documents, pp. 17–20).
Peguis Band at the date of first survey was 1,875 persons. This number would require a reserve of 60,000 acres under the terms of Treaty 1.

Given the quantity of land within the boundaries of the reserve relative to the entitlement, it appears likely that the surveyors believed that the river lots were to be included within the treaty allotment. It is clear, however, that many of the Indians thought otherwise, as they continued to sell their lots, even after the reserve had been surveyed. Complicating the issue was a growing discontent among some factions of the Peguis Band with the fact that outsiders were occupying land within the boundaries of their reserve. Complaints of damage to Indian property were made to Indian Superintendent J.A.N. Provencher, and there was pressure on the department to deal with what was clearly an anomalous situation.

DEPARTMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS, 1876–96

The existence of the privately held river lots within the boundaries of the St Peter’s Reserve, and the conflicts that arose as a result, would plague the Department of Indian Affairs for decades. One source of conflict concerned the right of treaty Indians to sell property owned by them prior to treaty. There was a divergence of opinion among high-ranking officials of the department on this point. Wemyss Simpson believed that the St Peter’s Indians could not be prevented from selling their holdings, given that it had been agreed at the treaty negotiations that the river lots would remain their own property whereas the Minister of the Interior had made public statements to the contrary.

The latter view subsequently became the official position of the department, particularly after the passage of legislation extending the surrender provisions of the Indian Act to Manitoba. In theory, all private land rights held by an individual became rights held in common by the band once that individual adhered to treaty. Consequently, the land could not afterwards be sold by the individual, because the surrender provisions did not permit the

47 J.A.N. Provencher to the Minister of the Interior, January 10, 1875, NA, RG 10, vol. 3614, file 4311.
48 Wemyss Simpson to E.A. Meredith, February 15, 1875, NA, RG 10, vol. 3614, file 4311.
50 SC 1868, c. 42; extended to Manitoba on May 26, 1874, by An Act to Amend Certain Laws Respecting Indians, and to Extend Certain Laws Relating to Matters Connected to Indians to the Provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia, SC 1874, c. 21.
sale of Indian land without a surrender. The main proponent of this position was the powerful Deputy Superintendent General, Lawrence Vankoughnet, who would hold this view until his retirement from the department in 1893.

In the meantime, the rights of non-Indian claimants who inhabited river lots within the boundaries of the reserve also occupied the attention of government officials. In 1876, department officials directed Provencher to investigate and determine which of the river lot occupants were legally entitled to inhabit their holdings, pursuant to the *Manitoba Act*, for the purpose of taking legal action to eject those who were trespassing. After conducting his investigation, Provencher divided the river lot claimants he considered “objectionable” into three categories: treaty Indians, persons who had purchased from treaty Indians subsequent to Treaty 1 but prior to the legislation extending the provisions of the *Indian Act* to Manitoba, and persons purchasing from Indians after the passage of the above legislation. Provencher anticipated that several test cases could be selected for prosecution, and that the decisions would then determine the rights of all other claimants in each category. It appears, however, that no action was taken as a result of the above investigation.

In the fall of 1877, a meeting took place between the Interior Minister and the Chief of the Peguis Band during which the latter disputed the validity of any titles acquired by purchase after the date of the conclusion of Treaty 1. As a result, a second investigation was conducted by Inspector E. McColl in the spring of 1878. McColl concluded that Chief Henry Prince had little cause to complain about lot sales, since he had participated in many of them, but that the claims of persons who purchased from treaty Indians were without merit. “I am of opinion that those who purchased lots from treaty Indians,” he wrote, “have no legal right whatever to them, although they might have been misled in doing so, for inasmuch as treaty Indians are wards of the government, they have no more power to convey lands than minors have.”

Despite continuing pressure from the Peguis Band, no action was taken as a result of McColl’s report until the spring of 1879. At that time, Vankoughnet recommended to the Superintendent General that all non-Indians who had acquired lots from Indians after the date of Treaty 1 should be ejected by notice, pursuant to the provisions in the *Indian Act*. When steps were taken

52 J.A.N. Provencher to the Minister of the Interior, September 19, 1876, NA, RG 10, vol. 3617, file 4646.
to effect this plan, however, the residents refused to leave, and departmental officials began to consider the introduction of special legislation to resolve the problem.\footnote{Tyler, Wright and Daniel Limited, “The Illegal Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve,” prepared for TARR Centre of Manitoba, 1979 and 1983, pp. 17–18 (ICC Documents, pp. 1119–82).} As a result, in the spring of 1880 the department devised legislation creating a two-year time limit within which all claims under the Manitoba Act were required to be submitted, and a further six-month time limit for the proving of such claims, failing which they would be considered forfeited.\footnote{An Act for the Final Settlement of Claims to lands in Manitoba by Occupancy, under the Act thirty-third Victoria, Chapter Three, SC 1880, c. 7.}

The deadline by which the claims were required to be proven expired in November 1882. However, officials of the Department of the Interior had not yet completed the work required of them in the investigation of claims filed pursuant to the relevant legislation, with the result that resolution of the river lot question was again delayed.\footnote{L. Russell to L. Vankoughnet, December 20, 1882, NA, RG 10, vol. 3617, file 4646.}

In the fall of 1883, Vankoughnet asked for yet another investigation, which was to be carried out by Indian Agent A.M. Muckle. The results of this latest effort were superseded by the strong recommendation of Inspector McColl, as well as by the views of the Minister of the Interior, that a bilateral commission be established by the Departments of the Interior and Indian Affairs to resolve the issue.

The terms of reference for the commission were the subject of some disagreement. Interior officials proposed that patents to river lots be issued to certain categories of non-Indian occupant. These categories included all bona fide residents in occupation as of the date of the transfer of Manitoba to Canada, or as of the date of the conclusion of Treaty 1, or, in the discretion of the commissioners, those whose occupation postdated the signing of Treaty 1. Interior officials also proposed that persons who purchased lots from Métis who had subsequently adhered to treaty be granted patents, on the basis that the Métis landholder had rights under the Manitoba Act at the time of the sale.\footnote{A.M. Burgess to L. Vankoughnet, March 17, 1884, NA, RG 10, vol. 3615, file 4466.} Although Vankoughnet saw the value of such a commission in the resolution of the river lot problem, he took the view that no one who was, or had become, a treaty Indian could pass title to private property unless the sale was completed before the vendor’s adherence to Treaty 1. Ultimately, the terms of reference governing the bilateral investigation were narrowed in accordance with Vankoughnet’s views, and McColl, on behalf of
Indian Affairs, and A.H. Whitcher, for the Department of the Interior, began their work in late 1884.\(^5\) McColl and Whitcher submitted their report in June 1885. They had divided 130 claimants into four schedules:

A. For claimants other than Indians where the claims were established by actual occupancy at the date of the Treaty, the issuance of patents was recommended.

B. For claimants who were Indian, or were Metis and admitted to treaty, or persons claiming through them; or claims for land that was unoccupied and unimproved at the time of treaty, the issuance of patents was not recommended.

C. For claimants who acquired lots from Indians (or Metis admitted to treaty) subsequent to the date of Treaty 1, but who continuously occupied and improved their holdings since the treaty, compensation was recommended although the issuance of patents was not.

D. For claimants who were actual residents and occupants of farm lots at the date of Treaty, and who used wood lots located within the boundaries of the Reserve in order to carry on their homestead operations, the issuance of patents was recommended.\(^6\)

For reasons that are not apparent, but which may be connected to the disruption caused by the 1885 Riel Rebellion, the McColl/Whitcher report sat in abeyance for 18 months. Finally, in January 1887, the Minister of the Interior recommended to the Privy Council that the recommendations of the report be accepted.\(^6\) Vankoughnet, however, felt that the commissioners had exceeded their mandate by recommending the acceptance of some claims in which the claimants were not in actual possession of the land at the time Treaty 1 was concluded. In Vankoughnet’s view, the reserve was created by the terms of the treaty, and, as a result, reserve land could only be sold by surrender to the Crown. Consequently, anyone purchasing after that date did so at his own risk.\(^6\) Vankoughnet also disagreed with the proposed disposition of the “wood lot” claims. He pointed out that the quantity of any lands patented to outsiders would have to be made up to the Band, as its entitlement had crystallized at the time the reserve was created.


Because of the inability of the Departments of Indian Affairs and the Interior to agree on which claimants (with the exception of the Schedule A claimants) should receive patents, the entire problem was again put in abeyance, to the continued frustration of band members and lot holders. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that some band members had withdrawn from treaty and taken Métis scrip in order to establish their claims under the Manitoba Act, only to discover that the department took the position that, as non-Indians, they would be required to leave the reserve. When they refused to leave, “it was not long before they became just another group of claimants ... demanding title to the land they occupied.” The Peguis Band, under Henry Prince, continued to agitate against the presence of outsiders, and, as a result, the department resolved to eject the group of recent scrip takers. The services of a sheriff were required to accomplish this task, and all eventually left the reserve.

The department was in the midst of plans to eject all the other lot holders whose claims McColl and Whitcher had rejected when the Exchequer Court of Canada rendered its decision in The Queen v. Thomas. This case concerned a Métis who had taken treaty with the Peguis Band, but withdrew a few years later to protect his property rights in a river lot occupied by him. The matter was before the Exchequer Court as a result of the department’s attempt to cancel a patent to the lot in question, which had been granted to him before it was realized that he had at one time taken treaty. The case turned on whether Thomas was an “Indian” within the meaning of the Indian Act on April 12, 1876, which was the date of passage of section 10 of the Act:

Any Indian or non-treaty Indian in the Province of British Columbia, the Province of Manitoba, in the North-West Territories, or in the Territory of Keewatin, who has, or shall have, previously to the selection of a reserve, possession of and made permanent improvements on a plot of land which has been or shall be included in or surrounded by a reserve, shall have the same privileges, neither more nor less, in respect of such plot, as an Indian enjoys who holds under a location title.

The effect of the above was to cancel the private property rights of any Indian who occupied and cultivated land surrounded by a reserve. As a result, if it

63 (1891) 2 Ex. CR 246.
64 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the laws Respecting Indians, SC 1876, c. 18, s. 10.
were determined that the above provision applied to Thomas at the time he was granted his patent, the transaction was void.

The decision of the court in Thomas’s favour was rendered on January 19, 1891. Justice Burbidge stated:

The first question to be decided is: Did the defendant by participating in the gratuity and annuities mentioned make an election and renounce the status and personal condition of a half-breed, and acquire that of an Indian? ... But take it that the defendant’s status, from the day he received his first payment under the Treaty until he returned the last [in 1874], must be deemed to be that of an Indian, the further question presents itself: By virtue of what law did he forfeit his interest in the homestead that he had purchased, and on which, with his wife and family, he was residing. The only answer suggested in reply to that enquiry is that such is the effect of the 19th section of the Indian Act (R.S.C. c. 43), whereby it is, amongst other things, provided that every Indian in the Province of Manitoba who has, previously to the selection of Reserve, possession of a plot of land, included in or surrounded by a Reserve, upon which he has made permanent improvements, shall have in respect thereof the same privileges as are enjoyed by an Indian who holds under a location title. But that provision was first enacted in 1876 by 39 Vic. C. 18 s. 10, and cannot, I think, be construed to deprive the defendant of any rights of property theretofore acquired, seeing that there is no pretence that he was at that time an Indian or liable to be considered or treated as an Indian within the meaning of the statute.65

The broader effect of the above decision was to determine that persons who took treaty in 1871 were not, by virtue of that fact, deprived of their personal property rights acquired prior to treaty. Only the passage of section 10 of the Indian Act on April 12, 1876, had that effect. Arguably, therefore, any members of the Peguis Band occupying river lots on the date of the transfer of Manitoba to Canada had the legal right to transfer those lots to third parties up to April 12, 1876.

Vankoughnet asked the Department of Justice for an opinion concerning the chance of a successful appeal. He was informed by the Deputy Minister of Justice that Justice Burbidge’s reasoning was correct and was “fatal to the case of the Crown.”66 Despite the clear implications of the Thomas case, however, the department continued to take the position that sales by treaty Indians between the date of Treaty 1 and April 12, 1876, were invalid.67

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65 The Queen v. Thomas (1891), 2 Ex. CR 246 at 249–51. Emphasis added.
After Vankoughnet’s retirement in 1893, the new Deputy Superintendent General, Hayter Reed, addressed the status of the claims that remained unresolved. Although he agreed with the McColl/Whitcher recommendations to reject the Schedule B and Schedule C claims, he disagreed with his predecessor’s position regarding the “wood lot” claimants and recommended to the Superintendent General that they be accepted. The Superintendent General recommended that this be carried out, but the plan was scuttled owing to unexpected opposition from officials of the Department of the Interior, leaving the situation immersed in the same conflicts and frustrations as before. Although the new Superintendent General, Hugh John Macdonald, ordered another investigation to be carried out in 1896, the change in government in that year caused matters to grind to a halt once more. As a result, it would be another decade before the land issue at St Peter’s Reserve would be resolved, although the manner in which it would be resolved was far from what the Indians of the Peguis Band had long anticipated.

THE HOWELL COMMISSION AND THE SURRENDER OF ST PETER’S RESERVE

Following the election in 1896, the problem of the St Peter’s land claims was assigned to T.G. Rothwell, the law clerk of the Department of the Interior, with the idea that the matter be resolved quickly and permanently. Despite this intention, it was 1900 before Rothwell’s report was submitted to the Superintendent General and Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton. What was significant about this report, however, was its recommendation that the tangle of claims be resolved by a surrender of the reserve, the first mention of such a course of action in the department’s 25-year history of dealing with the St Peter’s land question.68

Meanwhile, and independent of the Interior Department’s report, a movement in favour of the surrender of the reserve had gained support among local politicians in Manitoba, including the Selkirk Member of Parliament, W.F. McCreary. Many of the proponents of this plan were allied with river lot claimants, a fact that caused great consternation among members of the Peguis Band.69

McCreary died in 1904 and his replacement, Samuel Jackson, did not immediately immerse himself in the promotion of the reserve’s surrender. In the spring of 1906, however, the Chief and councillors of the Peguis Band petitioned Jackson to help in the removal of the non-Indian owners of river lots from the reserve. Jackson, who had at one time been an inspector of Indian agencies in the province, was familiar with the controversy, and he asked Frank Pedley, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to take steps to settle the matter once and for all. Pedley forwarded the matter to the Department of the Interior, which caused interest to be revived in Rothwell’s earlier surrender recommendation, and the latter’s report was forwarded to the new minister, Frank Oliver.

Oliver, who was well known as a proponent of reserve land surrenders, had recently introduced legislation in the House of Commons raising the percentage of sale proceeds that could be advanced to members of a band on surrender of their land, thereby providing an increased incentive for a band to surrender. As a result, Rothwell’s recommendation likely received favourable consideration in that quarter. In any event, Oliver sent Rothwell’s report to Pedley for his comments, with the direction that the St Peter’s land question be disposed of in a way satisfactory to all interested parties.

Pedley passed the matter on to other officials in the department, and, subsequently, several of the band councillors were interviewed about the issue. Just at this time, the price of real estate in the town of Selkirk, adjoining the reserve, began to rise, thereby generating interest in the reserve among local speculators. Shortly thereafter, in November 1906, Oliver conceived the idea of appointing a commission to investigate all claims to lands within the St Peter’s Reserve, for the purpose of advising the Privy Council on the means by which these claims could best be resolved. The letter announcing the plan to officials of the Department of Indian Affairs stated that it was “understood” that the Peguis Band would “willingly execute the necessary surrender.”

The commission was appointed by Order in Council dated November 22, 1906. The Order appointed the Chief Justice of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Hector Howell, as Commissioner to investigate certain questions with regard to the extent of reserve land which should have been set aside for the...
Band, as well as to determine the compensation to be given to the Band for the patented lands located within the boundaries of the reserve. The Order stated:

[I]t is certain from papers on file in the Department of the Interior that but for ... the necessity of first settling the area this band is entitled to under the terms of the Treaty of the 3rd August, 1871, and then settling what compensation should be made to its members for lands granted from it after the date of the Treaty, Letters Patent would have issued long ago for many of the parcels of land for which claim has for years been made and is yet being made.

