INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

DUNCAN’S FIRST NATION INQUIRY
1928 SURRENDER CLAIM

PANEL

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PART I
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND TO THE INQUIRY

This report addresses a claim submitted by the Duncan’s First Nation\(^1\) to the Government of Canada initially alleging that the surrenders of eight parcels of reserve land – Indian Reserves (IR) 151 and 151B to 151H – by the Band in 1928 were null and void. The First Nation claims that the surrenders were not obtained in strict compliance with the statutory requirements governing the surrender of reserve lands set out in section 51 of the 1927 *Indian Act*.\(^2\)

On August 27, 1994, Allan Tallman, Senior Claims Advisor with Specific Claims West (SCW), Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND or the Department), wrote to the Chief and Council of the Duncan’s First Nation to inform them of Canada’s position regarding the claim:

> It is Canada’s position that Duncan’s Indian Band’s claim submission has not established an outstanding lawful obligation on the part of Canada to the band, as outlined in the Specific Claims Policy booklet entitled: “*Outstanding Business*”. In arriving at our position, we have relied on the Specific Claims Policy, the evidence and materials provided to our office and, the historical report prepared on behalf of Specific Claims West. Furthermore, our position is preliminary in the sense that we will be prepared to discuss it with you, and we will review any further evidence or arguments that may be presented before a final position is taken by the Government of Canada.

> I should also point out that the band has the option to submit a rejected claim to the Indian Specific Claims Commission and request that the Commission hold an inquiry into the reasons for the objection.\(^3\)

In light of Canada’s position, Jerome Slavik, legal counsel acting on behalf of the Chief and Council of the Duncan’s First Nation, wrote to the Indian Claims Commission on October 7, 1994, to request an inquiry into the rejection of the claim:

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\(^1\) Alternatively referred to as “Duncan’s,” “First Nation,” or the “Band,” depending on the historical context. In earlier times the First Nation was also referred to as the Peace River Landing Band.

\(^2\) *Indian Act*, RSC 1927, c. 98.

\(^3\) Allan Tallman, Senior Claims Advisor, Specific Claims West, DIAND, to Chief and Counsel, Duncan’s Indian Band, August 22, 1994, DIAND file BW 8260/AB451-C1 (ICC Documents, pp. 807-09).
We have been instructed by Chief Irwin Knott and the Council of Duncan’s Indian First Nation to request that the Indian Claims Commission conduct an inquiry into the rejection of the specific claim filed by their First Nation regarding the wrongful surrender of a number of their Reserves.

... In our view, this claim centres around the truthfulness and validity of the Indian version of events as opposed to the documented version of events maintained in the Department’s archives. The rejection occurred because SCW did not believe testimony set out in the Affidavits of three elders who were familiar with the events and people surrounding this wrongful surrender.4

By letter dated October 28, 1994, the Indian Claims Commission (the Commission) informed the Specific Claims Branch of DIAND that, in accordance with the request submitted to the Commission by the Chief and Band Council of the Duncan’s First Nation, the Commission had initiated an inquiry into the Minister’s rejection of the claim.

It should be noted that this report does not deal with the First Nation’s other two reserves – IR 151A and 151K – since the former reserve was never relinquished and the latter, although surrendered in 1928, never sold and was returned to the First Nation in 1965. Nor does this report deal with IR 151H. During the course of this inquiry, Director General Michel Roy of DIAND’s Specific Claims Branch agreed to negotiate the First Nation’s claim regarding IR 151H, acknowledging that the First Nation had established Canada’s outstanding lawful obligation “arising from the alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the 1927 Indian Act when taking the 1928 surrender of Reserve 151H.”5 For this reason, the surrender of IR 151H has been withdrawn from our terms of reference, and we have addressed only the seven parcels referred to as IR 151 and 151B through 151G.

A summary of the written submissions, documentary evidence, transcripts, and the balance of the record in this inquiry is set forth in Appendix A of this report.

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5 Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 3).
MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION

The mandate of this Commission is set out in federal Orders in Council providing the Commissioners with the authority to conduct public inquiries into specific claims and to issue reports on “whether a claimant has a valid claim for negotiation under the [Specific Claims] Policy where the claim was already rejected by the Minister.” This Policy, outlined in the Department’s 1982 booklet entitled Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy – Specific Claims, states that Canada will accept claims for negotiation where they disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation” on the part of the federal government. The term “lawful obligation” is defined in Outstanding Business as follows:

The government’s policy on specific claims is that it will recognize claims by Indian bands which disclose an outstanding “lawful obligation,” i.e., an obligation derived from the law on the part of the federal government.

A lawful obligation may arise in any of the following circumstances:

i) The non-fulfillment of a treaty or agreement between Indians and the Crown.

ii) A breach of an obligation arising out of the Indian Act or other statutes pertaining to Indians and the regulations thereunder.

iii) A breach of an obligation arising out of government administration of Indian funds or other assets.

iv) An illegal disposition of Indian land.

Furthermore, Canada is prepared to consider claims based on the following circumstances:

i) Failure to provide compensation for reserve lands taken or damaged by the federal government or any of its agencies under authority.

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8 Outstanding Business, 20; reprinted in (1994) 1 ICCP 179.
ii) Fraud in connection with the acquisition or disposition of Indian reserve land by employees or agents of the federal government, in cases where fraud can be clearly demonstrated.\textsuperscript{9}

The Commission has been asked to inquire into and report on whether the Duncan’s First Nation has a valid claim for negotiation pursuant to the Specific Claims Policy. This report contains our findings and recommendations on the merits of this claim.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Outstanding Business}, 20; reprinted in (1994) 1 ICCP 180.
PART II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

TREATY 8

The impetus for the Government of Canada to negotiate a treaty with the Indians inhabiting the territory north of Treaty 6 coincided with the rapid influx of prospectors en route to the Yukon goldfields during the final years of the 19th century. The Indians inhabiting what is now northern Alberta became concerned that their rights were being jeopardized by the movement of non-aboriginal peoples into these lands, and their response was to seek the protection of a formal treaty. For its part, the Government of Canada was willing to negotiate a treaty, since such an agreement would facilitate the movement of settlers into this region. Therefore, in 1898, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs recommended to the Governor in Council that a treaty be concluded to minimize the potential for conflict between newcomers and the Indian inhabitants of the territory north of the Treaty 6 boundary. Order in Council PC 2749, which authorized the establishment of a commission to negotiate this treaty, offers the following description of the historical context in which these discussions proceeded:

On a report dated 30th November, 1898, from the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs ... it was set forth that the Commissioner of the North West Mounted Police had pointed out the desirability of steps being taken for the making of a treaty with the Indians occupying the proposed line of route from Edmonton to Pelly River; that he had intimated that these Indians, as well as the Beaver Indians of the Peace and Nelson Rivers, and the Sicamas and Nihames Indians, were inclined to be turbulent and were liable to give trouble to isolated parties of miners or traders who might be regarded by the Indians as interfering with what they considered their vested rights; and that he had stated that the situation was made more difficult by the presence of...
the numerous travellers who had come into the country and were scattered at various points between Lesser Slave Lake and Peace River.\(^{13}\)

The Treaty Commission created by this Order in Council was sent into the Territory of Assiniboia to conduct negotiations and, on June 21, 1899, Treaty 8 was concluded with the Indians of Lesser Slave Lake.\(^{14}\) The Treaty Commissioners – David Laird, J.H. Ross, and J.A.J. McKenna – then split up in an effort to meet with a number of groups of Indian people in the Treaty 8 area. Commissioners Ross and McKenna proceeded on towards Fort St John, British Columbia, while Commission Chairman Laird travelled to Peace River Landing (now Peace River) and Vermilion before turning his attentions to the northeast towards Lake Athabasca and the Slave River district.\(^{15}\)

Laird met with the “Indians of Peace River Landing and the adjacent territory” on July 1, 1899, at which time Duncan Testawits, “Headman of Crees,”\(^{16}\) signed an adhesion to Treaty 8 on behalf of his people.\(^{17}\) This adhesion guaranteed that band members were entitled to the provisions of treaty, including the allocation of reserve lands in common or, for those who wished, in severalty:

And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside reserves for such bands as desire reserves, the same not to exceed in all one square mile for each family of five for such number of families as may elect to reside on reserves, or in that proportion for larger or smaller families; and for such families or individual Indians as may prefer to live apart from band reserves, Her Majesty undertakes to provide land in severalty to the extent of 160 acres to each Indian, the land to be conveyed with a proviso as to non-alienation without the consent of the

\(^{13}\) Order in Council PC 2749, in Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 3 (ICC Documents, p. 4).

\(^{14}\) Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 15 (ICC Documents, p. 1).

\(^{15}\) Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 7-8 (ICC Documents, pp. 8-9).

\(^{16}\) The treaty actually refers to Duncan Testawits as “Duncan Tastaoosts.” Government officials have spelled the surname “Tastaoosts” a number of ways over the years, including “Tustawits,” “Tustowitz,” and “Testawich.” The spelling that appears to have been used most commonly historically – and which the Commission has adopted for the purposes of this report – is “Testawits.”

\(^{17}\) Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 15 (ICC Documents, pp. 2 and 16).
Governor General in Council of Canada, the selection of such reserves, and lands in severalty, to be made in the manner following, namely, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs shall depute and send a suitable person to determine and set apart such reserves and lands, after consulting with the Indians concerned as to the locality which may be found suitable and open for selection.\textsuperscript{18}

One of the primary concerns of the Indians involved in the Treaty 8 negotiations concerned fears that “the making of the treaty would be followed by the curtailment of the hunting and fishing privileges” formerly enjoyed by the various bands.\textsuperscript{19} Laird and his colleagues, however, calmed these fears by explaining that the treaty actually protected the right of Indians to pursue their traditional way of life:

> We pointed out that the Government could not undertake to maintain Indians in idleness; that the same means of earning a livelihood would continue after the treaty as existed before it, and that the Indians would be expected to make use of them....

> Our chief difficulty was the apprehension that the hunting and fishing privileges were to be curtailed. The provision in the treaty under which ammunition and twine is to be furnished went far in the direction of quieting the fears of the Indians, for they admitted that it would be unreasonable to furnish the means of hunting and fishing if laws were to be enacted which would make hunting and fishing so restricted as to render it impossible to make a livelihood by such pursuits. But over and above the provision, we had to solemnly assure them that only such laws as to hunting and fishing as were in the interest of the Indians and were found necessary in order to protect the fish and fur-bearing animals would be made, and that they would be as free to hunt and fish after the treaty as they would be if they never entered into it.\textsuperscript{20}

Upon concluding his duties in the Peace River District, Laird assured the Indians that the government did not intend to survey reserve lands in the immediate future:

\textsuperscript{18} Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 12-13 (ICC Documents, pp. 13-14).

\textsuperscript{19} Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 5 (ICC Documents, p. 6).

\textsuperscript{20} Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 5-6 (ICC Documents, pp. 6-7).
As the extent of country treated for made it impossible to define reserves or holdings, and as the Indians were not prepared to make selections, we confined ourselves to an undertaking to have reserves and holdings set apart in the future, and the Indians were satisfied with the promise that this would be done when required. There is no immediate necessity for the general laying out of reserves or the allotting of land. It will be quite time enough to do this as advancing settlement makes necessary the surveying of the land.  

Reserves as such were not established for the use and benefit of the Duncan’s Band until 1905.

**Selection and Survey of Reserves for the Duncan’s Band**

In the years following the signing of Treaty 8, the extent of non-aboriginal migration into the Peace River District increased markedly. Although located 450 km northwest of Edmonton, Alberta, the Peace River District offered settlers soil and climatic conditions suitable for commercial wheat production. By the summer of 1928, the available Crown lands in the region had been practically exhausted. By the end of 1931, over 400,000 acres of improved land in the district were devoted to producing agricultural crops – approximately 70 per cent in wheat alone – with an annual capacity of between 16 and 20 bushels per acre.

In 1900, G.D. Butler, the sergeant in command of the North-West Mounted Police detachment at Peace River Crossing, assisted the Indians of the Duncan’s Band to identify and stake out several parcels of land then occupied by band members and their families. Four individual parcels on the north bank of the Peace River near the Shaftesbury Settlement were identified as the holdings of specified individuals. As well, two substantial parcels, located to the northwest of the river lots and intended for use as haylands, were identified and staked. All the parcels were marked

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21 *Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc.* (1899; reprinted Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 7 (ICC Documents, p. 8).


as “temporary” Indian reserves by Sergeant Butler.24 With soil and climatic conditions well suited for crop production, the lands located on the flats of the Peace River near the Shaftesbury Settlement were as attractive to members of the Duncan’s Band as they were to incoming settlers. As a result, it was not long before competing interests created difficulties between these two communities.

In 1903, for instance, Butler assisted Duncan Testawits and band member Xavier Mooswah in evicting a group of squatters from the area that Butler and the Band had previously identified as temporary Indian reserve land.25 Subsequently, in July 1904, Butler filed a report with Commissioner Laird in which he outlined the deterioration of relations between Indians and settlers and requested that the Band’s reserves be established by a government surveyor as soon as possible:

I have the honor to report that the Peace River Band of Indians are claiming more land than they are entitled to, and if their Reserve is not surveyed soon there will be trouble between the Indians and settlers. A white man wants to settle on a good location when the Headman or one of his Band come and lay a complaint against him for trespass which means a three day patrol for us and swimming horses twice across the Peace River, which you yourself know is no joke. Three years ago I was in receipt of a letter from you stating that surveyors would be here during the Summer, but they did not get here. If you could possibly get it done this Summer it would simplify matters and be better than at present, when we should have a boundary and not an imaginary line which can be stretched by the Indians moving a stake.26

The timing of the request made it impossible to organize a survey for that year. In September 1904, the Department of Indian Affairs notified the Department of the Interior that a survey crew would be sent to the Peace River District during the summer of 1905 to set aside reserves for the Band.27


27 J.D. McLean, Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs (DIA), to P.G. Keyes, Secretary, Department of the Interior, September 3, 1904, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 30).
The following spring, J. Lestock Reid, a dominion land surveyor employed by the Department of Indian Affairs, travelled to the Peace Country to undertake the necessary survey. According to his year-end report, Reid and his survey team arrived at Peace River Landing on March 18, 1905, and commenced the survey work in early April:

Finding that Duncan, with some of his band, was away on a hunting expedition to the north, I sent a man with dog train to notify him that I had arrived to lay out his reservation.

While waiting, I made a traverse of the north bank of the river (Peace) between the English mission and the Big Island flat, as this was said to take in several Indian locations....

My teams returned with the wagons and supplies from the Lesser Slave lake on March 29, and the headman, Duncan Testawits, returned on the following Saturday evening.

I met with the headman and the Indians of the Peace River band on April 2, and after the usual talk with delays and adjustments, I at last succeeded in making the allotments I think satisfactory to them, and I hope the same will meet your approval.²⁸

According to Reid’s report, 10 reserves were created for the use and benefit of the Duncan’s Band, and their total acreage coincided with the Band’s treaty land entitlement, based on membership figures available on the date of first survey.²⁹ The Commission makes no findings, however, on whether the Duncan’s Band has an outstanding entitlement to land under the terms of Treaty 8.

Six reserves (IR 151B to 151G) were located along the northwest bank of the Peace River in the vicinity of an area referred to locally as the Shaftesbury Settlement. They were intended to accommodate the previously established holdings of individual band members and their families. Since some band members had resided on these lands for a number of years, the creation of several


²⁹ D. Robertson, Chief Surveyor, DIA, to D.C. Scott, DSGIA, January 5, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 142): “These reserves are located in two main parcels - No. 151 and 151-A, and eight small scattered parcels Nos. 151-B, 151-C, 151-D, 151-E, 151-F, 151-G, 151-H and 151-K.... [T]he total acreage of all the reserves is equivalent to the total acreage to which this band would be entitled under the terms of Treaty, according to their population at the time of allotment.”
small reserves allowed individuals to retain their original outbuildings, houses, and agricultural improvements.\(^\text{30}\) Reid also surveyed two larger communal reserves (IR 151 and 151A) adjacent to the present-day villages of Berwyn and Brownvale, respectively,\(^\text{31}\) which would provide the Duncan’s Band with ample haylands.\(^\text{32}\) Finally, before completing his work in the Peace River District, Reid portioned out two additional parcels of land for members who had requested land separate from the rest of the Band. Louison Cardinal received land on the northeast shore of Bear Lake (IR 151H), while William McKenzie chose land along the trail to Grouard, Alberta, 40 km south of Peace River Landing (IR 151K).\(^\text{33}\)

Order in Council PC 917, dated May 3, 1907, confirmed IR 151 and 151A to 151G as having been “withdrawn from the operation of the Dominion Lands Act.” IR 151H and 151K, although surveyed in 1905, were not confirmed by this instrument.\(^\text{34}\) These reserves were confirmed on June 23, 1925, by Order in Council PC 990.\(^\text{35}\) Table 1 and the accompanying map show the various Indian reserves surveyed and set apart for the use and benefit of the Duncan’s Band.


\(^{31}\) Duncan’s IR 151A near Brownvale was also referred to as the “Old Wives Lake Reserve” because of its proximity to the lake of the same name.

\(^{32}\) J.L. Reid, DLS, to Frank Pedley, DSGIA, April 25, 1905, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1, as cited in G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” p. 28, note 143, and p. 31, note 161 (ICC Exhibit 5).


\(^{34}\) Order in Council PC 917, May 3, 1907 (ICC Documents, p. 88).

\(^{35}\) Order in Council PC 990, June 23, 1925 (ICC Documents, p. 172).
In 1899, when the Duncan’s Band adhered to Treaty 8, its members were predominantly hunters and trappers. One of the few exceptions was headman Duncan Testawits, who had settled on land near the Shaftesbury Settlement before taking treaty.\textsuperscript{36} By 1908, H.A. Conroy, Inspector for Treaty 8, stated that band members were “very progressive and they are doing well. They have broken considerable land and fenced it. Some have built very good houses, have some horses and cattle and have made good progress in garden work.”\textsuperscript{37} Conroy’s report, unfortunately, does not establish whether the members of the Duncan’s Band were, at this time, pursuing commercial agriculture. Based on the comment regarding “progress in garden work,” however, it is more likely that hunting and trapping still constituted their main livelihood, while garden farming provided an additional food source.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Duncan’s Band Reserves}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
IR & Original Occupant & Acreage \\
\hline
151 & Duncan’s Band & 3,520.0 \\
151A & Duncan’s Band & 5,120.0 \\
151B & J.F. Testawits & 294.3 \\
151C & Xavier Mooswah & 126.6 \\
151D & Alinkwoonay & 91.6 \\
151E & Duncan Testawits & 118.7 \\
151F & David Testawits & 134.0 \\
151G & Gillaume Bell & 5.7 \\
151H & Louison Cardinal & 160.0 \\
151K & Wm. McKenzie & 960.0 \\
\hline
Total & & 10,530.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{36} Peace River Research Project, Interview with Mrs Henry Callahoo (Lucie Testawits), June 1956, Glenbow-Alberta Institute Archives, acc. no. M4560, file 36, as cited in G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” p. 23 (ICC Exhibit 5).

\textsuperscript{37} H.A. Conroy, Inspector for Treaty 8, to F. Pedley, DSGIA, December 7, 1906, Department of Indian Affairs, \textit{Annual Report for the Year Ended March 31, 1907}, 181.
Source to be pursued during the months when traplines were not being maintained or hunts being arranged.

Inspector Conroy’s year-end report for 1909 provides a much better basis for assessing the economic base of the Duncan’s Band:

Fifty miles down the Peace River, at what is known as the Duncan Reserve, there is a small band without a chief, but with two headmen. These headmen for the last few years have paid some attention to crop-growing, such as wheat, oats, potatoes, and for some few years have been quite successful; but like all Indians, they are easily discouraged. The drought and wind-storms destroy some of their crops, discouraging them greatly, so that some of them have not taken the same interest as they used to do; but I have tried to encourage them to continue in the work. They have a few cattle of their own, and a fairly good class of horse, but rather small for farming. I think that when they get a farm instructor on this reserve they will become self-supporting. Duncan, the headman, has a very good house and outbuildings. I find it difficult to interest them in their work, as for the least excuse they leave it and go off on a hunt. When they return, they find that their stock has broken into and destroyed a great portion of their crop. If the department had a good practical man to look after these two reserves, Dunvegan and Peace River, I think it would not be long before they would become self-supporting.  

The Department of Indian Affairs did not, however, heed Conroy’s recommendation to provide the Lesser Slave Lake Agency with a farming instructor at that time. The agricultural development of the Duncan’s Band reserves declined in the years that followed. Two of the Band’s more progressive agriculturalists, Duncan Testawits and David Testawits, died during the influenza epidemic of 1918. Paylists reveal that nine of the 68 Duncan’s Band members listed on the paylist of 1918 (13.2 per cent of the population) died between the summer of 1918 and the summer of 1919. It is probable that the loss of these nine individuals, including headman Duncan Testawits, coincided with a general abandonment of farming by the Band. Although the historical record on this issue is scanty, some information is found in correspondence between J.B. Early, a farmer with land adjacent to IR 151E (which had been set apart for Duncan Testawits), and representatives of the Department of Indian Affairs. In a letter dated January 12, 1923, Early noted that 75 acres of this reserve, known locally as the “Duncan Ranch,”


had been ploughed and cultivated as little as five years previously. However, he added that, by 1923, the farm was no longer being operated and had fallen into a state of disrepair:

Five years ago when I lived on the Carson place, the old Chief was here on the place. They had cattle, horses, hogs, chickens and farm implements. Where the tools and implements have gone to I do not know. Of course the old Chief and many of the family is dead, and the rest seem to have no interest in operating the place. Still they refuse to sell this river home ranch.40

It would appear that farming on the reserve originally laid out for Duncan Testawits and his family did not continue after 1918.

A similar situation arose on IR 151G, which had originally been surveyed for Gillaume or “Gillian” Bell. In 1922, after the Department was informed that a local settler had inadvertently encroached on these lands after claiming an adjacent parcel, Acting Indian Agent Harold Laird – the son of former Commissioner David Laird – was instructed to visit the scene and report to the Department. In a letter dated October 31, 1922, he observed:

The Indian Reserve, No. 151 G., mentioned in the Agent’s letter, was surveyed for Gillian Bell, one of Duncan Tustawits’ Band, who died in 1913. His widow married a Halfbreed named LaPretre and received a cheque for commutation on June 29, 1915. Since the latter date no one has lived on this land and the old buildings have fallen down and been burned.41

As was the case with the original Duncan Testawits farm, no farming or gardening had taken place on this reserve since the death of its original occupant.

Few other contemporary records exist. The detailed agency reports on individual bands, formerly included within the Department’s Annual Report, were discontinued after 1916, and for this reason it is not possible to provide a more detailed portrayal of the Band’s economic pursuits during this period. However, comments made by Agent Laird within his yearly reports concerning treaty


41 H. Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, October 31, 1922, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 135).
annuity payments to the Duncan’s Band appear to verify that the Band relied primarily on trapping at the time of surrender. On November 22, 1927, for instance, Laird reported that “[n]either the Indians of Dunvegan or Duncan’s Band did very well hunting and trapping last season; both fur-bearing animals and moose being scarce.” He included similar comments in his report the following year:

The fur catch throughout the Agency in the season 1927-1928 was the smallest and lowest in value on record and, as the Indians in the out-lying district depend almost entirely upon the proceeds of the sale of fur-bearing animal pelts to provide themselves with clothing and other necessities, this was the cause of considerable suffering and will cause hardship this coming winter as there does [not] seem any reason to expect any increase in the fur yield.

Similarly, the evidence of elder John Testawits indicates that trapping was the predominant livelihood of band members during this period. While providing a lengthy description of migration patterns during the trapping season, Testawits stated at the September 1995 community session that the Band followed a traditional way of life: “[T]hat’s how they make their living in them days, was hunting or trapping. That’s the only thing that was going on then.” Based on the correspondence concerning the abandonment of IR 151E and 151G, the foregoing agricultural statistics, Laird’s annual reports, and the recollections of John Testawits, it would appear that, at the time of the surrenders in 1928, the members of the Duncan’s Band sustained themselves through hunting and trapping, while cultivating gardens on a small scale. Therefore, it is improbable that the Band was farming its reserve lands commercially at the time of surrender.

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42 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to D.C. Scott, November 22, 1927, p. 4 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 3).

43 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, December 4, 1928, p. 4 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 3).

44 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995, p. 34 (John Testawits). See also correspondence from Chief Surveyor, Donald Robertson, DIA, who in 1923 recommended the surrender of IR 151G: “The matter of obtaining this surrender does not appear to be immediate and it is improbable that the Agent could obtain the attendance of a sufficient number of the voting members of the band during the trapping season”: DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 145). Emphasis added.
PRESSURE ON THE LAND RESOURCE BASE OF THE PEACE RIVER DISTRICT

Competition for land in the vicinity of the Duncan’s Band reserves predated the date of first survey. As previously noted, the records of the North-West Mounted Police detachment at Peace River Landing reveal that the police had cooperated with members of the Duncan’s Band in removing squatters from lands previously identified as belonging to the Band. On October 29, 1904, a group of eight settlers, in an effort to protect their own land holdings “on the N[orth] W[est] Bank of the Peace River about 15 miles S[outh] W[est] of Peace River Crossing” and to voice their concerns about lands occupied by the Duncan’s Band, petitioned the Department of Indian Affairs:

1. That we wish to have our lands surveyed in the shape we occupy them.
2. That as Mr. Selby is surveying in our vicinity we fear that he may trespass and cut up our lands.
3. We understand that the Indian Commissioner has promised a survey of the Indian Reserve in our midst next summer. We desire to have our claims adjusted before that should be done.
4. Many of us being in possession of our present lands previous to the Indian Treaty here. Some being located here for nearly twenty years.
5. We therefore humbly request that Mr. Selby or some other Surveyor be authorized to survey our settlement before any trouble may arise.

The Department responded in December, assuring these settlers that they “need have no fear as to [a surveyor] trespassing on or cutting up your holdings, as you suggest in your petition.” Nonetheless, this petition highlighted the competing interests of the Duncan’s Band membership and local settlers, and the Department decided to proceed with the proposed survey soon after.

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47 Department of Indian Affairs to T.A. Brick, Shaftesbury Settlement, Peace River Crossing, December 14, 1904, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 34).

Completion of the 1905 survey, however, did not eliminate local disputes over the availability of productive farmland. In 1906, for example, Alexander McKenzie Sr, a squatter with a claim to land adjacent to IR 151H, which had been surveyed for Louison Cardinal of the Duncan’s Band, raised a series of concerns with the Department. The following excerpt from his petition to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs illustrates the emotional nature of the dispute:

In the autumn of 1895 as a pioneer settler and before anyone, with the exception of the missionaries, had any cattle in these parts, I established a cattle ranch at the east end of Brass Lake situated about fifteen miles from here, erected two substantial byres, one horse stable and a dwelling house, besides a hay yard, and lived and kept my stock ... for four successive years, and during that period I was in the habit every summer of mowing all around the edge of the lake of an average width of 30 yards to a length of 2½ miles at most, together with two small lakes in the vicinity, besides cut out a good travelling waggon [sic] road from the edge of the prairie through the thick wood and bush to Brass Lake and another trail leading to and from the small lakes, the length of the two trails probably would be about twelve miles.

Through force of circumstances, however, I had to leave the place temporarily vacant for some years. Afterwards in order to retain my claim I rented it out for two years, but on my returning to the place this summer with some stock I find that Messrs. Reid and Wilson who were sent out last summer by the Indian Department to survey out the Indian Reserves, had unknown to us surveyed out a piece of land adjoining to my claim to one Louison Cardenette [sic], a Treaty Indian, tho’ really a half breed from Lac La Biche, taking in a considerable size piece of my hay grounds on the edge of Bears Lake to serve him.

Said Louison Cardenelle now goes and lets this piece of hay ground over to another treaty Indian belonging to Duncan Testawit’s band and himself sets to work and cuts hay in the prairie close by and outside of his reserve.

I consider this action on the part of Messrs. Reid and Wilson unreasonable and unfair after our going to the trouble and expense of cutting out roads and building, and moreover it deprives us of our squatters rights and places us in an inferior position to an [I]ndian as well as it encroaches upon our power to do our business and claims in a measure that we are not fit to do it.

So far the land has not been surveyed and in consequence we retain our holdings by squatters rights only.

Louison Cardenette came here in the summer of 1894 on a visit to some of his friends, then afterwards in 1897 made Bears Lake more of a camping place, from whence he trapped and hunted but did not permanently establish himself until the following year.
Now, may I therefore respectfully solicit your opinion and decision on the matter, whether I have to submit and take a back seat for Mr. Indian, or hold all my former holdings and claim of hay ground.\textsuperscript{49}

After consulting with Surveyor J. Lestock Reid, the Department chose to reject McKenzie’s claim, explaining that, as “Cardinal’s location contains only 160 acres with a comparatively small frontage on the Lake, it is thought that this location should not materially interfere with any of your operations, or with any rights which you think you may have acquired in that locality.”\textsuperscript{50}

The first wave of concerted pressure for lands in the vicinity of Peace River occurred after World War I,\textsuperscript{51} as the federal government sought to reintegrate former soldiers into civilian life by settling them on farm lands. The \textit{Soldier Settlement Act} of 1917 made it possible for war veterans to apply for a grant of 160 acres of Crown land in addition to the 160 acres already available to them under the homestead provisions of the \textit{Dominion Lands Act}. In 1919, the Act was amended to enable the Soldier Settlement Board to purchase lands, including Indian lands, for resale to interested ex-soldiers:

\textbf{10.} The [Soldier Settlement] Board may acquire from His Majesty by purchase, upon terms not inconsistent with those of the release or surrender, any Indian lands, which, under the \textit{Indian Act}, have been validly released or surrendered.\textsuperscript{52}

The Department of Indian Affairs actively cooperated with the Soldier Settlement Board in efforts to settle returned soldiers on uncultivated or otherwise underutilised Indian land. The following excerpt from a report written in December 1919 by Duncan Campbell Scott, the Deputy

\textsuperscript{49} Alex McKenzie Sr, Peace River Landing, Alberta, to Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, August 16, 1906, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, pp. 81-83). Underlining in original document.

\textsuperscript{50} J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to Alexander McKenzie, March 7, 1907, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 87).

\textsuperscript{51} In 1911, an inquiry was made concerning IR 151H; however, it appears that interest was not sustained, possibly because the initial inquiry was based on inaccurate information. See J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to Mr Reifenstien, Ottawa, August 29, 1911, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 91).

\textsuperscript{52} An \textit{Act to Assist Returned Soldiers in Settling upon the Land, or, Soldier Settlement Act} (August 29, 1917), section 4(3), and \textit{Soldier Settlement Act} (July 7, 1919), sections 7 and 10.
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, summarizes departmental policy regarding soldier settlement:

As there is pressing need for securing land for the settlement of returned soldiers under the provisions of the Soldier Settlement Act, the comparatively large areas of Indian reserve lands throughout the country, which were but scantily used by the Indians, were sought as a source of supply.

This department lost no time in inaugurating prompt and comprehensive measures in collaboration with the Soldier Settlement Board to take a complete survey of all available lands, and to make proper arrangements for placing these at the disposal of the Board. All the unsold surrendered lands in the market were turned over to the Soldier Settlement Board for acquirement, if, on investigation, they found the character of the land suitable for their purposes. It was realized that the Indian reserves in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta might yield extensive regions of cultivable lands.

The areas of the reserves set apart under treaty were generous, but were given as part compensation for the cession of title, and with the intention that, in the future, the proceeds from the sale of the lands might form funds from which the Indians could be maintained. That they have legal title to the lands, which can only be surrendered and sold with their consent, is a fact sometimes lost sight of.

The Department, acting in conjunction with the Board, arranged for a joint examination and valuation of these properties, and Mr. Commissioner W.M. Graham undertook this important duty. When the lands were found to be acceptable to the Board, and when a valuation had been placed upon them, Mr. Graham negotiated a surrender from the Indians.

In no case have the Indians refused to part with their lands for fair and reasonable payments, and the action has resulted in already placing 62,128 acres of land in the hands of the Board.53

There was significant interest in acquiring the Duncan’s Band reserve land for soldier settlement purposes, but the Department of Indian Affairs refused to pursue a surrender at that time. For reasons to be addressed below, both Scott and Indian Commissioner William M. Graham rejected the numerous proposals submitted by interested third parties.

One of the most determined requests to obtain the Duncan’s Band reserve lands for returning soldiers was made to the Minister of the Interior, Arthur Meighen, by Brigadier-General W.A. Griesbach, the Member of Parliament for Edmonton West, on behalf of the Peace River Unionist

53 D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to Arthur Meighen, SGIA, December 1, 1919, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report for the Year Ended March 31, 1919, 40-41.
Association. Writing in May 1919, Griesbach informed the Minister that he was “in receipt of representation in the northern part of Alberta, to the effect that some Indian Reserves in that area are but sparsely inhabited,” and he suggested that, since these reserves contained good farm lands, arrangements should be made “whereby these lands be thrown open for settlement.” Included within the list of reserves Griesbach and the Peace River Unionist Association sought to have “thrown open” for settlement were the Duncan’s IR 151, 151A, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151G, 151H, and 151K:

The ones we had particularly in mind from the Peace River are those I have numbered 3, 4 [IR 151A], 5, 6 [IR 151], 11 [IR 151K] & 12.... No. 4 at Old Wives Lake [IR 151A] consists of one of the finest pieces of land in the country. Last year on this reserve and on Nos 6-7 & 10 [IR 151, 151C-D, and 151H] there were 68 Indians. This number is probably now reduced to less than 30.... No. 11 at Little Prairie [IR 151K] is an excellent piece of land in well settled country. I have no definite knowledge of the number of Indians living on it but there are very few if any.... I trust this information will be of use to you and that the matter can be arranged as it is too bad that so much fine land should be lying absolutely unused.

Meighen’s initial reply of May 7, 1919, was favourable:

I presume there will be no difficulty in securing a surrender from the Indians in that section of the country. The necessity of securing as much land as possible for the returned men is fixed in the mind of the [Soldier Settlement] Board, and my directions are that every possible effort is to be made in this connection.

After reviewing the status of the Duncan’s Band reserves, however, Deputy Superintendent General Scott reported to Meighen:

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55 L.W. Brown, Peace River Unionists Association, to Brigadier-General W.A. Griesbach, MP, June 2, 1919, NA, RG 10, vol. 7535, file 26131-3 (ICC Documents, pp. 94-96). The evidence in this inquiry has not yielded any additional information regarding the Peace River Unionists. It is clear, however, that the group was well connected with influential people such as Griesbach and had the means to collect this reasonably thorough list of local reserves.

I beg to send herewith a correct list of reserves in the Peace River district, Treaty No. 8; these reserves were all set apart under the terms of the treaty, and the Indians, for the most part hunting Indians, have not made any agricultural use of them, although they have cattle and garden plots. Commissioner Graham has arranged to lease certain areas for grazing purposes, but none on the reserves mentioned in this list.

I am not aware whether there are any Dominion lands available in that district, but it seems extraordinary in a place so thinly settled that there should be such early pressure on the Indian reserves....

I do not think that either of us would be favourable to asking for a surrender for sale just at present, but, while this is my opinion, I would be willing to further discuss the matter with Commissioner Graham.\(^57\)

Graham agreed with Scott:

> It seems strange to me that the Indians should be called upon to surrender lands in that district at this early date, as there must be large areas of dominion lands available. As the district must be very thinly settled, personally I do not think that we should attempt to get these lands surrendered until such time as other available lands in the district are exhausted.\(^58\)

Despite this reply, Griesbach continued to pressure government officials to open up these lands for soldier settlement.

On September 23, 1919, Meighen’s private secretary forwarded to the Department an excerpt from a letter requesting the opening of a series of reserves in the Peace River District for settlement purposes. Although the record does not disclose the name of the letter’s author, the wording was nearly identical to the previous request from the Peace River Unionist Association and its proponent, Griesbach, suggesting that both had the same source. At any rate, J.D. McLean, Secretary of the Department, forwarded the following response to Meighen’s private secretary, emphasizing Indian Affairs’ continued rejection of the proposal:


With reference to your memorandum of the 23rd instant, with respect to the opening up for settlement of certain reserves in the northern part of Alberta, I beg to refer to Mr. Scott’s memorandum of the 13th June, last, addressed to Hon. Mr. Meighen, dealing with this matter.

The Minister approved of the last paragraph of that memorandum, and on 21st June, Mr. Graham was written to and asked for his views. He replied on 16th July supporting Mr. Scott’s views. I do not see, therefore, that I can add anything to Mr. Scott’s memorandum.59

On February 28, 1920, Griesbach again solicited the support of the Minister of the Interior. Once again, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs declined the request:

Commissioner Graham and I agreed that we should not throw open for soldier settlement Indian lands on these far northern reserves until other available lands have been exhausted. Commissioner Graham expects to be able to visit the Lesser Slave Lake agency this summer, and I would rather not take decisive action until I have a report from him. Meanwhile, it might be possible for the Dominion Lands Branch to say whether it is a fact that, as represented to Col. Griesbach, the country surrounding these reserves is settled up, and no other land is immediately available.60

Although the historical record does not reveal whether the Department of Indian Affairs conferred with the Dominion Lands Office regarding the availability of Crown lands in the Peace River District, other correspondence discloses that a demand for these lands did exist. Between June 17, 1919, and December 31, 1922, the Department of Indian Affairs received no fewer than eight additional requests proposing that Indian lands in the Peace River District be “opened up” for agricultural settlement.61 Despite these requests, the Department remained committed to the policy

59 J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to Mr Mitchell, Private Secretary, Minister of the Interior, September 24, 1919, NA, RG 10, vol. 7535, file 26131-3 (ICC Documents, p. 115).


articulated in Scott’s June 13, 1919, memorandum to Meighen: that reserve lands in the Peace River area should not be surrendered until such time as other available lands in the district were exhausted.

In 1922, however, a particular issue refocused the Department’s attention on the Duncan’s Band reserves and, in doing so, marked a departure from the previous policy regarding these lands. In a letter dated May 16, 1922, R. Cruickshank, Dominion Lands Agent at Peace River, informed Acting Indian Agent Harold Laird that an illegal encroachment had occurred on IR 151G, one of the small reserves previously occupied by “Gillian” Bell:

> In reference to the above which is situated in River Lot #5, Shaftesbury Settlement, Mr. Arthur Charles Wright filed upon River Lot #5, on April 6th, 1921, and unfortunately has placed most, if not all, his improvements upon the Reserve.
> I do not believe Mr. Wright did this purposely and as soon as he discovered his mistake he informed me and stated that he would willingly buy the 5 acres at a reasonable figure.62

That October, Laird forwarded this information to departmental headquarters, along with the results of his initial investigation of the situation:

> The Indian Reserve, No. 151 G., mentioned in the Agent’s letter, was surveyed for Gillian Bell, one of Duncan Tustawits’ Band, who died in 1913. His widow married a Halfbreed named LaPretre and received a cheque for commutation on June 29, 1915. Since the latter date no one has lived on this land and the old buildings have fallen down and been burned. The Reserve contains only some 5 acres of land, and is of very little land [sic] except as a residential lot.
> When I visited the Reserve, I found, as stated by Mr. Cruickshank, that Mr. Wright had built his house inside the Reserve, a few rods from the eastern boundary. I would estimate the value of the improvements made between $900.00 and $1,000.00.63
After reviewing the circumstances surrounding this encroachment on IR 151G, Donald Robertson, the Department’s Chief Surveyor, recommended a surrender for sale:

Mr. Wright has stated he would be willing to buy the 5.61 acres comprising this reserve at a reasonable figure. Under the circumstances it would be necessary to receive a surrender from the band, in order to dispose of the property.... I would recommend that an endeavour be made to secure a surrender for this purpose.64

Nevertheless, despite favouring a surrender, Robertson recognized that obtaining one might be difficult, having regard for band members’ traditional way of life:

The matter of obtaining this surrender does not appear to be immediate and it is improbable that the Agent could obtain the attendance of a sufficient number of the voting members of the band during the trapping season. It might be indicated to him that the Department fully realizes this but expects that he will take the matter in hand at the earliest opportunity.65

Early in the new year, the necessary surrender documents were drawn up and forwarded to Laird, with instructions authorizing him to consult the Band regarding the surrender of the reserve in question:

With further reference to your letter of the 31st October last relating to certain buildings erected by A.C. Wright on Indian reserve No. 151-G, I have to inform you that the Department proposes to endeavour to obtain a surrender of this reserve in order that it may be sold. If this surrender is obtained, Mr. Wright will no doubt have an opportunity of buying it when offered for sale.66

On January 23, 1923, Laird responded to these instructions by proposing that, while attempting to obtain the surrender of IR 151G, “the Department should also take surrenders of

64 Donald Robertson, Chief Surveyor, DIA, to Deputy Minister, January 5, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 142).


66 J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, to H. Laird, Acting Indian Agent, January 12, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 146).
Reserves 151B., 151C., 151D., 151E., 151F., 151H., and 151K.” Laird’s proposal included the surrender of all the Band’s reserve lands except IR 151 and 151A, on the grounds that “[t]here has been no work done on any of them for a considerable number of years, and if they are surrendered the Indians will still have ample land remaining in Reserves 151 and 151A., which contain 3,520 and 5,120 acres respectively of good farming land.”

At the same time that Laird suggested the surrender of the Band’s reserves located along the north bank of the Peace River, J.B. Early, the local farmer owning lands adjacent to IR 151E, had submitted to the Department a proposal to lease that reserve on the following terms:

> I want very much to consummate a lease on the Testawitch ranch [IR 151E] adjoining the old Carson farm.
> 
> I have the consent of the entire Testawitch family to a lease of this place comprising approximately a half section.
> 
> I remember that you stated that there were others besides the Testawitch family that are interested in this place, known locally as the “Duncan Ranch”. However, “Chief” Samuel T. seems to think he is in control, subject however to the ratification of your department. So far as I can learn, those Indians outside the “Duncans” are in the minority, and not in position to block the matter, and so long as they get their share of the lease money, they would undoubtedly be very glad it was leased. I would like to arrange at least a 5 yr. lease. Ten yrs would suit me better. Then I would put in an irrigation system and make this place very valuable. I would also clear up all the small brush land and make a beautiful farm of it.... The Indians have all moved away from the river.
> 
> You gave your consent to let me put in 15 acres last year, which I would have done had it rained so I could have plowed it. But I do not wish to incur the expense of putting an irrigation system on the place without a 5 yr. lease or longer, I would pay $2.00 per acre cash rent for the 75 acres that was once plowed up, now growing up to weeds and rose bushes. After 5 years free use of any land cleared and broken up by me would thereafter pay $2.00 cash rent for that.... Of course the old Chief and many of the family is dead, and the rest seem to have no interest in operating the place. Still they refuse to sell this river home ranch. Under the circumstances it seems to me that your department would be glad to have the place handled in a systematic way.
> 
> I have made a good road across the creek above the house and bridged the stream.

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[^67]: Harold Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, January 23, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 150).
Despite the detailed nature of this proposal – which included proposed rental rates and indicated that Early had discussed the proposition with certain members of the Band – Early’s request remained unanswered until he enlisted the aid of his Member of Parliament, D.M. Kennedy, on April 10, 1923, to make inquiries on his behalf:

Adjoining this tract of land [Early’s own land] on the east is a small Indian Reserve which the old chief Testauitch (Duncan) used as his home until his death a few years ago. The place is now practically abandoned, the fences all torn down for firewood, their farm tools scattered and all is going to rack. The Duncan boys will not farm the place.

I have the consent of resident and remaining “Breeds” to rent this Dincan [sic] farm for a period of years, and I accordingly applied to Agent Laird at Grouard to get consent of the Indian Department. Mr. Laird referred the matter to the head office at Ottawa, I have never heard from them.

I have offered to give $2.00 per acre cash rent for the 75 acres under cultivation. The place is very foul with mustard and wild oats. But in raising dairy feed for the cattle I could clean it up.

Would you kindly intercede for me and see if the Department would grant me a lease on this tract. The Indians do not wish to sell it neither will they farm it. My Jersey herd now numbers close to a hundred head, and we could use this tract to good advantage. If I could get a 5 year lease I would put the place under irrigation and make a valuable place of it.69

Kennedy forwarded his constituent’s request to the Department on April 23, 1923.70 After reviewing the issue, Deputy Superintendent General Scott responded the next day:

I have received your letter of the 23rd instant inclosing copy of one received from J.B. Early, of Peace River, Alberta, who wishes to secure a lease of a small Indian reserve in the Shaftesbury Settlement.


The Department proposes endeavouring to secure a surrender of the reserve in question as soon as possible, and in the event of the necessary release being obtained, Mr. Early’s application will be given consideration. The surrender documents will be forwarded to Agent Laird very shortly, and Mr. Early will be communicated with in the matter later on.\footnote{D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to D.M. Kennedy, MP, April 24, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 163).}

Scott’s letter did not specify whether the proposed surrender was intended for reason of sale or lease. As noted above, the merits of surrendering for sale the smaller Duncan’s Band reserves located along the northern bank of the Peace River had been discussed by Department officials during the previous months. The ambiguity of Scott’s response from April 24, 1924, does not necessarily suggest a finding that the same course of action – i.e., a surrender for sale – was being considered for IR 151E at this later date.

Nor does the record reveal whether the Department seriously considered the merits of entering into a lease agreement with Early as a means of generating revenue for the Duncan’s Band. Given Scott’s perfunctory response to the proposal, it is reasonable to infer that the Department was not favourably disposed towards the option of leasing IR 151E. Certainly, there is no evidence that the Band was ever approached by the Department – despite Early’s repeated assurances that his request to lease IR 151E met with the approval of some or all of the members of the Duncan’s Band.

It is interesting to note, however, that, during the same time period, similar leasing proposals involving other First Nations within the Lesser Slave Lake Agency had been considered by the Department and brought to the attention of those bands. The 1919 exchange of letters between Scott and Minister of the Interior Arthur Meighen confirms that certain reserve lands in the district – excluding lands reserved for the Duncan’s Band – had previously been leased for grazing purposes.\footnote{D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to Arthur Meighen, SGIA, June 13, 1919, NA, RG 10, vol. 7535, file 26131-3 (ICC Documents, p. 100): “Commissioner Graham has arranged to lease certain areas for grazing purposes, but none of the reserves mentioned in this list.”} Furthermore, during the early 1920s, requests for grazing leases on reserve lands near Fairview, Alberta, were frequently received at departmental headquarters. For example, in 1920, the Private
Secretary to the Minister of the Interior wrote to the Department of Indian Affairs on behalf of a constituent to inquire into a lease of Beaver IR 152A:73

Mr. H.F. Robertson, of Waterhole, Alta., a returned soldier, writes with reference to a small Indian reserve on the banks of the Peace River in Township 80, Range 3, West 6th. Mr Robertson states that he has leased all the lands around this reserve, and would like, if possible, to obtain a lease of the reserve, which he claims has never been used for anything as all the Indians of that particular tribe are now deceased. Please advise whether or not the lease could be granted, and, if so, on what terms.74

On receipt of this request, Scott reported to the Superintendent General that the reserve in question – IR 152A, containing 260 acres – “was laid out in 1905, under the terms of Treaty 8, for Neepee Chief, a Beaver Indian, who is now dead.” Scott assured the Minister that, if he wished, the Department “might arrange with the heirs of Neepee Chief to lease this land.”75 Subsequently, Agent Laird was authorized to negotiate such an arrangement, but he reported that the Beaver Indians were not interested in leasing their land, preferring instead to sell.76 Robertson’s lease proposal was consequently given no further attention.

Another proposal involving the 15,000-acre Beaver IR 152 was submitted on behalf of farmers residing near the villages of Waterhole, Dunvegan, and Fairview, Alberta, to D.M. Kennedy, their Member of Parliament:

I [A.D. Madden], backed by some three hundred settlers of the district, wish to apply for a grazing lease on the whole of the Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152, which contains about thirty-six sections of good pasture lands, with watering facilities. You are acquainted with this tract of land, and also know that it is not used even by the Indians, while the country is in great need of this. It is very handy to the

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73 Beaver IR 152A was located close to the village of Dunvegan, approximately 50 km southwest of Duncan’s IR 151A near Brownvale. See map of claim area for more detail.

74 Private Secretary, Minister of the Interior, to D.C. Scott, DSGIA, April 6, 1920, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).


whole district, and as I am located in the centre between the two branches of the reserve [IR 152 & 152A] I would be in a good position to look after the cattle entrusted to my care.

The Indians from this reserve have expressed their willingness to have it leased, as they seldom if ever stay on it. If necessary I can get a signed list of both the Indians interested or the settlers who wish me to try and obtain this lease.

If you can get this through it will be very much appreciated and will be a boon to the whole district. It seems too bad to have such splendid pasture right in the centre of the district, going to waste and at the same time the farmers forced to go out of the raising of cattle for lack of those very facilities.

... This of course would be on the usual terms of .04 cts [sic] per acre and for from five to ten years.\(^{77}\)

Kennedy forwarded this request to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs on May 4, 1922.\(^{78}\) As a result, the Department requested a detailed report on the issue from Laird.\(^{79}\) On May 16, 1922, Laird informed Commissioner Graham of his confidence that a surrender of Beaver IR 152 could be arranged:

I beg to report that the Western third of Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152 is not used at all by the Indians and might be leased for grazing purposes, but as it is a pretty fine piece of agricultural land, it would be a pity to tie it up in such leases except in short terms.

I think a surrender of this portion of the reserve could be obtained without difficulty as a number of the Indians have expressed their willingness to part with some of their lands.

There are 24 square miles in the reserve, and 138 Indians interested in it although less than 50 habitually reside there, the greater number living on Grande Prairie.\(^{80}\)


Graham’s opinion regarding the merit of the lease proposal, however, differed markedly from that expressed by Laird. In a letter dated May 12, 1922, Graham advised Scott of his reservations about the Department’s ability to administer such an arrangement:

In the past no land has been leased by the Department in that part of the country, and it is for the Department to decide whether it would be a wise plan to do so now. In my opinion to do so would be unwise as we have no organization in that district by which lessees could be controlled.81

Graham expressed similar sentiments on May 25, 1922, when, as requested, he forwarded Laird’s report on the issue to Ottawa. On this occasion, however, Graham also proposed terms that the Department might want to incorporate should it decide, despite his opposition, to proceed with leasing:

I enclose, herewith, copy of a reply received from Mr. Laird dated the 16th instant, and you will note that the Acting Agent states he thinks no difficulty will be incurred in securing a surrender. In my letter of the 12th I pointed out that we have no organization in that district by which lessees could be controlled, but the matter of securing a surrender, and leasing this land is one which I leave to the discretion of the Department only making a suggestion that we should be paid at least ten cents (.10¢) [sic] per acre as a rental, and if a surrender is taken it would be preferable to lease the whole area under one lease with the usual cancellation clauses inserted.82

Before a decision could be made or instructions issued by the Department, a second lease proposal was submitted by W.R. Robertson, a sheep rancher from Vanrena, Alberta, who sought to “obtain a lease of 1000 acres on the Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152, for a period of ten years.” Noting that “[t]he Chief claims he only has authority to lease for three years,” Robertson implied that he had been in contact with some of the band members residing on the reserve at the time and that


they may have been interested in the proposal.\textsuperscript{83} Regardless, the issue remained unaddressed for a period of months until yet another lease proposal was submitted to Ottawa by James Wylie of Waterhole, Alberta.\textsuperscript{84}

Reporting on the recent flurry of local interest in the reserve, Graham indicated on January 18, 1923, that he would “be glad to receive the Department’s instructions.”\textsuperscript{85} On March 29, 1923, the Department provided Laird with the necessary surrender documents, subject to the following instructions:

Inclosed are the necessary documents for the purpose of submission to the Beaver Band of Indians, with a view to obtaining a surrender for leasing purposes of approximately the western third of the Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152. In this connection I would direct your attention to [the] letter addressed by you to Commissioner Graham and dated the 16th of May last year, in which you stated you were of the opinion that a surrender of this portion of the reserve could be obtained without difficulty.

I am also inclosing for your information and guidance copy of instructions to Agents in taking surrenders, and have to call your attention particularly to the requirement of furnishing a voters’ list showing the number voting for this surrender and the number voting against.\textsuperscript{86}

Laird submitted a report to Ottawa on September 10, 1923, outlining his efforts “in regard the surrender of a portion of the Beaver Reserve, No. 152,” from which it can be concluded that his attempts to arrange a surrender meeting during the summer of 1923 met with little success:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{83} W.E. Robertson to Department of Indian Affairs, July 11, 1922, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} See W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to Secretary, DIA, January 18, 1923, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2). Note that, although this document is dated “January 18, 1922” on its face, the chronology of correspondence referred to within it reveals that the actual date should have been January 18, 1923.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to Secretary, DIA, January 18, 1923, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).
  \item \textsuperscript{86} D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to H. Laird, Indian Agent, March 29, 1923, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2). The “instructions to Agents in taking surrenders” referred to in this correspondence are likely those drafted by Scott himself and dated May 16, 1914.
\end{itemize}
I have the honor to report in regard to the surrender of a portion of the Beaver Reserve, No. 152, that on receipt of the papers I made arrangements to take surrender of this land from the Band on Treaty day, July 31st.

In connection with this I forwarded the necessary notices to Mr. Duncan MacDonald, who has interpreted for me for some years, at Dunvegan, and instructed him to have the notices posted at least eight days before the above date, (the 21st) [sic] and to remain on the Reserve and to explain to each voter the meaning of the surrender to lease for grazing purposes....

On my arrival at Fort St. John to pay Treaty on July 18th, I found eight Indians, belonging to the Dunvegan Reserve. These had no notice of the meeting called on their Reserve, as they had been hunting west of the Clear Hills. They came to Fort St. Johns [sic] to receive their Treaty money.

Consequently, when I reached the Dunvegan Beaver Reserve I found but three Indians there, who were more immediately interested in the surrender, and I was therefore unable to take a vote....

It will hardly be possible to arrange for another meeting until Treaty time next year. 87

The record reveals that Laird’s attempts to arrange a surrender meeting during the summer of 1924 were similarly unsuccessful and that the proposed surrender of Beaver IR 152 was postponed until a later date, in anticipation that a majority of the Band could be assembled at such time to attend a surrender meeting. 88 The Department received another request in December 1924 for third-party grazing privileges on Beaver IR 152A, but the lease initiative in general had lost its lustre for Department officials. They postponed it indefinitely in February 1925:

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, together with inclosures, with reference to the effort recently made by Mr. Agent Laird to secure a surrender of portion of Beaver Reserve, No. 152. I think the matter might be allowed to rest for the present, and no further attempt made to secure a release of any portion of the reserve unless some renewal of interest in the matter occurs. 89


89 J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, February 3, 1925, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).
Although the Department of Indian Affairs never concluded lease agreements for IR 152 and 152A between the Beaver Band and interested third parties, the foregoing historical record amply demonstrates that the Department considered the possibility of leasing reserve lands as a viable means of generating revenue for the benefit of the Band. Nevertheless, the record also reveals a preference by Department officials to obtain surrenders of reserve lands for sale where those lands were not being used by band members for farming.

**Lesser Slave Lake Agency: Prelude to the Surrenders, 1920-27**

The proximity of reserve lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency to thriving frontier settlements including Peace River, Grimshaw, Berwyn, the Shaftesbury Settlement, Fairview, Waterhole, Dunvegan, Spirit River, and Kinuso meant that pressure for the surrender of these reserve lands was inevitable, particularly as the availability of Crown lands in the area diminished. On the many occasions when private individuals asked about acquiring reserve lands in the region, the Department generally responded that the lands in question had not been surrendered and were therefore not available for settlement purposes. A letter dated April 30, 1925, typifies the position maintained by the Department on these occasions:

> I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of recent date, inquiring whether there was any prospect of certain small Indian Reserves north of the Peace River and in the vicinity of Waterhole, Berwyn and Peace River being made available for sale to settlers for farming purposes.

> The Department is not disposed to consider such disposition of these reserves at the present time, and in any event they could not be sold unless and until surrendered for that purpose by the Indians holding them. Doubtless there must be considerable Dominion lands in that district available for settlement purposes, and in the interests of your clients you might possibly make some satisfactory arrangement with the Department of the Interior, but for the present at least the Indian lands to which you refer are not available for purchase.\(^{90}\)

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When similar requests were advanced by municipal governments or by provincial or federal politicians, however, the response from Ottawa was noticeably different, especially if the inquiries were submitted for reasons of urban and/or economic development. Such inquiries generally received greater attention from the Department and often resulted in surrender discussions being held with the band concerned.

The submissions of the First Nation in this inquiry challenge the validity of the 1928 surrender, in part based on the alleged similarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the surrender of IR 152 by the neighbouring Beaver Band and the failed attempt to secure a surrender of reserve lands belonging to the Swan River Band. Clearly, Canada sought to obtain surrenders from all three Bands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency within one tour of the area by representatives of the Department of Indian Affairs, and the Beaver surrender has recently become the subject of a specific claim that has been accepted for negotiation by Canada. Although the formal basis for that claim has not been placed in evidence before the Commission, counsel for the Duncan’s First Nation points to evidence that, first, the surrender was taken in meetings with two or more small groups of Beaver Band members, and, second, two of the alleged participants at these meetings – including one who appears to have signed the surrender document – were dead before the meetings took place. If true, these facts would run afoul of section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act and undermine the validity of the Beaver surrender. Counsel argues that, since the Beaver surrender was taken by the same individuals who allegedly met with the Duncan’s Band, the propriety of the Duncan’s surrender must be similarly doubtful. Therefore, before dealing with the particular circumstances of the Duncan’s surrender, the Commission will set forth some of the details arising from Canada’s surrender discussions with these other two Bands to provide a broader context within which to consider the surrender by the Duncan’s Band.

Events Preceding the Swan River Band Surrender Meetings
Located just south of Lesser Slave Lake on the main trunk of the Northern Alberta Railway, the town of Kinuso, Alberta, was constructed on reserve lands surrendered from Swan River IR 150E in

1916. Upon founding, the town itself was more or less surrounded by reserve lands that remained held for the benefit of the Band. As such, it was foreseeable that local interest in the Swan River reserve would present itself as the town and surrounding settlement expanded. For instance, in March 1920, a prospective soldier-settler from Smith, Alberta, wrote to ask the Department of Indian Affairs to “kindly inform [him] when the Dominion Government intends to open the Indian Reserves of Swan River and Drift Pile [sic] Alta. for Soldiers Settlement.” As noted previously, an inquiry submitted by a single settler was not likely to persuade the Department to initiate surrender proceedings with a band. The Department’s reaction tended to be more purposeful when proposals of this kind were put forward by political stakeholders.

The first instance of political pressure for the surrender of Swan River Band reserve lands after 1920 was submitted in December 1922, when J.L. Côté, the provincial Member of the Legislative Assembly for Athabasca-Grouard, wrote to the Department on behalf of the residents of Kinuso:

I am enclosing a letter from one of my Constituents Mr. Wilfrid L. McKillop of Kinuso who desires on behalf of himself and the other residents to have the Indian Reserve at Swan River opened for settlers.

I realize it would be a great benefit, both for the village of Kinuso, which is actually built on the Reserve, and for the settlements adjoining, if this could be done.

Following Côté’s effort, the residents of Kinuso forwarded to the Minister of the Interior a petition containing the signatures of over 100 residents, farmers, and business persons from Kinuso and

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92 The members of the Swan River Band are descendants of a larger group formerly known as the “Lesser Slave Lake Indians.” These individuals entered Treaty 8 in 1899 under Chief Kinoosayoo and were thereafter divided into the Driftpile, Grouard, Sawridge, Sucker Creek, and Swan River Bands.


94 A former surveyor with the Department of the Interior, Jean-Léon Côté was elected to the Alberta provincial legislature in 1909. He was appointed to the provincial Cabinet in 1918, and eventually served as Minister of Mines and Minister of Railways and Telephones. He was appointed to the federal Senate in 1923. See The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Edmonton: Huruf Publishers, 1988), 1:524.

On receipt of the petition, the Minister of the Interior requested details about the proposal, to which Scott responded on February 20, 1923:

With respect to the attached correspondence received by the Minister from Hon. J.L. Côté of Edmonton, I would suggest that we forward the copies to Commissioner Graham, of Regina, for his report.

The communication refers to the question of opening up for settlement purposes of the Indian Reserve at Swan River, which action, of course, could not be taken without first obtaining a surrender of the reserve from the Indians. Commissioner Graham is doubtless familiar with local conditions, and before dealing with the matter definitely, it would be better to obtain his views and recommendations.

By April 1923, D.M. Kennedy, the federal Member of Parliament for West Edmonton, had also inquired into the surrender of portions of the Beaver and Swan River reserves. In a letter to Kennedy dated April 27, 1923, Scott responded:

Where reserves contain larger areas than are required for Indian use, and when surrounding settlement warrants such action, it is the policy of the Department to negotiate for a surrender of the excess areas, in order that the lands, if released, may be sold for agricultural purposes. It is essential, however, in such cases, to review local conditions carefully, as it would be a matter of dissatisfaction on the part of the Indians should large areas be released and remain unsold. The Department invariably endeavors to conduct a sale of such lands as soon as possible after surrender, as the Indians quite naturally, expect to obtain a substantial payment without delay.

The initiative in such matters usually rests with the Department, and is based upon general conditions and the prospective demand for additional agricultural lands. I quite agree with your view, that when conditions warrant, it is desirable that proper and beneficial use should be made of Indian lands not required for reserve purposes, but before obtaining a surrender and listing the lands for sale, the Department should feel assured that a considerable portion at least can be disposed of almost

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immediately. Crop conditions and the general agricultural situation are governing factors in this regard.

As a matter of fact, at present Commissioner Graham, of Regina, is acting upon instructions from the Department to obtain a surrender of twenty sections of the Swan River Reserve, and we anticipate that a release of this area will be secured shortly. Similar action is contemplated with respect to the western third of the Beaver Reserve, which, I understand, contains some very good agricultural land. In both cases Departmental action will be expedited in every possible way.  

Before Graham submitted his report, however, the Department received correspondence from the Chief of the Swan River Band stating that neither he nor his headmen supported the various proposals to surrender portions of the Band’s reserve lands. In clear terms, the Chief outlined his position on the issue of surrender:

I am told that some white people are going secretly through my reserves with a petition and trying my people, to sign, on purpose of having them abandoning the Swan Reserve and consenting to sell it.

Neither I, the Chief, nor my headmen, though we should, I think [illegible] to be consulted, have been asked our opinion about it [illegible] they go to [the] weak-minded to make by the number of names impression on the Depart[ment].

So that you can judge the injustice of such petition, I wish to [have] you know that I am absolutely against the cession of any of our R[eserve] and therefore that for all the gold in the world, I cannot consent [to] see the Swan River Reserve be sold and the reasons, in my opinion, [illegible] quite serious.

At first, the number of children on my reserve, instead of dec[reasing], increase; so that the need of land is not less at present than before.

Secondly, I admit that in the past, the principal way of living has been fishing and hunting; but in a very near future, it will be [illegible] for it and so the young ones will have to rely on the culture [illegible] need good lands.

Although certain key words in this document have been lost to the ravages of time, it seems clear enough that the Chief considered that the future of the Swan River Band lay in its reserve lands.

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On May 1, 1923, Graham submitted his report to Scott with regard to the proposed surrender, including a detailed blueprint of the quarter and fractional sections that Laird had “suggest[ed] might be surrendered for sale” to settlers. Despite the opposition previously expressed by the Chief of the Swan River Band, Scott instructed Graham to proceed with surrender negotiations:

The necessary documents of surrender to which a blueprint is also attached are inclosed herewith, for submission to the Indians at the first convenient opportunity. With regard to the fractions of land on both sides of the railway, and adjacent to the Town of Kinuso, these have been included in the description for sale as you are of the opinion that it would not be advisable to lease them, as recommended by the Agent [Laird].

Although it is likely that Laird was informed of this decision before his departure to make treaty payments in May or June, by the end of 1923 Graham had to report that Laird had not been successful in his attempt to assemble the requisite majority of band members to hold a meeting to vote on the surrender proposal. Despite this failure, Graham assured his superiors that the issue would be addressed during the summer of 1924, when Laird would again be meeting with the Band to make treaty payments.

Laird’s subsequent attempts to gather a quorum of the Swan River Band’s voting members were also unsuccessful, however. As Graham reported in May 1926:

In reply to Department letter 29,131-5 of 17th. instant I beg to say the last letter I received from the Acting Agent at Grouard [Laird] with reference to the proposed surrender of the Swan River Reserve No. 150E was dated 9th. January 1925. In that letter he stated that he could not get enough members of the Band together, even on Treaty Day, to hold a valid meeting but that he would attempt to do so at the earliest
possible time which would be in May (1925). I have now written to enquire as to whether the meeting was held or not and if it was, with what result."103

It is interesting to note that, in concluding his report, Graham informed officials in Ottawa that he had “further instructed the Acting Indian Agent ... to make a serious attempt to get the Indians together and secure the surrender.”104 Despite Graham’s commitment, it is evident that Laird was not able to arrange a surrender meeting during the treaty payment ceremonies in either 1926 or 1927. On December 15, 1927, nearly five years after the initiative had been proposed by J.L. Côté, Scott once again instructed Graham to have Laird continue his attempts:

I have received your letter of the 10th instant ... stating that Agent Laird has not yet been able to obtain the desired information with regard to the proposed surrender of the Swan River Reserve No. 150 E. The circumstances are, of course, somewhat exceptional, but Mr. Laird should be advised to continue his efforts in the hope and expectation that at Treaty time next year he may be able to gather a sufficient number of the Indians together to discuss the matter in detail, and ascertain the wishes of the majority. Kindly request the Agent to keep the matter in mind.105

Thereafter, the Department’s efforts to obtain surrenders of reserve lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency – including portions of the Swan River, Beaver, and Duncan’s Band reserves – took on a more coordinated form. These efforts will be reviewed below following consideration of the events immediately preceding the surrenders of portions of the Beaver and Duncan’s reserves.

**Events Preceding the Surrender of Beaver Reserve IR 152 and 152A**

During the spring of 1926, E.J. Martin, Secretary-Treasurer for the Municipal District of Fairview, Alberta, approached the Department to obtain “five acres from the south west corner of Indian Reserve No. 152” to straighten a dangerous section of highway and to secure a supply of gravel for

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construction purposes. On receipt of this request, Indian Affairs’ Secretary J.D. McLean asked Laird whether “such a surrender could be readily obtained” and, if so, the price at which the Agent thought the land could be sold. Laird responded:

I beg to report that a surrender of the land cannot be obtained easily at the present time.

Three-fifths, at least, of the members of the Band do not reside on the Reserve, but live at some distance from it – south and west of Grande Prairie.

At present the majority of the Indians are out hunting.

I will not be able to meet the Dunvegan Beaver Indians until they come in to be paid at Treaty time, June 26th.