The Minister further submits that, not only, therefore, is it now necessary to consider such unsettled claims to lands, but it is necessary to finally settle the total area of the Reserve, and the total area of all portions thereof which have been granted out of it or which may yet have to be granted out of it to satisfy the claims to lands therein of others than Indians, and for which compensation should be made to them, and also what the nature and extent or amount of such compensation should be. It may also become necessary to consider the advisability and necessity of obtaining from the members of the band a surrender of all ungranted lands in the Reserve and of setting aside other lands as a Reserve.74

Howell began his work in December 1906, after the appointment of counsel for the Band75 and for the non-Indian claimants. Before the public hearings, however, informal meetings to discuss the possibility of a surrender were held between the Commissioner, the two lawyers, and Chief William Prince of the Peguis Band. At one of these meetings, which was also attended by the band councillors and the Indian Commissioner, David Laird, it appears that Laird and the Band were strongly opposed to the idea of a surrender. Howell continued to meet informally with the Band after the start of hearings in February 1907, although it appears that Laird was not present. Nonetheless, the Chief and three of the councillors did not wish to discuss a surrender in February 1907, but instead put forward their longstanding complaints about the river lots and compensation for the loss to the Band of the land that had been patented.76

The formal hearings were primarily concerned with the rights of the river lot claimants. Howell ruled that the reasoning of Justice Burbidge in the Thomas case was applicable and that, as a result, sales of private lots by

74 OCPC 2320, November 22, 1906 (ICC Documents, pp. 85–92).
treaty Indians before April 12, 1876, were valid. Consequently, any claims for land that had been sold by treaty Indians after the above date were disallowed.

Howell’s informal meetings with the Band continued in the spring, concurrent with the formal hearings. A surrender proposal presented by Howell to the Band in April 1907 was opposed by all present at the meeting with the exception of one councillor. At a subsequent meeting on the reserve in May of that year, Howell’s proposal to the Band was again rejected. In late May, Howell had occasion to meet with Oliver during the minister’s stop in Winnipeg following a tour of western Canada. After this meeting, a new and more generous surrender proposal was presented to the Band, but it was again rejected by a majority at a meeting of the Chief and council. At a subsequent meeting between Howell and the entire Band to discuss the new proposal, discussions broke down when Howell mistakenly thought he was being accused of dishonesty by one band member, and the majority of the Band refused to meet with him further.77

Howell then enlisted the support of the Department of Indian Affairs to induce the Band to attend another meeting on July 15, 1907. Only one band member attended - Councillor W.H. Prince, who had previously supported the surrender - and he was questioned extensively by the lawyer appointed to represent the Band concerning the desirability of the Band’s relocation from the Selkirk area. Prince advised the commission that perhaps 20 families, representing something less than 10 per cent of the Band’s population, would be willing to relocate to a new location.78

In late August 1907, Howell renewed his attempts to secure a surrender from the Band. On August 28, Howell, along with several prominent citizens of the town of Selkirk, met with Chief William Prince and two councillors to discuss the proposed surrender on terms that were significantly better than had been previously offered. Howell reported that the Band had refused to consider a surrender until certain terms had been offered by him: the granting of individual patents to Indian heads of families totalling half the reserve’s acreage (with the Chief and councillors to receive significantly more land than ordinary band members); the retention of approximately 3,000 acres within the reserve for hay land for the Band; the balance of the land to be sold, with half the principal to be paid over and the other half to be invested,

with the interest paid annually; and the provision of a new reserve of 75,000 acres to be located elsewhere. In addition, Howell stated that the Band had proposed that its members be allowed to receive the proceeds of sale of a small parcel of land (called the “Mile Square”) that had been surrendered decades earlier. The Indians had recently petitioned the department to release these funds, believed to amount to $5,000, but the department had not acceded to the Band’s request. Howell informed Oliver that the last-mentioned term would likely cause the Chief and council to agree to a surrender, and he asked the Minister’s permission to promise it to the Band.

At the next meeting between Howell and the Chief and councillors on September 5, 1907, the Indians were “insistent” that the Mile Square proceeds be paid to them, and, as a result, Howell pressed the department for its concurrence in the above term. Pedley responded that it would be “impossible” to use the money for that purpose, owing to the terms of the original surrender, but that it would not be illegal to expend the funds in question on permanent improvements to a new reserve.

Soon afterwards, Pedley was dispatched to Manitoba to assist with the conclusion of the surrender. Pedley, Howell, and other officials met with the Chief and councillors of the Peguis Band on September 20, 1907. At this meeting, many of the proposed surrender terms were discussed, and, by its end, the Chief and councillors of the Peguis Band had apparently agreed to the surrender.

Pedley then arranged for a meeting of the entire Band to be held three days later on Monday, September 23, to discuss and vote on the surrender. To that end, notices were posted at several churches located on the reserve the day before the proposed meeting. It later became clear that many band members did not see the notices, as they were absent from the reserve or did not attend church services on that day. Nonetheless, on the day of the meeting, more than 200 band members arrived at the old schoolhouse on the reserve, the designated location for the meeting. As the building could hold at

79 H.M. Howell to Frank Oliver, August 30, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 4031, file 301808-6/2 (ICC Documents, pp. 97-103).
81 H.M. Howell to Frank Oliver, September 6, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 4031, file 301808-6/2 (ICC Documents, pp. 104-6).
82 Frank Pedley to H.M. Howell, September 7, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 4031, file 301808-6/2.
most 100 people, the rest remained outdoors and could not hear the proceedings.

The surrender meeting was chaired by Pedley and took place over two separate days. On the first day, Pedley, through two interpreters, explained the terms of the surrender document. Howell spoke as well, advising the band members in attendance to accept the terms of the surrender. Pedley let the Band know that he had brought $5,000 in cash with him for distribution on the execution of a surrender. Several years later, he stated that he had advised all in attendance that the funds did not originate in the Mile Square, but, instead, represented an advance of anticipated sale proceeds from the proposed surrender. Pedley also advised the meeting that the reserve land could be sold at $10 per acre and that each band member would receive $90 from that sale.

Opposition to the surrender was voiced by William Asham, an ex-Chief of the Band. He was later to state that the entire surrender document was never read to the band members assembled at the meeting. Some band members, including Asham, sensed that there was significant opposition to the surrender and requested that the surrender vote be held at the end of the first day. At the insistence of Pedley, supported by the Chief and council, however, the meeting was adjourned until the next day. When the meeting resumed on the second day, Asham discovered that the tide had turned and that much of the previous day's support for his position had evaporated. Discussion resumed on many of the same issues that had been heard the day before, until Pedley suggested that a vote be held after the lunch hour. Asham later related that attempts were made during the noon break to enlist his support for the surrender by means of the suggestion that he receive the same quantity of patented land as a councillor would receive, which was significantly greater than what an ordinary band member would get. Asham refused the offer.

The vote was held on the afternoon of September 24, 1907, after a speech by Chief William Prince in favour of the surrender. The vote, which was held out of doors, was to take place by a division of the voters into two groups, representing those in favour of the surrender and those opposed. Immedi-

85 Manitoba, "Royal Commission Re: St. Peter's Reserve" (testimony of Frank Pedley, p. 588), NA, RG 10, vol. 4033, file 301808-SP.
86 Manitoba, "Royal Commission Re: St. Peter's Reserve" (testimony of William Asham, p. 89), NA, RG 10, vol. 4033, file 301808-SP.
ately before the vote, John Semmens, the Inspector of Indian Agencies, was heard to call out in Cree that all those wanting to receive the $90 should go over to the side where the Chief and council were standing. After the vote was tabulated, it was announced that the surrender had passed by a vote of 107 to 98. Some band members then assembled in the schoolhouse with Pedley and the other officials, at which time the surrender was read out loud, in English, to those present. At some point during the proceedings, handwritten amendments were made to the terms of the surrender, apparently at the instigation of the Band. One amendment involved the striking of a clause specifying that any sales by band members of their individual allotments would have to be approved by the department. In addition, at the suggestion of Chief William Prince, a clause was added giving the ex-Chief, William Asham, 120 acres of land as his personal allotment, thereby placing him in the same position as a band councillor.  

The surrender agreement was signed by Chief William Prince, the four councillors, and ex-Chief William Asham. It was witnessed by Pedley, Semmens, and two other observers. In exchange for the Band’s surrender of its reserve, the agreement set out the following terms:

To Have and to Hold ... in trust to dispose of the same ... upon such terms as the Government of Canada may deem most conducive to our welfare ... and upon the further condition that all moneys received from the sale thereof shall ... be paid as follows, namely one half of said sum ... to be paid to us the year following the receipt of same by the Government after sale of said lands, the balance of said proceeds of sale to be funded for our benefit and the interest paid to us annually. At each payment as aforesaid the sum so paid shall be divided so that the Chief shall receive each year the sum of $10.00 and each Councillor the sum of $6.00 more than that to which the other individual members of the Band shall be entitled.

And upon the further conditions that ... there shall be granted an area not exceeding 21,000 acres to the members of the Band as follows: - To the Chief 180 acres, to the ex Chief and each Councillor 120 acres, and to the other members of the Band in the proportion of about 80 acres to each head of a family of five.... [The allotment] shall be the final settlement of the land to be patented, and of the parties to receive the same.

In addition to the said 21,000 acres above mentioned there shall be set aside 3000 acres of hay land for the members of the Band having land in the present reserve or entitled to receive land under this agreement....

A new Reserve for this Band shall be selected on Lake Winnipeg to the extent of 75,000 acres....

---

The Department shall advance at the time of the surrender the sum of $5000.00, to be repaid out of the first moneys received from the sale of the lands. A reasonable supply of agricultural implements and tools for use on the new Reserve shall be supplied and distributed at the discretion of the Department.

The Department is to render reasonable assistance in removing to the new Reserve in summer time in any year within five years of the date of this surrender ... This surrender shall release lands in the present Reserve from all claims of the Band and of each individual member thereof from all or any claims under the Manitoba Act or the Indian Act, and each member of the Band shall sign a release to this effect, when he receives his patent.89

The affidavit certifying the Band’s assent to the surrender was sworn by Agent Lewis and Chief William Prince before D.S. Daly, Police Magistrate. The surrender was accepted by Order in Council dated October 14, 1907.90 The same month, the Band and representatives of the department selected the site of the new reserve, near Fisher River, Manitoba.

Howell submitted his report to the Governor General in Council on December 2, 1907. The report dealt with several claims made by the Band concerning the correct location of the south boundary of the reserve; the right of band members to receive a patent for river lots occupied by them prior to treaty; and compensation for the loss to the reserve of river lots patented to outsiders. After recounting the history of the St Peter’s land issue and discussing the surrender, Howell reported: “The new Reserve is accepted by the Band in full satisfaction of all damages claimed and of all rights, individual or tribal, asserted as above set forth.”91

Subsequent events, in particular a 1911 Manitoba Royal Commission investigating the titles to the river lots and the surrendered land, were to vindicate those who had opposed the surrender’s validity. In the meantime, however, a significant proportion of the Band had relocated to Fisher River, patented lots had been sold, a sale of the remaining surrendered reserve land had taken place, and proceeds had been distributed to band members. The dominion government was unwilling to turn back the clock and reopen the St Peter’s land question. It was perhaps inevitable that the surrender would ultimately be validated by special legislation: the St. Peter’s Reserve Act.92 Under its provisions, purchasers would be required to pay an extra $1 per

89 Surrender: Chippewa, Cree and Saulteaux Indians of St. Peter’s Reserve to His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, September 24, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 107–11).
90 OCPC 2235/1907, October 14, 1907.
acre (to be added to the St Peter’s Band fund) to obtain a secure title to their land. The legislation had the effect of increasing the balance in the Band’s trust account by $40,000, but the St Peter’s Reserve was gone forever.
PART III

ISSUES

This claim concerned an alleged treaty land entitlement shortfall, and whether that shortfall was satisfied by the setting aside of a new reserve for the Peguis Band after the 1907 surrender of the St Peter’s Reserve. The following points are a more detailed summary of the issues as they were developed by the parties throughout the planning conferences:

(1) What was the date of first survey, and what is the appropriate population base for the purpose of determining the treaty land entitlement of the Peguis First Nation?

(2) What lands were set aside as “reserve lands” for the Peguis Band pursuant to Treaty 1, and, in particular:
   a) Were the St Peter’s Parish river lots intended to be included within the reserve?
   b) Do the provisions of the Manitoba Act, 1870, have any legal impact on the inclusion of the river lots within the reserve?
   c) What effect does Treaty Commissioner Simpson’s “outside promise” regarding the river lots have on this issue?

(3) Did the river lots become part of the reserve by operation of law, and, in particular:
   a) What is the effect of the 1874 legislation extending the provisions of the Indian Act to Manitoba?
   b) What is the effect of section 10 of the 1876 amendments to the Indian Act?

(4) Did the setting aside of a new reserve comprising 75,000 acres have an impact on the treaty land entitlement of the Peguis First Nation, and, in particular:
a) Was the new reserve provided purely in exchange for the surrendered lands?
b) Was the new reserve intended to represent additional lands under treaty?
CONCLUSION

On June 29, 1998, Assistant Deputy Minister John Sinclair, of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, informed Chief Louis J. Stevenson of the Peguis First Nation that Canada had accepted the Peguis treaty land entitlement claim for negotiation, on the basis that there existed an outstanding TLE shortfall. For the purpose of negotiation, Canada accepted that a shortfall had arisen from the fact that not all members of the Peguis First Nation appear to have been counted at the date of first survey. In the alternative, such a shortfall may have arisen from the erroneous inclusion of the St Peter’s Parish river lots in the calculation of the total acreage comprising St Peter’s Reserve.

In light of Canada’s offer to accept the claim for negotiation under the Specific Claims Policy, the Commission has suspended its inquiry and wishes the parties well in their negotiations towards a settlement.

FOR THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Daniel J. Bellegarde
Commission Co-Chair

P.E. James Prentice, QC
Commission Co-Chair

Dated this 9th day of March, 2001.
PEGUIS FIRST NATION TREATY LAND ENTITLEMENT INQUIRY

1 Planning conferences
The Commission held five planning conferences: January 12, 1995
   May 18, 1995
   October 16, 1996
   November 28, 1996
   April 9, 1997

2 Content of formal record
The formal record for Peguis First Nation Treaty Land Entitlement Claim consists of the following materials:

   · the documentary record (7 volumes of documents)
   · an annotated index.

The report of the Commission and letters of transmittal to the parties will complete the formal record of this inquiry.
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S OFFER TO ACCEPT CLAIM

June 29, 1998

Chief Louis J. Stevenson
Peguis First Nation
Peguis Reserve
P.O. Box 219
HODGSON MB R0C 1N0

Dear Chief Stevenson:

On behalf of the Government of Canada and in accordance with the Specific Claims Policy, I offer to accept for negotiation of a settlement the Peguis First Nation's specific claims concerning the 1907 surrender of St. Peter's Indian Reserve and outstanding Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE). It is proposed that these claims be negotiated jointly, as two interrelated components of a single claim.

For the purpose of negotiations, Canada accepts that the Peguis First Nation has sufficiently established that Canada has an outstanding lawful obligation within the meaning of the Specific Claims Policy, with respect to the First Nation’s allegations that: (a) Canada failed to comply with certain obligations under the surrender provisions of the 1905 Indian Act, rendering the 1907 surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve invalid; and (b) there is an outstanding TLE shortfall arising from the fact that not all members of the Peguis First Nation appear to have been counted at the date of first survey (DOFS), and/or from the erroneous inclusion of the St. Peter’s Parish river lots in calculating the acreage of the St. Peter’s Reserve.

The settlement will be in accordance with Canada’s Specific Claims Policy, as explained in the booklet “Outstanding Business”. Compensation will be based on Criteria 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, which are outlined in the booklet. The value of the compensation will take into account all the relevant criteria. No individual criterion will be viewed in isolation.
The steps of the specific claims process to be followed include: agreement
on a joint negotiating protocol, development of a settlement agreement;
conclusion of the agreement; ratification of the agreement; and finally,
implementation of the agreement. Throughout the process all government
files, including all documents submitted to the Government of Canada
concerning the claim, are subject to the Access to Information and the Privacy
Legislation in force.