Those Indians who are intimately interested in the surrender will not be in until later. These I will meet when I pay them on August 16th, at Grande Prairie.

I cannot understand why any main highway from Peace River (Crossing) to Grande Prairie, (which must cross the Peace River at Dunvegan), should come nearer than two miles to the Reserve No. 152.

The expense of taking this surrender will be out of all proportion to the present value of land required.

Despite Laird’s reservations, McLean informed Martin that the Department would eventually deal with the municipality’s request, although it would be “some time before the question of surrender for the purpose of sale [could] be brought to their [the Band’s] attention.”

However, in light of the time constraints imposed by the seasonal nature of road construction, Martin urged the Department to reconsider the late-summer time frame suggested in its initial response:

The Council desire me to urge for a speedy settlement of this matter. We have discussed the matter with the chief and a number of the Indians and they have

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106 E.J. Martin, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Fairview, to Indian Affairs Department [sic], May 18, 1926, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).


expressed their willingness to agree to the sale and it would appear that they must be practically all now living on the reserve. When treaty money was recently paid to them I went to the reserve but Mr. Laird was not present and Mr. Schofield informed me he was unable to do anything.

As stated in my letter of May 18th last, the Council would like to construct the roadway this summer if possible and we shall have the services of a surveyor who might not again be available for a considerable period, under which circumstances I would urge for an early decision.\textsuperscript{110}

Given the apparent receptiveness of the Band to the proposal and the time constraints identified by the municipality, the Department prepared a “Description for Surrender” and surrender forms in July 1926.\textsuperscript{111} The record does not disclose, however, whether Laird received these documents or any instructions to initiate surrender discussions with the Band.

In fact, the matter remained unaddressed until April 25, 1927, when Martin resubmitted the municipality’s proposal.\textsuperscript{112} Martin indicated that he had “received a letter from Hon. H. Greenfield in December last [1926], in which he informed me that a portion of this Indian reserve might be offered for sale in the near future.”\textsuperscript{113} The involvement of Herbert Greenfield, President of the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts, former Vice President of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), and former Premier of Alberta,\textsuperscript{114} is evidence that, by 1927, interest in Indian reserve lands in the Peace River District was no longer confined to local groups or municipal governments and had attained new levels of political importance.

\textsuperscript{110} E.J. Martin, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Fairview, to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, June 28, 1926, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).


\textsuperscript{112} E.J. Martin, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Fairview, to J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, April 25, 1927, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).

\textsuperscript{113} E.J. Martin, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Fairview, to J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, April 25, 1927, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).

\textsuperscript{114} Herbert Greenfield was Premier of Alberta from August 1921 until November 1925, when he resigned from office and was succeeded by fellow United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) MLA J.E. Brownlee. See The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1988), 2:937.
Comments made by J.C. Caldwell of Indian Affairs’ Lands and Timber Branch support the same conclusion. Writing on May 16, 1927, Caldwell endorsed Laird’s position that the proposed surrender of five acres from Beaver IR 152 would cost more money than the revenue that would be generated by the sale of such a small parcel of land. For this reason, he recommended that the proposal submitted by the Municipal District of Fairview be declined for the time being and that the municipality “be advised that it is not convenient for the Department to attempt to secure a surrender at the present time.” He concluded by noting that the lands in question were then being considered with a view to more widespread development:

This Reserve No. 152, together with certain other small reserves in that district, may possibly be surrendered later for settlement purposes, providing suitable arrangements can be made with the owners, and subject to your approval, I would recommend that the present application be allowed to remain in abeyance.

A handwritten notation on Caldwell’s memorandum of May 16 confirms that Scott agreed with this recommendation.

Accordingly, the Department informed Martin that it “was not disposed to proceed further with the matter” owing to the expense involved, but that the proposal would be entertained at a future date should circumstances change:

It may be that in the near future an attempt will be made to obtain the approval of the Indians to a surrender of the whole reserve, in order that it may be sold for settlement purposes, and if such action is taken, the application of your Municipality for this particular parcel will receive consideration.

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Interest in the proposed surrender and sale of Beaver IR 152 escalated during the fall of 1927 after the issue received exposure in the local newspapers.\(^{118}\) Perhaps by coincidence, it was at this time that Laird submitted a report to the Department noting that the Beaver Band had also expressed an interest in pursuing the issue:

> 
> I beg to report that, when paying Annuities, to the Dunvegan Beaver Indians, July 13th, last, the matter of a surrender of Reserve No. 152 was discussed.
> The Indians interested, expressed their willingness to surrender, all of the above Reserve, providing, the terms of surrender are satisfactory. In part lieu of, they wish to have set apart for them, 6 sections, situated in Township 87 Ranges 5 and 6 west of the 6th, Meridian.
> As I was unable to personally inspect the particular portion of land which they require, although knowing the country generally, I sent Mr. Duncan McDonald with Chief Neepee Pierre, (Pelly Law), who were accompanied by Mr. John C. Knott, as interpreter, to stake out and report upon the land desired.
> Mr. McDonald’s report and sketch map is herewith enclosed.
> I beg also to report, that the Chief, Neepee Pierre, (Pelly Law), is also willing to surrender reserve No. 152 A. (Part of Green Island flat), which was surveyed for the late Neepee Chief and family, of whom he is the only surviving heir.\(^{119}\)

Having received notice that the Band was interested in surrendering reserve land in exchange for other land, the Department was thereafter free to initiate more detailed surrender negotiations.

As noted above, the efforts to obtain surrenders of reserve lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency took on a more coordinated form in December 1927. These efforts will be reviewed below following consideration of the events immediately preceding the 1928 surrender by the Duncan’s Band.

**Events Preceding the Surrender of the Duncan’s Band Reserves**

In July 1925, Secretary-Treasurer E.L. Lamont of the Municipal District of Peace proposed to the Department of Indian Affairs that several Indian reserves in the Peace River District, referred to


\(^{119}\) H. Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, October 20, 1927, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 1 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).
collectively by Lamont as “Indian Reserve No. 151,” be surrendered and sold to permit additional settlement:

The above Indian Reserves situated within the boundaries of this Municipal District have been unoccupied for many years and the few Indians left who were attached thereto have expressed a wish to surrender this land in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act.

For this purpose the remnant of the tribe have agreed to gather on Indian Reserve No. 151 A on the 10th August prox, which is the date arranged by your Dept. for the payment of their treaty allowance.

As all the Indians interested are scattered over the country and it is difficult to get them together I would respectfully suggest that you instruct Mr. Harold Laird your Agent at Grouard, to have the necessary documents with him on that date, so that the assignment might be made in the proper manner.120

Lamont’s statement that “the few remaining Indians left who were attached thereto have expressed a wish to surrender this land” suggests that a number of band members had publicly declared their willingness to surrender portions of their reserve holdings. Accordingly, on July 15, 1925, the Department instructed Laird to meet with the Band to discuss the proposal. A month later, he reported the results of those discussions:

I met most of the Indians interested in this reserve at Treaty Payment time, the 10th inst. and the question of selling it, and the other small Reserves belonging to the Band, was mentioned.

I gathered that they are willing to sell.

This Reserve is used by them as a camping place except during the winter months. Part of it consists of fair agricultural land, the balance is sand mixed with gravel.

At the present time land values in the district are extremely low.121

120 E.L. Lamont, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Peace, to Secretary, DIA, July 7, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 174).

Based on this information, Indian Affairs’ Officer in Charge of the Lands and Timber Branch recommended that the Acting Deputy Superintendent General should refrain from proceeding with the surrender as proposed until land prices increased:

Recently the Secretary of the Municipal District of Peace, in the Province of Alberta, wrote the Department with respect to the question of surrender and sale of Indian Reserve No. 151. While it appears that the Indians are willing to surrender this particular reserve for sale, in view of the fact that the Agent reports that at the present time land values in the district are extremely low, I think it would be inadvisable to proceed further with the matter. There are no doubt plenty of other available lands in that district for settlement purposes, and unless and until the reserve property can be sold to advantage, I think the question of surrender should remain in abeyance.

Accordingly, A.F. MacKenzie, the Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary of Indian Affairs, advised Lamont that,

with reference to Indian Reserve No. 151, acting Indian Agent Laird has recently reported that the Indians would be agreeable to sell this land, but the Department is not disposed to proceed further with the matter, in view of the fact that the present current land values in that district are very low. Should land prices increase to some extent in the near future, the Department would be prepared to give the matter further consideration.

The issue of surrender was revisited some months later when local interests approached the Minister of the Interior with yet another request to open up Indian lands within the Peace River District. In reporting on the circumstances at Peace River, Deputy Superintendent General Scott informed Charles Stewart, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and Minister of the Interior, that he was not satisfied with the timing of the proposed surrender:

I return herewith certain documents which were handed to you by Rev. Mr. Macdonald, of Peace River, and with reference particularly to the question of opening

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122 Officer in Charge, Lands and Timber Branch, DIA, to Acting Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, September 2, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 179).

up for settlement certain Indian Reserves in the Municipal [D]istrict of Peace, No. 857.

The Reserves which are the subject of the attached correspondence are Nos. 151, 151A, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, and 151F, only the first two named being of any considerable size. It is true that these reserves are not utilized to advantage by the Indian owners, and possibly an agreement to surrender them for sale could be obtained if the matter was brought before the attention of the Indians. About a year ago Agent Laird reported to the Department that, when making treaty payments, he had discussed with the Indians the question of surrendering Reserve No. 151, which ... immediately adjoins the Village of Berwyn, and the Indians appeared to be willing to grant a surrender. However, as the Agent reported that land prices in that vicinity were extremely low, the Department considered it inadvisable to proceed further with the matter. It seems to me that if land prices are very low in this vicinity, plenty of farming lands must be available to purchase, and it would not be to the advantage of the Indian owners to dispose of their reserves at the present time.124

With this memorandum, consideration of the surrender proposal was once again placed in abeyance by the Deputy Superintendent General.

Notwithstanding this decision, Laird discussed the surrender proposal with the Band at treaty payment time during the summer of 1927. In his report of the July 14, 1927, meeting, Laird suggested that the impetus for reconsidering surrender may have come from certain members of the Band:

I beg to report that, at a meeting of Duncan’s Band, July 14th, 1927, on Reserve No. 151, I was requested to take up the matter with the Department, regarding the surrendering of several reserves, belonging to the Indians of the above named Band, as follows.—

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>3520.00 Acres</th>
<th>151. B.</th>
<th>294.00</th>
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<td>151. B.</td>
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<td>151. C.</td>
<td>126.56</td>
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<td>151. D.</td>
<td>91.65</td>
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<td>151. E.</td>
<td>118.68</td>
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<td>151. F.</td>
<td>131.02</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>151. G. (Approximate).</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>151. H.</td>
<td>160.00</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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Regarding Reserve No. 151.K. (surveyed for Wm. McKenzie and family), I beg to say, this land was not mentioned, as Mrs. Wm. McKenzie, widow of the late Wm. McKenzie, who is the only survivor, was not present at the meeting.

I also beg to say that, if these Reserves should be surrendered, the Indians of the Band, would still retain, Reserve No. 151.A. containing an area of 5120.00 acres.\(^\text{125}\)

J.D. McLean, the Secretary and Assistant Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, replied on November 23, 1927:

Referring to your letter of the 21st ultimo, wherein you state that the members of Duncan’s Band are apparently disposed to consider the surrender of a number of their reserves, given in your letter as Nos. 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, and 151H.

The Department is prepared to give consideration to the question of a surrender of these reserves for sale and settlement, but before proceeding further, it will be necessary to ascertain what terms and conditions the Band would be prepared to accept. With the exception, of course, of Reserve No. 151, the others are very small in area, and would not be worth very much. However, these could, together with 151, be offered for sale by public auction, if surrendered, and it might be that a reasonable price could be obtained for these lands if sold for farming purposes. That would depend, of course, upon the demand for such property in that particular district.

If the Indians are prepared to surrender these reserves, and to permit the Department to offer them for sale by public auction at some opportune time in the near future, we are prepared to go ahead with the matter. On the other hand, it may be that they have in mind some upset price or other condition which they would insist upon before granting a surrender. Your further report in the matter in order to clear up this particular phase of the situation is desired.\(^\text{126}\)

Laird submitted a second report in December 1927, on this occasion speaking directly to the specific questions raised by McLean:

Referring to Department letter of November 23rd, 1927. No. 27,131-8.

\(^{125}\) H. Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, October 21, 1927, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 186).

\(^{126}\) J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, to Harold Laird, Acting Indian Agent, November 23, 1927, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 187).
I beg to state that at the meeting of the Band last July, the members interested, asked me what terms the Government would offer. In my reply I told them that I would submit the matter to the Department.

The land in the vicinity is rapidly increasing in value and from sales made during the past summer, there is no doubt that a good price may be obtained for these Indian lands.

I would suggest that the Indians be offered 25% of the net proceeds of the sales and yearly interest on the balance thereof.\textsuperscript{127}

Laird’s assessment of rising land values in the district seems to be borne out by correspondence dated May 15, 1928, from J.W. Martin, the Acting Commissioner of Dominion Lands, Department of the Interior, to inquiring settler R.A. Bunyan. In that correspondence, which was copied to Indian Affairs, Martin explained to Bunyan that there were no longer significant quantities of unoccupied dominion land in the district:

With further reference to your ... inquiry respecting the possibility of purchasing land in the Peace River District ... I beg to say that no Dominion lands are at present available for purchase except in certain cases where small fractional areas of eighty acres or less are disposed of to the owners or homesteaders of lands lying immediately alongside.\textsuperscript{128}

It appears that, as of December 1927, the Department’s previous hesitance to undertake surrender negotiations with First Nations in the Lesser Slave Lake district until land prices had risen and “reserve property [could] be sold to advantage”\textsuperscript{129} was no longer warranted, owing to the change in circumstances. As we have seen, the Department’s efforts to obtain surrenders of reserve lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency took on a more coordinated format in December 1927.

\textsuperscript{127} Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, December 6, 1927, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 188).


\textsuperscript{129} Officer in Charge, Lands and Timber Branch, to Acting Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, September 2, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 179). A handwritten notation on the face of the document indicates that this memorandum was approved by Indian Affairs’ Assistant Deputy and Secretary J.D. McLean. See also A.F. MacKenzie, Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, to E.L. Lamont, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Peace, September 3, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 180).
Preparations for the Surrender of Reserve Lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency

From the foregoing, it can be seen that, between 1923 and 1927, the Department of Indian Affairs attempted to initiate surrender discussions with the Swan River Band for the surrender of IR 150E, the reserve that surrounded the town of Kinuso. The record further reveals that separate proposals for the surrender of reserve lands belonging to the Beaver and Duncan’s Bands had been submitted by local municipal governments between 1925 and 1926, and that the question of surrender had been discussed with both these Bands during the summer of 1927. The result of these discussions, according to Agent Harold Laird, was that the two Bands were amenable to surrendering substantial amounts of their reserve holdings. Until this time, the Department had addressed separately each proposed surrender. However, after December 1927, it decided to coordinate the three initiatives into one concerted effort to negotiate surrenders from the Duncan’s, Beaver, and Swan River Bands.

During the summer of 1927, Deputy Superintendent General Scott had discussed with members of the Alberta provincial cabinet a proposal for surrendering portions of several reserves belonging to bands in the Lesser Slave Lake/Peace River District. The same proposal was submitted directly to the Superintendent General on December 20, 1927, when the Premier of Alberta, E.J. Brownlee, expressed an interest in the surrender and sale of various reserves in the same district, including the Duncan’s IR 151 and 151A. In a memorandum dated December 29, 1927, to the Superintendent General, Scott considered Premier Brownlee’s proposal:

As requested, I have pleasure in submitting the following information with regard to the Indian Reserves mentioned in letter addressed to you by Hon. E.J. Brownlee, Premier of Alberta, and dated the 20th of this month.

The question of the surrender and sale of the reserves enumerated by Hon. Mr. Brownlee was brought to my attention while in the West last fall, and since returning to Ottawa I have taken the matter up with the local officials for the purpose of securing some first-hand information.

With regard to the Driftpile and Sucker Creek Reserves [of the Swan River Band], I may say that the local Agent, Mr. Harold Laird, of Grouard, reports that, while the Driftpile Reserve contains some excellent farming land, the Sucker Creek Reserve is quite unsuited for farming purposes....

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Hon. Mr. Brownlee also mentions in his letter the reserves at Peace River Crossing, Nos. 151 and 151A, and the Beaver Reserve No. 152. I may say that I have already initiated action with the object of obtaining a release and surrender of a number of these small reserves in the Peace River district. Nine reserves are involved [IR 151 and 151A through 151H]....

It is my intention to endeavor to secure a surrender of all these reserves, with the exception of 151A, which the Indians would in any case desire to retain as their common reserve. I understand from a report received recently from Mr. Laird, the Agent in charge, that the Indians would be willing to surrender these reserves, excepting 151A, providing some reasonable inducement is offered....

When replying to Hon. Mr. Brownlee, you may assure him that these several matters are at present receiving every possible attention by the Department and that it is expected we shall be in a position shortly to place a number at least of these reserves on the market for sale and settlement.\textsuperscript{131}

Eight weeks later, on February 23, 1928, the Department received yet another proposal for the surrender of these reserve lands. In a telegram to the Minister of the Interior, Herbert Greenfield, the former Premier of Alberta and the province’s representative coordinating immigration from the British Isles, suggested that an organization in Britain was contemplating a program of assisted emigration to Alberta and was interested in arranging a block purchase of Indian lands located within the Peace River District:

Group here considering movement of up to thousand families to Alberta, fifty families first year, increased numbers subsequent years. Are interested in Indian Reserve One fifty-one, One fifty-one A, One fifty-two, particularly latter. Parties are familiar with lands. Would you consider sale of one or all of these reserves? for non-profit settlement scheme organized and substantially backed by responsible people in England. Cable approximate price per acre.\textsuperscript{132}

The Department’s main difficulty with the scheme proposed by Greenfield was the stipulation that the lands be sold en bloc for the exclusive benefit of the families involved, since en bloc sales were generally contrary to departmental policy:

\textsuperscript{131} D. C. Scott, DSGIA, to SGIA, December 29, 1927, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, pp. 189-91; ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).

From an administrative standpoint, it would, of course, be decidedly advantageous to dispose of these lands en bloc and for a stated cash consideration, but, on the other hand, there appears to be considerable local demand for the opening of these reserves for settlement, and the question is whether the sale of these lands in the manner indicated by Mr. Greenfield would be acceptable to the municipalities directly interested. It is not the desire of the Department, neither, I am sure, is it your wish, to take any action in this matter which would result in local dissatisfaction or criticism.\(^{133}\)

Accordingly, the Department decided against the proposal, informing Greenfield on March 2, 1928, that it preferred that “Indian land be disposed of in usual way[,] namely public auction.”\(^{134}\)

On March 11, 1928, Scott replied to a February 6, 1928, memorandum from his Minister regarding a request advanced by L.A. Giroux, the provincial Member of the Legislative Assembly for the Athabasca-Grouard constituency, who was advocating the surrender and sale of the Driftpile, Swan River, Sucker Creek, and Sawridge Reserves on Lesser Slave Lake. Scott noted that he had deferred replying to the Minister’s memorandum “as this whole matter was under consideration and we have now practically decided upon a definite course of action.” Scott stated that the Department would, in the near future, “endeavor to obtain a surrender of the Swan River Reserve and the removal of the Indians now residing thereon to the Driftpile Reserve.”\(^{135}\) With respect to the Sawridge Reserve, he reported that the land was not acceptable for agricultural purposes and would not be sought by the Department. He added that, although no action would be taken regarding the Sucker Creek Reserve either, “there are a number of smaller Reserves in this Peace River section which it is our intention to try to offer for sale and settlement.”\(^{136}\) The reserves mentioned were the Duncan’s IR 151, 151A, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, and 151H, as well as the Beaver Band’s IR 152.


Charles Stewart, the Minister of the Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, replied to a similar inquiry dated May 26, 1928, from D.M. Kennedy, the Member of Parliament for West Edmonton, the focus of which was the Duncan’s IR 151A. In response to this inquiry, Stewart informed Kennedy that a number of reserves in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency were being considered for surrender:

You will be interested to learn that the Department is at present negotiating for the surrender of the Swan River Indian Reserve No. 150E and a number of smaller reserves in that district, which are known as Reserves 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, 151H and 151K. The total area of these reserves including Beaver and Swan River is 25,315 acres, and if successful in obtaining a release from the Indian owners, the sale of this quantity of land should prove of very great benefit to that portion of the country.\footnote{137}

It did not take long for word to circulate to the general public that Indian Affairs was preparing to secure a series of surrenders from Indians in the Lesser Slave Lake/Peace River District. As a result, a number of individuals from across the prairies wrote to the Department to find out when these lands would be available for sale. Having openly committed itself to the initiative, the Department broke with prior practice by subsequently informing applicants that surrenders were being pursued and that the lands would be sold at public auction to be advertised in advance.\footnote{138} From this time forward, the surrender proposal gained momentum. The technical process of surrendering
these lands commenced on March 10, 1928, when Laird requested instructions from Ottawa on the proposed surrenders of the Duncan’s Band reserves:

I beg to say that the Indians of the above Band will be coming in shortly from their Winter’s hunt and I shall no doubt, receive enquiries as to whether any action has been taken regarding the suggested surrender of their small reserves, therefore I would like to be informed if the Department is considering the matter of taking a surrender this coming Summer.\(^{139}\)

On April 4, 1928, A.F. MacKenzie, the Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary for Indian Affairs, advised Laird that “it is the intention of the Department to endeavour to secure a surrender this year” of IR 151 and 151B through 151H “in order that they may be placed on the market for sale for settlement purposes.” MacKenzie continued:

... it is understood that Reserve No. 151A will be retained for use as a common reserve. This matter will at once receive further consideration, and the necessary surrender papers will be prepared to be forwarded to you some time later. In the meantime, you might indicate what would be the most suitable time to call a meeting of these Indians for the purpose of considering this matter.\(^{140}\)

A week later, Laird proposed that August 6, 1928, “the date advertized for the payment of Annuities to the Indians interested in the small Reserves mentioned, would be a suitable date for a meeting of the Band.”\(^{141}\) With a tentative surrender meeting scheduled, Scott authorized the Department’s Lands and Timber Branch to prepare the “necessary documents, etc., – to be forwarded well in advance, to the local Agent.”\(^{142}\)

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\(^{139}\) Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, March 10, 1928, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 196).

\(^{140}\) A.F. MacKenzie, Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, to Harold Laird, Indian Agent, April 4, 1928, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 200).

\(^{141}\) Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, April 10, 1928, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 201).

\(^{142}\) Officer in Charge, Lands and Timber Branch, DIA, to DSGIA, April 19, 1928, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 202). Scott’s approval of the recommendation to take the surrender at the next payment of annuities is endorsed in a handwritten notation on the same document.
In the weeks that followed, the Department decided that the task of negotiating surrenders from three bands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency should be placed under the jurisdiction of a more senior officer than the Agent in the field. Writing on May 25, 1928, Commissioner Graham described the complexity of the situation with specific regard to the Swan River surrender:

The Agent states that he will not be able to take the surrender until after his return from Wabasca on 19th June and I am of the opinion that it would be advisable to send an Inspector to take the surrender as I am doubtful of Mr. Laird’s ability to further the interest of the Department in discussing terms with the Indians. There is the further consideration that the land surrendered should be fit for sale and that the amount paid to the Indians should be well within the sum for which the land could be sold. I am quite sure it will be advisable to send an Inspector to take the surrender and I shall be glad to hear from you as to whether a cash payment may be made to the Indians and if so, how much per head.143

In his response dated June 4, 1928, Scott agreed with Graham’s suggestion, stating that “[w]hen the proper time comes upon which to approach the owners of this reserve with the proposition to surrender these lands for sale, I agree that possibly it would be best for you to send an Inspector from Regina for the purpose of conducting the negotiations.” Scott also related his views and instructions regarding the proposed surrenders of Swan River, Beaver, and Duncan’s Band reserve lands, which the Department had by that time decided to address in a single concerted effort:

In view of the apparent necessity for taking such action, I desire to bring to your attention in sufficient time so that you may make all necessary preparation, that it is the intention of the Department to endeavor to secure the surrender some time this year of Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152, and a number of smaller reserves in the same Agency, and which appear in our Schedule as Reserves Nos. 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, 151H and 151K. These small reserves and including both the Swan River and Beaver reserves comprise an area of 25,315 acres, and their release and sale by public auction should prove of very great advantage to that section of the country. I would suggest, therefore, that the submission of these surrenders should, if possible, be undertaken at the same time, by the Inspector, and in view of the


number of reserves involved, and the distances between, it would undoubtedly be best for the Inspector to spend some time in this district, for the purpose of familiarizing himself with the situation and conditions, and in order that he may be able to advise the Department of the terms and conditions upon which the owners are prepared to release the larger reserves.\textsuperscript{145}

Laird, who had to date acted as the Department’s representative in all surrender discussions and proceedings within the Lesser Slave Lake Agency, was informed of the Deputy Superintendent’s decision on June 12, 1928:

\begin{quote}
It is the intention of the Department to endeavor to secure a surrender of Beaver Reserve this summer, and at the same time to obtain releases for sale of a number of small reserves in that district.... Negotiations are also under way with a view to having Swan Lake Reserve surrendered for a similar purpose, and this whole matter is of such importance that I have instructed Commissioner Graham, of Regina, to have one of his Inspectors visit this district this summer for the purpose of assisting you in conducting the preliminary negotiations, and if possible obtaining the consent of all the Indians involved to the release of the various properties.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

Notwithstanding the deferential tone of this correspondence, Laird was officially relieved of direct responsibility regarding the proposed surrenders of the Swan River, Beaver, and Duncan’s Band reserve lands, his subsequent involvement being limited to assisting his senior colleague, the Inspector of Indian Agencies.

On assuming responsibility for supervising the Inspector who was about to depart for the Lesser Slave Lake Agency to negotiate the proposed surrenders, Graham wrote to Ottawa on June 19, 1928, to request more specific instructions:

\begin{quote}
Before sending an Inspector into the district, I would be glad to have an outline from you as to the policy that the Department intend[s] to pursue in that district. What disposition is to be made of the Indians who may be occupying these smaller reserves? Are they to be amalgamated with other bands and if so, what arrangement would you suggest as a settlement with the Indians admitting them? It
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
may be that a number of the Indians occupying some of these reserves would prefer to become enfranchised and if so, I think our officer should report along these lines.

You will understand that it is a difficult matter to get these Indians together in order to treat with them. I have already taken this matter up with regard to the Swan River Band, and find that at the present time they are scattered all over the country – some working for the farmers, some on sections and others employed on the construction of the highway. All are more or less distant from the reserves so that when we do succeed in getting them together for the purpose of discussing terms of surrender with them, our officer should be very fully informed regarding the views of the Department.

The land, as you state, could be sold by public auction and an upset price fixed after ascertaining the natural features of the land.\(^{147}\)

On July 14, 1928, J.C. Caldwell of the Lands and Timber Branch forwarded to Graham draft surrender papers, along with a detailed letter of instruction setting out the policy and procedure to be followed with respect to the proposed surrenders of reserve lands:

With regard to the proposed surrender of Beaver Indian Reserve No. 152, I may explain that the local Agent some time ago reported that the Indians owning this reserve, were prepared to surrender these lands on condition that they were allotted another reserve farther North.... If it is your intention to have Inspector Murison handle this question, you may inform him that he is at liberty to advise the Indian owners of the Beaver Reserve that the Department has purchased for them this new reserve, chosen by themselves and that these lands are now available for their use on the condition, however, that they agree to a release of their present reserve in order that the land may be sold for settlement purposes and for their benefit. Surrender papers in duplicate, providing for the surrender of the Beaver Reserve are enclosed herewith.

Insofar as the Swan River Reserve is concerned, it appears from our Departmental records that you have already been advised in connection with this matter and know just what action should be taken.

In a previous letter you were advised that it was the intention of the Department to try this year to obtain a release from the Indian owners of Reserves Nos. 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, 151H and 151K.... Surrender papers in duplicate, providing for the surrender of these reserves by the Peace River Crossing Band, except however, Reserves No. 151H and 151K, also accompany this letter. Separate and distinct releases must be obtained of the two last mentioned reserves and it is not possible for the Department to prepare the necessary documents

as we are not quite positive of the present existing owners. I hope that this explanation and information will be sufficient for your purposes and in any case, I may again state that should Mr. Murison have an opportunity to review the previous exchange of correspondence with Agent Laird, he will be able to thoroughly grasp the situation....

P.S. I have omitted to explain that from Agent Laird’s letter of October 21\textsuperscript{st} last, it appears that it is the intention of the present owners of Reserve 151 to 151K to move to and reside on Reserve No. 151A, which contains something over five thousand acres. You will see, therefore, that the surrender of the Reserve mentioned and dealt with in this letter does not mean that the Indians will be without a suitable place of residence.\footnote{J.C. Caldwell, In Charge, Land and Timber Branch, DIA, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, July 14, 1928 (ICC Documents, pp. 210-12).}

Additional instructions were issued the same day by Scott, who, by coincidence, was visiting Graham’s office in Regina while conducting a tour of the Department’s operations in western Canada. Scott addressed Graham’s concerns regarding the difficulties experienced in past attempts to gather band members together for the purpose of conducting surrender meetings, suggesting that the consent of some Indians might be obtained individually rather than at a meeting of the eligible voters of a band as required by the \textit{Indian Act}:

\begin{quote}
I have suggested to Mr. Graham that under the peculiar local conditions we might accept the surrender if the consent of the Indians is obtained individually, or in groups, instead of at a meeting held under the provisions of the Act. If it were possible to obtain the consent of the majority of the voting members in this way, the Inspector might make an affidavit. You will remember in one or two cases we have had to take surrenders which did not conform in all respects to the provisions of the Act, to H.M. in Council.\footnote{D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to J.C. Caldwell, In Charge, Land and Timber Branch, DIA, July 14, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 214).}
\end{quote}

Although there is no indication that Scott’s suggestion was followed in the case of the Duncan’s Band surrenders, this correspondence indicates that the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs was at least willing to depart from the technical requirements of the \textit{Indian Act} to obtain the surrender of Indian lands in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency.
On July 30, 1928, Graham advised J.D. McLean, the Secretary of the Department, that he could not recommend a specific amount of money to be distributed to band members as an initial payment on the surrender of reserve lands. Graham also sought to clarify the name of the Duncan’s Band:

… with reference to the proposed surrender of certain reserves in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency and an initial cash payment to the Indians, I have to state that it is not possible to recommend a definite amount, as this could not really be determined until we can decide what will be a fair valuation of the area to be surrendered and the number of Indians to be paid. I would suggest, however, that the Inspector who interviews the Indians should have authority to bargain, so that no delay may be experienced in taking the surrender or surrenders. In Department letter of the 14th July, it is stated that the reserves in question were set aside for the Peace River Crossing Band, and on reference to the pay-lists of the Lesser Slave Lake Agency I did not find the name of the Band recorded, and it is possible that Treaty Payments are made to members of this Band under some other name. Will you please advise me as to this.150

On receipt of this communication, McLean made final preparations for the surrender meeting with the Duncan’s Band, and relayed the following information to Graham on August 9, 1928:

The surrender papers which were sent you recently gave the name of the Peace River Crossing Band as the owners of these reserves, but treaty payments have not been made under this name, and it is possible that it would be better to substitute the name of Duncan Tustawits Band…. The reserves which, therefore, may be properly considered as the property of what is known as the Duncan Tustawits’ Band are Reserves Nos. 151, 151A, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F and 151G…. Additional copies of surrender forms are herewith, in order that the change in the name of the Band may be made.151

The way had been paved for Inspector William Munson to conduct surrender meetings with the Swan River, Beaver, and Duncan’s Bands. However, his first meeting – at Swan River on September

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150 W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to Secretary, DIA, July 30, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 216).

151 J.D. McLean, Acting Deputy Superintendent General, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, August 9, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 218).
12, 1928 – proved inconclusive because a quorum of band members failed to materialize. After obtaining surrenders from the Duncan’s Band on September 19, 1928, and the Beaver Band on September 21, 1928, Murison returned to the Swan River reserve on September 26, 1928, at which time the Band’s members voted to oppose the surrender proposal. However, as we have seen, the surrender by the Beaver Band was later challenged and accepted for negotiation by Canada, based, according to counsel for the Duncan’s First Nation, on Murison’s failure to convene a single surrender meeting and his record of two deceased band members having taken part in the surrender proceedings.

The Surrender of the Duncan’s Band IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G

On September 19, 1928, the Duncan’s Band allegedly met and agreed to surrender IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G for sale to the Crown in right of Canada. Although the departmental correspondence with regard to events leading up the surrender is fairly detailed, there is little evidence about the surrender meeting itself. For present purposes, the Commission will set out whatever information can be gleaned from the available documents about the events related to the surrender meeting. The question of whether the surrender complied with the surrender provisions of the Indian Act will be addressed in Part IV of this report.

According to the daily journal entry of Agent Laird, he and Inspector Murison departed from Peace River Landing on the morning of September 19, 1928:

Left in car for Reserves 151 and [sic] 152 with Inspector Murison at 8:30 a.m. Had lunch at [Berwyn] and reached Reserve No. 152 at 3:30. Took surrender of Reserve No. 151. Drove to hotel at Waterhole for night.

152 William Murison, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to W. M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, October 2, 1928 (ICC Documents, pp. 249-52).

Laird’s entry for September 20, 1928, states that he and Murison “spent morning on Beaver Reserve No. 152.” Finally, the entry for September 21, 1928, reads: “Spent most of day on Dunvegan and Beaver reserve taking surrender.”