All negotiations are conducted on a “without prejudice” basis. Canada and
the First Nation acknowledge that all communications, oral, written, formal or
informal are made with the intention of encouraging settlement of the dispute
between the parties only, and are not intended to constitute admissions of fact
or liability by any party.

The acceptance of these claims for negotiation of a settlement is not to be
interpreted as an admission of fact or liability by the Government of Canada.
In the event no settlement is reached and litigation ensues, the Government
of Canada reserves the right to lead all defences available to it, including
limitation periods, laches, and lack of admissible evidence.

With respect to the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) inquiry initiated by the
Peguis First Nation concerning the TLE claim, Canada will not negotiate a
specific claim concurrently with a continuation of the ICC process.
Accordingly, I would ask that, as a condition of acceptance and before
negotiations proceed, you provide confirmation that this matter will be held in
abeyance by the ICC.

In the event that a final settlement agreement is reached, Canada will require
from the First Nation a final and formal release on every aspect of these
claims, ensuring that the claims cannot be reopened. In obtaining a full and
final release, Canada will require a re-surrender of the lands which are the
subject of your First Nation’s 1907 surrender claim. As part of the settlement,
the Government of Canada will also require an indemnity from your First
Nation.

Mr. Ian Gray of the Specific Claims Branch has been designated as a
preliminary contact with respect to these negotiations. Mr. Gray can be
reached at (819) 653-0331.
I would like to convey my best wishes, and my sincere hope that a fair settlement can be reached on the Peguis First Nation’s specific claims.

Yours truly,

[Signature]

John Sinclair
Assistant Deputy Minister
Claims and Indian Government
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

COWESSESS FIRST NATION INQUIRY
1907 SURRENDER CLAIM

PANEL
Commissioner Roger J. Augustine

COUNSEL
For the Cowessess First Nation
Daniel J. Maddigan / W. Allan Brabant

For the Government of Canada
Jeffery A. Hutchinson / Richard Wex

To the Indian Claims Commission
Kathleen N. Lickers

MARCH 2001
Commissioner Carole T. Corcoran committed herself tirelessly to the body of work produced by the Commission since its inception in 1991. We greatly regret her sudden passing.

This report represents Commissioner Corcoran’s final deliberations and contribution before her untimely death. As a tribute to her many efforts on behalf of the Commission, we dedicate this report to her memory.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND TO THE INQUIRY

This report addresses a specific claim submitted by the Cowessess First Nation\(^1\) to the Minister of Indian Affairs in March 1981. That claim alleged that a 1907 surrender of 20,704 acres from Indian Reserve (IR) 73, near Broadview, Saskatchewan, was invalid because it did not comply with procedures mandated by the Indian Act. In a supplementary claim document, dated March 5, 1984, the First Nation submitted further arguments relating to the alleged non-compliance. The First Nation also reserved its right to challenge the surrender on other grounds, including breach of treaty, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unconscionability.\(^2\) Further submissions were made to the Department of Indian Affairs by counsel for the First Nation on March 6, 1985,\(^3\) and March 26, 1992.\(^4\)

Following a review by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and the Department of Justice, Jack Hughes, Research Manager at Specific Claims West, DIAND, informed Chief Lavallee of the Cowessess First Nation of the federal government’s position with respect to each allegation made in the claim documents.\(^5\) According to Mr Hughes’s letter, dated March 25, 1994, the Government of Canada was of the view that the facts of the claim did not reveal a lawful obligation on the part of the Crown.

Two years after Canada’s rejection of the claim, the Cowessess First Nation formally requested that the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) conduct an

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\(^1\) Referred to as the "Cowessess Band," the "First Nation," or the "Band," depending on the historical context.

\(^2\) "Submission to the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs on the Claim by the Cowessess Band #73 with Respect to a Purported Surrender of Land Alleged to have been Taken on January 29, 1907," March 5, 1984 (ICC file 2107-33-01).

\(^3\) T.I. Waller to Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, March 6, 1985 (ICC file 2107-33-01).

\(^4\) David C. Knoll to Specific Claims Branch, March 26, 1992 (ICC file 2107-33-01).

\(^5\) Jack Hughes, Specific Claims West, DIAND, to Chief Terry W. Lavallee, March 25, 1994 (ICC file 2107-33-01).
inquiry into the 1907 surrender claim.\(^6\) Commission Counsel Ron Maurice informed Canada of the Commissioners’ decision to conduct the inquiry in late August 1996.\(^7\) By subsequent agreement of the parties, one legal issue, concerning the interpretation of section 49(1) of the Indian Act, and two factual issues, concerning the number of eligible voters in attendance at the surrender meeting and the number of valid votes cast in favour of the surrender, were placed before the panel.

**MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION**

The mandate of this Commission is set out in federal Orders in Council providing the Commissioners with the authority to conduct public inquiries into specific claims and to issue reports on “whether a claimant has a valid claim for negotiation under the [Specific Claims] Policy where the claim was already rejected by the Minister.”\(^8\) This Policy, outlined in the department’s 1982 booklet entitled Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy – Specific Claims, states that Canada will accept and negotiate claims that disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation” on the part of the federal government.\(^9\) The term “lawful obligation” is defined in Outstanding Business as follows:

The government’s policy on specific claims is that it will recognize claims by Indian bands which disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation,” i.e., an obligation derived from the law on the part of the federal government.

A lawful obligation may arise in any of the following circumstances:

i) The non-fulfillment of a treaty or agreement between Indians and the Crown.

ii) A breach of an obligation arising out of the Indian Act or other statutes pertaining to Indians and the regulations thereunder.

iii) A breach of an obligation arising out of government administration of Indian funds or other assets.

iv) An illegal disposition of Indian land.

Furthermore, Canada is prepared to consider claims based on the following circumstances:

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i) Failure to provide compensation for reserve lands taken or damaged by the federal government or any of its agencies under authority.

ii) Fraud in connection with the acquisition or disposition of Indian reserve land by employees or agents of the federal government, in cases where fraud can be clearly demonstrated. 10

This report contains the Commission’s findings and recommendations on the issues agreed upon by the parties.

PART II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

TREATY 4 (1874)

The ancestors of the Cowessess First Nation were primarily Saulteaux, but some Cree and Métis were among them when they adhered to Treaty 4 at Fort Qu’Appelle on September 15, 1874. Chiefs Cowessess ("Ka-wezauce," also known as "Little Boy" or "Little Child") signed the treaty for himself and his followers. The signatories to the treaty ceded to the Crown an area of 194,000 square kilometres (75,000 square miles) in what is now southern Saskatchewan, and in exchange were promised perpetual cash annuities, schools, agricultural assistance, and reserves upon which to settle when they ceased their traditional nomadic way of life. These reserves were to be selected by government officials, in consultation with the bands, and the area set aside was to equal one square mile for each family of five (or 128 acres per person). Treaty 4 also stipulated that the government, and only the government, could dispose of reserve land, after obtaining the consent of the Indians entitled to the land:

the aforesaid reserves of land, or any part thereof, or any interest or right therein, or appurtenant thereto, may be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of by the said Government for the use and benefit of the said Indians, with the consent of the Indians entitled thereto first had and obtained; but in no wise shall the said Indians, or any of them, be entitled to sell or otherwise alienate any of the lands allotted to them as reserves.

Precise procedures for the alienation of reserve land were set down in the Indian Act.

RESERVE SURVEYED FOR THE COWESSESS BAND

At the time of the treaty, the Cowessess people were nomadic buffalo hunters and did not immediately select a site for a reserve. In 1874 and 1875, the Band was paid annuities at Fort Qu’Appelle, but by 1876 it had moved to the Cypress Hills to be nearer to the dwindling buffalo herds. At the treaty annuity distribution in 1876, members of the Band were paid at two locations: Chief Cowessess and 191 of his followers took payment at their camp in the Cypress Hills, while 50 others were paid with headman Kaykahchegun, at Fort Qu’Appelle. By 1877, about one-quarter of the band members were paid at Qu’Appelle under headman Louis O’Soup, and the rest were paid in the Cypress Hills with Chief Cowessess. Comparable numbers were paid with the two respective leaders at Cypress Hills and Qu’Appelle for the next four years.14

In 1878 and 1879, the government promised Cowessess a reserve, first at a site north of Fort Walsh and then at Maple Creek in the Cypress Hills. No reserve was surveyed, however, even though Cowessess’s followers had commenced farming at the location that they had chosen near Maple Creek.15 In 1880, a reserve was surveyed at Crooked Lake near Fort Qu’Appelle for O’Soup and his followers. In the spring of 1883, Chief Cowessess and his followers were persuaded to leave the Cypress Hills and join O’Soup’s group at Crooked Lake, and the boundary of the reserve was adjusted to reflect the reconstituted Band’s total membership. According to the annuity paylists for 1883, 345 persons were paid with Chief Cowessess.16 Six years later, in 1889, Cowessess Indian Reserve 73 was confirmed by order in council. It comprised 78 square miles17 (49,920 acres), a calculated treaty land entitlement for 390 band members (49,920 ÷ 128 = 390).

17 Order in Council PC 1151, May 17, 1889, Indian Reserve No. 73, in National Archives of Canada (hereafter NA), RG 2, series 1 (ICC Documents, pp. 700–1).
PRESSURE FOR SURRENDER OF THE CROOKED LAKE RESERVES

Departmental Response, 1886 to 1903

The Cowessess IR 73 had been laid out at Crooked Lake, along with Sakimay IR 74, Kahkewistahaw IR 72, and Kakeesheway (later Ochapowace) IR 71. In departmental correspondence, they are often referred to collectively as the “Crooked Lake Reserve.”

Beginning in 1886, settlers located near the reserves began to lobby to have the southern portion of these reserves surrendered for sale. In the spring of that year, for example, settlers in the vicinity of Moosomin, Saskatchewan, asked the Minister of the Interior to move the reserves away from the settlement, a suggestion with which the Minister seems to have agreed:

> During his [Minister of the Interior’s] recent visit to the North West, the settlers in the neighbourhood of Moosomin brought to the Minister’s attention, the fact that the Indian Reserve in question [the Crooked Lakes Agency Reserves] lies immediately alongside of the Canadian Pacific Railway, that it would be desirable in the public interest and in the interest of the Indians themselves that they should be moved back six miles from the Railway....

> To this proposition, it was represented to the Minister, the Indians would be perfectly willingly to agree, and as he [is] confident that the public interest and the advantage [to] the Indians would be equally served by some such arrangement.

> I am to ask whether you do not agree with him in thinking it expedient to open negotiations with the Indians for the purpose of ascertaining their views.\(^\text{18}\)

The Indian Agent in charge of the Crooked Lake Agency, Alan McDonald, was asked his views of the proposal. He replied that the proposed surrender was not advantageous to the Indians and, if it proceeded, care should be taken to acquire adequate haylands in close proximity to the reserve:

> The hay on Little Child’s [Cowessess] Reserve is within the six miles asked for, I do not think there were forty tons cut out of it last year, and unless these Indians got the same area of hay lands as they would surrender and in close proximity to their Reserve, it would be unjust to entertain the proposition.

> Loud Voice and Kah-Ke-wis-ta-haw bands would be also giving up the best of their hay, but not to the same extent as “Little Childs”. [sic]

> These bands should in a few years possess [a] large number of Cattle requiring several thousand tons of Hay each, and we should in every way possible protect it for them.

If the land immediately north of the Reserves extending from Sakemays (North of Long Lake) to Loud Voices [sic] eastern boundary extending six miles north was given in exchange I think the area of hay lands could be got, the Indians would be justly dealt with, and the parties who are looking with envious eyes at the lands the Indians at present hold will be made contented....

We should not overlook the fact that should the proposition be carried out, the Indians will be giving up far more valuable lands than they will be receiving.19

As a result of this report, the Department of Indian Affairs informed the Department of the Interior that “it would not be prudent nor expedient to disturb the Indians in the possession of these lands.”20 The matter then lay dormant for a period of years.

In the spring of 1891, a proposed surrender of the southern portion of the Crooked Lake Reserves, including Cowessess IR 73, was again presented to the department by interested parties in the area. When asked to report on this issue, Agent McDonald repeated his view that these haylands were needed, and noted his regret that the issue had not been resolved as he had suggested in 1886. Once again, McDonald noted that the value of the lands proposed for exchange was unequal:

If these lands are surrendered by the Indians no reasonable money value can compensate them, as their Hay lands would be completely gone, and this would necessitate no further increase of Stock, which would of course be fatal to their further quick advancement, and would be deplorable, and the only alternative that I can see is to give them Hay lands of equal quantity and value immediately adjacent to the Reserve interested, which I do not think is possible now.

That part of Township 17 [the area requested for surrender] immediately north of Broadview is of very little use for agricultural purposes a great portion being under water in wet seasons, and the rest is gravelly and in dry seasons it is all more or less impregnated with Alkali, and were it open to Settlers tomorrow, I do not think there would be six settlers on it in as many years. Its only value is for the purpose it is being used by the Indians, viz. putting up hay.21

As in 1886, the department refused the proposal based on the concerns expressed by Indian Agent McDonald.

20 Draft [DSGIA], to A.M. Burgess, Deputy Minister of the Interior, April 7, 1886, and Draft [DSGIA], to A.M. Burgess, Deputy Minister of the Interior, May 6, 1886, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 43, 47–51).
21 A. McDonald, Indian Agent, Crooked Lake, to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, March 10, 1891, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 53–55).
When the issue was resurrected in January 1899, it was a local MLA who made the proposal to Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs:

Mr. R.S. Lake, Member of the Legislative Assembly of the North West Territories, has called on me in regard to getting a certain portion of the Indian Reserve north of the railway track at Broadview and Grenfell open for settlement. There is a rough sketch and memorandum attached. Please look into it and let me know what chance there is of being able to meet his views. I explained to Mr. Lake that it depended altogether upon the consent of the Indians.22

Before discussing this matter with the Indian Commissioner or the local Indian Agent, Sifton’s private secretary, J.A.J. McKenna, first asked Surveyor A.W. Ponton to report on the matter. Ponton supported the proposal:

I would strongly advocate the adoption of Mr. Lake’s suggestion, for the reason that the Indians are not benefited by the land, and while it remains tied up, settlement of the large agricultural district lying south of the Railway is prevented owing to the lack of market towns between Whitewood, and Grenfell ...

I would suggest that the Agent be instructed to obtain a surrender of the land from the bands interested.23

Upon receiving Ponton’s endorsement, Superintendent General Sifton requested additional information from Commissioner David Laird and the local Indian Agent.24 Laird convened a meeting with J.P. Wright, the Indian Agent at Crooked Lake, and Alan McDonald, the former Agent. Both opposed the proposal, and Commissioner Laird reported to Sifton that it would be unwise to pursue a surrender of the lands in question because “the Indians of three of the bands cut most of their hay off the southern portion of these reserves.”25

In turn, Superintendent General Sifton informed Mr Lake that the department would not, at that time, consider approaching the Indians for a surrender of the southern portions of their reserves. In concluding this correspondence, however, Sifton noted the following possibility:

The Commissioner, however, says that the Agent is making an experiment this year of raising Brome grass on the cultivated lands of these Indians, and if this experiment should prove a success it would remove the necessity at present existing of holding the Southern portion of the Reserve for hay land and it would then be, it is thought, an easy matter to obtain the desired surrender.\textsuperscript{26}

For the third time in less than 15 years, the Department of Indian Affairs refused to entertain the interests of the local settler community by entering into discussions with the Cowessess Band for its surrender of the southern portion of its reserve.

In September 1900, Magnus Begg became the Indian Agent for the Crooked Lake Agency. Sixteen months later, in January 1902, Agent Begg submitted a “proposition” to the department that he thought would be of great benefit to the Indians of his Agency. According to Begg, the Indians within his jurisdiction (he did not specify any particular group and his Agency encompassed Cowessess, Kahkewistahaw, Ochapowace, and Sakimay Bands) were having a difficult time paying debts incurred purchasing items such as wagons, farm implements, and harnesses for their agricultural operations. In order to pay these debts, the Indians were continually forced to sell off portions of their cattle herd, thereby depleting their investment. While acknowledging that the Indians needed the machinery and implements in order to produce enough feed for their cattle herds, Begg proposed that a surrender of part of their reserve land would provide a means to eliminate the accumulated debts of members of the Crooked Lake Bands:

These Indians have at present about 50,000 acres of land that they do not require, say a strip 3 miles deep above the line of the C.P. Ry, on the southern boundary of the Reserve, also the Leech Lake Reserve (all hay lands) in the Yorkton district most of which could be sold.

The proceeds according to the enclosed rough estimate should bring them each about $17.00 per annum interest, which amount would pay their debts, furnish them with more young cattle, lumber, &c.

If the Department would sanction this, I will use my best endeavors to have the Indians give a surrender, I see in this way that in a very few years they will be doing business on a solid basis and will prosper accordingly.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Clifford Sifton, SGIA, to Mr. Lake, MLA, Regina, April 29, 1899, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 71-72).

\textsuperscript{27} Magnus Begg, Indian Agent, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, January 13, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 73). The Leech Lake Reserve mentioned belonged to the members of Little Bone’s Band, most of whom resided on the Sakimay reserve. Upon concluding an agreement whereby those interested would be absorbed by the Sakimay Band, 75 per cent of the Leech Lake Reserve was surrendered in 1907 (see ICC Documents, pp. 513-20).
The Indian Commissioner, David Laird, relied on his previous investigations of surrender proposals to inform Begg that the land proposed by him for sale was needed for hay purposes, and any such proposal should await thorough consideration:

I beg to say that the information I have regarding the lands in question is that they are required for hay purposes. Where there are so many cattle (and the number ought to be increased) it would never do to have the Indians short of hay. It may be that owing to the wet season last year sufficient hay was secured outside of these lands, but the conditions in the future may not be so favourable and the lands would in that case be again required for hay purposes.

The question is one that cannot be decided offhand, but requires very careful and mature consideration and I think had better stand for the present. 28

Two months later, a group of settlers from the villages of Broadview and Whitewood, Saskatchewan, forwarded a petition to the Minister of the Interior, requesting, once again, that the strip along the southern boundary of the Crooked Lake Reserves be opened for settlement purposes. With signatures from over 190 local residents, including the farmer and MLA, R.S. Lake, the petition asked that the “Honourable the Minister of the Interior use his best offices to procure the assent of the Indians to the sale of this land to actual settlers....”29 As a result, J.K. McLean, the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs, was instructed by the office of the Minister, to reply as follows:

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of Petition from yourself and other residents of the Village of Broadview, the Town of Whitewood and surrounding districts, in East Assiniboia, asking that the assent of the Indians be procured to the sale of the Crooked Lakes Reserves to actual settlers, and to state that the Minister appreciates the desirability of acceding to the prayer of the Petitioners, but, of course, as they are aware that no Indian Reserve can be sold without the consent of the Indians.

I may say, however, that the Department will do its best to procure such consent and an Officer will be detailed for the purpose. 30

The petition was forwarded to Indian Commissioner David Laird at Winnipeg, with instructions to send “an Inspector, or Officer of the Department, who-

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29 Residents of the Village of Broadview and Town of Whitewood, to the Minister of the Interior, (undated, c. March 30, 1902), and Department of the Interior, Ottawa, to Mr McLean [Secretary, DIA], March 31, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 77-84).
ever you think is best qualified to discuss the question of surrender with the Indians.31 Commissioner Laird opted to address the issue in person, but put the proposal only to Kahkewistahaw and Ochapowace, not Cowessess:

I have to report that while returning from Varley last month [i.e., April 1902], I myself called at the Agency, and by previous appointment met the Indians in Council on the 16th. I explained to the bands of reserves 71 and 72 [Ochapowace and Kahkewistahaw, respectively], which are nearest the homes of the petitioners, the object of the council, and asked them if they were willing to surrender a strip of two or three miles on the part of their reserves nearest the C.P. Railway. I did not make the same proposal to Coweses [sic] band No. 73, as in conversation with Mr. Agent Begg, I ascertained their hay lands are almost wholly along the southern part of the reserve. Moreover, reserve 73 is not so near as reserves 71 and 72 to Whitewood and Broadview where the principal petitioners reside.

I found the Indians strongly opposed to surrendering any portion of their reserves....

When I put the question whether any member present of the bands represented at the meeting were favourable to a surrender, there was no response whatever.32

As had happened in the past, the detailed report from Commissioner Laird brought the issue to a close. Nearly two years passed before the matter was reintroduced.

Departmental Response, 1904 to 1907

In March 1904, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Clifford Sifton, once again brought forward the Broadview settlers’ desire for a surrender of the Crooked Lake Reserves. In writing to his deputy, Frank Pedley, Sifton noted the following:

The people of Broadview and neighbourhood are very anxious that the south half of the Indian Reserve there should be surrendered and sold so as to open for settlement. I wish you would have the matter referred to the Commissioner’s office so that Mr. McKenna can look into it and see whether it would be desirable from an Indian standpoint and whether the Indians would be likely to agree.33

31 J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, Winnipeg, April 2, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (IOC Documents, p. 86).
32 David Laird, Indians Commissioner, Winnipeg, to the Secretary, DIA, May 6, 1902, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (IOC Documents, pp. 87–89).
33 Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior, to Frank Pedley, DSGIA, March 8, 1904, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (IOC Documents, p. 96). It is interesting to note that Sifton requested that Mr McKenna be authorized to investigate this issue. McKenna’s personal association with the Minister went back to February 1, 1897, when he was appointed private secretary to the Minister of the Interior. See D.H. Hall, “Clifford Sifton and Canadian Indian Administration, 1896–1905” (1977) 2, 2 Prairie Forum 127 at 130.
Pedley asked Assistant Indian Commissioner J.A.J. McKenna to respond, and the latter reminded Minister Sifton that Commissioner Laird had personally investigated the same issue in April 1902 and had reported that the Indians of IR 71 and 72 opposed surrendering any portion of their lands. Based on this information, McKenna determined the following:

From the strong objection made by the Indians to surrendering any portion of the reserves, it seems to me that it would be bad policy to have me convene the Indians for the purpose of discussing anew a proposal to surrender, for it might create the impression that the Department is acting for the settlers in the matter. It would, I submit, if later information be required, be more advisable to have the Agent who is on the spot inquire quietly as to the mind of the Indians and report.34

Officials at headquarters agreed with this proposal, and on March 28, 1904, Indian Commissioner Laird was instructed that “the Agent take the matter up with the Indians to see if there is a prospect of the surrender being obtained.”35 Agent Begg wrote to Commissioner Laird on April 11, 1904, that he would “at once ... have a council with the Indians.”36 Begg, however, died nine days later, on April 20, 1904.37 J.A. Sutherland, the resident miller and blacksmith, was in charge of the reserve until the new agent, Matthew Millar, arrived on March 3, 1905.38

The historical documents imply that someone may have raised the issue with the bands before mid-June 1904, however, for on June 14 of that year, Acting Agent Sutherland forwarded a letter to the Commissioner’s office in Winnipeg from Kanas-way-we-tung, No. 7 Cowessess Band, who “is strongly opposed to selling part of the reserve and as a means to stop this he thinks he can by locating on the extreme South west corner of the reserve.”39

At the annuity payments in July 1904, Commissioner Laird proposed to the Crooked Lake Bands that they surrender the southern part of their reserves

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34 J.A.J. McKenna, Assistant Indian Commissioner, Winnipeg, to the Secretary, DIA, March 19, 1904, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 100–2).
37 J.A. Sutherland, Acting Indian Agent, NWT, to SGIA, August 1, 1904, Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1904, 191.
38 J.A. Sutherland, Acting Indian Agent, NWT, to SGIA, August 1, 1904, Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1904, 148.
as a means of raising money to fence the reserve, and the idea was left for the band members to consider:

At the annuity payments in July [1904] the matter was brought up, as a favourable opportunity occurred in connection with a complaint that settlers' animals strayed upon the reserve and were left there by owners for grazing purposes. Mr. Lash, of this office, who was in charge of the payments, fully explained to the Indians the benefit they would derive by surrendering a strip of the reserve and a portion of the proceeds received from the sale being used to fence the reserve. The Indians appeared to appreciate the suggestion, but wanted time to think it over. Of course, Mr. Lash was not authorized to make any definite offer; but he explained to the Indians that on other reserves the plan had been adopted and was very satisfactory to the Indians. The Cowesses [sic] Band headed by their Chief, Joe LeRat, wanted the full proceeds of the land surrendered handed over to the Indians to do with as they saw fit. This suggestion Mr. Lash told them could not be acted upon. Joe LeRat is a nonprogressive Halfbreed and a good talker, so that he is readily listened to by the Indians. I would suggest that shortly after the new Agent has been appointed and the affairs of the agency fully reported upon by the Inspector, that the question of surrender be taken up with the Indians either by myself or the Asst. Commissioner, with full power to make a definite proposal to the Indians of say 10% of the proceeds of sale to be expended for their benefit in farming outfits and in a per capita payment in cash or for liquidation of debts.40

Commissioner Laird stressed that "[a]t the present time it would not be well to push the matter too hastily, as it is one that requires very careful handling."41 The secretary of the department agreed that the issue should be let stand until after the affairs of the Agency had been put in order.42 The matter lay dormant for two years.

1907 SURRENDER OF LAND IN IR 73

Prelude to Surrender
In March 1906, the Department of Indian Affairs received a letter from a resident of Saskatchewan through the local Member of Parliament, Mr Turiff, asking whether or not an Indian could sell reserve land to a non-Indian. In reply, departmental Secretary J.D. McLean informed the individual that such

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42 J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, October 4, 1904, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 113).
an arrangement would be a violation of the Indian Act, but added that the
department would soon be arranging to have certain lands within the
Crooked Lake Reserves surrendered and placed on the market, to “be sold
for the benefit of the Indians, due notice of the sale being given to all
parties.”43

In June 1906, William Morris Graham, the Inspector of Indian Agencies
for the Qu’Appelle Inspectorate, wrote in a “personal” letter to the Superin-
tendent General of Indians Affairs, Frank Oliver, that he had just returned
from three days in the Crooked Lake Agency where he had been “feeling the
Indians with regard to the surrender of their land (about 95,000 acres).”44

According to Graham, the bands knew about the “good cash payment down”
received by the Pasqua Band at its recent surrender, and, he thought, they
might be willing to surrender land on similar terms:

I am satisfied that if this matter were handled promptly and on about the same
lines as the Pasqua’s surrender was obtained, these Indians would consent to sell. In
fact, I am sure that if I had had the papers and money with me when I was there I
could have obtained the surrender.

... The trouble in the past has been due to the fact that too many people have been
dabbling in the matter. The people in the adjacent towns are keen for the surrender,
and as a result, the Town Council, the Board of Trade and Individuals have been
talking to the leading Indians, and they now have all kinds of ideas of [sic] their
heads. In my opinion, the matter should be handled by our own people, without the
knowledge of the outside public, as was done at Pasqua’s, the people at Fort
Qu’Appelle did not know anything until the matter was settled.

I drove over the reserve and saw the land again, and I believe that a proper basis
on which to pay would be $3.00 for the Ochapowace reserve, and $5.00 for Ka-ka-
wistahaw and Cowesses [sic] reserves. The difference could be made up when the
second twentieth is paid. As this is a large deal it would be necessary to have the
matter thoroughly understood and the terms of surrender should be thoroughly
decided upon before the proposition is put to the Indians, as it would have a bad
effect if the Department had to go back to them with a second proposition. Outsiders
would interfere in the interval as in the past. If a little latitude were given to the
Officer taking the surrender, he could perhaps meet any small requests, that would
come from the Indians at the meeting.45

43 J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to A. Lowes, Grayson, Saskatchewan, March 16, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file
26623 (ICC Documents, p. 113).
44 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to Frank Oliver, SGIA, June 19, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732,
file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 114-16).
45 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to Frank Oliver, SGIA, June 19, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732,
file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 114-16).
On July 6, 1906, headquarters asked Inspector Graham to provide precise acreages for the land to be surrendered from each reserve. Graham responded at the end of September with the following report, giving the acreages, estimated value, and his opinions about how the Indians should be approached in this matter:

My opinion is that the Indians should be asked to surrender all of the land lying in Township 17, Ranges 3, 4, 5 and 6, – in all about 90,240 acres. The land in each reserve would be as follows, – Coweses, 36,480, Ochapowace, 21,120, Ka Ka wis ta haw, 32,640. The Department are aware that several futile attempts have been made to get this surrender. I am of the opinion, however, that it can be obtained if handled judiciously. The money for the first payment should be on hand the day the meeting asking for the surrender is held, and the whole matter should be handled with dispatch. I am almost certain that Ka Ka wistahaw and Ochapowace Indians will surrender and I am hoping that Coweses Indians will fall in line when they see the other Indians surrendering.

W.A. Orr, the officer in charge of Lands and Timber Branch, provided J.D. McLean, the acting deputy minister, with the details of the proposed surrender in a memorandum dated September 28, 1906, at the end of which he asked “whether forms of surrender should be sent to Inspector Graham for submission to the Indians, on terms as above proposed by him.” Overwritten on this memorandum are three notes, one from McLean to the Minister dated September 28: “Submitted whether Inspector Graham should be authorized to submit a surrender to the Indians on the lines herein indicated”; a response dated September 29: “Approved, go right ahead, B.O.M. [By Order of the Minister]” but the initials are unreadable; and finally McLean to Orr: “for necessary action” dated October 1, 1906.

On the following day, October 7, 1906, the Chief Surveyor prepared a description for the surrender of approximately 20,704 acres on the Cowesess Reserve. On October 3, 1906, McLean sent Graham the forms of surrender for the three Crooked Lake Bands, “which surrenders you are hereby

authorized to submit to the Indians under and in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Indian Act,” along with a cheque for $22,046 – “being one-half
of the 10% of the price of land on the different reserves, estimated on the
basis referred to in your communication.” Graham replied that other work
prevented him from immediately going to Crooked Lake to submit the sur-
renders, but he did not “consider that a delay will have any prejudicial effect
on the proposition, in fact, I think it will have a contrary effect.” Graham
also suggested that he “be authorized to insert the same conditions as were
in the Pasqua Surrender,” and on October 16, Secretary J.D. McLean for-
warded an amendment to the original instructions:

I beg to enclose, as requested, copy of the conditions in the surrender of the Pasqua
lands, which may be inserted in the surrender of the Crooked Lake Reserves, making
any necessary changes to suit the circumstances in each case.

It will be satisfactory if you make an estimate of the value of improvements, but
you should furnish the Department with full information in regard thereto, giving the
nature of improvements and value thereof as well as the owner, so that the surveyor
may be furnished with a complete statement in regard thereto.

In early December 1906, Graham wrote to headquarters asking for money to
complete the down payment to the Pasqua Band for their surrender before
he went to the Crooked Lake Agency, “as I think it will have an effect on
these Indians if they see how the Pasqua Indians have been dealt with.”

The First Surrender Meeting, January 21, 1907
Graham arrived at Crooked Lake at the end of January and proceeded to
meet separately with the Cowessess, Ochapowace, and Kahkewistahaw Bands.
His first meeting was held Monday, January 21, 1907, with the Cowessess
Band, at the Agency office, which was on its reserve. With Graham was Indian
Agent Matthew Millar and Peter Hourie, acting as interpreter. Hourie worked
for 20 years as an interpreter in the Indian Commissioner’s office in Regina

51 J.D. McLean, Acting Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to Inspector W.M. Graham, October 3, 1906, NA,
52 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, October 9, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732,
file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 131).
53 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, October 9, 1906, and J.D. McLean, Secretary,
54 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, December 7, 1906, NA, RG 10, vol. 2389,
file 79921 (ICC Documents, p. 134).
before being posted to Sakimay’s reserve as farming instructor in February 1898.55

According to the Agency’s minute book entry, this first meeting on January 21 was “called for the purpose of considering a proposition for the surrender of a portion of their reserve lands lying on the south side of the Reserve,” and advance notice of the meeting “had been given through the Chief Joe LeRat and Headman Ambrose Delorme.”56 At the beginning of the meeting, roll was called prior to the discussion of business, but, unlike the subsequent meetings at Ochapowace and Kahkewistahaw, there is no record of the number of band members attending or their names.