Although Laird’s account of the alleged surrender meeting with the Duncan’s Band includes no significant details on the surrender meeting, such as who attended and what was discussed, Murison’s report to Commissioner Graham, dated October 3, 1928, is somewhat more helpful, if still incomplete:

I am submitting herewith a surrender which I obtained on the 19th of September from Duncan Tustawits Band of Indians, in Grouard Agency. Attached to the surrender is an affidavit taken by myself and the principal men of the band and also a list of the adult male members of the band over the age of 21 years. The surrender includes the following reserves:-

<table>
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<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Contains</th>
<th>Acres</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace River Crossing</td>
<td>No. 151</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Felix Tustawits</td>
<td>No. 151B</td>
<td>294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taviah Moosewah</td>
<td>No. 151C</td>
<td>126.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alinckwoonay</td>
<td>No. 151D</td>
<td>91.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Tustawits</td>
<td>No. 151E</td>
<td>118.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Tustawits</td>
<td>No. 151F</td>
<td>134.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillian Bell</td>
<td>No. 151G</td>
<td>4.94</td>
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These Indians were prepared for me and had evidently discussed the matter very fully amongst themselves, having been notified on August 3rd that an official would meet them some time later this year to take up the question of surrender with them. There are 53 members in this band, only 7 male members being of the full age of 21 years. 5 members out of the 7 were present and they were unanimous in giving their assent to the release of the above lands.

They asked what they would get for the land, but this I was not able to inform them, but told them that it would be sold by public auction to the highest bidder which seemed to satisfy them. The second condition is that all monies received from the sale of the said lands would be placed to their credit and interest thereon paid to them annually on a per capita basis. Also that an initial payment of $50.00 be made to each member of their band on or before the 15th day of December, 1928. They also asked if a portion of the proceeds could be used in the purchase of stock, farm implements and building materials and I inserted a condition in the surrender covering this request.

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This is a small band and they appear to be decreasing. They have not been making use of the lands which they have surrendered. Reserve No. 151, comprising 3520 acres, is excellent farming land, largely open, level prairie with no waste land on it. There is a sparse growth of light poplar and willow, but there are large open tracts of prairie land as well. The land is free from pot holes and there are no lakes or sloughs on it. The village of Berwyn, on the Central Canada Railway, is situated in close proximity to the north west boundary. I would not be surprised to see this land bring an average of from twenty-five to thirty dollars per acre.

This band are retaining Reserve No. 151A which comprises 5120 acres. I would say that at least 35% is open farming land and the balance is covered with a medium sized growth of poplar with open spaces here and there. There is a small lake called Old Wives Lake, with a creek running along at the south end of the reserve, as well as a spring, where water can be obtained. There are also some hay lands on the border of Old Wives Lake. This makes it a much more desirable reserve for Indians than the land which they have agreed to release. The village of Brownvale is situated about two miles from the north west corner of this reserve.

It will be seen from the foregoing that ample provision has been made for this small band in retaining Reserve No. 151A, and after going carefully into the whole situation, it appears to me that it would be in their best interests if the Government can see fit to accept the surrender as it stands. The members of this band, in the past, have earned their living by hunting and working out for settlers and they have had no fixed place of abode. Some of them expressed a desire to settle down on their reserve and start farming, hence the request that provision be made to supply equipment for them.¹⁵⁵

Graham in turn reported to Scott on October 6, 1928:

With regard to your [letter] of the 4th June last, and Departmental letter of the 14th July, regarding the matter of obtaining surrenders of certain reserves in the Peace River country, I beg to inform you that I sent Mr. Inspector Murison up to deal with this matter early in September, and he has just returned after a most satisfactory trip. Separate reports and surrenders are attached hereto, in connection with the various reserves....

It appears that Reserve No. 151, which contains 3520 acres, is very valuable land and should bring a good price. You will note what the Inspector says regarding Reserve 151A, which the Indians have retained for their own use, and which seems to be ample for their requirements.¹⁵⁶


Murison forwarded the surrender document dated September 19, 1928, with his report. The surrender document provides a record of the specific terms under which the Duncan’s Band apparently surrendered its reserves:

**KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS** that We, the undersigned Chief and Principal men of the Duncan Tustawits Band of Indians ... acting on behalf of the whole people of our said Band in Council assembled, do hereby release, remise, surrender, quit claim and yield up unto our Sovereign Lord The King, his heirs and successors forever. All those parcels of land ... containing together by admeasurement four thousand two hundred and eighty-nine acres and eighty-five hundredths of an acre, more or less, being composed of and comprising all of the following Indian reserves,—

[Descriptions of IR 151 and 151B to 151G]

**TO HAVE AND TO HOLD** the same unto His said Majesty the King, his heirs and successors forever, in trust to sell by Public Auction the same to such person or persons and upon such terms as the Government of the Dominion of Canada may deem most conducive to our welfare and that of our people.

**AND upon the further conditions,** namely;—

1. That all moneys received from the sale thereof shall be placed to our credit, and interest thereon paid to us annually on a per capita basis.
2. That an initial payment of Fifty Dollars shall be paid to each member of our Band on or before the Fifteenth day of December, in the year Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight.
3. That a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the said lands shall be used to purchase horses, cattle, farm implements and building materials for deserving members of our Band to such an amount and in such a manner as the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs may direct.\(^{157}\)

The signatures of band members James Boucher and Eban Testawits, and the marks of fellow members John Boucher, Joseph Tustawits, and Emile Leg, appear on the document. Murison and Laird signed on behalf of the Department of Indian Affairs, with N. McGillivray and interpreter Charles Anderson executing the document as witnesses. Seals were affixed beside the signatures and marks of the five members of the Duncan’s Band listed above.

An affidavit attesting to the validity of the surrender proceedings was sworn before and certified by William Dundas, a lawyer and notary public, on September 19, 1928, at Waterhole, a village located approximately 10 miles south of Fairview, Alberta. The signatures of Eban Testawits and James Boucher, and the mark of Joseph Testawits, appear on behalf of the Band, while Murison signed for the Department. The relevant portions of the standard form document (with typewritten insertions shown in italics) read as follows:

And the said William Murison for himself saith: –
That the annexed release or surrender was assented to by a majority of the male members of the said band of Indians of the full age of twenty-one years entitled to vote, all of whom were present at the meeting or council.

That such assent was given at the meeting or council of the said Band summoned for that purpose and according to its rules or the rules of the Department.

That the terms of the said surrender were interpreted to the Indians by an interpreter qualified to interpret from the English language to the language of the Indians.

That he was present at such meeting or council and heard such assent given.

That he was duly authorized to attend such council or meeting by the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs.

That no Indian was present or voted at said council or meeting who was not a member of the band or interested in the land mentioned in the said release or surrender.

And the said Eban Testawits, James Boucher and Joseph Testawits say:–
That the annexed release or surrender was assented to by them and a majority of the male members of the said band of Indians of the full age of twenty-one years.

That such assent was given at a meeting or council of the said band of Indians summoned for that purpose as hereinbefore stated, and held in the presence of the said William Murison.

That no Indian was present or voted at such council or meeting who was not a habitual resident on the reserve of the said band of Indians and interested in the land mentioned in the said release or surrender.

That the terms of the said surrender were interpreted to the Indians by an interpreter qualified to interpret from the English language to the language of the Indians.

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158 It is interesting to note that W.P. Dundas was a member of the law firm hired by the Band in 1930 in an effort to compel the Department to fulfill the terms of surrender regarding the purchasing of agricultural implements. See G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” pp. 90-91 (ICC Exhibit 5).
That they are *Principal men* of the said band of Indians and entitled to vote at the said meeting or council.\(^{159}\)

A voters’ list showing the eligible voting members of the Duncan’s Band and a record of the vote taken was appended to the affidavit (see Table 2).

**TABLE 2**

**Duncan’s Band, Peace River, Voters List**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>John Boucher</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Samuel Tustowitz</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Joseph Tustowitz</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Eban Tustowitz</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>James Boucher</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Emilie [sic] Leg</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Francis Leg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 2 5

Certified Correct
[signed] W. Murison, Inspector


At the recommendation of the Superintendent General, the Governor in Council accepted the surrender of the Duncan’s reserves. Order in Council PC 82 confirmed the surrender of the Duncan’s Band IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G on January 19, 1929.\(^{160}\)

**EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SURRENDER OF THE DUNCAN’S RESERVES**

The record reveals that the second additional condition of the Duncan’s Band surrender agreement, providing for an initial $50 per capita payment, was at least partially met. On October 16, 1928, department officials informed Commissioner Graham that a cheque for $9,900 was being forwarded

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\(^{159}\) Surrender Affidavit, September 19, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 261).

to Laird to provide “payment on the basis of $7,200 to the Beaver Band, $2,650 to the Duncan Tustawits Band, and $50 to Mrs. William McKenzie.” Laird received the cheque on October 22, 1928. In March 1929, Graham advised the Department that Laird had paid the Indians of the Beaver and Duncan’s Bands $8,800 of the $9,900 forwarded to him, and Graham returned the balance of $1,100 to Ottawa.

The surrender paylist indicates that Susan McKenzie of the Duncan’s Band received her $50 payment on November 5, 1928, and that 44 other band members received payments totalling $2,200 two days later. Six children, all attending St Bernard’s or St Peter’s Schools at the time of payment, were credited with their respective $50 payments, which were apparently placed in trust for their benefit.

The surrendered Duncan’s Band reserves were sold by public auction at Fairview on June 15, 1929, the terms of sale being “cash, or one-tenth cash and the balance in nine equal, annual instalments with interest at 6% on the unpaid purchase money.” The following excerpt from a newspaper article in the Peace River Record recounts the sale of the surrendered lands:

With an attendance which more than taxed the capacity of the Gem theatre at Fairview, practically all of whom were concerned in the bidding, the sale of Indian lands held at Fairview on Saturday last fully equalled all expectations as to interest and bidding.

The sale was conducted under the supervision of Harold Laird, Indian Agent, of Grouard, assisted by Chas. A. Walker and several officials from the Department of Indian Affairs at Ottawa. Opening at 10 o’clock Saturday morning, the selling continued until well after 6 o’clock in the evening, practically all of the land being
sold. The only parcels not taken were a few scattered pieces to which buyers were not attracted by reason of sloughs or other undesirable topographical features.

On the other hand, the bidding for the most part was brisk, with good prices. The reserve adjoining the townsite of Berwyn [IR 151] was sold out at an average price of between $17 and $18 per acre. One parcel went to J.B. Early at a price of $30 per acre, and another parcel of 264 acres immediately adjoining the townsite was secured by Jesse Smith at $22 per acre. The one quarter section of undesirable land in this reserve, consisting of the swamp and gravel pit on the one corner, will, it is understood, be purchased by the municipality for road purposes, as it is one of the few gravel supplies in this district.\(^{166}\)

Inspector Murison, the senior departmental official administering the auction sale, submitted a detailed report to Commissioner Graham on June 20, 1929:

> I beg to forward herewith a Bank Draft in favour of the Receiver General drawn on the Bank of Commerce at Ottawa for $31,797.91 being the amount collected as a first payment on account of Indian Lands sold by Public Auction at Fairview, Alberta on the 15th instant....

> Altogether 153 parcels were offered. The land unsold includes one parcel in reserve No. 151, seventeen in No. 152, and all of reserves 151 C, 151 D, 151 F, 151 G, 151 H and 151 K.

> I had a number of enquiries and offers to purchase a quantity of the unsold lands two days after the sale at the upset price and referred them to the Department.\(^ {167}\)

The acreages of the Duncan’s reserve lands sold on this occasion, the amounts collected at the auction for those lands (generally the 10 percent down payments), and the average price per acre (based on the full selling price) are summarized in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve No.</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
<th>Amount Collected</th>
<th>Average Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>3292</td>
<td>$5,730.29</td>
<td>$17.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151B</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>$ 441.00</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151E</td>
<td>118.68</td>
<td>$ 378.54</td>
<td>$30.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The remaining unsold Duncan’s reserve lands, with the exception of IR 151K, were eventually sold on a case-by-case basis, with those interested applying directly to departmental headquarters. IR 151K never did sell, and was subsequently returned to the Band in 1965. The record in this inquiry does not include payment schedules for the various parcels of land sold by the Department on behalf of the Duncan’s Band. Another specific claim regarding this issue was submitted to the Specific Claims Branch of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in February 1989.168

The record shows that a second per capita payment of $50 was made to the Duncan’s Band in January 1930. Although the terms of surrender did not provide for the distribution of a second cash payment to the Band, such a payment was suggested as early as October 6, 1928, when Graham sent the Department copies of Murison’s reports regarding the surrender of lands from the Beaver and Duncan’s Band reserves:

I am also enclosing a surrender and report in connection with the following reserves belonging to the Duncan Tustawits Band of Indians.... The Indians made a complete surrender of these reserves, and they also asked for an initial payment of $50.00 per capita, to be made before December 15th, 1928, and that part of the purchase money be used to buy stock, farm implements, building materials, etc. It has occurred to me that although the surrender granted by this band only calls for an initial payment of $50.00, and no second payment, it might be in the interests of harmony and good feeling to arrange to give them a second payment at the same time the Indians of the Beaver Band are receiving theirs. They are practically all together as one band, and I fear it might cause dissatisfaction for one band to receive this additional payment and not the other. I would, therefore, ask that a payment of $50.00 per capita be given to this band also in 1929.169

The Department did not agree to Graham’s request at that time. However, the following summer the Band apparently asked Murison to take up the issue of a second payment on its behalf. The Band’s request is summarized in a report from Graham to the Secretary of Indian Affairs on July 17, 1929:

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Mr. Murison informs me that when he was in the Peace River district recently the Indians of the Duncan Tustawits and Beaver Bands asked that their second payment of $50.00 per capita be paid to them about August 16th. 

... although the surrender only called for an initial payment of $50.00, the Beaver Band, who are their close neighbours, have a second payment of $50.00 provided for them. Mr. Murison informs me that the members of the Duncan Tustawits Band are looking forward to the second payment, and will no doubt be very disappointed if they do not receive the same treatment as the Beaver band. I trust the Department will act on my recommendation and forward the $50.00 for this Band as well.  

When this request for a second payment was also rejected by Indian Affairs in Ottawa, Graham wrote again on August 31, 1929:

I regret that the Department does not see fit to provide for a second payment of $50.00 to the Duncan Testawits Band, putting them on the same terms with regard to the surrender as the Indians of the Beaver Band. The surrender was taken from the Duncan Testawits Band three days before that taken from the Beaver Band, and the former band was most reasonable to deal with. As these Indians are all living as one band it is going to cause permanent dissatisfaction if their request to have similar treatment to that given the Beaver Band is not granted. While I am aware there is nothing in the surrender that provides for this, the fact remains that they have made a strong request for it. If the Department required it the band would willingly sign a resolution.  

On October 29, 1929, Laird informed the Department that, when the surrenders were obtained in September 1928, the “members of the Duncan’s Band understood then that they would be accorded the same treatment in the matter of payments as made the Beaver Band.” He added that the Duncan’s Band personally petitioned him in August 1929 “to endeavour to obtain for them a second payment of $50.00 each.” With this request, Laird forwarded to Ottawa a standard form
resolution dated October 15, 1929, that purported to represent the wishes of a quorum of the Band’s eligible voting members, as signified by the marks of John Boucher, Eban Testawits, Francis Leg, Joseph Testawits, and James Boucher:

> We the undersigned, Chief and Councillors of the Duncan’s Band of Indians ... Do hereby, for ourselves, and on behalf of the Indian owners of the said Reserve, request that a sum not exceeding Twenty-two Hundred Dollars, be paid out of money standing to the credit of this Band, for the purpose of Making a payment of FIFTY DOLLARS to each member of the Band as a second payment from funds received from the sale of Reserves Nos. 151, 151 B, and 151 E.  

It should be noted that, although James Boucher and Eban Testawits signed their names in longhand to both the surrender and surrender affidavit in 1928, this document shows each of their endorsements or “marks” recorded with an “X.”

It appears that the Department gave the proposal serious consideration, as a handwritten marginal note dated November 7, 1929, on Laird’s memorandum provided Deputy Superintendent General Scott with the following information:

> Under an O.C. I presume we could make this payment. The Band has passed a resolution.... The terms of surrender do not cover such a payment. The Band’s capital stands at $7,108.90. The population of this Band is 50 so that it will require $2500.00 to make a per capita payment of $50.00.

However, when the Department again rejected the request, Graham forwarded a final report on the subject to Ottawa on December 2, 1929:

> In July last, almost a year later, when Mr. Murison was in the district looking after the sale of the lands, the Duncan Testawits Band made a request that they receive a second payment.... I reported this to you on July 17, and in your reply of the 9th

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174 The signature of James Boucher also appears on the September 20, 1928, Statutory Declaration regarding the surrender of IR 151H (ICC Documents, p. 256), and the June 14, 1943, surrender of IR 151K (ICC Documents, p. 480).  

August you pointed out that as the terms of the surrender did not provide for a second payment to those Indians the Department was unable to forward funds for this purpose. Feeling as I did that this would cause a lot of discontent I again wrote to the Department on August 31 ... and pointing out that the request was a reasonable one, as the two Bands were practically living as one. I presented my case as strongly as I could in this letter, and I then received a reply stating that under the Act this payment could not be made even with a resolution of the band.\textsuperscript{176}

On December 10, 1929, Scott begrudgingly approved the second per capita payment of $50 to members of the Duncan’s Band. However, he informed Graham that he was “at a loss to understand Mr. Murison’s action in treating two Bands in the same locality in different manner,” and he requested an explanation.\textsuperscript{177} Graham replied:

I note you state you are at a loss to understand Mr. Murison’s action in treating two bands in the same locality in a different manner as to cash distribution, and that you would like to have his explanation. Mr. Murison has read your letter and he merely repeats what has been said before. He treated with the Duncan Tustawits Band on the 19\textsuperscript{th} September and they agreed to accept a $50.00 payment. The Inspector completed the surrender papers and took the affidavits and so far as this band was concerned the matter was settled and they were satisfied with the terms. He then went over to the Beaver Band, whose reserve is situated eighteen miles from that of the Duncan Tustawits Band, and they refused to accept the terms which had been made with the Duncan Tustawits Band. Now the Inspector could very well have refused to take the surrender under these circumstances, but this was the last thing that entered his mind. The first request of this band was that they be given a prompt payment of $100.00, and the best bargain the Inspector could make was to agree to give them a payment of $50.00 down, and $50.00 at a later date, and as I explained to you, when the Duncan Tustawits Band heard of this they naturally wanted their deal re-opened, and I do not think the Inspector would have been justified in doing this.

In my covering letter submitting these surrenders I pointed out that it might be in the interests of harmony to give these Indians a second payment of $50.00, and the Department informed me that this could not be done.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{176} W. M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to the Secretary, DIA, December 2, 1929, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-5, pt 2 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).


\textsuperscript{178} W. M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to Duncan C. Scott, DSGIA, December 14, 1929, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-5, pt 2 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 2).
The second payment was made on January 28, 1930, and thirteen days later Murison issued a report detailing the distribution of this money:

I am enclosing herewith Pay Lists in triplicate in connection with the second payment to the Duncan Tustawits Band of Indians in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency on account of surrender of land in 1928.... I left $500.00 with Mr. Laird for absentees who sent messages by their friends to have their money held for them. These instances are noted on the pay-list.

The following is a statement of the payment,-

Received from Departmental Cheque $2500.00
Paid 41 Indians at $50.00 each  2050.00
Balance returned to the Department  450.00
To be funded for school children  300.00
Total amount sent to Department  $750.00

I will report further in connection with this Band under separate cover.179

The Department later informed Graham that it would “now be necessary for Mr Laird to send in receipts from the Indians to show that they received their money.”180 It is not possible to determine from the record before the Commission whether Laird complied with this request, but there is evidence that annual distributions of interest on the undistributed sale proceeds held in trust were made until at least 1939.181

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181 Paylist Comparison Database (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 1).
PART III

ISSUES

The Commission has been asked in this inquiry to determine whether Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the Duncan’s First Nation as a result of events surrounding the surrender of significant portions of the First Nation’s reserve holdings in 1928. The parties agreed to frame the issues before the Commission in the following manner:

1. Did the surrender procedures meet the requirements of subsections 51(1) and 51(2) of the Indian Act?
2. Did the Crown meet its pre-surrender fiduciary obligations?
3. Was the decision of the Indians tainted by the conduct of the Crown in the pre-surrender proceedings?\(^\text{182}\)

We will address these issues in the following section of this report.

\(^{182}\) Issues in this inquiry were confirmed by letter from R. David House, Associate Legal Counsel, Indian Claims Commission, to Perry Robinson, Legal Counsel, DIAND Legal Services, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, November 6, 1997 (ICC file 2108-15-01).
PART IV
ANALYSIS

ISSUE 1  VALIDITY OF THE 1928 SURRENDERS

Did the surrender procedures meet the requirements of subsections 51(1) and 51(2) of the Indian Act?

Surrender Provisions of the 1927 Indian Act

The parties agree that the threshold issue in this inquiry is the interpretation of subsections 51(1) and (2) of the 1927 Indian Act, and specifically whether the Department of Indian Affairs complied with these statutory provisions in relation to the surrender of IR 151 and 151B through 151G. Section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act prohibits the direct sale of reserve land to third parties and sets out the procedural requirements for a valid surrender of reserve lands. Section 51 is reproduced below in its entirety:

51. Except as in this Part otherwise provided, no release or surrender of a reserve, or a portion of a reserve, held for the use of the Indians of any band, or of any individual Indian, shall be valid or binding, unless the release or surrender shall be assented to by a majority of the male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose, according to the rules of the band, and held in the presence of the Superintendent General, or of any officer duly authorized to attend such council, by the Governor in Council or by the Superintendent General.
2. No Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.
3. The fact that such release or surrender has been assented to by the band at such council or meeting shall be certified on oath by the Superintendent General, or by the officer authorized by him to attend such council or meeting, and by some of the chiefs or principal men present thereat and entitled to vote, before any person having authority to take affidavits and having jurisdiction within the place where the oath is administered.

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183 For ease of reference, our analysis will refer to the surrender of IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G as the “1928 surrender,” but this term will not include the surrenders of IR 151H and IR 151K. As we have already discussed, although the latter two surrenders also occurred in 1928, Canada has agreed to negotiate the First Nation’s claim with regard to IR 151H, and IR 151K was eventually returned to the First Nation after Canada failed to sell it.

184 Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 51.
4. When such assent has been so certified, as aforesaid, such release or surrender shall be submitted to the Governor in Council for acceptance or refusal.\footnote{185}

In any case in which the validity of a surrender is put at issue, the Commission’s first step must be to determine whether the technical requirements of the Indian Act regarding surrender have been fulfilled. These technical requirements were described by Estey J on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada in \textit{Cardinal v. R.}:\footnote{186}

It has also been argued that the interpretation which is now being considered is one which exposes the membership of the band to a risk of loss of property and other rights, contrary to the general pattern and spirit of the Indian Act. It is perhaps well to observe in this connection that there are precautions built into the procedures of Pt. I of the Act, dealing with surrender. Firstly, the meeting must be called to consider the question of surrender explicitly. It may not be attended to at a regular meeting or one in respect of which express notice has not been given to the band. Secondly, the meeting must be called in accordance with the rules of the band. Thirdly, the chief or principal men must certify on oath the vote, and that the meeting was properly constituted. Fourthly, only residents of the reserve can vote, by reason of the exclusionary provisions of subs. (2) of s. 49. Fifthly, the meeting must be held in the presence of an officer of the Crown. And sixthly, even if the vote is in the affirmative, the surrender may be accepted or refused by the Governor in Council. \textit{It is against this background of precautionary measures that one must examine the manner in which the assent of eligible members of the band is to be ascertained under s. 49.}\footnote{186}

\footnote{185}{The surrender provisions of section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act trace their origin to the \textit{Royal Proclamation of 1763}, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 1, which entrenched and formalized the process whereby only the Crown could obtain Indian lands through agreement or purchase from the Indians. The proclamation states:  

\begin{quote}
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; In order, therefore, to prevent such irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow Settlement; but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively within which they shall lie.  
\end{quote}}

\footnote{186}{\textit{Cardinal v. R.}, [1982] 1 SCR 508, 13 DLR (4th) 321, [1982] 3 CNLR 3 at 10. Emphasis added. Estey J was dealing with section 49 of the 1906 Indian Act which, other than setting forth a more restricted list of persons authorized to take the surrender affidavit under subsection (3), was essentially identical to section 51 of the 1927 statute.}
The first five of these criteria deal with a band’s consent to the surrender of all or a portion of its reserve. The sixth criterion – the requirement of consent by the Governor in Council to the band’s decision to surrender – will be discussed in the context of the statutory requirements for surrender, but also later in the context of determining whether the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations towards the Duncan’s Band.

In the event that we conclude that one or more of the foregoing criteria have not been satisfied on the facts of this case, another important issue for the Commission to consider will be whether the provisions of section 51 are mandatory or merely directory. If the provisions are mandatory and Canada did not comply with them, the surrender will be considered invalid; if they are directory and Canada did not comply, the surrender will be considered valid, although Canada may still be subject to other remedies.

Scott’s Instructions to Indian Agents
Before turning to the statutory criteria relating to the consent of the Duncan’s Band to the 1928 surrender, the Commission wishes to address a submission by the First Nation with regard to certain instructions delivered by Indian Affairs to its agents for taking surrenders of reserve land. These instructions, first prepared in 1913 by Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott, were issued by the Department as a guide to fulfilling the substantive and procedural requirements of the Indian Act. Framed in language that is similar, but not identical, to the surrender provisions in the Indian Act, the agents’ instructions stated:

1. A proposal to submit to the Indians the question of the surrender of an Indian reserve or any portion thereof must be submitted by an officer of the Department for approval by the Superintendent General or his deputy, upon a memo setting forth the terms of the proposed surrender and the reasons therefor.

2. An officer duly authorized by the Superintendent General or his deputy to submit a surrender to the Indians shall for the purpose of taking such surrender make a voters’ list of all the male members of the band of the full age of twenty one years who habitually reside on or near and are interested in the reserve in question.
3. The meeting or council for consideration of surrender shall be summoned according to the rules of the band which, unless otherwise provided, shall be as follows:
   Printed or written notices giving the date and place of meeting are to be conspicuously posted on the reserve, and one week must elapse between the issue or posting of the notices and the date for meeting or council. The interpreter ... who is to be present and interpret at the meeting or council must deliver, if practicable, written or verbal notice to each Indian on the Voters’ list not less than 3 days before the date of meeting, and must give sufficient reasons for the non-delivery of such notices.

4. The terms of the surrender must be interpreted to the Indians, and if necessary or advisable to individual Indians present at the meeting or council by an interpreter qualified to interpret the English language into the language or languages spoken by the Indians.

5. The surrender must be assented to by a majority of the Indians whose names appear upon the voters’ list, who must be present at a meeting or council summoned for the purpose as hereinbefore provided.

6. The officer duly authorized shall keep a poll book and shall report the vote of each Indian who was present at the meeting or council and voted.

7. The surrender should be signed by a number of the Indians and witnessed by the authorized officer and the affidavit of execution to the surrender should be made by the duly authorized officer and the chief of the band and a Principal man or the Principal men before a judge, stipendiary magistrate or a justice of the peace.

8. The officer taking the surrender should report the number of voting members of the band as recorded in the voters’ list, the number present at the meeting, the number voting for and the number against the surrender.  

The First Nation argues that Scott’s instructions to his agents were not merely administrative conveniences, but in fact reflected the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in the surrender context. The notice provisions of those instructions “were concentrated on being comprehensive, thorough, fair, well in advance with interpreters, with a proposal in hand that explained the terms of the surrender well in advance of a meeting.” Being obligations, the instructions were, in counsel’s submission,

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mandatory and not discretionary.\textsuperscript{189} The fact that the Crown failed to conduct itself in accordance with its own instructions constituted “strong evidence of a breach” of those obligations.\textsuperscript{190}

The Crown responds that these instructions did not add anything to the surrender provisions of the \textit{Indian Act} or constitute a second order of mandatory requirements to be superimposed on the statutory requirements of section 51. Moreover, the instructions did not expand on the fiduciary duties owed by Canada to a band in taking a surrender of reserve land. Counsel suggests that the instructions “were merely intended as practical guidelines to assist agents in carrying out the surrender provisions of the \textit{Act} and can be viewed as internal instructions that contain, in essence, a partial job description for Indian Agents.”\textsuperscript{191}

The Commission notes that there is no indication in the instructions that they received legislative sanction by statute or regulation. Accordingly, we would be reluctant to imbue them with the force of law or to suggest that they imposed additional fiduciary obligations on the Crown, even if Scott had insisted that they be observed to the letter. In making this statement, we find support in the comments of McLachlin J in \textit{Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)} (hereinafter referred to as the \textit{Apsassin} case) to the effect that the courts should be careful not to impose requirements in addition to those set out in the provisions of the \textit{Indian Act}. In that case, McLachlin J considered whether trust principles should be applied to a 1945 surrender that, in the view of Gonthier J, amounted to a “variation of a trust in Indian land” created by an earlier surrender in 1940:

\textit{The difficulties of applying trust principles directly to the \textit{sui generis} Indian interest in their reserves point to the fact that it is better to stay within the protective confines of the \textit{Indian Act}. The 1927 \textit{Indian Act} contains provisions which regulate in some detail the manner in which Indians may surrender their reserves or interests in their reserves to the Crown. The formal surrender requirements contained in the \textit{Indian Act} serve to protect the Indians’ interest by requiring that free and informed consent is given by a band to the precise manner in which the Crown handles property which it holds on behalf of the Band. The Act also recognizes the Indians as autonomous

\textsuperscript{189} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 83 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{190} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 83-84 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{191} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 16.
actors capable of making decisions concerning their interest in reserve property and ensures that the true intent of an Indian Band is respected by the Crown. No matter how appealing it may appear, this Court should be wary of discarding carefully drafted protections created under validly enacted legislation in favour of an *ad hoc* approach based on novel analogies to other areas of the law.\textsuperscript{192}

We have also had regard for the decision of Killeen J of the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) in *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)*.\textsuperscript{193} In that case, the plaintiff First Nation objected that its 1927 surrender meeting had been attended by A. MacKenzie Crawford who, during the course of the meeting, offered cash payments to the voting members to solicit their support for the surrender. The First Nation argued that subsection 49(2) of the 1906 *Indian Act* had been violated because the provision, “by necessary implication, prohibits anyone other than the Indian Agent and qualified voters from being in attendance at the General Council meeting” called to consider a surrender. In rejecting this argument, Killeen J placed considerable emphasis on the provisions of the *Indian Act* and on Parliament’s failure to expressly legislate to forbid the “direct dealings” claimed by the plaintiffs to be prohibited by necessary implication:

> As to the undoubted attendance of Crawford at the General Council meeting, I can find no support in the Royal Proclamation [of 1763] or s. 49(2) for an express or implied prohibition against that.

> The Royal Proclamation does not prohibit direct dealings perse. What it does is prohibit direct sales and interposes the presence of the Crown through the surrender procedure in an attempt to protect the Indians from the sharp and predatory practices of the past.

> It would have been easy for Parliament, if so-minded, to prohibit all direct dealings and, within s. 49(2), to prohibit the attendance of outsiders, including a prospective purchaser, at a surrender meeting. It chose not to do so and I find no warrant anywhere in the Royal Proclamation or the Act for virtually re-writing s. 49(2) such that it could be interpreted to prohibit direct dealing or attendance at the surrender meeting.

\textsuperscript{192} *Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)*, [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 395-96 (SCR), McLachlin J.

\textsuperscript{193} *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [1996] 1 CNLR 54 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.).)
Equally, I cannot conclude that the promises of the $15.00 direct cash payments and the distribution of $5.00 to each of the voters at the March 30 meeting violated s. 49(2) or any other provision of the Act.\(^{194}\)

On appeal, this reasoning was subsequently adopted by Laskin JA of the Ontario Court of Appeal, who agreed that “the mere presence of Crawford at the meeting violated neither the language nor the rationale of the *Royal Proclamation* or s. 49 of the *Indian Act*.\(^{195}\) He also agreed, however, that the cash payments had “an odour of moral failure about them” and might afford grounds for the plaintiff First Nation to make out a case of breach of fiduciary duty against the Crown.\(^{196}\) We will return to the fiduciary aspects of these decisions later in this report.

It is also significant that Killeen J specifically addressed the Department’s instructions to its agents, which were apparently reissued on February 13, 1925. Although Killeen J concluded that Indian Agent Thomas Paul had followed the guidelines in that case, his comments are also instructive with regard to the status given to the instructions at law:

\[ T \]he “Instructions” document issued by the Department on February 13, 1925, lays down guidelines for Indian agents incidental to surrender and sale ... and it was followed by Paul in this case. Paragraph 3 of this document says this:

The meeting or council for consideration of surrender shall be summoned according to the rules of the band, which unless otherwise provided, shall be as follows: – Printed or written notices giving the date and place of the meeting are to be conspicuously posted on the reserve, and one week must elapse between the issue or posting of the notices and the date for meeting or council. The interpreter who is to be present and interpret at the meeting or council must deliver, if practicable, written or verbal notice to each Indian on the voters’ list, not less than three days before the date of the meeting, or must give reasons for the non-delivery of such notices.

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\(^{194}\) *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1928), 1 CNLR 54 at 87-88 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).

\(^{195}\) *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1996), 31 OR (3d) 97 at 101-02 (Ont. CA).