The minute book entry for this first meeting states:

Inspector Graham then addressed all present at length explaining the terms of the agreement which had been made by the Department and which was [illegible] submitted to them to decide and vote either for acceptance of the proposition or rejection as they may determine by their votes.57

Directly below this paragraph, a single word appears to have been inserted, and subsequently erased at an unknown date. It appears as though the word originally read “Refused.” The last paragraph of these minutes - directly following the erasure - describes the conclusion of this meeting, without any reference to a vote having been taken:

Chief Joe LeRat then spoke and said that he thought that the terms of the proposition had been well explained and that they understood it. Mr. Graham told them that he would be pleased to answer any question or make any further explanation [sic] they could suggest, and wanted them to take plenty of time before reaching a decision - meeting adjourned till Turday [sic] January 29th to meet again at the same place.58

55 In 1901, Hourie asked for a raise in his salary because, he stated, he acted as interpreter as well as farming instructor and “when there is any difficulty with Indians I am always sent there” (Peter Hourie to T.O. Davis, April 10, 1901, NA, RG 10, vol. 3770, file 34060). There is, however, no reference in the Agency’s minute book or any of the other correspondence that Hourie acted as interpreter at the Crooked Lake Agency on any other occasion.

56 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 21, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, p. 54). Note: A copy of the Broadview Area Minute Book was submitted to the ICC by counsel for the First Nation in March 1998. According to Mr. Al Brabant, this copy was made from a copy obtained by Senator Edwin Pelletier while he was Chief of the Cowessess Band. The original cannot be located, and was probably destroyed in a fire in DIAND’s district office in Yorkton in the 1970s. The ICC’s Exhibit 1 contains only the portions of that minute book which relate to the Cowessess First Nation.

57 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 21 and 29, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, pp. 54–56).

58 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 21 and 29, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, pp. 54–56).
Inspector Graham’s subsequent report states that no vote was taken at this first meeting:

On the 21st of January I called the Indians of Cowesses Band, Reserve 73, together, for the purpose of explaining to them the conditions of surrender that I wished to submit to them for a vote at a later date. At this meeting I arranged for a full meeting of the Band one week later.59

The next day, January 22, Graham, Millar, and Hourie met with the Ochapowace Band. At this meeting, the government party also included E.D. Sworder, a clerk in Graham’s Regina office, H. Nichol, the clerk for the Crooked Lake Agency, H. Cameron, the department’s official interpreter, and J.A. Sutherland, formerly the farming instructor on Cowessess Reserve and now the miller and blacksmith for the Agency.60 A vote was taken at this meeting and failed, four voting in favour and 16 against. On the next day, January 23, the same seven government officials met with the Kahkewistahaw Band and again a vote was taken, and again a surrender was refused, five voting for the surrender and 14 against.61 Inspector Graham did not explain why he took votes at the initial meeting with Ochapowace and Kahkewistahaw and not with Cowessess, but from earlier correspondence it appears clear that he “was almost certain that Ka Ka wistahaw and Ochapowace Indians will surrender and I am hoping that Cowesses Indians will fall in line when they see the other Indians surrendering.”62

The Second Surrender Meeting, January 29, 1907

Five days later, on January 28, Graham again met with the Kahkewistahaw Band at its request, and again put the surrender proposition to a vote. On this occasion, the surrender was accepted by a margin of 11 to six. Immediately after the surrender, the Inspector “at once began paying the approximate one-twentieth, which was $94.00 each. This payment lasted well on to mid-night and the day following.”63

59 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, February 12, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 802-3).
60 All information about departmental employees is taken from the Department of Indian Affairs Annual Reports.
63 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, February 12, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 802).
On the next day, January 29, Graham, Millar, Sworder, Nichol, Sutherland, and Cameron proceeded to the Cowessess Reserve to meet with that Band, as proposed at the first meeting. Mr Hourie is not listed as attending, but, despite the presence of the department’s paid interpreter, Harry Cameron, band member Alex Gaddie acted as interpreter. Mr Gaddie, often cited in the annual reports of the department as one of the most productive farmers in the Cowessess Band, had acted as interpreter at other meetings, according to other minute book entries.

The minutes of the meeting state as follows:

Adjourned meeting of Cowesess Band of Indians held this 29th day of January, 1907 for the further consideration of an agreement for the surrender of a portion of their lands. Mr. Inspector Graham presiding Mr. M. Millar Indian Agent with Mr Sworder Mr. H. Nichol Mr J.A. Sutherland and H. Cameron were also present a member of the Band Alex Gaddie acted as Interpreter. The roll being called 29 [numbers superimposed over each other] voting Indians answered to their names. Mr. Graham again carefully made further explanation [sic] of the matter under consideration after which a vote was proceeded with, the number voting being

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<th>For Surrender:</th>
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<td>1. N Sparvier</td>
<td>1. Napahpennness</td>
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<td>2. M. Lavallee</td>
<td>2. Joe LeRat</td>
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<td>3. T. Gopher</td>
<td>3. Ambrose Delorme</td>
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<td>4. B. Henry</td>
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<td>5. Wm Trotter</td>
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<td>6. Max Gunn</td>
<td>6. Wm Aisaican</td>
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<td>7. J.J. Stevenson</td>
<td>7. Zac LeRat</td>
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<td>8. Nap Delorme</td>
<td>8. Alex Tanner</td>
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<td>10. Joe Peltier</td>
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<td>11. Agecoutay</td>
<td>11. Ambrose LeRat</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Alex Gaddie</td>
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After taking the vote payment was proceeded with when the following signed the agreement for surrender:
At the community session held in the course of the Commission’s inquiry into this surrender, Chief Joe LeRat’s daughter, Harriet LeRat, who was born about 1911, consistently testified that her father attended the meeting and voted, but was ill and left before voting was complete. According to her testimony, the vote was tied when the Chief left and two men later informed Chief LeRat that a “stranger” had cast the deciding vote in favour of the surrender:

A stranger is the one that sold it. My dad and the rest didn’t want to sell....

I remember there was a tie on that meeting but two men came along and told my dad they had lost, but they said the man was a stranger....

He came home right after the meeting because he was sick, so after that that’s when the men come to this place and told him about it, that they had lost....

[In answer to the question: “Was your dad at the surrender meeting?” she said:] Yes, but when it was over he went home before it really come out evenly....

He was there for the vote, but before they counted them he came home.65

Alex Gaddie’s name is the last one listed on the “yes” side, and in July 1908 Gaddie stated that he had indeed been the tie breaker:

I had, as Mr. Graham knows well, the deciding vote on the surrender of our reserve, and had Mr. Graham told me before the surrender I was to receive nothing for my

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64 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73, Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 29, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, pp. 55–56).
improvements, I certainly would not have given him my vote or helped him as I did.\footnote{Alex Gaddie, Crooked Lake Agency, to David Laird, Indian Commissioner, July 13, 1908, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 226).}

At our community session, elder Harold LeRat also implied that Gaddie was the tie breaker:

They were - they were prepared to have a vote, and they were - supposedly had a vote, which was tied, and so I think it was Commissioner Graham at the time decided to have a meeting a week later, which is the 29th of January, in the meantime they went and got an extra person by the name of Alex Gaddie to come down to the meeting.\footnote{ICC Transcript, March 11, 1998, p. 20 (H. LeRat).}

The surrender document was witnessed by E.D. Sworder, H. Nichol, and M. Millar, Indian Agent (Inspector Graham’s name is not listed), and signed by the 22 men listed above. Norbert Delorme, Max Gunn, Stanislaus Young, Wm Trottier, Ambrose LeRat, and Napoleon Sparvier signed their names; the others marked with an “X.” A comparison of the voters’ list with the surrender document reveals that 14 individuals named as voting “yes” are also named on the surrender document (the name “Nap Delorme” is not on the surrender); that six named as voting “no” are on the surrender document (Napahpeness, Wapamoose, Ambrose Delorme, William Aisaican, Joseph Peltier, and Ambrose LeRat), and that two names appear on the surrender which do not appear on the voters list (Norbert Delorme and Francis Delorme). Based on the 1906 paylist, there were 37 eligible voters at the time.\footnote{DIAND, Treaty Annuity Paylists, Crooked Lake Agency, Cowessess Band, July 13, 1906 (ICC Documents, pp. 641–53).} Of these eligible individuals, only two (No. 142 Alex Payasis/Tanner and No. 169 Emmanuel LeRat) were not paid the advance money. Further, there is one notation to the effect that the advance money was paid to a relative because the man, No. 190 Isadore Sparvier, was too ill to attend.\footnote{Record of Advance Payments, Cowessess, January 29, 1907, and February 4, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 9849 (ICC Documents, pp. 147–67). Both Emmanuel LeRat and Alex Tanner, “who were absent at the time the land surrender money was paid,” were paid in April 1908; see J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to M. Millar, Indian Agent, April 6, 1908, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 215).} These three names do not appear on the voters list or the surrender.

Two days later, on February 2, 1907, Inspector Graham and Alexander Gaddie swore the affidavit required under the Indian Act, before Justice of the Peace E.L. Wetmore. The affidavit stated: “The same having been first
read over and explained to the said Alexander Gaddie who seemed to perfectly understand to same and made his make thereto in my presence.” In this affidavit, both Graham and Gaddie attested that the surrender was assented to by a majority of the male members of the Band over the age of 21 years, and “That no Indian was present or voted at said council or meeting who was not a member of the Band or interested in the land mentioned in the said Release or Surrender.”

On February 12, 1907, Inspector Graham reported on the second Cowesess meeting as follows:

Tuesday [January] 29th. The Band assembled on this date and after a great deal of talking a vote was taken which stood fifteen for selling and fourteen against. Chief Jo LeRat and Headman A. Delorme are non-progressive Indians voting against the surrender. Although the vote was so close it is interesting to note that twenty-two out of the twenty-nine Indians at the meeting signed. I began paying these Indians their approximate one-tenth which was $66.00. This payment continued well on into the night and for several days following.

Originally, the band was to receive only one-twentieth of the estimated value of the land, but on the day of the surrender, Inspector Graham telegraphed to headquarters and received approval to increase the payment to one-tenth. The payment was made in two instalments of $33.00 each per person, on January 29 and February 4, 1907.

The surrender was confirmed by Order in Council PC 409, dated March 4, 1907, and the surrendered land was subdivided in May 1907 and offered for sale by auction in November 1908 and June 1910.

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70 Surrender affidavit, February 2, 1907, DIAND Land Registry, Registry Number 1127-5 (ICC Documents, pp. 797, 799). The wording in Gaddie’s portion of the affidavit reads “a habitual resident on the Reserve” rather than “a member of the Band.”

71 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, February 12, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, p. 803).

72 Telegram, W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, January 29, 1907, and telegram, Frank Pedley, DSGIA, to Graham, February 1, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 872 and 875).

73 Order in Council PC 409, March 4, 1907 (ICC Documents, p. 176).
PART III

ISSUES

The Commission has been asked to determine whether Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the Cowessess First Nation as a result of events surrounding the surrender of a portion of IR 73 in 1907. The parties agreed to frame the issues before the Commission in the following manner:

Issue 1  What is the proper interpretation of section 49 of the Indian Act? In particular, on the basis that a majority of eligible band electors attended the surrender meeting, does section 49 require a majority of those attending the surrender meeting, or a majority of those voting at the surrender meeting, to vote in favour of the surrender in order to achieve the requisite consent?

Issue 2  Based on a preponderance of the evidence presently before the Commission in this inquiry, how many eligible voters of the Cowessess Band attended the surrender meeting on January 29, 1907, for the purpose of a surrender vote?

Issue 3  Based on a preponderance of the evidence placed before the Commission in this inquiry, did a majority of the eligible voting members of the Cowessess Band assent to the surrender of a portion of reserve No. 73 within the requirements of the Indian Act?
ANALYSIS

ISSUE 1  INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 49 OF THE INDIAN ACT

What is the proper interpretation of section 49 of the Indian Act?

In particular, on the basis that a majority of eligible band electors attended the surrender meeting, does section 49 require a majority of those attending the surrender meeting, or a majority of those voting at the surrender meeting, to vote in favour of the surrender in order to achieve the requisite consent?

Surrender Provisions of the 1906 Indian Act

For a surrender of Indian reserve land to be valid, the parties must comply with the procedural requirements in section 49:

49. Except as in this Part otherwise provided, no release or surrender of a reserve, or a portion of a reserve, held for the use of the Indians of any band, or of any individual Indian, shall be valid or binding, unless the release or surrender shall be assented to by a majority of the male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose, according to the rules of the band, and held in the presence of the Superintendent General, or of an officer duly authorized to attend such council, by the Governor in Council or by the Superintendent General.

2. No Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.

3. The fact that such release or surrender has been assented to by the band at such council or meeting shall be certified on oath by the Superintendent General, or by the officer authorized by him to attend such council or meeting, and by some of the chiefs or principal men present thereat and entitled to vote, before some judge of a superior county or district court, stipendiary magistrate or justice of the peace, or, in the case of reserves in the province of Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta, or the Territories, before the Indian commissioner, and in the case of reserves in British Columbia, before the visiting Indian Superintendent for British Columbia, or, in either
The historical origin of section 49 lies in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The surrender provisions of the latter document arose from the recognition that “Great Frauds and Abuses” had been perpetrated in the acquisition of Indian lands by Europeans. As a result, and in order to protect its aboriginal subjects from exploitation, the Crown interposed itself between First Nations and third parties by prohibiting the alienation of Indian lands to anyone other than the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered the meaning of section 49 of the Indian Act in Cardinal v. R. In that leading case, Estey J provided the following summary of the Act’s surrender provisions:

It has also been argued that the interpretation which is now being considered is one which exposes the membership of the band to a risk of loss of property and other rights, contrary to the general pattern and spirit of the Indian Act. It is perhaps well to observe in this connection that there are precautions built into the procedures of Part I of the Act, dealing with surrender. Firstly, the meeting must be called to consider the question of surrender explicitly. It may not be attended to at a regular meeting or one in respect of which express notice has not been given to the band. Secondly, the meeting must be called in accordance with the rules of the band. Thirdly, the chief or principal men must certify on oath the vote, and that the meeting was properly constituted. Fourthly, only residents of the reserve can vote, by reason of the exclusionary provisions of s. 49(2). Fifthly, the meeting must be held in the presence of an officer of the Crown. And sixthly, even if the vote is in the affirmative, the surrender may be accepted or refused by the Governor in Council. It is against this background of precautionary measures that one must examine the manner in which the assent of eligible members of the band is to be ascertained under s. 49.

The main issue in Cardinal was whether the “majority” contemplated by section 49(1) of the Act required that an absolute majority of all eligible voting members of the Band vote in favour of the surrender. On behalf of the Court, Estey J rejected that view. Rather, he held that the section only

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74 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 49.
required that a majority of eligible voters be in attendance at the meeting, and that a majority of the quorum give their assent to the surrender.\footnote{Cardinal v. R., [1982] 1 SCR 508, 13 DLR (4th) 321, 3 CNLR 3 at 10.}

Therefore, it is clear from the above that section 49(1) comprises four components:

- A meeting must be summoned for the express purpose of considering the surrender;
- The meeting must be summoned in accordance with the rules of the Band;
- The meeting must be held in the presence of the Superintendent General or an authorized officer; and
- A majority of the male members of the band of the full age of 21 years must attend the meeting, and a majority of the quorum must assent to the surrender.