\(^{196}\) *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1996), 31 OR (3d) 97 at 106 (Ont. CA).
This proviso calls for the summoning of a meeting or council in accordance with the rules of the Band and there is solid independent evidence that the calling of the General Council had the support of the Band and, especially, its Chief and councillors. On February 11, 1927, Chief John Milliken and three other councillors, Sam Bressette, Robert George and William George, wrote to the Department asking for a General Council meeting on an urgent basis. The letter says in part:

Please give us permission for to hold [sic] a general council as soon as possible, the majority of the voters are in favour of the sale of this land and are anxiously waiting for a general council.
If the letters sent by Cornelius Shawanoo has [sic] any thing to do with the delaying of this sale please do not pay any attention to them. No doubt the most [sic] of his letters are fictions.

In my view, it is inconceivable that such a request would have been made by the Chief and other senior members of the Band if there were a Band rule requiring a Band Council Resolution in every surrender case. Even assuming that a Resolution were required, this letter is surely the practical equivalent of such a Resolution and gives force to the calling of the General Council meeting on March 30.197

In these comments, Killeen J has recognized that the instructions were “guidelines ... incidental to surrender and sale,” and he was prepared to view the Council’s letter as the “practical equivalent” of a Band Council Resolution, assuming that one was required as part of the rules of the Band to request a surrender.

In our view, these comments underscore the conclusion that Scott’s instructions to his agents were merely intended to provide practical assistance in implementing the statutory provisions, but did not create an additional standard of compliance over and above the requirements of the Indian Act. Moreover, although it is obvious from Laird’s report of his attempt to gather the Beaver Band for a surrender meeting in 1923 that he was fully aware of Scott’s instructions,198 it is equally obvious from his failure to convene the 1923 meeting that those instructions were impractical and inappropriate with respect to the circumstances of far-flung bands such as the Beaver and Duncan’s Bands. Nevertheless, the instructions may be relevant to this inquiry for at least two purposes. First,

197 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 84-85 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)). Emphasis added.

if one of the surrender provisions of the *Indian Act* should be found to be ambiguous, then the instructions may provide relevant extrinsic evidence to assist in interpreting the meaning and effect of that provision. Second, evidence demonstrating a marked and substantial departure from these instructions on the part of the Crown’s agents in obtaining a surrender may be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the Crown has fulfilled its fiduciary obligations in the pre-surrender context. Therefore, the agents’ instructions may provide important evidence regarding the standard of “due diligence” to which the Crown expected its representatives to adhere, and to that extent may be relevant in determining whether the Crown discharged its fiduciary duties to the Duncan’s Band in obtaining the 1928 surrender.

As we have already noted, we will return to the fiduciary aspects of this claim later in our report. We will now address the surrender provisions of the *Indian Act*, starting with the general principles of interpretation developed by the courts to guide us in this endeavour.

**Principles of Interpretation**

To the extent that questions of interpretation arise in determining the meaning and effect of section 51, it is important to bear in mind the following three principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada which provide the jurisprudential context within which the surrender provisions must be considered. First, the oft-quoted principle from *Nowegijick v. The Queen* provides that “treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.” Second, Justice Major in *Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada* made the following statement with regard to the underlying purpose and theme of the surrender provisions: “Both the common law and the *Indian Act* guard against the erosion of the native land base through conveyances by individual band members or by any group of members.” Third, section 51 is the sole statutory protection afforded to a band to ensure that the goals and choices of its members with respect to the disposition of their lands are honoured. As McLachlin J stated in *Apsassin*, “[t]he basic

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The purpose of the surrender provisions of the Indian Act is to ensure that the intention of Indian bands with respect to their interest in their reserves be honoured.\footnote{Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 391 (SCR), McLachlin J.}

The second and third of these principles are aptly summarized in the further statement by McLachlin J in Apsassin\footnote{Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.} that

... the Indian Act’s provisions for surrender of band reserves strikes a balance between the two extremes of autonomy and protection. The band’s consent was required to surrender its reserve. Without that consent the reserve could not be sold. But the Crown, through the Governor in Council, was also required to consent to the surrender. The purpose of the requirement of Crown consent was not to substitute the Crown’s decision for that of the band, but to prevent exploitation. As Dickson J. characterized it in Guerin\footnote{Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 370-71 (SCR), McLachlin J.} (at p. 383):

The purpose of this surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to prevent the Indians from being exploited.

It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to surrender the reserve, and its decision was to be respected. At the same time, if the Band’s decision was foolish or improvident – a decision that constituted exploitation – the Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown’s obligation was limited to preventing exploitative bargains.\footnote{It is against this backdrop of balancing autonomy and protection that we now turn to the specific terms of section 51. We will deal first with the issues relating to the surrender meeting – whether there was a meeting in the first place and, if so, whether that meeting was summoned for the specific purpose of dealing with the surrender, and whether it was summoned according to the rules of the Band. We will then address questions of voter eligibility, identifying those male members of the Band at least 21 years of age who were “habitually resident on or near, and interested in the reserve...}
in question.” In doing so, we will determine whether any ineligible Indians attended or voted at the alleged meeting of September 19, 1928.

Next, we will consider the issues relating to consent: whether the surrender meeting was attended by a quorum of voting members, whether the surrender was approved by a sufficient number of those voting members, and whether the Governor in Council properly consented to the surrender. At that point, before turning to the second set of issues relating to the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to First Nations, we will draw our conclusions as to whether the provisions of section 51 of the Indian Act were satisfied. Finally, if any of those provisions were not satisfied, we will consider whether the provisions of section 51 were mandatory (implying that the surrender was invalid if they were not met) or merely directory (thus validating the surrender, but perhaps exposing Canada to other forms of relief in favour of the First Nation).

Was There a Meeting?
The First Nation submits that the first criterion not fulfilled by Canada was the requirement to convene a meeting to consider the surrender. It will be recalled that the first subsection in section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act states:

51. Except as in this Part otherwise provided, no release or surrender of a reserve, or a portion of a reserve, held for the use of the Indians of any band, or of any individual Indian, shall be valid or binding, unless the release or surrender shall be assented to by a majority of the male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose, according to the rules of the band, and held in the presence of the Superintendent General, or of any officer duly authorized to attend such council, by the Governor in Council or by the Superintendent General.

The First Nation challenges the 1928 surrender on the basis that, in obtaining the ostensible consent of the Duncan’s Band to the surrender, Canada failed to comply with a number of the criteria in this subsection and subsection (2). In the First Nation’s submission, the effect of such failures, individually and cumulatively, is to render the surrender invalid or void ab initio (i.e., from the outset).
Counsel contends that a properly convened meeting or council pursuant to section 51 is fundamental and crucial to the validity of a surrender for a number of reasons:

IV. subsection (1) ensures that the decision-making process is culturally compatible with the band’s traditional processes by referencing the band’s practices and rules;

V. a surrender meeting provides an open, transparent forum where all information and points of view can be shared and debated, thereby allowing a collective decision rather than a private one reflecting only individual or factional interests;

VI. since subsection (2) excludes certain band members deemed to be ineligible for voting purposes, the meeting process is protected from being tainted by outside influences, including non-resident and disinterested members; and

VII. because the meeting provides an open forum for the Indian agent to fully and carefully explain the transaction and the band’s alternative options, it represents the best means of ensuring the collective informed and voluntary consent of a majority of eligible voters to the surrender.\(^{204}\)

For these reasons, the First Nation submits that the surrender meeting represents a primary safeguard for a band against an exploitative bargain, and that full documentation of the meeting is an equally significant safeguard for Canada:

From the record of such a meeting the Crown can fully demonstrate through its conduct that it is acting in the best interests of Indians and not proceeding merely to pursue its own political and financial interests. In our view, failing to keep a clear record showing full compliance with this requirement, raises doubts and uncertainty as to the occasion and manner of compliance. And we believe that such doubts should be resolved in favour of the Indians. It also raises the presumption that the Department may have been acting in its own interests and pursuing its own agendas.\(^{205}\)

The Commission agrees with the First Nation’s submissions regarding the purposes of surrender meetings. It seems clear that a properly conducted surrender meeting has most, if not all,
of the advantages enumerated by counsel for the First Nation, and even Canada is likely to agree that full records of surrender proceedings conducted by it would, in retrospect, have made it easier for the parties to determine whether the requirements of the statute had been met. However, it is our view that the evidence in this case does not require us to make the sort of presumption or negative inference that the First Nation proposes.

With regard to the merits of whether a meeting actually happened, the First Nation points to a number of facts or allegations that, in its submission, demonstrate that the surrender meeting of September 19, 1928, was fabricated. Counsel submits that, although Inspector Murison claimed that the meeting took place, he failed to disclose its location, date and time, the individuals with whom he met, the substance of the discussions, and how or if a vote was conducted. Agent Laird’s diary is, it is suggested, similarly inconclusive. Contending that most of the individuals on the voters’ list did not live near the reserve, the First Nation submits that they were probably away on their winter hunts and likely did not attend any such meeting. In fact, since Scott had expressed the Department’s willingness, owing to difficulties in assembling the bands, to permit surrenders in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency to be signed by individuals or small groups, it is possible, submits counsel, that such one-to-one meetings were used to obtain the Duncan’s surrender, just as they were for other bands in the area. At the very least, it was “unusual for Indians residing near or interested in a reserve to attend a meeting some 30 miles away” – assuming, as the parties agreed, that the surrender was taken at IR 152 – to surrender their reserves.

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208 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 36.

209 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, pp. 18-19.

210 Jerome N. Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, to Ron Maurice, Indian Claims Commission, Bruce Becker, Specific Claims, DIAND Legal Services, and François Daigle, Department of Justice, May 16, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 13).

The First Nation also finds reason for suspicion in the actual surrender documents. First, the signatories to the surrender were different from those who signed the certifying affidavit, and the marks made for those individuals who signed both documents likewise differed from one document to the other. According to counsel, these facts suggest that the marks were not made by the Indian “signatories” at all and were, in fact, forged.\textsuperscript{212}

Second, relying on evidence indicating that the surrender documents may have been prepared some months in advance of the meeting, counsel submits that, since no changes were made to those documents in obtaining the surrender, this invites an inference that no discussions or surrender meeting occurred at all;\textsuperscript{213} assuming that the Band proposed the surrender, as argued by Canada, it was just as likely that the Band would have placed terms, questions, demands, or comments regarding the surrender before Murison as it was unlikely that a pre-printed affidavit could accurately describe the events of a later surrender meeting, absent changes on the face of the surrender documents.\textsuperscript{214} It was particularly surprising that no changes or comments were forthcoming, given, based on the evidence of elder John Testawits, that a number of band members were opposed to surrendering the reserves.\textsuperscript{215} The more probable scenario, argues counsel, is that the additional terms of the surrender documents were designed in advance to act as inducements to surrender.\textsuperscript{216}

Third, the First Nation questions whether the jurat – the portion of the surrender affidavit indicating that an illiterate person has had the contents of the affidavit read to him and that he understands them – was properly prepared. According to counsel, such a failing “would in today’s terms severely undermine the view that an illiterate person in the first instance and one who could not speak English well or at all in the second instance understood the contents of the document they

\textsuperscript{212} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, pp. 24 and 36.

\textsuperscript{213} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 22; ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 50 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{214} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{215} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 53 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{216} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 45 (Jerome Slavik).
were alleging to be the truth.”\(^{217}\) Compounding this shortcoming, in the First Nation’s view, is a lack of evidence that the affidavit was translated to its Indian signatories or that its key terms, such as “entitled to vote,” “residing on or near,” and “interested in the reserve,” were explained to them.\(^{218}\) Arguing that even the Crown was reluctant to place much reliance on Murison’s documents relating to the surrenders of IR 151H or the Beaver Band’s IR 152, the First Nation questions why his documentation of the 1928 surrender of IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G should be accorded more weight.\(^{219}\)

Finally, the First Nation relies heavily on the evidence of elder John Testawits in relation to his discussions with now-deceased members of the Band regarding the occurrence of a meeting. John Testawits stated that he had been told by his uncle, Samuel Testawits, that the only meeting which took place involved Samuel, John’s aunt Angela (Joseph Testawits’s wife), his aunt Angelique (David Testawits’s widow), and an Indian agent named L’Heureux. Apparently the three Indian participants advised the agent that, since only the three of them were in attendance, the Band was not sufficiently represented to make a decision, and they did not want to surrender the reserve in any event.\(^{220}\) This meeting evidently took place in the late summer or early fall when many of the men were putting up hay near Bear Lake.\(^{221}\)

Joseph Testawits informed John Testawits that he was at Spirit River when this meeting took place, that he never attended a meeting to discuss surrendering reserve land, and that he was angered to discover on his return that such a meeting had taken place.\(^{222}\) Similarly, James Boucher informed

\(^{217}\) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 203 (Jerome Slavik).

\(^{218}\) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 203-04 (Jerome Slavik).

\(^{219}\) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 201-02 (Jerome Slavik).


\(^{222}\) Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 27; ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 66-68 (Jerome Slavik); Statutory Declaration of John Testawits, December 3, 1991, pp. 5-6 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 4; ICC Exhibit 10, tab B, Schedule 7).
John Testawits that he never attended a surrender meeting, agreed to a surrender, or signed a surrender document, nor did he recall his father, John Boucher, doing so. 223 The First Nation argues that it would be unusual for such an important event to occur with band members having no memories of it. 224 In summary, counsel likened the surrender in this case to that considered by the Commission in the Moosomin inquiry, where there was also considerable uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a meeting. 225

Canada’s response to these arguments is that, while a precise time and location of the September 19, 1928, surrender meeting cannot be determined, the documentary evidence clearly demonstrates that a meeting took place for the purpose of the Band deciding whether to surrender some of its reserves. 226 The surrender affidavit, Murison’s report, and Laird’s diary all indicate that a meeting was held, 227 and Laird’s letter of October 29, 1929, enclosing the Band’s petition for the second payment of $50 – in which he referred to “a majority of the members of this Band [being] present on the Beaver Reserve No. 152 when surrenders were taken from both Bands” – provides further corroboration of the meeting’s existence. 228 Even more compelling, however, in Canada’s submission, is the evidence of Angela Testawits, who, in a 1973 interview, recalled: “I was standing right there when they [the reserves] were sold because it was my old man [Joseph Testawits] who sold them.” 229 Moreover, according to counsel, the fact that the surrender may have been held on IR 152 is neither surprising nor meaningful, since there was no statutory requirement for the location

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224 ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 64-65 and 67 (Jerome Slavik).

225 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, pp. 59-60.


228 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, October 29, 1929, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-5, pt 2 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab F); Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 18; ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 149-50 (Perry Robinson).

229 Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G); ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 132 and 149 (Perry Robinson).
of a surrender meeting, and the members of the Duncan’s Band often assembled at Fairview in any event to receive their treaty payments.\(^ {230} \)

Although Scott did write a memorandum authorizing Murison to have Indians in the Lesser Slave Lake Agency sign surrender documents individually or in small groups, Canada argues that there is no evidence to suggest that Murison acted on these instructions in relation to the Duncan’s Band. In fact, since Murison made no effort to hide the fact that he took individual assents from members of the Beaver Band, Canada further submits that it can be implied that, in Duncan’s case, no such steps were required and the individuals who attested to the surrender were in fact present at the meeting.\(^ {231} \)

With regard to the First Nation’s challenges to the surrender documents, Canada first submits that no significance or negative inference should be attached to the fact that all five voting members signed the surrender document, but only three signed the affidavit. Subsection 51(3) of the Indian Act merely prescribed that “some of the chiefs or principal men present thereat and entitled to vote” were to certify the Band’s assent.\(^ {232} \) As to the suggestion that the surrender documents were forged, Canada replies that the inconsistencies between a voter’s marks on different documents, or the similarities between the marks of different voters on a single document, can be explained by the common practice of having the signatory touch the pen as his mark is being made by the Indian agent:

100. For example, to account for the three marks on the surrender document being made by the hand of one person, reference is made to a circular from Deputy Superintendent General Pedley to Indian Agent Gooderham dated July 28, 1904 [which] states in part:

“The Department’s attention has been drawn to the fact that in some instances when Agents make payments to Indians and issue receipts, which should be signed by mark (the Indian touching the pen), the mark is made when the Indian is not present. According to law, a

\(^ {230} \) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 150-51 (Perry Robinson).


valid receipt cannot be given by an illiterate person unless he touches the pen when “the mark” is being made. Agents are therefore warned that in future the mark of an Indian must be made by the Indian touching the pen, and the act must be witnessed by a third party, who must sign as witness. Before an Indian makes his mark to a receipt or other document the transactions should be fully explained to him....” (Ex. 6(j))

101. It is submitted that this is consistent with the common law concerning signatures in the case of wills which indicates that subscription by mark is sufficient when a pen has been guided by another person or where the signature or mark has been written by another while the signatory holds the tip of the pen.

102. In the case of a surrender, the validity is not dependent upon whether a particular individual made their own mark. Rather, the key issue is, whether the person “signing” was in fact present, was aware of the nature and content of the document and intended to sign.233

Second, regarding the First Nation’s argument that the surrender documents could not be used to demonstrate the truth of their own contents since they had been previously prepared and appeared unaltered, Canada contends that the evidence does not bear this out. Both Murison’s report of October 3, 1928, and Angela Testawits’s interview illustrate, in Canada’s view, that a meeting was held and that the Indians in fact negotiated the terms of the surrender.234

Third, to counter the First Nation’s position that the surrender documents may have been inadequately executed, Canada emphasizes that notary W.P. Dundas – “the only independent person in relation to this whole surrender” – attested to the fact that three members of the Band stood before him in Waterhole and swore to the truth of their affidavit. Counsel submits that Dundas’s independence, and the risks he would have faced for knowingly attesting to a false affidavit, mean that he should be given the benefit of the doubt when assessing the integrity of that affidavit.235

Finally, Canada notes that, in making its case, the First Nation has relied primarily on the evidence of elder John Testawits, who was not present when the surrender was taken and did not


return to the reserve until 1931. In counsel’s submission, where this evidence conflicts with that of
Angela Testawits, Angela should be given “pre-emptive credibility as she is the only voice we have
from a firsthand, on-the-scene participant at the surrender meeting.”

The First Nation disputes this point, arguing that Angela’s remarks were made without legal advice or preparation in the context of the claim. Counsel suggested that Angela’s evidence regarding the sale by her “old man” related not to the surrenders but to the subsequent dispositions of the surrendered lands by public auction.

He also questioned the weight that should be given to

...a portion, probably less than five minutes worth, of a 32-minute interview with
Angela Testawits in 1973 when she was 80 years old and that occurred some 45 years
after the events described. This testimony is unsworn, unexamined and unexplained.
In [a] civil situation this would be hearsay with a capital H.

Counsel further argued that Canada had an opportunity to cross-examine John Testawits on his various statements and statutory declarations, and, having failed to do so, should not be able to imply that he lied about what he had been told by Joseph, Samuel, Angelique, and even Angela Testawits. Because John Testawits’s evidence was given in the context of the Commission’s inquiry, it should be preferred to the information obtained from Angela Testawits.

The Commission has set out in some detail the parties’ arguments with respect to whether a meeting took place because this issue forms a central theme of the First Nation’s claim. However, we have little doubt that the meeting did, in fact, occur. In particular, we are struck by the remarkable consistency between the accounts of Murison and Angela Testawits regarding the discussions involving the three additional terms inserted by Murison and the price to be paid for the surrendered lands. It will be recalled that Murison wrote in 1928:

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They asked what they would get for the land, but this I was not able to inform them, but told them that it would be sold by public auction to the highest bidder which seemed to satisfy them. The second condition is that all monies received from the sale of the said lands would be placed to their credit and interest thereon paid to them annually on a per capita basis. Also that an initial payment of $50.00 be made to each member of their band on or before the 15th day of December, 1928. They also asked if a portion of the proceeds could be used in the purchase of stock, farm implements and building materials and I inserted a condition in the surrender covering this request.\textsuperscript{240}

In her interview, Angela stated in 1973:

The officials told him [Joseph Testawits] there isn’t a figure that we can count with in terms of money entitled to each individual with the amount of land you have sold, now what do you want to do? He replied, “as long as there is one of my people left, every fall and spring money should be given to them.” His other request was that if someone wanted to farm, he should be provided with a tractor and implements, that was what he wanted, we never saw any of these things. We received $200 in the fall and the same in the spring but since my husband died we didn’t even get $50.\textsuperscript{241}

In the Commission’s view, this brief excerpt from Angela’s interview deals with each of the items described in the preceding quotation from Murison’s report: price, the initial payment, annual interest payments, and farm implements. As to the First Nation’s objection that Angela’s statements constituted hearsay, we can only observe that there must surely be less objection to the evidence of someone like Angela, who was actually there at the surrender meeting, than to that of John, who merely relayed the recollections of others. In any event, we are more interested in Angela’s recollection of what was said and what she observed than in any use of those recollections to establish the truth of the statements made by Murison and Joseph Testawits, and for this reason we do not believe that Angela’s evidence falls afoul of the hearsay rule.

\textsuperscript{240} W. Murison, Inspector of Indian Agencies, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, October 3, 1928, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-5, pt 1 (ICC Documents, pp. 253-54).

\textsuperscript{241} Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G).
While it is true that Angela Testawits gave evidence at the age of 80,\(^{242}\) some 45 years after the surrender, John Testawits’s evidence, given at a similar age, was not only second-hand but was given closer to 65 years after the surrender. It also displayed a number of troubling inconsistencies. In his statutory declaration of December 3, 1991, John asserted that Samuel, Angelique, and Angela Testawits attended the meeting with L’Heureux,\(^{243}\) but in his evidence before the Commission at the community session in Brownvale on September 6, 1995, he stated that “[i]t was just those two old ladies at Berwyn at the time of the signing of the surrender at Berwyn” and that Samuel was away putting up hay.\(^{244}\) Similarly, during the course of a transcribed interview with trader Ben Basnett on February 25, 1992, John indicated that Joseph Testawits was absent during the surrender meeting because he was away haying at Spirit River and Bear Lake, suggesting a meeting in late summer or early fall.\(^{245}\) This evidence is consistent with John’s statutory declaration,\(^{246}\) but it is contrary to his interview before Commission counsel on August 15, 1995, where he stated:

> I never signed nothing he [Joseph Testawits] told me straight out. If somebody did he said it’s all hogwash because I never signed nothing. How could I sign anything when I was away. I was at Spirit River hunting all through, beaver hunt and that would take right up to May and after that it was June and he was still not back from the beaver hunt. And that’s as far as I know.\(^{247}\)

\(^{242}\) It should be noted that, although in her interview Angela Testawits stated that “[r]ecently, I had my age marked as 80 years old.” interviewer Richard Lightning recorded her age as 91 years: Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 1 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G).


\(^{244}\) ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 36) (John Testawits).

\(^{245}\) Interview of Ben Basnett, February 25, 1992, p. 30 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab A).


It also contradicts his evidence at the community session, which again suggests that the surrender meeting would have taken place in late spring or early summer.\textsuperscript{248} However, in our view, nothing turns on these inconsistencies. It seems that John Testawits may have been recounting the recollections of his predecessors with regard to a different meeting in a different location (Berwyn), involving different elders from those who participated in the surrender meeting on IR 152.

The Commission does not wish to be taken as being critical in any way of John Testawits or as suggesting that he and the other elders on whose information he relied were not telling the truth. Recalling events that occurred as much as 65 years ago is a difficult undertaking at the best of times, and doubly so for someone who did not have the advantage of experiencing those events personally.

Nevertheless, we conclude that the alleged meeting of September 19, 1928, actually took place. As Canada has submitted, there is no evidence to suggest that Murison met with band members individually or in small groups, as allegedly occurred in relation to the surrender by the Beaver Band. Murison was frank in describing his difficulties in gathering voters for the Beaver and Swan River Band surrenders, but, as counsel for the First Nation admits, there is no report of any similar efforts being required in relation to the Duncan’s Band.\textsuperscript{249}

Likewise, we do not find it surprising that Murison met members of the Duncan’s Band on Beaver IR 152 since, as we will discuss below, John and James Boucher – and indeed other members of the Band – may have resided on or near that reserve at the time of the surrender. In fact, in September 1928, it may well have been more convenient for many Band members to meet with Murison on the Beaver reserve than on their own. As Laird reported with regard to paying treaty annuities to the Band just over a month earlier:

> The next morning [August 3, 1928] I drove to Reserve No. 152, where the Beaver Indians were paid, – 46 Indians – $250.00. There were 4 deaths on this Reserve since the 1927 payments.

> On the above Reserve, most of the Indians of Duncan Tustawits’ Band were encamped, who were paid after the Beaver Indians. Leaving Mr. Scovil to pay the few remaining Indians of this Band on the Reserve near Berwyn [presumably IR

\textsuperscript{248} ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 41) (John Testawits).

\textsuperscript{249} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 22; ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 50 (Jerome Slavik).
151], I drove to Peace River (Crossing) and took train for Enilda, reaching Grouard by stage at 7 in the morning of the 4th.\textsuperscript{250}

We conclude that Canada’s representatives likely met with band members on IR 152, where most of them may have already congregated, and that three of the voters – Eban Testawits, James Boucher, and Joseph Testawits – subsequently accompanied Murison and Laird, or made their own way, to Waterhole to swear the affidavit before Dundas. This is not to say that the alleged meeting involving Samuel, Angelique, and Angela Testawits did \emph{not} occur, but, even if it did, that does not mean that we would have to conclude that the surrender meeting did not happen.

We are mindful of the First Nation’s concerns with regard to the surrender documents. However, the evidence before the Commission does not lead us to conclude that the surrender documents were fabricated, as counsel for the First Nation urges us to believe. We also disagree that the existence of different signatories to the surrender document and the affidavit should lead to the implication that a meeting did not occur. As for the shortcomings, if any, in Dundas’s jurat, we consider those to be the sort of technical deficiency in certifying the surrender \emph{after the fact} that McLachlin J found insufficient to render invalid the surrender in \emph{Apsassin}.

Although the First Nation argues that the surrender documents were prepared in advance of the meeting, there is, in our view, considerable evidence to suggest that they may have been redrafted on site. Murison’s report of October 3, 1928, and Angela Testawits’s evidence both indicate that the additional terms were discussed. Perhaps more telling, however, are the documents themselves. The date on the surrender document – “this nineteenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight” – is, like the rest of the document (with the exception of the handwritten word “September”), \emph{typewritten} without any obvious amendment. We are at a loss to explain why the word “September” was handwritten. Although we might speculate as to the reason, we would nevertheless be surprised, assuming this document was prepared in advance, if the draftsman would have known the exact day of the month – the nineteenth – on which the document would be executed. Similarly, on the affidavit, the names of Murison and the principal men, the location in which the affidavit was sworn, and the date on which the affidavit was sworn were all

\textsuperscript{250} Harold Laird, \textit{Indian Agent to Assistant Deputy and Secretary}, December 4, 1928, NA, RG 10, vol. 6920, file 777/28-3, pt 3, C-8012 or C-10980 (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 3).
completed by typewriter. We fail to see how this document could have been prepared in advance, since the names of the deponents and the date of the meeting to swear the affidavit would likely have remained uncertain until the actual event. Even counsel for the First Nation seemed prepared to concede at the community session that Murison “obviously had a typewriter with him, because he typed up an alternative form [of surrender for IR 151H] on the 20th [of September, 1928]...”

Moreover, we note that, when he sent the new forms to Indian Commissioner Graham on August 9, 1928, Acting Deputy Superintendent General J.D. McLean wrote that “[a]dditional copies of surrender forms are herewith, in order that the change in the name of the Band may be made”, this language appears to anticipate that the new documents were yet to be prepared. In conclusion, it seems apparent that, even if documents were prepared in advance, new ones were drawn up to incorporate the additional terms and the particulars of execution.

Nevertheless, having concluded that a meeting did take place, we must still consider whether the other criteria in section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act were satisfied.

**Was the Meeting Summoned to Deal with the Surrender?**

In dealing with this criterion, Estey J in *Cardinal* stated: “Firstly, the meeting must be called to consider the question of surrender explicitly. It may not be attended to at a regular meeting or one in respect of which express notice has not been given to the band.” It will be seen that there are two aspects to this criterion: the purpose of the meeting, and notice.

As to whether the meeting was summoned for the purpose of dealing with the surrender, this point was not really argued before us. Canada takes it as given that the meeting was called to consider the surrender, while the First Nation, as we have discussed, denies that a meeting was called or took place at all.

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251 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 100-01) (Jerome Slavik).

252 J.D. McLean, Acting Deputy Superintendent General, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, August 9, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 218).


254 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 45.
On this point, it will be recalled that A.F. MacKenzie, the Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary for Indian Affairs, asked Laird on April 4, 1928, “[W]hat would be the most suitable time to call a meeting of these Indians for the purpose of considering this matter [the surrender]?” Laird responded that August 6, 1928, “the date advertised for the payment of Annuities to the Indians interested in the small Reserves mentioned, would be a suitable date for a meeting of the Band.” Ultimately, annuities were distributed on August 3, 1928, at which time, according to Murison’s October 3, 1928 report, Band members were notified that there would be a meeting later that year to consider “the question of surrender.” It is unclear whether the failure to deal with the surrender in early August resulted from concerns that the meeting to pay annuities might then be considered to have been called for a purpose other than surrender, contrary to subsection 51(1); alternatively, that failure may have stemmed from the delays in providing the replacement surrender documents, which were not sent to Murison until August 9. In any event, there seems to be little doubt, from the Commission’s perspective, that the September 19, 1928, meeting was summoned for the precise purpose of dealing with the surrender, particularly since there is no evidence to suggest that any other business took place there.

Turning to the question of notice, the First Nation submits that the Crown failed to give notice of a surrender meeting or, at the very least, that the notice was insufficient and certainly not what Estey J referred to as “express notice.” Although prepared to acknowledge that four male members of the Band were advised on August 3, 1928, upon receiving treaty annuities at Dunvegan, “that an official would meet them some time later this year to take up the question of surrender with them,” counsel for the First Nation argues that this advice failed to stipulate a date, time, or location.

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256 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, April 10, 1928, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 201).

257 J.D. McLean, Acting DSGIA, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, August 9, 1928 (ICC Documents, p. 219).

258 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 68.

of the meeting or any indication of whether the purpose of the meeting was to take the surrender or simply to discuss possible terms.\footnote{Counsel also refers to Scott’s instructions to his agents, which stipulated, in the absence of a band’s own rules on the subject of notice, the conspicuous posting of printed or written notices on the reserve at least one week before the surrender meeting, followed by the interpreter delivering, where practicable, written or verbal notice to each Indian on the voters’ list not less than three days before the meeting; in the event that an agent was unable to comply with these instructions, he was instructed to provide sufficient reasons detailing his failure to do so. In counsel’s submission, although Murison would have known of Scott’s instructions, there is no record of notices being posted on the reserve,\footnote{no record of written or verbal notice being given to eligible voters, and no record of any reason for failing to provide such notice.}

Moreover, counsel contends that, of the four individuals to whom notice was given during the payment of treaty annuities at Dunvegan on August 3, 1928, John and James Boucher were long-time residents of the Beaver reserve, Emile Leg resided near Eureka River, and Francis Leg was of no fixed address. Therefore, since Murison gave no report of any efforts to gather band members, as he did with the Beaver and Swan River Bands, counsel concludes that those band members resident on IR 151 must have received no notice of the meeting.\footnote{Accordingly, “it strains credulity,” in counsel’s submission, “to accept that the majority of the eligible voters of Duncan’s were allegedly assembled late in the afternoon of September 19, 1928 on the Beaver Indian Reserve with virtually no notification or effort on the part of Murison.”\footnote{Besides its objection that Scott’s instructions to his Indian agents did not superimpose a secondary order of mandatory surrender requirements over and above the provisions of the Indian Act, Canada takes the position that those instructions were simply not practical in Duncan’s case. Counsel asserts that, if there is no place on a reserve to conspicuously post a notice, since the band

\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 91 (Jerome Slavik).}
\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 82-83 (Jerome Slavik).}
\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 17, 1997, pp. 45-46.}
\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 52 (Jerome Slavik).}
\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 22.}}
is not resident there, it would be absurd to suggest that posting a notice should be a mandatory requirement when it would obviously not suffice to notify people of the impending meeting. It then becomes necessary, in counsel’s view, to resort to other means of giving notice.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 154 (Perry Robinson).}

Whatever those other means might have been, Canada contends that prior notice of the meeting was in fact given, and that the surrender affidavit is at least \textit{prima facie} evidence that the Crown’s representatives complied with the statute.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, pp. 17-18; ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 156 (Perry Robinson).} Moreover, in a letter dated January 31, 1997, from Michel Roy, the Director General of the Specific Claims Branch, to Chief Donald Testawich and counsel for the First Nation, Canada stated:

The evidence indicates that the matter of a surrender was not raised unexpectedly as it had been discussed with DFN [Duncan’s First Nation] members on at least two earlier occasions, including: at treaty time on July 10, 1925; and at a July 14, 1927 meeting between Agent Laird and DFN members at which time the parties discussed the possibility of surrendering reserves 151 and 151B to 151G. The evidence indicates that notice was given on August 3, 1928 to the effect that an official would meet with the DFN some time in the year to take up the question of a surrender.... In Canada’s view, the fact that a majority of eligible voters attended the surrender meeting is also indicative of sufficient notice.\footnote{Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 4).}

Counsel further points to Murison’s report that “[t]hese Indians were prepared for me and had evidently discussed the matter very fully amongst themselves” as evidence that sufficient notice of the meeting to consider surrender had been duly given to Band members.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, pp. 17-18; ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 154-55 (Perry Robinson).}

The Commission is inclined to agree with Canada on this point. For reasons we have previously given, we have less difficulty than the First Nation in accepting that band members were able to assemble on Beaver IR 152 on September 19, 1928, since it appears that they may have
already been there, having recently received their treaty annuities on that reserve. However, given the First Nation’s doubts regarding the whereabouts of band members in 1928, the Commission has undertaken a careful review of the treaty annuity paylist for that year.