The provisions of section 49(1) have been held to be mandatory in nature, with the result that a failure to comply with those terms will render a surrender void from the outset. In the words of the trial judge in the case of Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point:

Section 49(1) lays down, in my view, in explicit terms, a true condition precedent to the validity of any surrender and sale of Indian reserve lands. It makes this abundantly clear by saying that no such surrender “shall be valid or binding” unless its directions are followed.\footnote{Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Attorney General of Canada, [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 83.}

This interpretation has been accepted by this Commission in previous inquiries,\footnote{See ICC, Kahkewistahaw First Nation Report on 1907 Reserve Land Surrender Inquiry (Ottawa, February 1997), reported (1998) 8 ICCP 3 at 68; Duncan’s First Nation Report on 1928 Surrender Inquiry (Ottawa, September 1999), 171, reported (2000), 12 ICCP 53 at 208–9.} and, as a result, if it is found on the facts of this case that the provisions of section 49(1) were not followed, the surrender must be considered void.

In this case, the parties have identified a preliminary issue concerning the nature of the majority assent required by the Act. As a result, our analysis will commence with this issue.

**Majority Assent**

The preliminary legal issue in this inquiry concerns a narrow point that did not specifically arise on the facts in Cardinal. This point concerns the com-
position of the majority of the quorum at the surrender meeting, often referred to as the “second majority” in reference to Justice Estey’s interpretation of section 49(1) of the Indian Act. To determine the composition of the majority of the quorum, we are required to decide whether the majority in favour of a surrender must be drawn from all those in attendance at the surrender meeting, or whether it may be drawn merely from those present and voting. In other words, we must decide whether abstentions from the vote are to be taken into account in determining the validity of a surrender. The two parties to this inquiry hold opposing views on this issue.

In his written submission, counsel for the Cowessess First Nation refers to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Cardinal that section 49(1) may be interpreted in number of ways, including both of the two interpretations articulated above. Quoting Estey J:

Section 49(1) may be capable of at least five interpretations (assuming always a validly called meeting regularly held):
1. A majority of all eligible voters in the band must attend a meeting and that same absolute majority must assent to the surrender.
2. A majority of all eligible voters in the band must attend a meeting and a majority of those present must assent to the surrender.
3. A majority of all eligible voters in the band must attend a meeting and a majority of those present and voting must assent to the surrender.
4. A simple majority of all eligible voters who attend the meeting must assent to the surrender.
5. A simple majority of all eligible voters who attend and vote must vote in favour of the surrender.80

The First Nation’s counsel contends that, given the decision of the Supreme Court in Cardinal, options 1, 4, and 5 are effectively eliminated. This leaves only options 2 and 3, which represent the interpretations put before us by the Cowessess First Nation and Canada, respectively.

Counsel for the First Nation also points out that Estey J stated:

No distinction was made by the majority of the Court of Appeal as between a majority of members present or a majority of those voting at a meeting called for these purposes, perhaps because on the facts here it is unnecessary to do so.81

As a result, the First Nation takes the position that it is open to us to accept option 2 above, and it puts forward several arguments in support of its interpretation. First, counsel draws an analogy between the surrender provision and statutory provisions having an impact upon aboriginal and treaty rights. He argues that, since section 49(1) is the legislative means by which the aboriginal right to occupy land can be extinguished, it must be interpreted strictly and in a way that has the least potential to extinguish the aboriginal right.82

Secondly, counsel cites with approval the comments of Dickson J in Nowegijick v. The Queen to the effect that treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indian.83

He argues that, as between the two possible interpretations of section 49(1), the position put forward by the First Nation in this case has the greater capacity to reveal the intent of the entire Band with respect to a surrender. As a result, he submits that option 2 is consistent with Nowegijick in that it is clearly in the First Nation’s favour that consent be obtained from the greatest number of its members.84

Counsel also states that, although Justice Estey in Cardinal noted that option 3 was generally consistent with the common law approach to majority voting requirements in the context of corporations and unincorporated associations, it should not follow that the same reasoning should be applied to the surrender requirements of the Indian Act. He cites McLachlin J in Apsassin in support of his position:

The formal surrender requirements contained in the Indian Act serve to protect the Indians’ interest by requiring that free and informed consent is given by a band to the precise manner in which the Crown handles property which it holds on behalf of the Band. The Act also recognizes the Indians as autonomous actors capable of making decisions concerning their interest in reserve property and ensures that the true intent of an Indian Band is respected by the Crown. No matter how appealing it may appear, this Court should be wary of discarding carefully drafted protections created under validly enacted legislation in favour of an ad hoc approach based on novel analogies to other areas of the law.85

84 Written Submission on Behalf of the Cowessess First Nation, September 27, 1999, pp. 15–17.
Counsel argues that the First Nation’s interpretation, option 2, is also consistent with the “intention-based” approach to surrenders mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Apsassin, above. In that case, both the majority and the minority judgments referred to the intention of the band as the purpose underlying section 49.\(^{86}\) Counsel submits that Canada’s interpretation, option 3, “clearly serves to enhance the potential for minimizing Band participation in the surrender decision.”\(^{87}\) As a result, he argues that option 2, which requires majority assent from the entire quorum, follows the Supreme Court’s direction that the true intention of the Band be ascertained.

Canada, for its part, takes the position that certain comments made by Justice Estey in Cardinal support its position that a valid consent within the meaning of section 49(1) of the Act only requires that a majority of those present and voting vote in favour of the surrender:

> Unless otherwise prescribed by the statute (and this statute does not do so), a meeting expresses assent by a majority of votes cast at that meeting.\(^{88}\)

Counsel for Canada also quotes passages from Cardinal that appear to apply the common law in the interpretation of section 49(1):

> In the common law, and indeed in general usage of the language, a group of persons may, unless specially organized, express their view only by an agreement of the majority. A refinement arises where all members of a defined group present at a meeting do not express a view. In that case, as we shall see, the common law expresses again the ordinary sense of our language that the group viewpoint is that which is expressed by the majority of those declaring or voting on the issue in question....
>
> ... To require otherwise, that is to say more than a mere majority of the prescribed quorum of eligible band members present to assent to the proposition, would put an undue power in the hands of those members who, while eligible, do not trouble themselves to attend, or if in attendance, to vote....\(^{89}\)

Although the facts of Cardinal did not specifically require consideration of the issue of abstentions from the surrender vote, counsel for Canada submits that comments such as the above, when made by the Supreme Court, should

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\(^{87}\) Written Submission on Behalf of the Cowessess First Nation, September 27, 1999, p. 21.


be respected and followed, in particular when they are found in the Court’s leading decision on the meaning of section 49(1). 90

With respect to the interpretation of treaties and statutes applicable to Indians, counsel for Canada acknowledges that the Nowegijick case stands for the proposition that statutes concerning Indians should be liberally construed. He submits, however, that the principles enunciated in that case have been somewhat amended by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, counsel for Canada quotes Justice La Forest in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band:

But as I view the matter, somewhat different considerations must apply in the case of statutes relating to Indians. Whereas a treaty is the product of bargaining between two contracting parties, statutes relating to Indians are an expression of the will of Parliament…. I think the approach must be to read the Act concerned with a view to elucidating what it was that Parliament wished to effect in enacting the particular section in question. This approach is not a jettisoning of the liberal interpretative method. As already stated, it is clear that in the interpretation of any statutory enactment dealing with Indians, and in particular the Indian Act, it is appropriate to interpret in a broad manner provisions that are aimed at maintaining Indian rights, and to interpret narrowly provisions aimed at limiting or abrogating them….

At the same time, I do not accept that this salutary rule that statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favour of the Indians implies automatic acceptance of a given construction simply because it may be expected that the Indians would favour it over any other competing interpretation. It is also necessary to reconcile any given interpretation with the policies the Act seeks to promote. 91

Relying on the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lewis, 92 which quoted with approval the above reasoning in Mitchell, counsel for Canada submits that the Indian Act must be interpreted having regard to the “wording, context, and purpose of the statutory provision.” 93 Counsel for Canada argues that the ordinary meaning of the wording of section 49(1) supports the conclusion that Parliament intended that a valid consent could be obtained from a majority of those present and voting.

Further, Canada submits that, although the protective purpose of the surrender provisions of the Act were recognized in Cardinal, Justice Estey himself stated in that case:

It serves no purpose to interpret the language of Parliament by attributing to it meanings which are not plain and natural but rather which are superimposed upon the words adopted by Parliament in order to promote an intention conceived by the Court to be inadequately attended to by Parliament itself.94

As a result, counsel for Canada submits that its interpretation of the section is consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation enunciated by the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject.

Thirdly, Canada submits that the First Nation’s interpretation, option 2, leads to an absurd result, in that it would “give undue effect to the indifference of a small minority.”95

Finally, Canada submits that its interpretation of section 49(1) preserves the option of neutrality and precludes the need to make assumptions about the intentions of abstainers.96

As noted earlier in this report, Justice Estey was not required to choose between options 2 and 3 in his decision in Cardinal. Both parties to this inquiry have referred to selected passages from Justice Estey’s decision, which, if viewed in isolation, appear to support both option 2 and option 3. Therefore, it is open to us to interpret the provision ourselves, and to apply that interpretation to the facts before us in this inquiry. As a result, the question before us is, Which of the two interpretations is more legally sound, having regard to the principles governing the interpretation of statutes relating to Indians, and keeping in mind the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Cardinal, which remains the leading judicial authority interpreting section 49(1) of the Act?

As a first step, we must consider the relevant principles of statutory interpretation. As discussed above, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nowegijick v. The Queen97 is authority for the proposition that treaties and statutes relating to Indians must be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians. Subsequent decisions of that Court, however, have amended the general principle as it pertains to statutes. The decision of the majority of the Court in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band98 requires an examination of the purpose of the policy that the Act seeks to promote. Building on the reasoning in Mitchell, the Court’s subsequent deci-

sion in R. v. Lewis\(^99\) required that the “wording, context, and purpose of the statutory provision” be examined in the course of its interpretation.

This Commission had occasion, in the Friends of the Michel Society Inquiry,\(^100\) to consider the above authorities in the context of the interpretation of other provisions of the Indian Act. In our report we stated:

Thus, the principle is not simply that any construction favouring the Indians ought to be accepted, because we still, of course, demand fidelity to the language and purpose of the statute. Statutes relating to Indians should be construed liberally, having regard for parliamentary intent as embodied in the text....

In summary, then, while statutes dealing with Indians must be liberally construed, an interpretation that furthers the protection of Indian rights can be accepted only if the language and purpose of the statutory provision can support such an interpretation.\(^101\)

It appears to us that the language of section 49(1), by itself, can support either the interpretation put forward by Canada or the interpretation advanced by the First Nation. Therefore, we must examine the purpose of the provision in order to determine which of the two possible interpretations is to be preferred.

The origin of section 49(1) of the Indian Act is found in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which stated:

> And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; In Order, therefore, to prevent such irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians ... but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony....\(^102\)

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\(^102\) Royal Proclamation of 1763.
By its own terms, the above provision recognized that “great Frauds and Abuses” had been committed in the acquisition of the Indians’ lands. Its clear purpose was to prevent the exploitation of the aboriginal subjects of the Crown in land transactions, a purpose that was protective in nature. All subsequent Indian Acts, including the 1906 Act at issue in this inquiry, have contained surrender provisions embodying the substance of the above, namely, that lands reserved for Indians cannot be disposed of except to the Crown. Therefore, if we determine that the policy underlying section 49(1) of the 1906 Act was the intention to protect Indian bands from improvident transactions, we must interpret the requirement of majority assent in that light.

It is useful, in this context, to examine the views of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the purpose of the surrender provisions of the Indian Act. First, we note that Justice Estey, in Cardinal, referred to section 49 of the 1906 Act in its entirety as a “background of precautionary measures” against which the assent of eligible voters was to be ascertained. Subsequently, Justice Dickson observed, in Guerin v. The Queen: “The purpose of the surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to prevent the Indians from being exploited.”

More recently, McLachlin J stated in Apsassin: “My view is that the Indian Act’s provisions for surrender of band reserves strikes a balance between the two extremes of autonomy and protection.” We are mindful of the fact that the Act confers autonomy upon a First Nation to consent to the sale or lease of its reserve, and its decisions in these matters, according to the Supreme Court in Apsassin, are to be respected and honoured. Nevertheless, we conclude from all of the above that a major purpose underlying the surrender provisions of the Indian Act, a purpose dating from the earliest origins of the provision, is to protect a band from exploitative or ill-considered transactions concerning its land base.

As referred to earlier in this report, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lewis stated that the context of a statutory provision, in addition to its language and purpose, must be considered in the course of its interpretation:

104 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 383.
In order to arrive at the correct interpretation of statutory provisions, the words of the text must be read in context: see Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, supra at p. 193.108

As a result, we have taken notice of the definitions of the terms “band” and “reserve” found in section 2 of the Indian Act of 1906, which are a part of the context within which the surrender provisions of the 1906 Act were enacted:

2(d) “band” means any tribe, band or body of Indians who own or are interested in a reserve or in Indian lands in common, of which the legal title is vested in the Crown....

... 2(i) “reserve” means any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted to a particular band of Indians....109

We note that section 2 of the 1906 Indian Act, above, defined a “reserve” as land set aside for the use or benefit of a “band.” In turn, the Act defined “band” as a “body of Indians who own ... a reserve in common ...”110 Thus, it may be concluded that reserve land, in the context of the Indian Act, is set aside for all the members of a band, not merely for some. In other words, it is clear that ownership of a reserve is shared by the entire membership, notwithstanding that the 1906 Act only entitled a portion of the band to vote on a surrender. When we consider this aspect of the statutory scheme, in conjunction with the twin purposes of protection and autonomy underlying the surrender provisions of the Act, we conclude that section 49(1) must be interpreted in a way that takes into account the policy of protecting the interests of the entire band with respect to its land base. In this context of common ownership, we must determine which of the two possible interpretations best serves the above purposes.

It appears clear to us that the interests of the entire band with respect to its commonly held land are best protected if consent to the surrender is secured from the greatest number of band members. Therefore, it makes sense to us to interpret section 49(1) of the Indian Act so as to require the consent of a greater number of band members, as opposed to a smaller number. Option 3, the position advanced by Canada, would permit a smaller

109 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 2.
110 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81 s. 2. Emphasis added.
portion of those attending the surrender meeting to determine the fate of
land set aside for present and future generations of the band as a whole.
Option 2, however, would require the entire quorum in attendance at the
meeting to be taken into account before such a decision could be made.
Having regard to the language, context, and purpose of section 49(1) of the
Indian Act of 1906, we determine that option 2, the requirement that major-
ity consent be obtained from all those present at the surrender meeting, is to
be preferred.

ISSUE 2  NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS
AT 1907 SURRENDER MEETING

Based on a preponderance of the evidence presently before the Commission
in this inquiry, how many eligible voters of the Cowessess Band attended the
surrender meeting on January 29, 1907, for the purpose of a surrender vote?

The parties to this inquiry agree that there were 37 potential eligible voting
members of the Cowessess Band at the time of the surrender in 1907. The
parties differ, however, on the number attending the meeting. Normally, it is
necessary to establish the number in attendance for two purposes: to deter-
mine if a proper quorum was in attendance (which is not at issue here), and
to determine whether majority consent was achieved. Our analysis will focus
on the second aspect of majority consent.

The First Nation takes the position that this factual issue must be examined
in the context of all the evidence pertaining to the events surrounding the
surrender. Counsel for the First Nation argues that, based on all the evidence
before us in this inquiry, there were at least 30, and perhaps as many as 35,
eligible voters at the meeting, and that, as a result, a valid majority was not
achieved.