Of the 50 band members paid in 1928, it appears that 19 – including the Bouchers and the Legs – were paid on the Beaver Band’s IR 152A near Dunvegan, two were paid at Grouard, one at Sucker Creek, one at Whitefish Lake, one at Swan Lake, and two others at specified but illegible locations. With respect to the remaining 25, including the three Testawits brothers, there is nothing on the paylist to indicate where they received their annuities. However, Laird reported on December 4, 1928, that “most” of the Indians of the Duncan’s Band were “encamped” and paid on IR 152 on August 3, with Laird’s assistant paying “the few remaining Indians of this Band on the Reserve near Berwyn” on August 6, 1928.269 The reference to “most” of the Indians being paid at IR 152 appears incongruous if Laird meant only those 19 band members who were paid on IR 152A at Dunvegan. Obviously, 19 individuals would not represent “most” of the 50-member Band. Perhaps other members were paid on IR 152 at Fairview, and at the same time received notice of the fall surrender meeting, but the evidence on this point is inconclusive. More significant is the fact that Laird came across most of the members of the Band at IR 152 in August without having summoned them to be there; this illustrates that it should not have been surprising for them to be there in September and for the surrender meeting to have been held there, since that was where they frequently congregated and received their annuities in any event.

It is significant, in our view, that, even if only four potential voters were given notice at Dunvegan on August 3, 1928, two of the remaining potential voters in fact attended the meeting and were, in Murison’s words, prepared to discuss the surrender. Further evidence of this preparedness is demonstrated in the Band’s negotiation and settlement of the terms of the surrender, as illustrated in Murison’s report and Angela Testawits’s comments concerning the additional conditions inserted in the documents at the Band’s request. We have also had regard for Canada’s argument that the issue of surrender was raised with the Band at meetings on July 10, 1925, and July 14, 1927, the

269 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, December 4, 1928, NA, RG 10, vol. 6920, fık 777/28-3, pt 3, C-8012 or C-10980. Interestingly, there is nothing on the paylist to suggest that anyone was paid near Berwyn.
implication of which is that the subject was not new to band members when the surrender meeting took place on September 19, 1928. Similarly, on March 10, 1928, Laird anticipated receiving inquiries from band members returning from the hunt “as to whether any action has been taken re[garding] the suggested surrender of their small reserves.” In this sense, the evidence is reminiscent of the findings of Addy J at trial in Apsassin, as relied upon by McLachlin J in the Supreme Court of Canada:

1. That the plaintiffs had known for some considerable time that an absolute surrender of I.R. 172 was being contemplated;
2. That they had discussed the matter previously on [sic] at least three formal meetings where representatives of the Department were present;
3. That, contrary to what has been claimed by the plaintiffs, it would be nothing short of ludicrous to conclude that the Indians would not also have discussed it between themselves on many occasions in an informal manner, in their various family and hunting groups.

We acknowledge that the record is lacking in details regarding the date, time, and place of the surrender meeting, but we must concur with Canada that posting a notice on the reserve in this case would have been an exercise in futility. The real key is not the means of notice but the sufficiency of that notice. We conclude that there was apparently sufficient notice, since most of the eligible voting members attended and were reportedly prepared to proceed.

**Was the Meeting Summoned According to the Rules of the Band?**

Even if the members of the Duncan’s Band received adequate notice of the surrender meeting, the First Nation contends that the Crown’s representatives failed to summon or conduct the meeting in accordance with the Band’s practices. In the First Nation’s submission, the Band should have controlled where and when the meeting was to be held, what the subject matter of the meeting would

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270 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, March 10, 1928, DIA ND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 196).


272 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 68.
be, how notice of the meeting would be given, and who would be entitled to attend. As counsel stated:

When you call a meeting, you think of all those things. It’s a fundamental issue of being able to control the process. Control. That’s what summoning according to the rules of the Band means. The Indians control the process. In this case there is no evidence that anyone in the Band summoned a Band meeting together on the Beaver Indian Reserve. They didn’t control the process. They didn’t control all those crucial factors that so much affect the outcome, timing and substance of a decision.

Who did control that? The Department. Is there any explanation of the Department what they thought the rules of the Band were throughout this by anyone? No.273

Relying on the evidence of John Testawits, counsel submitted that the Band’s normal practice for summoning a meeting was that “they would call a meeting at someone’s home on the reserve, and they would have the whole community come and discuss an important event, and that the meeting would be held on the reserve in the community, not somewhere else.”274 Since the September 19, 1928, meeting was held 30 miles from the reserve, without notice or recorded efforts of trying to gather people to attend, and since the Band did not control the process, the meeting was not called according to the rules of the Band. In the First Nation’s submission, this represented a substantive breach of the Indian Act surrender requirements and thus invalidated the surrender.275

Canada responds to these submissions in two ways. First, it argues that John Testawits was away at school when the surrender was taken and therefore is not in a position to speak about the Band’s rules for calling meetings at that time. Second, it contends that there is no evidence before the Commission that the Band had any rules for calling meetings at that time in any event.276 According to counsel, John Testawits’s evidence, to the extent that it can be given weight, illustrates a lack of “any authoritative procedures on calling meetings” and “suggests the existence of an

274  ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 94 (Jerome Slavik).
275  ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 94-95 (Jerome Slavik).
informal and flexible practice, much like that found by Killeen J in *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point* and by Addy J (without contradiction by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada) in *Apsassin*. The First Nation having failed to establish governing rules of practice, counsel submits that the *Indian Act*’s requirement for calling meetings in accordance with band rules simply does not apply in these circumstances:

... the requirement to summon the meeting according to the rules of the Band essentially only applies if the Band actually had rules for calling meetings. Otherwise notice is going to have to be given to the Band members, and if there is no established Band practice, I would submit that whatever is going to work for the Band to get them at this meeting is going to be the course of conduct that is going to be undertaken.

In *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point*, the plaintiff Band similarly alleged that a surrender meeting had not been called in accordance with the rules of the Band. Those rules, in the Band’s submission, required a Band Council Resolution to authorize a General Council meeting to consider a surrender proposal. Since the surrender meeting in that case had not been authorized by a Band Council Resolution, the Band submitted that the requirements of subsection 49(1) of the 1906 *Indian Act* had not been met. However, Killeen J rejected this argument, concluding that, although there was evidence in that case of previous General Council meetings being summoned by Band Council Resolution, “there is no convincing evidence that the Band had a written or customary rule, of an inflexible nature, requiring that such a Band Council Resolution precede the General Council meeting.”

Similarly, in *Apsassin*, the plaintiff Band argued that the surrender was invalid because the surrender meeting had not been called in accordance with the rules of the Band. Addy J held that the

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279 *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [1996] 1 CNLR 54 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)) at 84.
Band bore the onus of establishing that it had rules for summoning meetings or council, but that this evidentiary burden had not been met on the facts in that case.\textsuperscript{280}

In light of these authorities, the Commission has carefully reviewed John Testawits’s evidence regarding the Band’s practice for calling meetings in 1928, and we believe that certain portions of it warrant highlighting. On examination by counsel for the First Nation, Testawits stated:

\begin{verbatim}
Q ... If the Indian Agent wanted to get some information from you or to make a decision, he wouldn’t call a council meeting. How would he do it? Would he just talk to you or talk to someone else? Would he talk to Joseph? How would he do it?
A You mean before I got –
Q Yes, before –
A Well, the Indian Agent would come, and he talked to the people, and get to talk – we gather as a meeting, just like this, just to get together on it, and then we talk about it ahead of time, what’s our intentions, what should be done and this and that, and we consult with the elders, of course, Joe, and that is the way we accomplished things. We didn’t need no band council resolution. There wasn’t no band council at that time, no chief yet. So whatever consensus the people said – the grassroots people is the ones we consulted with, and whatever they figured best, well, that’s the way we done it until such time as I got in as chief, and then we got a band council resolution from there on.
Q To make an important decision, then, the people would have a meeting amongst themselves to talk about it?
A Yeah, we had a meeting amongst ourselves, yeah.
Q So would that include the men and the women?
A We bring in everybody before I was chief. We bring in everybody. We had a meeting in somebody’s house. Sometimes Uncle Joe’s house, and sometimes Angelique’s, Mr. Jack Knott’s place.
Q That is the way they had been doing it for years. They would meet at somebody’s house on the reserve and talk it over?
A Yeah.
Q Do you think that is the way they would do it while you were away at school in the twenties? They would do it the same way?
A Oh, yes, they would do the same process. They would talk about it. \textit{Whichever way the best thing that could be done, that is the way they done it.} But I wasn’t around, so they just done it their way, and that’s it.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{280} Apsassin \textit{v. The Queen}, [1988] 1 CNLR 73 (FCTD) at 88.
Q But if they had to make an important decision, though, they would meet. There would be a meeting at somebody’s house to talk about it.

A M-hm.

Q They wouldn’t make an important decision – one person wouldn’t make an important decision on their own.

A They all have to get in together on it, not just one person. Because they used judgment of people, the grassroots people. They are not wrong. They bring in everything, whatever they figure they could do best, it should be done, and that is they way they do it. Just as simple as that. Now it takes a band council resolution to get it going.

Q But in those days, all the adults would gather at somebody’s house and talk it over?

A Yeah. You didn’t need to be at somebody’s house. You could go in a tepee, some tepees and some tents, go there and sit around and talk about it, and that is it. When you are done, you are done. Just as simple as that.

Q If they had an important decision to make in the community, would they go, for example, and hold a meeting at Fairview? In, say, the twenties and thirties, would they go all the way to Fairview to hold a meeting?

A No, not necessarily....

Q When the Indian Agent wanted a decision from the members, he would come to the reserve.

A The people come to him. He comes with his buggy. Most of the time, they are driving the buggy, little buggy. They come. When he come there, everybody knows about it, because they know they going to get that treaty money or they are going to get rations. That is relief, we call it.

Q But Johnny, the point I am trying to get to you is that, in your view, if there was an important decision to be made, you would not go to – you wouldn’t have all the adults and women and everybody go to Fairview for a meeting with the Indian Agent. The Indian Agent would come to the reserve.

A Yeah, that’s what I said.281

From this excerpt, we conclude that meetings of the Duncan’s Band were convened on a relatively ad hoc basis, without much concern for niceties of form. The Band simply adopted whatever course it thought best to deal with the problem at hand. The Band’s meetings may have been, but were not necessarily, held in someone’s house or even on the reserve. As for the Band’s control of the meeting process, there is virtually no evidence of how the 1928 surrender meeting was conducted, although

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we have already found it more likely that Murison came to the Indians on IR 152 than that they came to him.

The Duncan’s Band, like many bands in the Treaty 8 area, appears to have been a band more in name than in substance, constituting as it did a collection of families assembled for the purposes of hunting and trapping. Its people were not a cohesive group but rather seem to have congregated from time to time only as circumstances might require, such as for the annual payment of treaty annuities. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Band should have little or nothing in the way of formal rules or procedures for calling and conducting meetings, and that, when Band members did get together to deal with issues that might arise, they would do so on an informal basis.

Based on this scant evidence, we conclude, as Addy J did in _Apsassin_, that the First Nation has failed to establish that it had any fixed rules in 1928 for summoning meetings or councils. Accordingly, we cannot infer that the meeting was called in contravention of band rules or practice, nor can we hold that Canada was in breach of this provision of subsection 51(1).

**Who Were the Male Members of the Band of the Full Age of 21 Years?**

Having concluded that there was a surrender meeting, summoned with sufficient notice and without contravening any rules of the Band, for the specific purpose of dealing with the surrender, and held in the presence of duly authorized officers of the Crown, we turn now to the eligibility requirements of section 51.

The first criterion for determining whether an individual was entitled to attend and vote at a surrender meeting in 1928 is set forth in subsection 51(1) of the 1927 _Indian Act_. That subsection

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282 As Neil Reddekopp commented:

From the standpoint of social organization and the occupation and use of land, the distinction between the Beaver and the Cree is inconsequential. As with the Cree, the basic social and economic unit for the Beaver was the family, either nuclear or extended, and the largest permanent entity was the hunting band, made up of two or more families related by kinship ties. These hunting bands functioned independently of each other from the autumn of one year to the spring of the next. Each summer, a number of hunting bands would come together to form a regional band at a spot which favoured fishing, haying and hunting non-forest animals such as bison. One area which met all of these criteria and was admirably suited for spending the summer was found along the north bank of the Peace River between Dunvegan and the confluence of the Peace and Smoky Rivers.

stipulates that a surrender “shall be assented to by a majority of the male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one years.” Therefore, to be eligible to vote, an individual was required to be male, a member of the Band, and at least 21 years old.

Generally, in considering these criteria, the First Nation submits that the Commission should assess the Band’s paylists and surrender voters’ list with a critical eye. Laird was described by his successor as “manipulative and careless” in handling paylists, and was later found to have misappropriated funds by failing to deliver annuity payments or by pocketing payments for deceased individuals whom he reported as still alive. Moreover, he characteristically underreported adult band members. For these reasons, the First Nation argues that Laird’s integrity and competence should be questioned, and that his paylists should be considered “inherently unreliable.”

As for Murison, counsel contends that there is no evidence to indicate that he made inquiries into whether there might be other eligible voters, such as Alex Mooswah, or whether the individuals on his voters’ list actually qualified as being habitually resident on or near, and interested in the reserve. Since Murison allegedly included two deceased members of the Beaver Band as eligible voters in that Band’s surrender documentation, and showed one of those two as an actual signatory to the surrender, it should be open to the Commission, in the First Nation’s view, to infer that proper assent to the Duncan’s surrender was not obtained:

So on paper it looked good. I mean Murison knew how to paper over the event, that’s my point. But the analysis of his voters list there, and how the vote was taken and the conduct of Murison didn’t comply with what he said occurred in his Affidavit.

The conclusion is that Murison was either negligent, careless, manipulative and in any event self-serving and negligent in his pursuit of these surrenders. In our view, he showed callous disregard for both the requirements of the Act and of the truthfulness of his statements.

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For its part, Canada stands by Murison’s surrender voters’ list, noting that both Murison and the three band members on the surrender affidavit swore that the surrender was assented to by a majority of the seven male members of the Band aged at least 21 years and entitled to vote.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, pp. 20-21.}

The Commission has had occasion to review various band paylists and voters’ lists over the years, and we know they have not always proven to be accurate reflections of band membership or other information indicated on the face of those lists. For example, in the present case, the November 7, 1928, paylist for the first advance payment of $50 from the surrender proceeds to the Duncan’s Band records a total of eight men as band members, including Isadore Mooswah (now known as Ted “Chick” Knott), whose age was shown as 23 years. The subsequent paylists for the second payment of $50 and interest payments to 1932 also show Isadore Mooswah as being 23 or 24 years of age\footnote{Paylist of First Advance Payment of Indians re Surrender of Reserves Nos. 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F and 151G, Duncan’s Band, November 7, 1928 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab K); Paylist of Second Advance Payment, Surrender of Reserves Nos. 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F and 151G, Duncan’s Band, January 28, 1920 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab L); Paylist of First Interest Payment, Duncan’s Band, September 20, 1930 (ICC Exhibit 6, tabs M and N); Paylist of Second Interest Payment, Duncan Tustawits’ Band, January and February 1931 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab O); Paylist of Third Interest Payment, Duncan’s Band, undated (ICC Exhibit 6, tab P).} and thus eligible, on at least a \textit{prima facie} basis, to vote at the surrender meeting. However, at the Commission’s community session on September 6, 1995, Ted Knott declared that he attended school in the 1930s, and he gave his age as 82 years.\footnote{ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 26) (Ted Knott).} This means that he would have been born in 1913 and only 15 years of age at the time of the surrender – and thus ineligible to vote. As a consequence, we agree with counsel for the First Nation that we must carefully consider the paylist and voters’ list information and, wherever possible, determine whether there is other evidence to prove or disprove the contents of those lists.

It is in this context that we now turn to our review of the First Nation’s challenges to Murison’s interpretation and application of the eligibility requirements in subsection 51(1) with regard to Alex Mooswah and the Leg brothers. We will then consider certain evidence raised by John Tustawits regarding John Boucher’s eligibility under that subsection.
Alex Mooswah

The First Nation contends that Alex Mooswah was 27 years old at the time of the surrender, but, despite being old enough to be eligible to vote, was for some reason excluded from the voters’ list.\textsuperscript{288}

In drawing this conclusion, counsel relies heavily on the following evidence of Neil Reddekopp, a lawyer/genealogist with the Province of Alberta’s Department of Aboriginal Affairs:

Most documents associated with the Lesser Slave Lake Agency suggest that Alex Mooswah was born in approximately 1910. Murison gave his age as 19 in January 1930, but, as with Isidore Mooswah, Murison did not meet Alex. It was not until 1936 that Alex Mooswah received his own ticket, and his age was given as 29 in 1939.

On the other hand, there is convincing, if circumstantial, evidence that Alex Mooswah was approximately 27 years of age when the Duncan’s surrender vote was held in 1928. Some of this is contextual relating to the interpretation of entries on the paylists regarding Alex Mooswah and his father, Modeste Mooswah. Paylist entries for the latter do not indicate the birth of a boy in 1910 or 1911, the years in which Alex would have to have been born in order for his age to match Murison’s 1930 estimate or the age given on the 1939 paylist. The only male births to Modeste Mooswah’s ticket were recorded in 1902 or 1916. Alex Mooswah’s own ticket indicates that his wife was 47 years of age in 1942, which alone would suggest that Alex was more likely to be approximately 40 than about 25 at that time. Added to this, both Isidore Mooswah [Ted Knott] (born in 1913), Alex Mooswah’s cousin and John Testawits (born in 1915) remember Alex as being considerably older than themselves.

Finally, parish records reveal that Alex Letendre, the son of Modeste Letendre and Marie Tranquille, was born on December 27, 1901, and his January 14, 1902 baptism was recorded in the parish register at Spirit River. Identification of this child as Alex Mooswah requires, of course, the conclusion that the Modeste Mooswah who was Number 15 of Duncan’s Band and the Modeste Letendre who was the father of Alex Letendre were the same person. In this regard, it should be noted that the interchangeable use of the names Monswa (or Mooswah) and Letendre is common in parish records through northern Alberta. There is also considerable overlap between the birth of children to Modeste Letendre and Marie Tranquille and the appearance of children on the ticket of Modeste Mooswah. Not only does the birth of Alex Letendre in December 1901 correspond to the appearance of a boy on Modeste Mooswah’s ticket in 1902, the births of Charlotte in April 1904, Marie Rose

\textsuperscript{288} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 26.
in May 1908, and Elise in June 1911 correspond to the appearance of girls on the ticket in 1904, 1908 and 1912.\textsuperscript{289}

Canada responds to the First Nation’s submission by citing the conflicting evidence in Reddekopp’s report as evidence that the First Nation has failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that Alex Mooswah should have been an eligible voter.\textsuperscript{290} Moreover, after reviewing Ted Knott’s evidence at the community session that he last saw Alex Mooswah in the summer or fall of 1935, at which time, in Knott’s opinion, Alex was about 20 years old, Canada argues that Alex could not have been 21 years old in 1928.\textsuperscript{291}

Having considered the evidence, and subject to the questions of residency and interest in the reserve raised by the First Nation in relation to the Leg brothers and other members of the Band, we are prepared to conclude on a \textit{prima facie} basis that Alex Mooswah should have been included on the voters’ list, although, as Canada suggests, it remains to be determined whether this oversight has any practical or legal significance.

\textbf{Emile and Francis Leg}

With regard to Emile and Francis Leg, the First Nation’s primary position is that, even if they were band members, they were ineligible to vote because they were not habitually resident on or near, or interested in the Band’s reserves, as required by subsection 51(2) of the \textit{Indian Act}. We will consider that argument later in this report. First, however, we should consider John Testawits’s evidence, based on discussions with his mother, that the Leg brothers were not even members of the Band.\textsuperscript{292}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{289} G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” pp. 107-09 (ICC Exhibit 5). Footnote references omitted.
  \item \textsuperscript{290} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{291} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 171-72 (Perry Robinson).
  \item \textsuperscript{292} ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 43-44) (John Testawits); Statutory Declaration of John Testawits, December 3, 1991, p. 8 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 4; ICC Exhibit 10, tab B, Schedule 7); Indian Claims Commission, “Interview of Elders John Testawits and Ted Knott Taken at the Mile Zero Hotel, Grimshaw, Alberta,” August 15, 1995, pp. 2-3 and 6 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab B); Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 28.
\end{itemize}
a contention which, if true, would also have disqualified them from voting. Canada takes the position that both Emile and Francis were band members.293

It is interesting that counsel for the First Nation has not vigorously pursued this line of argument. By tacitly conceding that the Legs may have been band members while at the same time arguing that they were ineligible to vote for reasons of lack of residency on and interest in the reserves, counsel seeks to argue that the Legs should be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum for a surrender meeting, but should not be counted for the purposes of determining whether a majority of the male members of the Band aged at least 21 years assented to the surrender.

We will return to the issues of quorum and majority assent, but for now we feel that we can safely conclude that Emile and Francis Leg were members of the Duncan’s Band. Both joined the Band in 1905 with their mother when she married into the Band, and they were given their own tickets on the annuity paylist in 1914 and 1915, respectively.294 Neither appears to have resided for any length of time or at all on any of the Band’s reserves, but, as we will see, that was not necessarily unusual for members of this Band. While the Legs’ hunting and trapping may have taken them far afield and appears to have led to only sporadic contact with their Band, both consistently received their annuities with other band members from 1905 until well after the 1928 surrender. We see little in the way of concrete evidence to suggest that the Leg brothers belonged to another band and, based on their consistent inclusion on the Duncan’s Band’s paylists over many years, we conclude that they were members of the Duncan’s Band.

John Boucher
Although this issue did not form a major pillar of its submission, the First Nation tendered evidence and argument to the effect that the 1928 surrender documents were fabricated because, although John Boucher appears as a signatory, he may have already been dead by that date. In his statutory declaration of December 3, 1991, elder John Testawits stated that John Boucher was dead before

294 Paylist Comparison Database (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 1).
Testawits returned home from school in 1931, and in his August 15, 1995, interview by Commission counsel, Testawits added that Boucher “died before 1928 according to the records.” Counsel for the First Nation tied this evidence into his argument that Agent Laird’s paylists should not be trusted, given the extent of the paylist fraud in which Laird was later shown to have been engaged:

Mr. Reddekopp estimated that Mr. Boucher was probably born in around 1860, which at the time of the alleged surrender would have made him 68. There is no report of death either before 1928 or in 1931, ‘32, when it is reported on the paylist. So he is reported deceased on the 1932 paylist. He is shown as being paid in 1931. However, the pattern on the ticket has some but not all of the similarities related to those cases of fraud by Indian Agent Laird. And you heard Mr. Testawits speak of the fraud whereby annuities were paid to people on the paylists that were deceased. This was discovered in 1930. Laird was fired in ‘30. And most of the names of the elders who were the objects of the fraud were deleted from the paylists in 1932, the same year as John Boucher was deleted from the paylist. He may be a possible candidate for fraud as he was an elderly man. He was quite isolated and was a widower.

Obviously, if John Boucher predeceased the 1928 surrender meeting, he would have ceased to be capable of voting, let alone eligible to do so.

In contrast to these submissions are statements by elder Ted Knott and by Boucher’s grandson, Ben Boucher. Knott recalled that he last saw John Boucher in the summer of 1932, 1933, or 1934 at Moss Lake, which was where Knott believed Boucher to have lived. In a statutory declaration dated December 21, 1995, Ben Boucher stated that his grandfather was buried close to the railway in the Gage area near Hay Lake (also known as Moss Lake), north of Fairview, following

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297 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 86) (Jerome Slavik).
298 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 30 and 76-77) (Ted Knott).
his death at the age of 85 in the winter of 1936-37. Ben Boucher also attested to the fact that John Boucher was alive and residing near Hay Lake in 1928.299

The Commission believes it is important to deal with such allegations because, as we have noted, there is some evidence before us that, in the Beaver surrender taken by Murison and Laird just two days after the Duncan’s surrender, two individuals who reportedly took part in the meeting, including one who ostensibly signed the surrender document, were later shown to have been deceased before the meeting took place.300 However, it is the Commission’s view that the firsthand evidence of Ted Knott and Ben Boucher is compelling. We conclude that John Boucher was a male member of the Band of at least 21 years of age in 1928.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, we have determined that, in 1928, eight individuals were male members of the Duncan’s Band of at least 21 years of age. The membership of four of those individuals – Joseph Testawits, Samuel Testawits, Eban Testawits, and James Boucher – is not at issue. We have further established that Emile and Francis Leg were Band members by virtue of their long-standing, albeit intermittent, connection with the Band, and that John Boucher was still alive at the time of the surrender. Moreover, although the evidence is not definitive, we are also prepared to conclude that Alex Mooswah was a band member for the purposes of considering whether the quorum and majority assent requirements of the *Indian Act* were satisfied.

**What Is the Meaning of the Phrase “Habitually Resides on or near, and Is Interested in the Reserve in Question”?**

The next qualification for eligibility to participate in a surrender vote can be found in subsection 51(2) of the 1927 *Indian Act*, which states:


2. No Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.

It can be seen that there are two proscriptions in this provision: an Indian who is not habitually resident on or near, and interested in the reserve in question shall not take part in a surrender vote, but, just as significantly, no such Indian is even permitted to be present at the meeting at which the decision to surrender is being considered. The question of whether a particular Indian attended or voted at a surrender meeting is likely to be relatively clear in most cases. The more difficult question – and the one which the parties have identified as the threshold issue in this inquiry – is whether that Indian habitually resided on or near, and was interested in the reserve in question. There are a number of elements to this provision that require legal interpretation, and we will address each in turn.

“The Reserve in Question”

In this case, the meaning of the phrase “the reserve in question” is problematic because not one, but seven, parcels of reserve land were surrendered. According to the First Nation, although Samuel and Eban Testawits resided on IR 151A, none of the seven listed voters or Alex Mooswah habitually resided on or near any of the reserves that were actually surrendered.301 In drawing this conclusion, counsel relied on the statement by Secretary-Treasurer E.L. Lamont of the Municipal District of Peace that “[t]he above Indian Reserves situated within the boundaries of this Municipal District have been unoccupied for many years,”302 and on Murison’s report that “[t]he members of this band, in the past, have earned their living by hunting and working out for settlers and they have had no


302 E.L. Lamont, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Peace, to Secretary, DIA, July 7, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 174).
fixed place of abode.”

Obviously, the implication of such a conclusion is that every individual on the voters’ list was ineligible to vote, meaning that the surrender itself was a nullity. Moreover, even if Samuel and Eban Testawits might be considered eligible because they resided on IR 151A, only Eban assented to the surrender and signed the surrender document; the result, in the First Nation’s submission, is that the surrender still fails because only one of two eligible voters – and not the required majority – participated at the surrender meeting and assented to the surrender.

Counsel continued:

If there were no eligible voters then the overriding principle of preservation of the reserve lands for future generations would apply. Recalling that in 1928 the population of the band included 7 or 8 adult males, 27 women, and 15 children it would have been prudent to have waited to ascertain the potential future use among all other members in order to ensure that the reserves were not needed for future use and to determine what was in the best interests of all of the band members.

In reply, Canada takes the position that habitual residence on or near, and interest in any one of the reserve parcels was sufficient to establish voter eligibility under subsection 51(2). Counsel contends that this position is supported by the definition of “reserve” in the 1927 Indian Act, which does not require a reserve to consist of a single contiguous parcel of land. Section 2 of the 1927 Indian Act states:

2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, ... (j) “reserve” means any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted to a particular band of Indians, of which the legal title is in the Crown, and which remains so set apart and has not been

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305 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 55.
surrendered to the Crown, and includes all the trees, wood, timber, soil, stone, minerals, metals and other valuables thereon or therein.  

In the present case, although there is some uncertainty in the record as to whether IR 151H and 151K were set apart in severalty or in the collective interest of the entire Duncan’s Band, there is no such uncertainty with respect to IR 151 or 151B through 151G. All were clearly set apart for the benefit of the entire Band, and, in our view, each of them could have been considered as part of the Band’s “reserve,” as that term was defined in the 1927 statute. We consider the First Nation’s approach to interpreting the phrase “the reserve in question” to be too narrow because, depending on the facts of a given case, it might entirely preclude a band from dealing with part of its reserve simply because no one lives on or near it. In the right circumstances, the remote location of a parcel of reserve land might be the major reason for a band to want to dispose of it, but, if the First Nation’s argument is accepted, the band would be prevented from doing so.

We appreciate the argument that, in such cases, reserve lands should be preserved for future generations, but, as McLachlin J stated in Apsassin, we must attempt to strike a balance between autonomy and protection by honouring and respecting a band’s decision to surrender its reserve unless it would be foolish, improvident, or exploitative to do so. We will consider whether the 1928 surrender was foolish, improvident or exploitative later in these reasons. For the moment, we must agree with Canada that, as long as an otherwise eligible band member habitually resides on or near, and is interested in any portion of the reserve in question, he should not be disqualified from voting with regard to the surrender of that portion or any other part of the reserve.

306  Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 2. Emphasis added.
“Interested in”

The First Nation describes the Indian interest in reserve land as “usufructuary,” and relies on the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*\(^\text{307}\) definition of that term as adopted by Estey J of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Smith v. The Queen*:

Usufruct

1. *Law*. The right of temporary possession, use, or enjoyment of the advantages of property belonging to another, so far as may be had without causing damage or prejudice to it.

2. Use, enjoyment, or profitable possession (of something)....

Usufructuary

1. *Law*. One who enjoys the usufruct of a property, etc.\(^\text{308}\)

Counsel for the First Nation submits that being “interested in” a reserve means more than the mere self-interested pecuniary or commercial interest of “disinterested and distant members” to sell the land and realize their respective shares of the proceeds;\(^\text{309}\) it also means more than simple membership in the Band:

If any member of the Band could vote, as my friend contends, in short, if all members of the Band were automatically interested because of their beneficial interest, then having the phrase interested there would be redundant and all they would really need to say is all Indians residing on or near. They wouldn’t need to say interested. Interested here in my view connotes something more than mere membership.\(^\text{310}\)

Rather, a band member can only be truly interested in a reserve for the purposes of subsection 51(2), according to counsel, if he resides *on* it, or alternatively sufficiently *near* to it to permit him to make *actual use* of it for his residence, for economic functions such as farming, ranching, hunting, and


\(^{309}\) Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 52.

trapping, or for cultural, spiritual, or religious purposes. There are thus two categories of eligible voters provided for by subsection 51(2), in counsel’s submission: first, those band members who were habitually resident on the reserve in question, and, second, those who, while not habitually residing on the reserve, lived in very close physical proximity to the reserve in question and were making actual use of reserve lands. This narrow interpretation is consistent, according to the First Nation, with the “legislative package” of provisions in the Indian Act by which the Crown has undertaken to protect Indians from the risk of losing property – including both reserve lands and chattels held on those reserves – which they hold by virtue of their status as Indians. The result of this narrow interpretation is to deny the eligibility to vote on reserve surrenders to those non-resident members whose interest in surrender would be of a purely pecuniary nature.

Canada argues that, rather than narrowing the list of band members who are eligible to vote on a surrender, it makes more sense to broaden the interpretation of who is interested in the reserve so that the pool of eligible voters will be as large and representative of the band as possible. Doing so would arguably help prevent frauds and abuses, counsel urges, since a narrow interpretation of who is interested in a reserve might preclude a band from surrendering its reserves at all, or might allow surrenders to be authorized by only a few inhabitants of the reserve against the wishes and without the consent of otherwise qualified band members. This means that “interested in” should be interpreted broadly to refer to “all band members who would be legally eligible to participate in the proceeds of the reserve’s sale or lease.”

311 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 49.
312 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 52; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band (1990), 71 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC) at 226 (per La Forest J).
313 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 52.
315 Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 23. Canada initially argued that the words “interested in the reserve in question” were originally designed to distinguish between those members of a band who shared a collective interest in the band’s reserve lands and those who did not share in such collective interest (e.g., severalty lands): Bruce Becker, Counsel, DIAND Legal Services, Specific Claims, to Jerome N. Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, May 28, 1997, p. 2 (ICC Exhibit 14). However, after counsel for the First Nation pointed out that the phrase “interested in” first appeared in the Indian Act as early as 1876, whereas the concept of severalty was not introduced until Treaty 8 in 1899, Canada conceded that the phrase “interested in” could not have
Canada further submits that the words “interested in” must mean something more than residency.\(^{316}\) Counsel suggests that adopting the First Nation’s narrow approach would mean that “only those members who have direct dealings with the reserve (such as using the reserve for some purpose, or having a house or other improvements on the reserve) would be entitled to vote”; in effect, this would, in counsel’s view, equate interest in the reserve with residency, making the words “habitually resides on or near” redundant and thus meaningless.\(^{317}\) Since a band member who did not reside on the reserve or maintain contact with those on the reserve would still be interested in the reserve by virtue of his membership and his consequent right to receive a per capita distribution of the sale proceeds and interest following surrender, Canada submits that all the voters on Murison’s list were properly interested in the surrendered reserves.\(^{318}\)

In the parties’ submissions in the present inquiry, we are faced with two extreme positions. One is a very narrow approach, put forward by the First Nation, that would limit interest in the reserve to those living on or virtually adjacent to the reserve and making actual use of the reserve in some way, whether for residential, commercial, or spiritual purposes. The other is the polar opposite, advanced by Canada, which would sweep into the fold of eligible voters all band members having any treaty rights with respect to the reserve, regardless of whether those members made any use of, or had any physical or spiritual connection with, the reserve.