First, counsel for the First Nation compares the voters list transcribed in
the minutes of the meeting\(^\text{111}\) with the surrender document itself,\(^\text{112}\) and
points out that although the minutes apparently record 29 votes, the 22
marks or signatures on the surrender include two individuals (Norbert
Delorme and Francis Delorme) who were not listed on the voters list. Since
the surrender was signed the same day the vote was taken, counsel argues
that, by inference, these two individuals must have attended the meeting as

\(^{111}\) Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 29, 1907
(ICC Exhibit 1, pp. 136–37).
\(^{112}\) Surrender – Cowessess Band of Indians, January 29, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 138–40).
well. In further support of this conclusion, counsel submits that Inspector Graham’s report to his superiors\textsuperscript{113} implies that all 22 who signed the surrender were at the meeting, and that, as the voters list names eight individuals who did not sign the surrender, there must have been at least 30 in attendance.\textsuperscript{114} Further, the First Nation takes the position that the record of the first advance payment to the Band,\textsuperscript{115} made on the same day as the surrender vote was taken, includes the names of five eligible voters who neither voted nor signed the surrender. Since the minutes indicate that the advance payment took place after the vote, and at the same time as the signing of the surrender, counsel submits that some or all of these five must have also been present at the meeting.\textsuperscript{116} Finally, counsel relies on the Band’s oral history, which was presented at the community session, to the effect that both Norbert Delorme and Francis Delorme were present at the meeting\textsuperscript{117} and that there were abstainers present at that time as well.\textsuperscript{118}

For its part, Canada argues that the only credible evidence regarding the number in attendance at the meeting supports its position that only 29 eligible voters were present. Since Canada also takes the position that there were 15 authentic votes in support of the surrender, it argues that the surrender is valid.

Counsel for Canada relies on the minutes of the surrender meeting, which apparently record that 29 voting members answered the roll call prior to the vote.\textsuperscript{119} Counsel acknowledges that the surrender document records two individuals, Francis Delorme and Norbert Delorme, who are not recorded in the minutes as having voted, but argues that neither document states unequivocally that the two were present at the vote.\textsuperscript{120} With respect to Norbert Delorme, it is Canada’s position that he was present, but referred to mistakenly in the Minutes as “Nap” Delorme, which is the subject of Issue 3, below. With respect to Francis Delorme, Canada submits that the preponderance of evidence before this inquiry establishes that he was present at the meeting in time to sign the surrender document but was not present at the time of the vote. In support of this conclusion, Canada points out that the minutes of a

\textsuperscript{113} W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, February 12, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 168–71).
\textsuperscript{114} Written Submission on Behalf of the Cowessess First Nation, September 27, 1999, pp. 7–8.
\textsuperscript{115} Record of First Advance Payment ..., January 29, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 147–58).
\textsuperscript{116} Written Submission on Behalf of the Cowessess First Nation, September 27, 1999, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{117} ICC Transcript, March 11, 1998, p. 43 (George Delorme).
\textsuperscript{119} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, October 7, 1999, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{120} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, October 7, 1999, p. 30.
later vote on the reserve concerning a different matter specifically record an abstention beside the name of the abstainer. Therefore, counsel argues, the absence of such a notation in the minutes of the 1907 surrender vote is evidence that there were no abstentions on that occasion.

Further, counsel for Canada cites Inspector Graham’s report as evidence that the payment of the first advance took many hours to complete, and that there was therefore a significant period of time during which Francis Delorme could have arrived and signed the surrender document.

With respect to the individuals who received the advance payment on January 29, 1907, but were not listed as present in the minutes and did not sign the surrender, counsel for Canada submits that the oral history evidence presented by the First Nation is not reliable. He submits that this evidence lacks the necessary detail, is not based on first-hand knowledge, and appears on its face to be the witnesses’ opinion drawn from other documents.

In rebuttal, the First Nation states that the primary evidence relied upon by Canada with respect to this issue, namely the minutes of the surrender meeting dated January 29, 1907, appears to have been altered in a material way. Specifically, it is alleged that the number of voters recorded as answering the roll call was altered from “30” to “29.” As a result, counsel argues that the document is unreliable as evidence on this point.

Prior to making any determination on this issue, we must review the evidence before us in this inquiry. The documentary evidence pertaining to the number in attendance at the meeting consists of the minutes of the surrender meeting, the surrender document, and the paylist documenting the first advance payment of proceeds to band members. All the above documents are dated January 29, 1907. Also relevant is the sworn statement attesting to the circumstances of the surrender, dated February 2, 1907, and Inspector Graham’s February 12, 1907, report to his superiors.

The most detailed document bearing on the issue of attendance consists of the minutes of the surrender meeting. This document states that the roll was called and that 29 voters answered to their names. From our examination of the original document, however, the number “29” appears to have

126 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 29, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, pp. 136–37).
been superimposed over the number “30” in a subsequent alteration. There is no evidence as to the source of or circumstances surrounding this alteration. The minutes also list the names of 29 individuals who were apparently in attendance at the meeting. Of the 29 voters, it is stated in the document that 15 voted in favour of the surrender and 14 voted against it. It is also stated in the minutes:

After taking the vote payment was proceeded with when the following signed the agreement for surrender.127

The document then lists the names of 22 individuals who signed the surrender, a list in accord with the list of signatories on the surrender document itself.128 The voting list includes a number of names of individuals who did not sign the surrender, but all of these (with the exception of “Nap Delorme”) are stated to have voted against the surrender, so their failure to sign is perhaps not unexpected.

Of the 22 signing the surrender, two individuals, Norbert Delorme and Francis Delorme, are not listed in the voters list. Leaving aside the issue of whether Norbert was in fact the “Nap Delorme” who voted, it appears to us that 30 known eligible voters, 28 from the voters list and two from the surrender document, either voted or signed the surrender. In addition, a number of eligible voters received payment of the first advance on that day,129 but did not sign the surrender and are not listed as having voted.

Another piece of evidence, which is relied on in different aspects by both parties, is Inspector Graham’s report to his superiors, dated February 12, 1907. Inspector Graham stated:

The Band assembled on this date and after a great deal of talking a vote was taken which stood fifteen for selling and fourteen against. Chief Joe Lerat and Headman A. Delorme who are non-progressive Indians voting against the surrender. Although the vote was so close it is interesting to note that twenty-two out of the twenty-nine Indians at the meeting signed. I began paying these Indians their approximate one-tenth which was $66.00 This payment continued well on into the night and for several days following.130

127 Broadview Area Minute Book, Reserve No. 73 – Crooked Lake Agency, Minutes of Council, January 29, 1907 (ICC Exhibit 1, p. 136).
129 Record of First Advance Payment ..., January 29, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 147–58).
130 W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to the Secretary, DIA, February 12, 1907, NA, RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26623 (ICC Documents, pp. 168–71).
Finally, we must consider the sworn affidavit of Inspector Graham and Alexander Gaddie attesting to circumstances surrounding the surrender. The relevant portions of the affidavit, which are preprinted, state that:

The ... surrender was assented to by a majority of the male members of the said Band of Indians of the [Cowessess Reserve Number 73] of the full age of twenty-one years then present.131

What then is the effect of the above on the determination of this issue? Beginning with the minutes of the meeting, we find that the apparent alteration of the number 30 to the number 29 in connection with the number in attendance renders this part of the document of little weight with respect to this issue. There has been no explanation as to how or why this alteration came to be, and, as a result, it would not be safe to rely upon it as determinative of the very issue in question in this inquiry.

Our reading of Agent Millar’s comment in the same document, quoted above, regarding the commencement of payment and signing, leads us to conclude that the payment began immediately after the vote, and that the signing of the document and payment took place simultaneously. It is common sense, however, that the payment of the entire Band would take a considerable period of time.

Inspector Graham’s report, quoted above, appears to state that 29 were in attendance at the meeting. We agree with counsel for the First Nation, however, that a normal reading of Graham’s statement that “twenty-two out of the twenty-nine Indians at the meeting signed” would lead to the conclusion that the 22 signers were certainly in attendance. If that were true, the total in attendance would exceed 29, since Francis Delorme was one of the signers. Therefore, this part of the report appears to contradict itself, which significantly lessens its weight as evidence.

We also point out that another statement in this report contains an inaccuracy, which may also lessen the weight that should be given to the report as a whole. Specifically, the document contains a statement to the effect that Graham:

began paying these Indians their approximate one-tenth which was $66.00. This payment continued well on into the night and for several days following.132

This statement appears to imply that one payment of $66.00 took place over a period of days. The evidence before this inquiry, however, makes it clear that there were two payments of advance proceeds, one of $33.00, which took place on January 29, 1907,133 followed by a second of $33.00, which took place on February 4, 1907.134 It may be said that this inaccuracy is of slight degree. At the very least, however, it demonstrates that Graham did not record this event precisely. As a result, we believe that care should be taken before accepting the details of his statements as the literal truth.

The surrender affidavit sworn by Graham and Alexander Gaddie states that a majority of those present voted in favour of the surrender.135 This would imply that no more than 29 eligible voters were present, since other evidence, such as the minutes, indicates that there were 15 votes in favour. The weight to be given to this evidence needs to be considered, however. The reference in the affidavit to a majority of those “present” is found in the preprinted part of the document. It is not a personal statement made by Graham and Gaddie at the time of the event. Also, it is clear that Alexander Gaddie was illiterate, as he signified his assent to the affidavit by mark rather than by signature. Therefore, it would not be safe to consider this document as determinative where the evidence is as equivocal as it is in this case.

It is apparent that the evidence discussed up to this point does not reveal a clear preponderance on either side of this issue. In fact we might have been required to decide the issue on the burden of proof alone, were it not for one other piece of evidence before us. Specifically, when we examine the surrender document itself, we find evidence which tends to support the conclusion that Francis Delorme was likely present at the surrender meeting.

As referred to earlier in this discussion, the minutes note that payment of the first advance of proceeds began immediately after the vote, and that the signing of the surrender took place contemporaneously with payment. The January 29, 1907, surrender document136 reveals that Francis Delorme signed the surrender, a fact confirmed by the minutes.137 Moreover, he was not the last to sign the document, but signed before five band members who were unquestionably present at the time of the vote. It must be remembered that Francis Delorme and Norbert Delorme were the only two names not on

133 Record of First Advance Payment ..., January 29, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 147–58).
134 Record of Second Advance Payment ..., February 4, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 159–67).
the voters list who signed the surrender. Leaving aside for the moment the issue surrounding Norbert Delorme, it appears more reasonable to us to conclude that Francis was present at the time of the vote but abstained, than it would be to conclude that he arrived later only to sign and be paid.

In support of this conclusion, we note that five other male members eligible to vote were paid on that day, although they did not sign the surrender and are not listed on the voters list. These individuals were Pierre LeRat (No. 11), Wahpekahnewanp (No. 139), Alfred Cowessess (No. 145), Patrick Redwood (No. 152), and James Kanaswaywetung (No. 162). Aside from Norbert, Francis is the only non-voter who signed the surrender in addition to being paid. His unique position in this respect tips the balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion that he was in attendance at the meeting.

Therefore, the circumstances surrounding Francis’s involvement in the events of January 29, 1907, suggest to us that it is more probable than not that he attended the meeting, but abstained from voting. As a result, and leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether “Nap Delorme” was an eligible voter or not, we find that the attendance of Francis Delorme brings the total number in attendance at the surrender meeting to 30 eligible voters.

**ISSUE 3  DID A MAJORITY OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS ASSENT?**

Based on a preponderance of the evidence placed before the Commission in this inquiry, did a majority of the eligible voting members of the Cowessess Band assent to the surrender of a portion of reserve No. 73 within the requirements of the Indian Act?

In our discussion of Issue 1, above, we interpreted section 49(1) of the Indian Act to require that a majority must be obtained from those “present” at the surrender meeting, and not merely from those “present and voting.” Given that we have found on the balance of probabilities that Francis Delorme was present at the meeting, we must conclude that the surrender fails, for the reason that a majority vote could not have been obtained, notwithstanding the identity of “Nap Delorme.” Our reasoning is as follows. Even if there were 15 valid votes in favour of the surrender (i.e., if “Nap Delorme” were in fact Norbert Delorme), Francis’s presence brings the total in attend-

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138 Record of First Advance Payment ..., January 29, 1907 (ICC Documents, pp. 147-58). In addition, Isidore Sparvier, who neither voted nor signed, had his payment given to his brother, the paylist noting that Isidore “was too ill to come.”
ance to 30, which means that a majority was not achieved. If Nap Delorme’s vote is completely discounted, there would remain 14 votes in favour of the surrender, out of 29 eligible voters present. Either way, the surrender fails. Therefore, we need not consider the evidence regarding the identity of “Nap Delorme,” or make any determination on this issue.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Commission has been asked to inquire into and report on whether the Government of Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the Cowessess First Nation. We have concluded that it does.

First, we have concluded that the surrender provisions of the Indian Act require that a majority of eligible voters attending a surrender meeting must vote in favour of a surrender, in order for it to be valid. After a careful consideration of the language, purpose, and context of the statutory provisions, we have concluded that Parliament clearly intended the Act to protect an entire band from improvident transactions concerning its land base. To interpret the surrender provisions so as to require a majority from only those present and voting would theoretically permit a small number of band members to consent to the permanent loss of a reserve, which is an asset set aside for the band as a whole. As a result, we hold that abstentions must be counted to determine the quorum.

Second, we find that, on the evidence presented before us, it is more probable than not that Francis Delorme attended the surrender meeting, but abstained from voting. Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, we find that there were not 29 but at least 30 eligible voters in attendance at the surrender meeting on January 29, 1907.

Third, since only 15 members voted for the surrender, given our determination that Francis Delorme was present at the meeting, we find that the surrender cannot be valid, notwithstanding the identity of the voter identified in the minutes as “Nap Delorme.” We have concluded that, even if “Nap Delorme” were in fact Norbert Delorme, a valid majority vote could not have been obtained, because of the need to count Francis Delorme as part of the quorum. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to make any determination concerning the identity of “Nap Delorme,” as the surrender would fail in either case.
As discussed in Part IV, we have found that the documentary evidence submitted in the course of the inquiry supports our conclusions. We also note that our determinations are consistent with the beliefs of the elders who gave evidence at the community session to the effect that a valid majority vote was not attained.

In conclusion, we therefore recommend to the parties:

That the claim of the Cowessess First Nation regarding the portion of IR 73 surrendered in 1907 be accepted for negotiation under Canada’s Specific Claims Policy.

FOR THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Roger J. Augustine
Commissioner

Dated this 28th day of March, 2001.
COWESSESS FIRST NATION 1907 SURRENDER INQUIRY CLAIM

1 Planning conferences  
   October 24, 1996  
   November 19, 1997

2 Community session  
   March 11, 1998
   One community session was held at the Cowessess First Nation. The Commission heard evidence from Harriet Lerat, Harold Lerat, Henry Delorme, George Delorme, Audrey Lerat, Theresa Stevenson, Bob Stevenson, George Tanner, and Andrew Delorme.

3 Legal argument  
   Regina, Saskatchewan, October 20, 1999

4 Content of formal record
   The formal record for the Cowessess First Nation 1907 Surrender Inquiry consisted of the following materials:
   - the documentary record (4 volumes of documents)
   - 5 exhibits tendered during the inquiry
   - transcript of the community session
   - written submissions of counsel for Canada and written submission and rebuttal submission of counsel for the Cowessess First Nation, including authorities submitted by counsel with their written submissions and transcript of oral submissions.

   The report of the Commission and letters of transmittal to the parties will complete the formal record of this inquiry.
RESPONSES

Re: Moose Deer Point First Nation Pottawatomi Rights Inquiry
Robert D. Nault, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to
Daniel J. Bellegarde and James Prentice,
Indian Claims Commission,
March 29, 2001
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Re: Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation Inquiry
WAC Bennett Dam and Damage to Indian Reserve No. 201 Claim
Robert D. Nault, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to
James Prentice, Indian Claims Commission,
April 2, 2001
279

Re: ’Namgis First Nation Cormorant Island Inquiry
Robert D. Nault, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to
Daniel J. Bellegarde and James Prentice,
Indian Claims Commission,
May 11, 2001
281

Re: Duncan’s First Nation 1928 Surrender Inquiry
Robert D. Nault, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to
Daniel J. Bellegarde, James Prentice, Roger J. Augustine,
Indian Claims Commission,
June 13, 2001
285
Mar 29, 2001

Messrs. Daniel J. Bellegarde and James Prentice, Q.C.
Co-Chairs
Indian Specific Claims Commission
PO Box 1750, Station B
OTTAWA ON K1P 1A2

Dear Messrs. Bellegarde and Prentice:

Thank you for providing me with copies of the Indian Specific Claims Commission’s (ISCC) March 1999 report on the Moose Deer Point inquiry. I regret Canada’s delay in responding to the Commission’s report on this claim.