As Canada has argued, the First Nation’s approach to interest in the reserve would render the words “on or near” virtually meaningless because that approach practically demands an eligible voter’s residency in sight of the reserve. However, the First Nation contends that Canada’s approach would similarly give little or no meaning to “on or near” because any band member with even a mere pecuniary interest in the reserve, and regardless of his location, would be eligible to vote.
If we leave aside for the moment the question of residence, it is the Commission’s view that the proscription in subsection 51(2) against an Indian attending or voting at a surrender meeting unless he or she was interested in the reserve is intended to prevent surrender votes and meetings from being disrupted or influenced by Indians who were not sufficiently interested in the band’s reserve lands. Nevertheless, in the Commission’s view, we should be reluctant to limit the participation of band members in votes regarding the surrender of reserve lands belonging to those members and their children; accordingly, we must respect this interest and give it voice. Still, it must be recognized that the words “interested in” are intended to ensure the participation of those band members who have a reasonable connection – whether residential, economic, or spiritual – with the reserve. What constitutes a reasonable connection will clearly vary depending on the circumstances of a given case, and therefore it would not be wise or even necessary for us to attempt to enumerate all of the criteria that might be considered to give rise to such a connection. Generally speaking, we would err on the side of inclusion, and we would observe that it is only those individuals who have little or no connection with the reserve who should be excluded from voting on the surrender of reserve lands. We have had careful regard for the First Nation’s argument on this point but we cannot agree with its narrow interpretation of “interested in” since doing so might exclude everyone in the Band from being able to vote. There is no balance to this position and we cannot believe that it reflects Parliament’s intention.

We find support for our conclusion in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs). That case is not directly on point, dealing as it does with whether the exclusion of Indians not “ordinarily resident on the reserve” from voting in band elections governed by subsection 77(1) of the Indian Act contravenes subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, whether such contravention is nonetheless justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. Obviously, some of the fundamental premises underlying the Corbiere decision arise from its Charter context, which simply did not apply with regard to a surrender of reserve land in 1928. Nevertheless, certain statements by L’Heureux-Dubé J in her concurring reasons on behalf of a four-member minority of the Court

319 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) (May 20, 1999), No. 25708 (SCC).
highlight the competing considerations at play. On one hand, there are matters in which all band members have an interest, regardless of whether they live on- or off-reserve, but at present off-reserve members are entirely precluded by subsection 77(1) from participating in electing the band council to deal with those matters. As L’Heureux-Dubé J stated:

The wording of s. 77(1), therefore, gives off-reserve band members no voice in electing a band council that, among other functions, spends moneys derived from land owned by all members, and money provided to the band council by the government to be spent on all band members. The band council also determines who can live on the reserve and what new housing will be built. The legislation denies those in the position of the claimants a vote in decisions about whether the reserve land owned by all members of the band will be surrendered. In addition, members who live in the vicinity of the reserve, as shown by the evidence of several of the plaintiffs in this case, may take advantage of services controlled by the band council such as schools or recreational facilities. Moreover, as a practical matter, representation of Aboriginal peoples in processes such as land claims and self-government negotiations often takes place through the structure of Indian Act bands. The need for and interest in this representation is shared by all band members, whether they live on- or off-reserve. Therefore, although in some ways, voting for the band council and chief relates to functions affecting reserve members much more directly than others, in other ways it affects all band members.320

Similarly, as McLachlin and Bastarache JJ stated on behalf of the majority:

The impugned distinction perpetuates the historic disadvantage experienced by off-reserve band members by denying them the right to vote and participate in their band’s governance. Off-reserve band members have important interests in band governance which the distinction denies. They are co-owners of the band’s assets. The reserve, whether they live on or off it, is their and their children’s land. The band council represents them as band members to the community at large, in negotiations with the government, and within Aboriginal organizations. Although there are some matters of purely local interest, which do not as directly affect the interests of off-reserve band members, the complete denial to off-reserve members of the right to vote and participate in band governance treats them as less worthy and

320 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) (May 20, 1999), No. 25708, para. 78 (SCC), L’Heureux-Dubé J. Emphasis added.
entitled, not on the merits of their situation, but simply because they live off-reserve.\textsuperscript{321}

On the other hand, L’Heureux-Dubé J was prepared to acknowledge that on-reserve band members have special interests in the reserve that off-reserve members do not:

There are clearly important differences between on-reserve and off-reserve band members, which Parliament could legitimately recognize. Taking into account, recognizing, and affirming differences between groups in a manner that respects and values their dignity and difference are not only legitimate, but necessary considerations in ensuring that substantive equality is present in Canadian society. The current powers of the band council, as discussed earlier, include some powers that are purely local, affecting matters such as taxation on the reserve, the regulation of traffic, etc. In addition, those living on the reserve have a special interest in many decisions made by the band council. For example, if the reserve is surrendered, they must leave their homes, and this affects them in a direct way it does not affect non-residents. Though non-residents may have an important interest in using them, educational or recreational services on the reserve are more likely to serve residents, particularly if the reserve is isolated or the non-residents live far from it. Many other examples can be imagined.\textsuperscript{322}

What the Commission takes from these statements is that there may legitimately be different voting rights for various members of a band depending on the subject matter of the vote. Ultimately, the scheme recommended by L’Heureux-Dubé J – essentially identical to the solution proposed by the majority – would confer voting rights on off-reserve band members, subject to recognition being given to the “special interests” of those residing on the reserve. Nevertheless, we perceive that the underlying philosophy of the judgments is to include in some way, rather than exclude outright, off-reserve band members in votes that relate to the surrender of reserve lands. Although the Charter had no effect with respect to a surrender in 1928, we perceive a similar philosophy at play in subsection 51(2) of the 1927 Indian Act, wherein Parliament chose not to entirely exclude off-

\textsuperscript{321} Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) (May 20, 1999), No. 25708, para. 17 (SCC), McLachlin and Bastarache JJ. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{322} Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) (May 20, 1999), No. 25708, para. 94 (SCC), L’Heureux-Dubé J.
reserve band members but to limit participation in surrender votes to those who habitually resided on or near, and were interested in the reserve.

We see no reason why it should be assumed that the only interest that the wide-ranging members of the Duncan’s Band would have in their reserve would be to see it sold so they could realize their respective shares of the proceeds. In the Commission’s view, although members of the Duncan’s Band continued their traditional way of life that took them away from their reserves in many cases for most of each year, little had changed since the days when Treaty 8 was signed and the reserves were set apart for the Band. The very fact that it was necessary to set apart ten parcels of reserve land for the Band in the first place is a testament to the dispersed nature of the Band’s membership and its chosen means of earning its livelihood. There is no basis for suggesting that, notwithstanding their diverse locations and way of life, the members of the Duncan’s Band had any less interest in their reserves in 1928 than they had in the earlier years when those reserves were established. The treaty negotiations of 1899 foreshadowed the day when advancing settlement would result in competition for land and might make hunting and trapping a less viable proposition, so provision was made to protect the Indians’ position by securing reserves for them at an early date.

The fact that some of those reserve lands were later surrendered – at a time when hunting and fishing remained the primary livelihood of band members – goes to the heart of the question of whether Canada breached any fiduciary obligations in permitting the surrender to take place. However, it does not necessarily indicate that the sole interest of all non-resident band members in their reserve lands would have been to surrender those lands in exchange for a per capita distribution of a portion of the sale proceeds and annual payments of interest on the balance. Nor can the converse be assumed – that the members of the Band resident on one of the reserves would not be motivated by the lure of a cash payment and annual distributions of interest, particularly when the reserve lands that would have to be sold to generate these payments were standing largely idle and providing little in the way of economic return.

We will return to the application of these principles after we have considered the meaning of the term “habitually resides on or near.”
“Habitually Resides on or near”

We have already discussed the meaning of the phrase “the reserve in question.” It now remains to determine what is meant by being habitually resident on or near that reserve.

There would seem to be little doubt that residence on the reserve in question means residence within its geographical boundaries, regardless of whether that reserve is composed of a single contiguous parcel or, as in the present case, a number of parcels separated in some instances by several miles. The more difficult questions are what constitutes “near” the reserve, and what is necessary to be considered habitually resident.

Looking first at the question of habitual residence, the First Nation submits that... residency would require indicia of a degree of continuity and intent to remain. Although a member following the trapping mode of life would be called upon to travel and spend time away from the reserves he or she could still be considered a resident if habitually returning to the reserve and having established a primary residence where most of the year was spent and which they would consider and refer to as their residence.323

In reaching this conclusion, counsel relied in particular on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General of Canada v. Canard,324 a case in which the courts were asked to decide, for estate administration purposes, whether a deceased Indian, at the time of his death, ordinarily resided on the Fort Alexander reserve. The evidence showed that each year Canard moved his family from the reserve into a bunkhouse on a farm off-reserve where he took summer work. Two days after moving to the farm in 1969, he died in a traffic accident. Although most of the judges in the Supreme Court were of the view that the case turned on constitutional issues arising out of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Beetz J more thoroughly addressed the residence issue by adopting the following reasons of Dickson JA (as he then was) of the Manitoba Court of Appeal:

The words “ordinarily resident” have been judicially considered in many cases, principally income tax cases or matrimonial causes. Among the former: Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] 1 D.L.R. 689 at p. 701, [1946] S.C.R. 209, [1946] C.T.C.

51, in which Rand, J., said: “It is held to mean residence in the course of the customary mode of life of the person concerned, and it is contrasted with special or occasional or casual residence”; Levene v. Inland Revenue Com’rs, [1928] A.C. 217 at p. 225, in which Viscount Cave, L.C., said: “... I think that it connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences”. Among the latter: Stransky v. Stransky, [1945] 2 All E.R. 536 at p. 541, in which Karminski, J., applied the test: “where ... was the wife’s real home?” Perdue, J.A., of this Court, in Emperor of Russia v. Proskouriakoff (1908), 18 Man. R. 56 at p. 72, held that the words “ordinarily resident” simply meant where the person had “his ordinary or usual place of living”.

Applying any of these tests it would seem to me that at the time of his death Alexander Canard was ordinarily resident on the reserve. He normally lived there, with some degree of continuity. His ordinary residence there would not be lost by temporary or occasional or casual absences.

When one seeks to interpret the phrase “ordinarily resident” within the context of the Indian Act one is re-enforced in the view which I have expressed. Section 77(1) of the Act gives a bandmember “ordinarily resident on the reserve” the right to vote for the chief of the band and for councillors. Parliament could not have intended that an Indian would lose such voting rights, and lose the right to have his children schooled pursuant to s. 114 et seq. if he left the reserve during the summer months to guide or gather wild rice or work on a nearby farm.325

It can be seen from this passage that, unlike counsel for the First Nation, Dickson JA did not stipulate that “ordinarily resident” requires an individual to have “established a primary residence where most of the year was spent.” Rather, he referred to an individual’s “ordinary or usual place of living,” where a person normally lived with some degree of continuity and which would not be lost by temporary or occasional or casual absences in the summer to guide, gather rice, or work as a temporary farm labourer. We see no reason why temporary winter absences for hunting and trapping purposes should be treated any differently.

Canada submits that “ordinarily resident” means something different from “habitually resident.”326 Counsel relies on a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Adderson v. Adderson327 which dealt with the term “habitual residence,” not in the context of the Indian Act but rather under

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that province’s *Matrimonial Property Act*.\(^{328}\) In that case, a wife obtained a decree of divorce in Hawaii but commenced a matrimonial property action in Alberta, claiming that the province had constituted the couple’s “last joint habitual residence” under subsection 3(1) of the statute. Laycraft CJA noted that the concept of “habitual residence” had not been previously considered by the court, and continued:

One object of adopting the new term according to the learned authors of *Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws*, 10\(^{th}\) ed. (1980), at p. 144, was to avoid the rigid and arbitrary rules which had come to surround the concept of “domicile”. While “domicile” is concerned with whether there is a future intention to live elsewhere, “habitual residence” involves only a present intention of residence. There is a weaker animus....

A number of text writers ... have placed “habitual residence” somewhere between “residence” and “domicile” in the tests necessary to establish it. Evidence of intention does not have the importance it has in tests for “domicile” but may be a factor in some cases. In *Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws*, 10\(^{th}\) ed. (1980), at pp. 144-5 it is said:

> It is evident that “habitual residence” must be distinguishable from mere “residence”. The adjective “habitual” indicates a quality of residence rather than its length. Although it has been said that habitual residence means “a regular physical presence which must endure for some time”, it is submitted that the duration of residence, past or prospective, is only one of a number of relevant factors; there is no requirement that residence must have lasted for any particular minimum period.\(^{329}\)

It is interesting to note that, in reviewing the case authorities, Laycraft CJA considered *R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, Ex p. Nilish Shah*,\(^{330}\) in which Lord Scarman of the English House of Lords adopted Lord Denning’s conclusion in the Court of Appeal that “ordinarily resident” means that “the person must be habitually and normally resident here.” Laycraft CJA commented:

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Lord Scarman ... said at p. 342 that the adverb “habitually” imports “residence adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes”. Expanding on the meaning of “settled purposes” he said at p. 344:

And there must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one; or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. This is not to say that the “propositus” intends to stay where he is indefinitely; indeed his purpose, while settled, may be for a limited period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family, or merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode. And there may well be many others. All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.

The word “habitual” was used in that case merely as one of the words defining ordinary residence. I do not consider it to be of assistance to equate the two terms. Lord Scarman’s discussion of “settled purposes” is, however, useful as a factor in the consideration of present intention as applied to “habitual residence”.

After referring to other texts and cases, Laycraft CJA concluded:

I adopt the views of the text writers, which, though somewhat variously expressed, state that the term “habitual residence” refers to the quality of residence. Duration may be a factor depending on the circumstances. It requires an animus less than that required for domicile; it is a midpoint between domicile and residence, importing somewhat more durable ties than the latter term. In my view, it is not desirable, indeed it is not possible, to enter into any game of numbers on the duration required. All of the factors showing greater or less present intention of permanence must be weighed.

In summary, we take from these authorities that an individual’s “habitual” place of residence will be the location to which that individual customarily or usually returns with a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled, and will not cease to be habitual despite “temporary or occasional or casual absences.” Although such residence entails “a regular physical presence which must endure for some time,” there is no fixed minimum period of time and the duration of


residence, past or prospective, is only one of a number of relevant factors, the quality of residence being the overriding concern. It is not clear to us that there is a significant difference between “habitual” and “ordinary” residence, and similarly we are unsure whether it matters on the facts of this case. Although there is evidence that the eight eligible voters moved around a great deal in pursuit of their traditional hunting and trapping way of life, there does not appear to be any real dispute that, in general, there were particular locations in which they were habitually resident at the time of the 1928 surrender. The real question is whether those locations were situated “near” the reserve in question.

Counsel for both parties agree that “near” is a relative term, but beyond that they differ as to how it should be interpreted. The First Nation submits that the term is ambiguous and uncertain, and, as such, it should, in the spirit of Nowegijick, be liberally construed, with the doubtful expression resolved in favour of the Indians. Given counsel’s argument that the thrust of the Indian Act is to protect reserve lands for future generations of band members, then the procedures for permitting reserves to be surrendered should be strictly observed by narrowing the scope of those permitted to attend surrender meetings and participate in surrender votes. Accordingly, counsel submits that

... “near” ... should be defined and understood as sharing common characteristics with similar terms such as ‘close’, ‘proximate’, ‘neighbouring’, ‘adjacent’, ‘contiguous’, ‘bordering’, ‘abutting’, or ‘adjoining’. If they [band members] lived in Berwyn, if they lived in Brownvale and had a use or interest in the reserve, yes. But at Eureka River, at Gage which is the other side of Fairview, at Spirit River or west of Spirit River? We don’t think that is near at all.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 101 (Jerome Slavik).}

In other words, the First Nation contends that “the term ‘near’ should be narrowly construed to circumstances where an Indian resided off-reserve but in very close proximity to the reserve.”\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 52.} This is in keeping, according to counsel, with legal authorities such as \textit{R. v. Lewis}\footnote{\textit{R. v. Lewis}, [1993] 5 WW R 608 (BCCA).} and \textit{Mitchell v.}
Peguis Indian Band\textsuperscript{336} which have confined phrases like “on the reserve” to mean within the territorial limits of the reserve.\textsuperscript{337}

Contrasting this position is Canada’s view that “near,” while a relative term, is not indicative of any particular distance. Rather, whether an Indian is habitually resident near a reserve should be determined as a question of fact in each case,\textsuperscript{338} with factors such as the lifestyle of band members, and the distances travelled by them in accordance with that lifestyle, taken into account.\textsuperscript{339} In this case, counsel submits that the wide distances travelled by band members for hunting and trapping purposes during most of the year “were comparable to or greater than the distance between the place where the individuals may have habitually resided and the band’s reserves”;\textsuperscript{340} in other words, relative to the areas covered by band members in the course of pursuing game, the distances between the reserve and the members’ respective places of habitual residence could be considered “near.” According to counsel:

What I’m suggesting is that even if individuals who were Band members were frequenting, and trapping, and hunting and fishing in a broad area, which may have either encompassed the reserves in question or at least been equidistant from the points at which they hunted and trapped, I would suggest that a more expansive definition of “near” will broaden the voter base, which makes more sense.

Now, the contention will be by the Claimants, of course, that this in fact has the opposite effect in that the reason for restricting the voters list in this case to people who are habitually resident on [the reserve] is so that ten people who are band members living in Toronto can’t sell a reserve out from underneath the five or six band residents who are living on a reserve where they’re actually using it. And that’s the Claimant’s general contention.

I would agree in that case. I mean if you have individuals that have no association with these reserves and they are living in Toronto, that’s when on or near makes sense. But I mean in this case they’re all up there in the area. The suggestion

\textsuperscript{336} Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band (1990), 71 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC).

\textsuperscript{337} Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{338} Bruce Becker, Counsel, DIAND Legal Services, Specific Claims, to Jerome N. Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, May 28, 1997, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 14).

\textsuperscript{339} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 25.

is that it makes more sense to have a more expansive voters list rather than the two people that the Claimants are suggesting. Two people could surrender a reserve with a population of 53, and that’s what the Claimants are committed to on their submissions.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 181-82 (Perry Robinson).}

Counsel concluded that it would be ironic “if the very reason that would motivate band members to pursue a surrender – lack of use as evidenced by diminished residence – would prove to be a technical bar that prevented the free exercise of that band’s choice to surrender its reserve.”\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 26; ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 184 (Perry Robinson).}

In reply, the First Nation objects that the Crown’s approach of judging “near” by the Band’s pattern of mobility would prevent the establishment of any concept of nearness that could be consistently applied in varying factual circumstances, and, as such, would be “grossly result oriented and contrary to the Act.”\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 53; ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 101 (Jerome Slavik).}

The Commission’s task with respect to this issue is a difficult one because, in essence, we are asked to decide how near is “near,” or, perhaps more accurately, how far can “near” be. The parties appear to agree that band members resident in Toronto would not be “near,” but there is no agreement on where the line should be drawn such that those on one side are sufficiently “near” to be eligible to vote at a surrender meeting, while those on the other are not. We believe it would be arbitrary to pick a certain distance that should apply in all cases, since the circumstances of various bands can be so different. We cannot agree with the First Nation’s position that “near” should take its flavour from words like “adjacent” or “contiguous,” because those terms connote a degree of proximity that was unrealistic given the Band’s background and way of life.

Such a conclusion does not, as suggested by counsel for the First Nation, run afoul of the principle in \textit{Nowegijick} that doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favour of the Indians. As we stated in our report regarding the treaty land entitlement claim of the Kahkewistahaw First Nation,
a doubtful expression may work to the benefit of a band in one case but to the detriment of a band in another:

We disagree that using the date of first survey rather than the date of selection is “clearly prejudicial to the Indians,” or that using the date of selection “would ensure that all Indians receive land and are treated equally, fairly and consistently.” It is not accurate to suggest that one approach is universally favourable to the Indians and the other is consistently prejudicial. Calculating a band’s population on the date of selection would work to the band’s detriment if the band’s population was increasing, just as calculating the population on the date of first survey would be disadvantageous if the population was decreasing.344

Likewise, in some cases choosing a narrow interpretation of “near” might work to the advantage of a band, whereas in other cases a broad construction might best serve band interests. The point is that, whatever interpretation is selected, it must still be chosen on the basis of principle and not simply on the basis of whichever interpretation suits the needs of the band in a given situation.

That being the case, we feel that Canada’s approach to treating “nearness” as a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each individual case is appropriate, particularly in Treaty 8 where both Canada and the Indians have recognized since the date of treaty that band members engaged in traditional hunting, fishing, and trapping pursuits were unlikely to remain in close physical association with their reserves. As we have seen, Indian Commissioner William Graham made particular note of this trait in the summer of 1928:

You will understand that it is a difficult matter to get these Indians together in order to treat with them. I have already taken this matter up with regard to the Swan River Band, and find at the present time they are scattered all over the country – some working for the farmers, some on sections and others employed on the construction of the highway. All are more or less distant from the reserves so that when we do succeed in getting them together for the purpose of discussing terms of surrender with them, our officer should be very fully informed regarding the views of the Department.345


Similarly, John Testawits stated:

And when you ask questions where did you stay for the winter, you know, it’s a kind of a silly question for me because I was a trapper. All my trapping days I spent in the wintertime and I don’t come out until the beaver hunt – until about the 15th of June, and then you’re asking where you lived all winter. You’re living in a cabin, looking after your trap line all winter long. There’s no place to go, but just look after your traps and that’s it. That’s where you stay. Your residency is there.

*I had 75 square miles of trap line* northeast of Hotchkiss, 7 cabins, and I would go from one cabin to another. You don’t just go around in one circle, because you have a whole toboggan full of frozen squirrels, you take them to the second cabin, and you got to wait for them to thaw out, you would wait and skin them, and there’s foxes, lynx and everything. That’s your pastime for the winter....

So you’re asking a difficult question over and over again, why do you stay there and, you know, where do you stay in the winter. He lives in his cabin, with his trap line. That’s his pastime right until June 15th. *We stayed there until the beaver hunt was over and that’s it, and we come out and lived in a settlement like civilized people.*

What we take from these statements and other evidence in this case is that the male members of the Duncan’s First Nation engaged in traditional pursuits of hunting, fishing, and trapping to earn their livelihood, and that this often took them far afield from their reserves. When the season for tracking game ended, they generally returned to their respective home locations where, for the purposes of our analysis, we would consider them to be “habitually resident.” The question of whether those habitual residences were sufficiently near the reserve is one that must be answered on a case-by-case basis for each of the individuals involved, having regard for the general use of the reserves by the Band, the residence patterns of each individual, and Band members’ mobility as hunters and trappers relative to the more sedentary agricultural lifestyle adopted by southern prairie bands. It is to that task that we now turn.

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Did Any Ineligible Indians Attend or Vote at the Surrender Meeting?

In broad terms, Canada takes the position that all the band members on the voters’ list prepared by William Murison – and in particular the five who voted at the September 19, 1928, surrender meeting – resided on or near, and were interested in the Duncan’s Band reserves, and were accordingly eligible to attend the meeting and to vote. However, counsel further submits, relying on the reasons of Killeen J in *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point*, that, even if one or more of the latter five were in fact ineligible, their presence and participation in the surrender vote, depending on the facts of the case, would not necessarily taint or invalidate the surrender.

In contrast, the Duncan’s First Nation submits that none of the seven band members enumerated on the voters’ list prepared by William Murison resided near the reserves in question and that, of the five who voted, only Joseph and Eban Testawits made any use of the reserves. In that event, assuming there were no eligible voters, then the underlying philosophy of the *Indian Act* to preserve reserve lands for future generations should have applied, with the prudent course in the best interest of the Band being to prevent the surrender until the potential use of the reserves by future members could be ascertained.

Alternatively, if the phrase “the reserve in question” can refer to any of the Band’s ten parcels of reserve land in 1928, then the First Nation is prepared to concede that Samuel and Eban Testawits were eligible to vote at the surrender meeting – but only if it could be demonstrated that they made sufficient use of IR 151A (on which they resided) or one or more of the other parcels to be considered “interested” in them. In that event, the Crown still would not have achieved the necessary majority assent to the surrender since only one of these two (Eban Testawits) voted, and

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349 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 53.
350 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 55: “[T]here is ample evidence that Emile Legge, John Boucher, and James Boucher made no use whatsoever of any of the Duncan’s Reserves.”
351 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 55.
352 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, pp. 50 and 55.
the other (Samuel Testawits) is known to have been opposed to the surrender. In short, the First Nation asserts that the Crown’s representatives permitted ineligible voters to take part in the vote and to determine the Band’s position on the surrender, and that the surrender should therefore be considered invalid.

As for Canada’s submission that Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point means that the presence of ineligible voters and other voters at a surrender meeting does not necessarily invalidate the surrender, the First Nation argues that Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point dealt with the presence of a non-Indian third party at a surrender meeting, which is a different question; since subsection 51(2) of the 1927 Indian Act prevents certain Indians from voting at a surrender meeting, and since the Federal Court of Appeal in Apsassin concluded that subsections 51(1) and (2) are related, this means that subsection (2), like subsection (1), must be treated as a mandatory procedural requirement. According to counsel, subsection 51(2) of the 1927 Indian Act was fundamental to the purpose of preserving reserve lands for future generations by preventing them from being lost as a result of individual pecuniary interests in a moment of vulnerability or greed.

The parties’ submissions require the Commission to decide whether any of the Indians who attended or voted at the surrender meeting were ineligible to do so by virtue of subsection 51(2). If not, then the surrender would be valid. If some of the participating Indians were ineligible, we will have to consider whether the provisions of subsection 51(2) were mandatory and thus imperative, implying that the surrender would be invalid if they were not met, or merely directory and of no obligatory force, thus validating the surrender but perhaps exposing Canada to other forms of relief in favour of the First Nation.


354 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 69.


We will now review on a case-by-case basis the evidence and submissions of the parties with regard to the eight adult male members of the Duncan’s Band.

**Joseph Testawits**

Although the First Nation has submitted that Joseph Testawits did not attend the 1928 surrender meeting, we have already concluded, based on the evidence before us, that he did in fact attend and vote in favour of the surrender.

Counsel for the First Nation submits that there are three bases for finding that Joseph Testawits’s habitual residence was not on or near the reserve:

Joseph’s residence was in Spirit River. We know this because, first of all, his wife [Angela] was from that area. Second of all, he was married in the area and, thirdly, his children were born in Spirit River. And the key documentation here is the birth certificate of Joseph Testawits’ daughter born in the spring of 1928. The parents gave on the birth certificate their residence as being at Spirit River.

So the parents considered themselves to be resident at Spirit River. Although he probably spent most of his time at the Michel Testawits’ camp located west of Spirit River. This would have been a distance of over a hundred miles from the Duncan’s Reserves, close to it anyway. You can draw it on a map, but it’s a significant distance in those days. It’s a significant distance today. So he subjectively considered himself to be resident at Spirit River.\(^{357}\)

Joseph’s visits with relatives on the reserve during the summers may have constituted *use* of the reserve, but they did not, in counsel’s submission, amount to residence *near* the reserve.\(^{358}\)

Canada responds by pointing to evidence suggesting that Joseph may in fact have been resident on IR 151A at the time of the surrender. John Testawits recalled that Joseph spent most of his time each year from September to June at Michel Testawits’s camp west of Spirit River,\(^{359}\) but, when he was not trapping at Spirit River, “[h]e was at 151A” and in fact spent most of his life

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\(^{357}\) ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 74-75 (Jerome Slavik).

\(^{358}\) ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 102 (Jerome Slavik).

\(^{359}\) ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 48) (John Testawits).
there.\textsuperscript{360} John also gave evidence that, although Joseph would trap at Spirit River during the winter months, his wife, Angela, would “stay home, likely”\textsuperscript{361} – that home, in counsel’s submission, being on IR 151A. Canada acknowledged John Testawits’s evidence that Joseph moved back to the reserve only in 1929 or 1930 and built one of five homes that John recalled as “brand new” when he returned to the reserve in 1931.\textsuperscript{362} However, counsel also points to Angela Testawits’s interview on the Duncan’s Reserve in 1973 in which she stated: “My son was already a big boy when my husband sold the reserves. \textit{We were living here already} but the selling of reserves took place at Fairview.”\textsuperscript{363} Counsel submits that, since duration is not the determining factor in establishing “habitual residence,” it can be argued that, although Joseph may have been away for a significant portion of each year at Spirit River, his then-present intention was to reside at the reserve, given that he returned regularly to his wife there when he was not trapping. Even if Joseph Testawits habitually resided near Spirit River and merely visited the reserve in hunting’s summer off-season, he still resided near the reserve, in Canada’s view, and was entitled to vote on the surrender.\textsuperscript{364}

\textbf{Eban Testawits}

The parties agree that, until his untimely death in 1931 or 1932, Eban Testawits resided on IR 151A.\textsuperscript{365} Indeed, counsel for the First Nation considers that, of the five voters on Murison’s list, Eban Testawits may have been the only one eligible to vote.\textsuperscript{366}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{360} Indian Claims Commission, “Interview of Elders John Testawits and Ted Knott Taken at the Mile Zero Hotel, Grimshaw, Alberta,” August 15, 1995, p. 21 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab B).
\item \textsuperscript{361} ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 50) (John Testawits).
\item \textsuperscript{362} ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 48 and 88) (John Testawits and Jerome Slavik).
\item \textsuperscript{363} Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G).
\item \textsuperscript{364} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Indian Claims Commission, “Interview of Elders John Testawits and Ted Knott Taken at the Mile Zero Hotel, Grimshaw, Alberta,” August 15, 1995, pp. 21-22 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab B); ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 88) (Jerome Slavik); ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 75 (Jerome Slavik); ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 175 (Perry Robinson).
\item \textsuperscript{366} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 75 (Jerome Slavik).
\end{itemize}
**Samuel Testawits**

Because Samuel Testawits did not attend or vote at the surrender meeting, the only reason it becomes necessary to establish his residency and interest in the reserve is to determine whether the requirements of section 51 of the 1927 *Indian Act* regarding quorum and majority assent at the surrender meeting were satisfied. John Testawits recalled that Samuel lived in a log shack by the spring on IR 151A until his death in 1933.\(^{367}\) The First Nation contends that, other than Eban Testawits, Samuel was the only male band member aged 21 years to reside on one of the Band’s reserves.\(^{368}\) However, despite being the band member whose attendance at the surrender meeting would likely have been most easily accomplished, Samuel was absent – a fact that, in light of Samuel’s apparent opposition to the surrender, the First Nation considers as raising suspicions that a surrender meeting never happened.\(^{369}\)

Canada makes no submission regarding Samuel since, in its view, the First Nation has conceded that Samuel habitually resided on or near, and was interested in the reserve in question.\(^{370}\)

**John Boucher**

The evidence regarding John Boucher’s place of residence is inconsistent. John Testawits, who never met or knew John Boucher, gave evidence that Boucher’s permanent residence was a log home on the southwest corner of IR 151A.\(^{371}\) He continued:

> John Boucher died before I returned home in 1931. At that time, he was a very old man. James Boucher occupied John’s house when he died. When I returned from the Grouard Mission in 1931, I recall very clearly that James Boucher was living in a log house on the #151A Indian Reserve which had been the residence of John Boucher. To the best of my knowledge, prior to 1928, neither John nor James Boucher lived

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368 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 29.

369 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 29.


on any of the Reserves by the river [IR 151B to IR 151G]. They lived year-round in
a log cabin on #151A in the southwest corner.372

In contrast to this evidence is the statutory declaration of Ben Boucher – the son and grandson of
James and John Boucher, respectively – who deposed:

4. My grandfather was John Boucher who was a member of the Duncan’s
Indian Band. He lived 2½ miles north of Gage near an area which was called
Hay Lake [also known as Moss Lake]....

6. To the best of my knowledge, my grandfather never lived on the Duncan’s
Indian Reserve. In 1928 he was living near Hay Lake, north of Fairview.