As you will recall, there were three issues considered by the Commission in this claim. The following issues were considered by the inquiry:

1) Were promises made by the Crown to its allies, including the ancestors of the Moose Deer Point First Nation?

2) If promises were made by the Crown to its allies, including ancestors of the Moose Deer Point First Nation, what were the nature and scope of the promises?

3) Does the Crown have an outstanding lawful obligation to the Moose Deer Point First Nation?

I note that the ISCC found that the 1837 speech by Samuel Jarvis constituted a “Treaty”. However, Canada maintains the position that the Jarvis address was a unilateral statement of government policy which included the invitation to the assembled Indians to settle on Manitoulin Island. I also note that the ISCC did not conclude that Canada owed an outstanding lawful obligation to the Moose Deer Point First Nation in relation to the alleged unfulfilled treaty promises.

Canada
The ISCC found that the right to "presents" was terminated in 1852 by Superintendent Anderson at an address to the Indians at Penetanguishene. With respect to the First Nation's equality rights, and rights to use and occupy lands for traditional purposes, the Commission noted that "the First Nation has failed to tender the sort of evidence on which we can comfortably rely to define the precise extent of these rights or to be able to conclude definitively that the Crown has failed to fulfill them". Despite this finding, I note that the ISCC recommended that Canada enter into negotiations with Moose Deer Point First Nation and conduct further research to determine if the rights at issue can be substantiated.

Under the Specific Claims Policy, Canada is mandated to enter into negotiations where it is determined that there is an outstanding lawful obligation. Under the Specific Claims Policy, First Nations are provided with funding to assist with their claims research, to retain lawyers, and to advance their claims. In this case, although no outstanding lawful obligation has been determined, the ISCC has recommended that Canada "further research and negotiate the First Nations' outstanding entitlements, if any, under that treaty".

Canada has certainly undertaken joint research projects with First Nations in the past. However, the parameters of this research and the precise issues being researched have always been well defined beforehand. I am sure that the ISCC will appreciate that the circumstances of this particular claim are quite different. After a fully researched claim submission, consideration by Canada, a full ISCC inquiry and, I understand, very able representation by the First Nation's counsel, the very substance of the treaty rights Canada is alleged to have breached cannot be defined with any certainty. Given these circumstances, I am not prepared to authorize a joint research project with the First Nation.

I readily add, however, that it is always open to the First Nation to make further submissions on any of the issues touched upon by the ISCC, and that Canada will consider such submissions in accordance with the Specific Claims Policy. The First Nation has been advised with respect to the availability of funding to conduct further research.

I regret that my response could not be more favourable at this time.

Yours sincerely,

Robert D. Nault, P.C., M.P.

cc. Chief Edward Williams
Dear Commissioner Prentice:

Thank you for providing me with copies of the Indian Specific Claims Commission’s (ISCC) March 1998 report concerning the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation’s (the FN) specific claim, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation Inquiry - WAC Bennett Dam and Damage to Indian Reserve No. 201 Claim.

As you will recall, there were four issues reviewed by the ISCC in this report:

1. Does Canada have a statutory or fiduciary lawful obligation to the FN to have prevented, mitigated or sought compensation for environmental damages to IR 201 caused by B.C. Hydro?

2. If so, what is the nature and extent of the Crown’s statutory and fiduciary obligation for environmental protection of reserve land?

3. Did the Crown meet its statutory and fiduciary obligations to the FN?

4. Did the Crown breach the FN’s treaty rights by allowing an unreasonable and unjustified interference with the FN’s hunting, fishing and trapping rights on IR 201?

The ISCC concluded that Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the FN and recommended that the FN’s claim be accepted for negotiation under Canada’s Specific Claims Policy. Based on the Department of Justice Canada’s legal review of the facts, Canada does not agree with this recommendation and this claim will not be accepted for negotiation under the Specific Claims Policy.
In Canada's view, Canada did not have a fiduciary duty to protect Reserve No. 201 against damage caused to the reserve by construction and the operation of the Bennett Dam by a third party. Canada did not have a duty to invoke the provisions of the Navigable Waters Protection Act to stop the construction of the Bennett Dam or dispose of it once it was built. Furthermore, Canada did not have an obligation on the basis of Treaty No. 8 to ensure that the reserve would be protected from any damage resulting from the construction and operation of the Bennett Dam. Therefore, there is no outstanding lawful obligation owed to the FN on the part of Canada.

I would like to thank the Indian Specific Claims Commission for its consideration of this claim.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Robert D. Naft, P.C., M.P.
MAY 11, 2001

Mr. Daniel J. Bellegarde
Mr. James Prentice, Q.C.
Co-Chairs
Indian Specific Claims Commission
PO Box 1750, Station B
OTTAWA ON K1P 1A2

Dear Commissioners Bellegarde and Prentice:

As you are aware, I am in receipt of the Indian Specific Claims Commission's (ISCC) March 1996 report regarding the Namgis First Nation's specific claim, Namgis First Nation Inquiry - Report on: Cormorant Island. I regret Canada's delay in responding to the Commission's report on this claim.

The seven issues raised before the ISCC are as follows:

1. Did Canada have the mandatory obligation, pursuant to the Orders in Council (and related documentation), which effectively appointed W.J. Sproat as sole Indian Reserve Commissioner, to refer the rejection of Sproat's allotment of Cormorant Island to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court?

2. Did Canada have a fiduciary obligation to refer the rejection of Sproat's allotment of the Island to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court?

3. In the alternative, did Canada have an obligation, pursuant to Article 13 of the Terms of Union 1871, to refer the rejection of Sproat's allotment of the Island to the Secretary of State for the Colonies?

4. If the answer to question 2 or 3 is yes, did Canada fulfill its obligation by requesting a review and opinion from Prime Minister MacDonald's "Confidential Agent on Indian Affairs and Railway Matters, J.W. Trutch"?

5. If the rejection of Sproat's allotment had been referred to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court, would the allotment have been upheld?
6. Was Canada negligent in not referring the rejection of Sproat's allotment to either a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court or the Secretary of State for the Colonies?

7. Does this claim fall within the scope of the Specific Claims Policy?

The ISCC recommended that Canada accept this claim for negotiation. The ISCC found that, pursuant to the Order in Council (and related documentation) appointing Sproat as Commissioner, Canada had a mandatory obligation to refer the rejection of his allotment of Cormorant Island to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court. The ISCC also found that Canada had a fiduciary obligation to make such a referral and that Canada did not fulfill its fiduciary obligation by requesting its confidential agent, Mr. Joseph Trutch, to review and provide his opinion on the matter. The ISCC also indicated that, had Canada fulfilled its obligations, it might have succeeded in having the allotment upheld or at least in obtaining a larger portion of reserve land for the First Nation.

In light of these conclusions, the ISCC did not consider it necessary to address the issues of whether an obligation arose from Article 13 of the Treaty of Union 1871 or whether Canada was negligent in failing to refer the rejection of Sproat's allotment of the Island to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court. The ISCC concluded that the First Nation's claim fell within the scope of the Specific Claims Policy.

Canada has thoroughly reviewed the recommendations of the ISCC. Despite the legal and policy analysis conducted as a result of this ISCC report and others, Canada maintains its view that the facts do not disclose an outstanding lawful obligation to the Namsis First Nation. In Canada's view, the wording of the Order in Council (and related documentation) appointing Sproat contemplate that a referral of differences between Sproat and the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court was a discretionary rather than a mandatory obligation, as found by the ISCC.

Canada does not view the nature and scope of its fiduciary obligations to be the same as that found to exist by the ISCC. Canada maintains that the elements required to establish a fiduciary obligation to refer the rejection of Sproat's allotment to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court are not present.

In addition, Canada continues to conclude that, although it was not required to take further steps following the rejection of Sproat's allotment, it acted in a reasonable manner to investigate the difference between Sproat and the Chief Commissioner by obtaining an opinion from Mr. Trutch on the matter and by later agreeing that Commissioner O'Reilly should proceed to the Island to allot reserves for the First Nation.
As recognized by the ISCC, we cannot know with certainty what a Judge would have done if the matter of the rejection of Sproat’s allotment had been referred to a Judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court. There is no evidence that a judicial decision would have meant that different or more lands were allotted to the First Nation by Commissioner O’Reilly.

Therefore, Canada concludes that there is not an outstanding lawful obligation owed to the Namgis First Nation in respect of the subject matter of this claim. Consequently, the claim will not be accepted for negotiation.

I would like to thank the Indian Specific Claims Commission for its consideration of this claim.

Yours sincerely,

Robert D. Nault, P.C., M.P.
Dear Commissioners Augustine, Bellegarde and Prentice:

As you are aware, I am in receipt of the Indian Specific Claims Commission’s (ISCC) September 1999 report regarding the Duncan’s First Nation’s specific claim, Duncan’s First Nation Inquiry - Report on 1928 Surrender Inquiry. I appreciate the detailed consideration which the Commission brought to the issues.

I would also like to thank you sincerely for the work done during the ISCC inquiry, which resulted in Canada’s agreement to negotiate the Duncan’s First Nation’s claim with respect to IR 151H. These negotiations led to the settlement of that claim in 1999.

As you know, Canada and the Duncan’s First Nation settled an earlier claim in 1996 relating to the application of the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act to sales of surrendered reserve lands.

In your report, although the ISCC concluded that Canada owes no lawful obligation to the Duncan’s First Nation in relation to six of the seven reserve parcels at issue, the Commission recommended that Canada accept Duncan’s claim with respect to one parcel, IR 151E (118 acres). The ISCC stated that Canada should have brought a 1923 leasing proposal in relation to IR 151E to the First Nation’s attention and that:

...having failed to fulfill this duty, the Governor in Council should have withheld consent to the surrender of IR 151E since, without the Band having been afforded the opportunity to consider its options, the surrender must be considered to have been foolish, improvident, and exploitative.

Canada
After careful review, Canada has declined to accept the Commission’s recommendation to negotiate with the Duncan’s First Nation regarding IR 151E, for the reasons outlined below.

First, the leasing proposal was submitted by Mr. Early five years before the actual surrender, and there is no evidence that a lease of IR 151E was still being sought in 1928. In addition, the evidence indicates that the First Nation knew of the 1923 leasing proposal and could have raised the issue on its own behalf. The Crown cannot substitute its own decision for that of the First Nation, and the Commission found that the assent to the surrender was given freely, and that Canada invited the First Nation to raise issues. The ISCC accepted that Canada posed the question at the surrender meeting: “What do you want to do?” In Canada’s view, nothing prevented the First Nation from raising the leasing issue at the time.

Finally, the Commission did not examine the terms of the proposed lease and, as a result, made no finding that the 1923 lease proposal was either more or less advantageous to the First Nation than a surrender. Without this information, Canada is not able to accept the Commission’s conclusion that it was exploitative to allow for the surrender and sale to go forward.

For these reasons, Canada cannot accept this claim for negotiation as recommended by the ISCC.

I thank you for your patience in waiting for Canada’s response to your report. Although I regret that my reply regarding IR 151E could not be more positive, I would like to thank and congratulate the ISCC for its pivotal role in the successful settlement of the Duncan’s First Nation’s claim with respect to IR 151H.

Yours sincerely,

Robert D. Nault, P.C., M.P.
Co-Chair Daniel J. Bellegarde is an Assiniboine/Cree from the Little Black Bear First Nation in southern Saskatchewan. From 1981 to 1984, he worked with the Meadow Lake District Chiefs Joint Venture as a socio-economic planner. He was president of the Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies from 1984 to 1987. In 1988, he was elected first vice-chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, a position he held until 1997. He is currently president of Dan Bellegarde & Associates, a consulting firm specializing in strategic planning, management and leadership development, self-governance, and human resource development in general. Mr Bellegarde was appointed Commissioner and then Commission Co-Chair in July 1992 and April 1994, respectively.

Co-Chair P.E. James Prentice, QC, is a lawyer with the Calgary law firm of Rooney Prentice. He has an extensive background in native land claims, commencing with his work as legal counsel and negotiator for the Province of Alberta in the tripartite negotiations that brought about the Sturgeon Lake Indian Claim Settlement of 1989. Since that time, Mr Prentice has participated in the inquiry or mediation of some 70 treaty land entitlement and surrender claims across Canada. Mr Prentice was appointed Queen’s Counsel in 1992. He has also been the Faculty Leader at the Banff Centre for Management’s annual program on specific claims since 1994. He was appointed Commissioner and then Commission Co-Chair in July 1992 and April 1994, respectively.
Roger J. Augustine is a Mi’kmaq born in Eel Ground, New Brunswick, where he served as Chief from 1980 to 1996. He was elected president of the Union of NB–PEI First Nations in 1988, and completed his term in January 1994. He has received the prestigious Medal of Distinction from the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse for 1993 and 1994 in recognition of his efforts in founding and fostering both the Eel Ground Drug and Alcohol Education Centre and the Native Alcohol and Drug Abuse Rehabilitation Centre. In June 1996, he was named Miramichi Achiever of the Year by the Miramichi Regional Development Corporation. He was appointed Commissioner in July 1992.

Renée Dupuis has had a private law practice in Quebec City since 1973. From the outset, she focussed on human rights and specifically on the rights of Canada’s aboriginal peoples. From 1972 to 1975, she served as lawyer for the Association of Indians of Quebec and, beginning in 1978, acted as legal advisor to the three Attikamek and nine Montagnais bands in her home province, representing the bands in their land claims negotiations with the federal, Quebec, and Newfoundland governments, as well as in the constitutional negotiations. From 1989 to 1995, Mme Dupuis served two terms as Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission. She has been a consultant to various federal and provincial government agencies, authored numerous books and articles, and lectured extensively on human rights, administrative law, and aboriginal rights. Mme Dupuis is a graduate in law from the Université Laval and holds a master’s degree in public administration from the École nationale d’administration publique. She was appointed Commissioner in March 2001.
Alan C. Holman is a writer and broadcaster who grew up on Prince Edward Island. In his long journalistic career, he has been an instructor at Holland College in Charlottetown, PEI; editor-publisher of a weekly newspaper in rural PEI; a radio reporter with CBC in Inuvik, NWT; and a reporter for the Charlottetown Guardian, Windsor Star, and Ottawa Citizen. From 1980 to 1986, he was Atlantic parliamentary correspondent for CBC-TV news in Ottawa. In 1987, he was appointed parliamentary bureau chief for CBC radio news, a position he held until 1994. That same year, he left national news reporting to become principal secretary to the then-PEI premier, Catherine Callbeck. He left the premier’s office in 1995 to head public sector development for the PEI Department of Development. Since the fall of 2000, Mr Holman has worked as a freelance writer and broadcaster. He was educated at Kings College School in Windsor, NS, and Prince of Wales College in Charlottetown, where he makes his home. He was appointed Commissioner in March 2001.
Sheila Purdy has been an advisor to the Government of the Northwest Territories on justice and other matters relating to the territorial division and the creation of Nunavut. From 1993 to 1996, she was senior policy advisor to the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada on a number of justice issues, including aboriginal justice, the Canadian Human Rights Act, and violence against women. From 1991 to 1993, she acted as policy analyst on the constitution, justice, aboriginal affairs, women, human rights, and also for the Solicitor General. In 1992 and 1993, she was special advisor on aboriginal affairs to the Office of the Leader of the Opposition and from 1989 to 1991, she was legal consultant on environmental issues. She has been active in advocating against abuse of the elderly and in 1988, she received the Award of Merit from Concerned Friends for her work in this area. She worked as a lawyer in private practice from 1982 to 1985, after graduating with a law degree from the University of Ottawa in 1980. She was appointed Commissioner in May 1999.

Commissioners and staff at the ICC were deeply saddened to learn of the sudden passing of Commissioner Carole T. Corcoran on February 15, 2001. Her dedication to the work of the Commission, her undaunted efforts to clarify the spirit of the law, and her gentle disposition will remain an inspiration to all who knew her. We extend our heartfelt sympathy to family, friends, and community. Let us all take comfort from her legacy of strength, integrity, and good will.

- The Commissioners