7. My grandfather was 85 years old when he died in the winter of 1936-37. He
was buried near the railroad in the Gage area, one mile west of where he was
living.373

Similarly, Ted Knott recounted that he last saw John Boucher in the 1932-34 period at Moss Lake,
which is where Knott always saw Boucher and believed that he lived.374 The Commission also notes
that, in the 33 years from the signing of Treaty 8 in 1899 through the last year he was paid in 1931,
John Boucher was paid in 16 of those years in the vicinity of IR 152, including 14 times at Dunvegan
and once each at Hay Lake and Fairview. In the remaining 17 years, he is reported to have been paid
at Peace River Landing (three times), Peace River Crossing (nine times), on the Duncan’s reserve
(twice), and once each at Grouard, Vermilion, and Old Wives Lake.375

In addressing all the foregoing evidence prior to the oral submissions in this inquiry, Canada
wrote:

While it is arguable based upon this information that John Boucher resided on 151A,
the evidence of both Ben Boucher and Ted Knott, and the fact that John Boucher
regularly received his treaty annuity payments in the vicinity of the Beaver Reserve

374 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 30 and 76) (Ted Knott).
375 Provincial Archives of Alberta, Treaty Annuity Paylists, Duncan’s Band, 1910-36 (ICC Documents,
pp. 716-83); Paylist Comparison Database (ICC Exhibit 15, vol. 1).
No. 152 and Dunvegan when other Band members were paid at the Duncan’s Reserve, suggest that John Boucher likely habitually resided in the Moss Lake area. However, we are of the view that this was “near” the reserve ... and that he was entitled to vote on the surrender.\textsuperscript{376}

According to counsel for Canada, Moss Lake is situated about one mile from Fairview, which is in turn located approximately 18 miles (29 kilometres) from IR 151A.\textsuperscript{377}

In the First Nation’s submission, however, John Boucher did not reside on or use the Band’s reserves and had no affiliation or connection with them.\textsuperscript{378} Moreover, Boucher’s residence is not in doubt, given Canada’s acknowledgment that he resided in the Moss Lake area in 1928. His real affiliation, according to counsel, was with the Beaver Band, since he lived and died at Moss Lake on IR 152 and married the daughter of the Beaver Chief.\textsuperscript{379} In short, the First Nation contends that John Boucher, his son James, and the Leg brothers “were classic examples of Indians who were on the membership list but did not reside near and certainly had no interest” in the reserve.\textsuperscript{380}

\textit{James Boucher}

John Testawits recalled that, in 1931, James Boucher lived in a log house on IR 151A that had been John Boucher’s residence.\textsuperscript{381} He further stated that James Boucher resided on IR 151A most of his life,\textsuperscript{382} for at least part of that time in one of the five houses built in 1929 or 1930. It appears that the

\textsuperscript{376} Bruce Becker, Counsel, DIAND Legal Services, Specific Claims, to Jerome N. Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, May 28, 1997, p. 10 (ICC Exhibit 14).

\textsuperscript{377} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 180 (Perry Robinson).


\textsuperscript{379} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 71-72 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{380} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 101 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{381} Statutory Declaration of John Testawits, December 3, 1991, p. 7 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 4).

\textsuperscript{382} Interview of Ben Basnett, February 25, 1992, p. 35 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab A); Indian Claims Commission, “Interview of Elders John Testawits and Ted Knott Taken at the Mile Zero Hotel, Grimshaw, Alberta,” August 15, 1995, p. 22 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab B).
house was first occupied by Annie Laprete, and that James Boucher did not move in until after her death in the early 1930s. This information seems consistent with Ben Boucher’s statutory declaration:

3. My father is James Boucher and my mother, Justine, was a Beaver Indian from the Moss Lake area, which was located near the present location of the Town of Fairview.

8. My father was born at Fairview. In 1928, my father, James Boucher, was residing at Moss Lake on the Beaver Indian Reserve #152. He was living there when I left for Grouard Mission School in 1933. He moved to Duncan’s Reserve in 1933 or 1934 when I was away at school. I was told this by Sister Mary at Grouard.

9. When I was 10 years old, I went to the Mission School in Grouard. When I returned from Grouard for summer holidays, I lived with my father on the Duncan’s Indian Reserve. I finished school at age 17. I had grade 10.

10. I am Metis as both my father and I enfranchised from the Duncan’s Band. I left the Duncan’s Reserve in 1938.

In his February 25, 1992, interview, Ben Basnett stated that James Boucher “didn’t really live anywhere” and just camped wherever he liked, spending his winters in the north and “then they’d go back down to Fairview and put in the summer.” Ted Knott recalled that James Boucher “spent a lot of time” at Hay Lake north of Gage.

In response to the foregoing evidence, Canada submits:

The evidence of Ben Boucher, supported to a limited extent by the evidence of Ted Knott and Ben Basnett, and the fact that James Boucher was born in Fairview, married a woman from the Beaver Band and regularly received his treaty annuity annuity

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383 Annie Laprete’s name was given a number of different spellings on paylists over the years, but she is no doubt the “Anna La Pretre” referred to later in this report in an excerpt from John Testawits’s statutory declaration: Statutory Declaration of John Testawits, December 3, 1991, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 4).

384 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 48-49) (John Testawits).


386 Interview of Ben Basnett, February 25, 1992, p. 26 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab A).

387 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 31) (Ted Knott).
payments in the vicinity of the Beaver Reserve No. 152 and Dunvegan, suggest that James Boucher likely habitually resided in the Moss Lake area. However, we are of the view that this was “near” the reserve for the reasons mentioned previously, and that he was entitled to vote on the surrender. 388

The First Nation contends that James Boucher did not reside on the Duncan’s reserves, made no use of them, and had no affiliation or connection with them. 389 Rather, James was married to a Beaver woman; did not move to the Duncan’s reserves until 1933 or 1934, where heresided for only a few years before enfranchising with his son Ben; and was affiliated by marriage, residency, and social ties with the Beaver Band. Given Canada’s recognition that James Boucher resided in the Moss Lake area in 1928, the First Nation urges the Commission to conclude that he did not reside on or near, and was not interested in the Band’s reserves. 390

**Emile Leg**

The individual giving rise to the most debate in this inquiry is Emile Leg. Ben Basnett indicated that Emile “didn’t live particularly anywhere,” but just “put up a teepee and stayed anywhere.” However, he also stated that Emile was always on the Beaver Indian reserves at Eureka River or Fairview, and lived most of his life in the vicinity of Eureka River about 70 miles from Berwyn and IR 151. As to where Emile trapped, “they’d come out in the spring and nobody knew where they went out half of the time.” 391 He believed that Emile lived most of his life in the Eureka River area where he trapped. 392

Similarly, Ted Knott observed that Emile lived near Worsley, which is west of Eureka River some 80 miles from the Grimshaw/Berwyn area. 393 He recalled that Emile trapped at Hay River,
located north and west of Worsley, and would return to Herb Lathrop’s trading post at Worsley for part of the summer. Emile would also spend part of each summer picking berries at Fort St John before returning to Lathrop’s post at the end of August to purchase supplies prior to returning to the north to trap for the winter.\footnote{394} Knott added:

6. During the years of my acquaintance with Emile Legg, I believe that what I have described above was his consistent pattern of movement throughout the year. It is my belief that Emile Legg had no settled place of residence, and followed a traditional Indian lifestyle moving through parts of north western Alberta and north eastern British Columbia. These areas are all located at a considerable distance from the Indian reserves where members of the Duncan’s Band had their residence.

7. I have frequented the Duncan’s Indian Reserve all my life and I never saw Emile Legg on the Reserve. To my knowledge, Emile Legg never resided on Indian Reserves held for the use and benefit of the Duncan’s Band.

8. It is my belief that Emile Legg had no close connection with any Indian Band, pursuing as he did a traditional itinerant Indian lifestyle.\footnote{395}

The preceding evidence is consistent with John Testawits’s statements that he did not know Emile Leg other than through his mother, who told him that the Leg brothers were interpreters for the Indian agents and thus just passed through, and did not live on, the Duncan’s reserves.\footnote{396} He understood that Emile’s “home place” was at Eureka River,\footnote{397} where he stayed most of the time and belonged to the Beaver Band.\footnote{398}


\footnote{396} Interview of Ben Basnett, February 25, 1992, p. 23 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab A); ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 72-73) (John Testawits); Statutory Declaration of John Testawits, December 3, 1991, p. 8 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 4).


\footnote{398} ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 43) (John Testawits).
The First Nation submits that Emile and Francis Leg took treaty with the Beaver Band in 1900 and transferred to the Duncan’s Band with their widowed mother in 1905. When Emile died at age 34 in Eureka River, he had lived there for most of his adult life, having never lived on or made any use of the Duncan’s reserves.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 101 (Jerome Slavik).} In short, counsel contends that Emile Leg did not reside near those reserves and had no interest in them, thereby disqualifying him from participating in the 1928 surrender meeting.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 74 (Jerome Slavik); ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, pp. 85-86) (Jerome Slavik).}

For its part, Canada acknowledges that Emile Leg married a woman from the Beaver Band in 1914 and received his treaty annuities for most of the 1920s preceding the surrender at Dunvegan or on the Beaver reserve. Counsel further accepts that Emile died at Eureka River in 1934 after living in the district for 16 years, and that he was buried on the Clear Hills Indian Reserve of the Horse Lake Band (formerly part of the Beaver Band) north of Eureka River. Nevertheless, arguing that “a more expansive view of ‘near’ makes sense,” counsel concluded:

Based upon the foregoing information, it appears likely that Emile Legg was habitually resident in the Clear Hills/Worsley area. However, we are of the view that this was near the reserve ... and that he was entitled to vote on the surrender.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, pp. 38-40; ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 181 (Perry Robinson).}

\textit{Francis Leg}

Like Samuel Testawits, Francis Leg did not attend or vote at the surrender meeting, but it is necessary to consider whether he was eligible to do so for purposes of establishing whether the quorum and majority assent requirements of section 51 of the 1927 \textit{Indian Act} were met. Unfortunately, the evidence regarding Francis Leg is sketchy. As we have already seen, John Testawits recalled his mother saying that the Legs did not live on the Duncan’s reserve, but instead passed through only when they were required to do so to interpret for the Indian agent.\footnote{Interview of Ben Basnett, February 25, 1992, p. 23 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab A).}
did not know Francis Leg, but understood him to be a member of the Beaver Band rather than the Duncan’s Band. Neither Ben Basnett nor Ted Knott provided any additional information regarding Francis Leg.

The First Nation submits that, as with Emile Leg, Francis was not affiliated or connected with the Duncan’s Band and did not reside on or make use of the reserve. Indeed, the First Nation goes so far as to say that “[t]here is no record of Francis Legg ever being resident on the Duncan’s Reserve ... his residence whereabouts was unknown,” and accordingly he was not resident near, or interested in the reserve. Canada again responds that, with an expansive definition of “near,” Francis Leg was properly considered an eligible voter.

**Alex Mooswah**

There is even less evidence with regard to Alex Mooswah than for Francis Leg, and the evidence we do have is conflicting. Ted Knott claims to have known Mooswah when he was in his early twenties, and that the last time he saw Mooswah was at Ben Basnett’s post at Eureka River. However, at one point in his remarks, Knott suggested that this was in 1923 or 1924, and at another he said that it may have been the summer or fall of 1935. Annuity paylist information discloses that, following the death of his father, Modeste Mooswah, in the 1919 influenza epidemic, Alex Mooswah continued to be paid on Modeste’s ticket until 1935. He was paid four times with his father at Dunvegan or on the Beaver Reserve from 1915 to 1919, but was generally shown as being paid with the rest of the Duncan’s Band during the 1920s, including 1928. In the 1930s he regularly received his annuities at Fort St John, British Columbia.
From this information the First Nation argues that Alex Mooswah “perhaps should have been on the voters’ list and was not.” As we have already seen, Canada merely suggests that Mooswah was too young to be an eligible voter.

**Conclusions**

It is the Commission’s view that, in assessing the eligibility of these individuals, it is important to recognize the realities of the Treaty 8 area in 1928. The people of the Duncan’s Band, like those of many other bands in Treaty 8, engaged in hunting and trapping as their means of subsistence. They were mobile and travelled far afield each year to maintain their traplines and pursue game. Although they may not have lived on any reserve, or even in close proximity to a reserve, for much of any given year, they nevertheless returned to their reserves from time to time and collected their annuities together. Despite their nomadic ways, most of these people still considered their reserves – particularly IR 151A – to be the “home” to which they were lured through long, albeit sporadic, association. As John Testawits commented in his statutory declaration of December 3, 1991:

9. The Duncan Testawit’s family lived on #151A prior to the Treaty and after Treaty. This was known as the “Duncan’s family Reserve”. Members of the family and community as a whole moved back and forth between the different Reserves during the different times of the year. Most, however, had permanent residences of log homes on #151A and visited the other Reserves. The log houses on #151A were occupied by John Boucher (S.W. corner), Anna La Pretre (at the spring), Joseph Testawit’s (N.W. corner), Julia Testawit’s (at the spring), Margaret or Jimmy Testawit’s (son of Joseph) (South S.W.), and Samuel Testawit’s (at the spring)....

33. I recall my uncle, Samuel, telling me, and I remember at that time, that the people moved around a great deal. They would hunt for moose south of the Peace River and would trap in that area during the winter. They would spend the summer months on the Reserve at #151A and part of their time at #151 which was known as the Berwyn Reserve. They also travelled a great deal around the region seeking work from the few settlers that were there at that time.

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408 ICC Transcript, September 6, 1995 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab C, p. 90) (Jerome Slavik).

It appears from these statements that IR 151A formed the focal point for the Band, with the other reserve parcels being visited from time to time. In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that it would be artificial to strain the meaning of the terms “interested in” or “near” in a way that would disenitle many of the people of Treaty 8, let alone the members of the Duncan’s Band, from being able to participate in a decision as important as the disposition of their reserves.

From the foregoing evidence and submissions, we have reached the following conclusions:

XI. Since the parties apparently agree that both Eban and Samuel Testawits habitually resided on, and were interested in IR 151A, we conclude that, although Eban was the only one of these two to actually attend and vote at the surrender meeting, each was eligible to do so.

XII. With regard to Joseph Testawits, John Testawits asserted that Joseph did not build a house and move to IR 151A until 1929 or 1930, but Angela Testawits stated that the family had already moved to the reserve by the time of the 1928 surrender. For reasons we have already expressed, we find that Angela’s evidence has greater immediacy and weight. John’s comments are not entirely inconsistent, either, since a house built in 1928 might still have looked just as new on John’s return in 1931 as one built in 1929 or 1930, and in any event the family may have already taken up residence on the reserve even if the new house was built in one of the latter two years. We are also of the view that the fact that a new house was built is evidence of Joseph Testawits’s intent as of 1928 to make IR 151A his permanent home. It is also noteworthy that Angela Testawits remained “at home” on IR 151A while Joseph hunted and trapped, but that he returned to her during the summer off-season. We conclude that Joseph Testawits habitually resided on or near, and was interested in the reserve, and was therefore eligible to vote at the 1928 surrender meeting.

XIII. The evidence with regard to Alex Mooswah is incomplete, but the Commission has already found that he was a member of the Band and old enough to be eligible to vote. The First Nation submits that he should have been on the voters’ list, and Canada’s only stated objection is with regard to age. We conclude, therefore, that, at the time of the surrender, he habitually resided on or near, and was interested in the reserve, making him eligible to vote on its surrender.

XIV. The Commission has reflected at great length on the circumstances of Emile Leg and his brother Francis. Given the importance of permitting band members to participate in surrender proceedings affecting their reserve lands, we are reluctant to exclude the Leg brothers from the list of eligible voters under subsection 51(2) of the 1927 Indian Act. Nevertheless, we must conclude that they were not eligible to vote. The two were members of the Duncan’s Band in name only, having been born into the Beaver Band and being children when that Band was admitted to Treaty 8 in 1899. They transferred to the Duncan’s Band with their widowed mother in 1905, but they lived virtually all of their adult lives at Eureka River near
the Beaver Band’s IR 152C, a significant distance from the Duncan’s reserves. John Testawits stated that he did not know the Legs and that they apparently returned to the Duncan’s reserves only occasionally with the Indian agent to act as translators and to receive their annuities. The evidence of Ben Basnett and Ted Knott indicates that the Legs were habitually resident in the vicinity of Eureka River, and Knott stated that he had never seen Emile Leg on the Duncan’s reserve. Although the treaty annuity paylists indicate that the Legs were paid consistently with the Duncan’s Band prior to 1919, initially under their mother and thereafter on their own tickets, and that they received annuities on the Duncan’s reserve on at least three occasions in the mid-1920s, we are not convinced that occasional returns to the reserve for the sole purpose of receiving annuities represented a reasonable connection with the Band or the reserves for the purposes of subsection 51(2). Despite Joseph Testawits, Eban Testawits, and James Boucher all certifying in the surrender affidavit that “no Indian was present or voted at such council or meeting who was not a habitual resident on the reserve of the said band of Indians and interested in the land mentioned in the said release or surrender,” we conclude that the Legs were neither habitually resident on or near, nor sufficiently interested in the reserve to be eligible to participate in and vote at the 1928 surrender meeting.

XV. The evidence regarding John and James Boucher, unlike that with respect to the Legs, is that they had a much closer connection with the Duncan’s Band reserves, having spent most of their lives in and around those lands. They habitually resided at Moss Lake in 1928, a distance of only 18 miles (29 km) from IR 151A and relatively much closer than the Legs to the Band’s reserves. The evidence before the Commission also indicates that the members of the Duncan’s Band often congregated and received their annuities at IR 152, on which Moss Lake was situated, which would place the Bouchers regularly in the midst of their fellow Band members. Indeed, in the year of the surrender itself, Agent Laird commented that he found most of the members of the Band on IR 152 when he arrived to distribute annuities earlier that year. Moreover, whereas Ted Knott and John Testawits gave evidence suggesting that the Legs were rarely, if ever, on the Duncan’s reserves, there is no such evidence with regard to the Bouchers. In fact, it appears from the evidence of John Testawits that, following the surrenders of the Duncan’s reserves and Beaver IR 152 in 1928, John Boucher may have moved to one of five new houses on IR 151A, where, after his death, he was succeeded by Annie Laprete and later his son James. It also appears that both Bouchers, like other Band members, travelled extensively in the area between IR 152 and the various reserves of the Duncan’s Band. In our view, these facts demonstrate a reasonable connection to the Band and its reserves, and we conclude that both John and James Boucher resided on or near, and were interested in the reserves. Accordingly, they were eligible to participate and vote at the 1928 surrender meeting.

In summary, we find that, of the seven individuals on the voters’ list prepared by William Murison – Joseph Testawits, Eban Testawits, Samuel Testawits, John Boucher, James Boucher, Emile Leg and Francis Leg – five were eligible to be there – the three Testawits brothers and the Bouchers. Emile and Francis Leg did not qualify to vote, meaning that, given our conclusion that Alex Mooswah should have been on the list, the Band’s quorum and voting majority requirements fell to be determined on the basis of six eligible voters.

Other Participants at the Surrender Meeting

It will be recalled that subsection 51(2) of the 1927 Indian Act provides that “[n]o Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.” Although it is clear that only five individuals voted at the meeting, it is less clear how many other Indians were present at the meeting and whether any of those in attendance were prohibited by subsection 51(2) from being there. The parties have made no submissions on this point, but the Commission has noted some evidence that might suggest the presence at the surrender meeting of Indians having no interest in the Duncan’s reserves.

In his request for a second payment of $50 from the proceeds of the public auction to each member of the Band, Indian Agent Harold Laird reported on October 29, 1929, that “a majority of the members of this Band were present on the Beaver Reserve No. 152 when surrenders were taken from both Bands and a promise was made to the Beaver Band of a payment of $50.00 to each member in the fall of 1928 and a second one of $50.00 in 1929.”411 This statement suggests that the members of the two Bands, whom Indian Commissioner William Graham referred to as “all living as one band,”412 may have all been in attendance at the surrenders of each other’s reserves.

We have also had regard for the following evidence of Angela Testawits:

Richard [Lightning]: When your husband was dealing with the reserves, how many years ago is that, do you remember?

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411 Harold Laird, Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, October 29, 1929, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-5, pt 2 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab F).

412 W. M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, to Secretary, DIA, August 31, 1929, NA, RG 10, vol. 7544, file 29131-9, pt 2 (ICC Documents, p. 348).
Angela: I don’t really know. If I could see the people who were there, *three of them are still alive that were there.*

Richard: What are their names?

Angela: *One is my brother, his name is Francis Naposis,* the other one is in Grouard or High Prairie, I really would like to see him. He is a whiteman who understands a bit of Cree, he would know exactly how much land we had. Maybe he is dead I haven’t heard of him in a long time. I told John Spring (Testawich) to inquire about him, he would know everything. He was the one who led the surveyors. I don’t remember his name. If I was in Grouard I would know his name by asking. The other man is Phillip Knot, he would know how many years ago it took place.\textsuperscript{413}

Of the individuals identified by Angela Testawits, the “whiteman” is irrelevant because, not being an Indian, his attendance was not prohibited by subsection 51(2). Similarly, the 1939 annuity paylist for the Duncan’s Band indicates that Emile Leg’s widow, Rosalie Laglace, married a Phillip Knott who was characterized on the paylist as a “halfbreed,” which, if true, would mean that the surrender could not be challenged on the basis of his presence since he was technically not an Indian either. Angela herself, although not eligible to vote because of her gender, was not forbidden from attending because, like her husband, Joseph, she presumably resided on or near, and was interested in the reserves. However, Francis Naposis, if Indian, would have been precluded from attending the surrender meeting because his name did not appear on any of the treaty annuity, surrender, or interest paylists as a member of the Duncan’s Band.

It appears from the September 21, 1928, affidavit relating to the surrender of the Beaver Band’s IR 152 that the “Francis Naposis” identified by Angela Testawits may have been the “François Napasis” showing as one of the principal men attesting to that Band’s surrender.\textsuperscript{414} There is evidence that Angela was born at Spirit River before Treaty 8 was concluded,\textsuperscript{415} so her brother’s

\textsuperscript{413} Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 5 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G).

\textsuperscript{414} Surrender Affidavit for Beaver Band’s IR 152, September 21, 1928 (ICC Exhibit 10, tab A, Schedule 19, p. 1). There may in fact have been more than one Francis Naposis. In his paper, Neil Reddekopp refers to a “Francis Napasis” who was in his mid-80s in 1972, which would make Naposis close in age to Angela Testawits. However, Reddekopp refers to Napasis as Angela’s *uncle* rather than her brother: G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” pp. 128-29 (ICC Exhibit 5).

\textsuperscript{415} Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 1 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G).
membership and status as a principal man in the Beaver Band would hardly be surprising. Moreover, in reporting on a visit to the Lesser Slave Lake Agency in early 1931, Murison wrote with regard to the poor land purchased for what was then known as the Dunvegan and Grande Prairie Band:

This reserve was purchased at the time of the surrender of Reserves Nos. 152 and 152A in 1928, at a cost of $6.75 per acre. After seeing the land, I am convinced that the Indians paid altogether too much for it, and that $3.00 an acre would have been a much fairer price and nearer its value. It is a question if this band will ever make use of six sections of land. There are only very few people living there – the Chief, Neepee Pierre, with a family of 3, Francis Naposis and family of 5, Louis Mosquito’s widow and children, 6 in the family, and three old widows. The balance of the band make their homes at Hay Lakes and Fort St. John.

The other faction of this band reside [sic] 170 or more miles south by road, at Horse Lakes.\(^{416}\)

Although it seems clear that Francis Naposis was a member of the Beaver Band and would have been prohibited from attending the surrender meeting, we cannot conclude in the circumstances that the vague references by Laird and Angela Testawits constitute definitive evidence that members of the Beaver Band, while assembled in the same location as the Duncan’s Band, actually attended the Duncan’s surrender meeting. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that separate meetings were held with the two bands on September 19 and 21, 1928.

However, since Emile Leg attended and voted at the Duncan’s surrender meeting despite being ineligible to do so, subsection 51(2) of the 1927 *Indian Act* was violated even if Francis Naposis and other members of the Beaver Band did not attend the Duncan’s surrender meeting. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether that violation invalidates the 1928 surrender by the Duncan’s Band. Our decision on this question will turn on whether the provisions of subsection (2) were mandatory or merely directory.

**Is Subsection 51(2) of the 1927 *Indian Act* Mandatory or Merely Directory?**

Subsection 51(2) provides that “[n]o Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.” The First Nation

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argues that, assuming that at least one of the five individuals who attended and voted at the 1928 surrender meeting was ineligible to do so, subsection 51(2) renders the entire surrender void \textit{ab initio}. The basis for this position is that the word “shall” in the subsection is presumed to be mandatory, thus imperatively prohibiting attendance and voting by non-resident and uninterested Indians. The only exception would be where such strict compliance works a serious inconvenience – for example, in circumstances where the failure to comply does not go to the heart of the matter in question or undercut the purpose of the provision.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 40; ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 84 (Jerome Slavik).}

Counsel submits that, in the present case, subsections 51(1) and (2) not only use the term “shall” but also state that no surrender shall be “valid or binding” unless the terms of those subsections are satisfied. The implication of this language, according to the First Nation, is that those subsections must be considered to be a mandatory procedure to prevent abuse, fraud, coercion and exploitation and to ensure that a band’s consent to a surrender is informed and voluntary.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 42.} In contrast, subsections (3) and (4) merely provide evidence of compliance with subsections (1) and (2); therefore, failure to comply with subsections (3) and (4) will not invalidate a surrender where the intentions of the Indians are otherwise clear and untainted, as was the case in \textit{Apsassin}.\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, pp. 40-41.} Counsel concludes that, since the Crown has sought to formalize the surrender process in the \textit{Indian Act} and in Scott’s instructions to his Indian agents,\footnote{Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 45.} the Commission “should be wary,” as McLachlin J stated in \textit{Apsassin}, “of discarding carefully drafted protections created under validly enacted legislation.”\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 86 (Jerome Slavik).}

Canada’s initial position in response is that the Crown satisfied all of the requirements of section 51 since all of the voters at the 1928 surrender meeting resided on or near, and were
interested in, the Band’s reserves.\textsuperscript{422} Nevertheless, based on the reasons of Killeen J in \textit{Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point}, Canada recognizes that subsection (1) is mandatory in terms of requiring a separate surrender meeting and majority assent of a band’s adult male members at that meeting since those aspects of section 51 represent “the very essence of the protection of band autonomy in the decision-making process.”\textsuperscript{423} However, counsel suggests that other aspects of subsection (1) may be merely directory. Noting that Estey J in \textit{Cardinal} referred to the criteria in section 51 as simply “precautions” or “precautionary measures,” counsel asserts that some of those criteria were intended to be directory, and that indeed in \textit{Apsassin} the criteria in subsection (3) have already been determined to be exactly that.\textsuperscript{424} Similarly, some of the criteria in subsections (1) and (2) may also be directory only. Counsel asks:

... what about a situation where all other requirements of the surrender were met except that a meeting was not called in accordance with the rules of the band? Although a s. 51(1) requirement, it is arguable that if the failure to call the meeting according to band rules was the sole “flaw” in the surrender process, then the surrender might not be invalid. The test outlined by McLachlin [J] in \textit{Apsassin} in the context of s. 51(3), the requirement for the surrender affidavit, might still apply. To determine whether any surrender requirement is mandatory or directory, it must be measured against the object and purpose of the statute. If reading the requirement as mandatory would work a “serious inconvenience”, then an argument can be made that the requirement is directory only.\textsuperscript{425}

Canada further submits that, even if subsection (1) is mandatory, “[subsection] 51(2) is directory only, and the attendance of an ineligible voter at the meeting itself, and I would submit the signature on the document, does not necessarily invalidate the entire surrender.”\textsuperscript{426} For example, counsel argues that, if all 100 individuals on a voters’ list vote in favour of a surrender, it might still make

\textsuperscript{422} Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, pp. 15 and 22.

\textsuperscript{423} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 156 (Perry Robinson).


\textsuperscript{426} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 174 (Perry Robinson).
sense to give effect to the surrender if one person on the list turns out to be ineligible. In that event, the word “shall” might be more appropriately construed as being directory only.\textsuperscript{427}

**Mandatory v. Directory Generally**

Before turning to the authorities dealing with section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act, it is instructive to review the two leading cases dealing generally with mandatory and directory statutory provisions. The first of these is the classic judgment in *Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin*,\textsuperscript{428} a case involving a claim that a jury verdict should be set aside due to the failure of the sheriff to update voters’ lists to empanel juries. The Privy Council established the essential principles to guide the courts on the issue:

... the statutes contain no enactment as to what is to be the consequence of non-observance of these provisions. It is contended for the Appellants that the consequence is that the trial was *coram non judice* and must be treated as a nullity.

It is necessary to consider the principles which have been adopted in construing statutes of this character, and the authorities so far as there are any on the particular question arising there. The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at.... When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done.\textsuperscript{429}

More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has given further consideration to the issue of mandate and direction in *British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada* (the *Vancouver Island

\textsuperscript{427} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 231-33 (Perry Robinson).


In that case, Iacobucci J for the majority would have preferred not to deal with the issue of mandatory and directory provisions, since in his view his reasons adequately disposed of the appeal without the need to do so. However, given that McLachlin J in dissent agreed with the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the issue, he felt obliged to comment:

... I must ... accept that whenever a statute uses the word “shall”, there is a great temptation to emboss upon the word a conclusory label. Is the word “shall” in s. 268(2) [of the Railway Act\textsuperscript{431}] “mandatory” or “directory” in its effect? McLachlin J. proceeds to answer this question by first citing Montreal Street R. Co. v. Normandin (1917), 33 D.L.R. 195, [1917] A.C. 170 (P.C.), and with that traditional citation I have no quarrel. I prefer, however, to place the greater emphasis on what has become of Normandin in Canadian case law.


The doctrinal basis of the mandatory/directory distinction is difficult to ascertain. The “serious general inconvenience or injustice” of which Sir Arthur Channell speaks in Montreal Street R. Co. v. Normandin, supra, appears to lie at the root of the distinction as it is applied by the courts.

In other words, courts tend to ask, simply: would it be seriously inconvenient to regard the performance of some statutory direction as an imperative?

There can be no doubt about the character of the present inquiry. The “mandatory” and “directory” labels themselves offer no magical assistance as one defines the nature of a statutory direction. Rather, the inquiry itself is blatantly result oriented. In Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, supra, this court cited R. ex rel. Anderson v. Buchanan (1909), 44 N.S.R. 112 (C.A.) at p. 130, per Russell J., to make the point. It is useful to make it again. Russell J. stated:

I do not profess to be able to draw the distinction between what is directory and what is imperative, and I find that I am not alone in suspecting that, under the authorities, a provision may become directory if it is very desirable that compliance with it should not have been omitted, when that same provision would have been held to be imperative if the necessity had not arisen for the opposite ruling.


\textsuperscript{431} Railway Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3.
The temptation is very great, where the consequences of holding a statute to be imperative are seriously inconvenient, to strain a point in favor of the contention that it is merely directory...

Thus, the manipulation of mandate and direction is, for the most part, the manipulation of an end and not a means. In this sense, to quote again from Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, supra, the principle is “vague and expedient” (p. 18). This means that the court which decides what is mandatory, and what is directory, brings no special tools to bear upon the decision. The decision is informed by the usual process of statutory interpretation. But the process perhaps evokes a special concern for “inconvenient” effects, both public and private, which will emanate from the interpretive result.

With these thoughts in mind, I acknowledge my agreement with much of what McLachlin J. has said. In particular, I agree with her that the language of s. 268(2), and especially its use of the word “shall”, suggests an imperative reading. Indeed, in Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, supra, this court characterized the word shall as “presumptively imperative” in its ordinary grammatical meaning (p. 13). I also agree with McLachlin J. that the structure of the Railway Act demonstrates a concern for public input into termination decisions. Those concerns are real and pressing, and to ignore the value of public input in termination decisions would be to condone at least some level of inconvenience. But in my view, to the extent that I must make this alternative finding, I believe the approach of McLachlin J. focuses on the inconvenience of trammelling public input to the virtual exclusion of other kinds of inconvenience, both public and private.432

Apart from Justice Iacobucci’s complaint regarding the “blatantly result oriented” process of determining whether a given provision is mandatory or directory, the critical part of his analysis seems to be that, although the word “shall” is presumptively imperative, the inquiry is primarily one of statutory interpretation, with “a special concern for ‘inconvenient’ effects, both public and private, which will emanate from the interpretive result.” However, Iacobucci J was also careful to point out that a decision on whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory can work both public and private inconveniences, and that a court must ensure that it does not consider or over-emphasize one type of inconvenience to the exclusion or under-emphasis of another.

We now turn to the application of these principles to section 51 of the Indian Act.

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**Mandatory v. Directory in the Context of Section 51 of the Indian Act**

There are no cases that specifically decide the issue of whether subsection 51(2) is mandatory or directory, but some authorities touch on it in *dicta*. In *Apsassin*, Addy J was asked at trial to decide whether a surrender meeting complied with the requirements of subsections 51(1) and (3). The question of eligibility under subsection (2) did not arise. However, the parties *did* contest whether the various subsections of section 51 were mandatory or merely directory, and on this point Addy J wrote:

> On the question of whether non-compliance with all of the provisions of s. 51(3) of the Act would invalidate the surrender, a legal issue arises as to whether those provisions are mandatory or merely directory. *In the latter case non-compliance would not render void the surrender itself nor its subsequent acceptance by the Governor in Council.*

> In considering this issue the actual wording of the other provisions of s. 51 are *[sic]* of some importance. Subsection 1 provides that “... no surrender ... shall be valid or binding unless assented to ...”. This is clearly a substantial or mandatory provision. *Subsection 2 defines who is entitled to vote at a meeting and s-s. 4 provides that the Governor in Council may either accept or refuse the surrender. These provisions are also clearly substantial or mandatory.* Subsection 3, however, provides the means by which the fact that the surrender has been properly taken and executed is to be evidenced or established.\(^{433}\)

After reviewing the *Montreal Street Railway* case, Addy J remarked:

> As stated in the *Montreal Street Railway* case, the object of the statute must be considered. It seems clear that s. 51 has been enacted to ensure that the assent of the majority of adult members of the Band has been properly obtained before a surrender can be accepted by the Governor in Council and become valid and effective. The object of that section is to provide the means by which the general restrictions imposed on the surrender, sale or alienation of Indian reserve lands by s. 50 of the Act can be overcome. In other words, the sale or lease of Indian reserve lands must be made pursuant to the wishes on the Indian band and must, of course, also be approved by the Governor in Council. The last requirement would presumably involve the Governor in Council being satisfied that the surrender has been properly approved, that it is for the general welfare of the Indians and that they are not being unfairly deprived of their lands.

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Examination of the object of the statute reveals that a decision which would render the surrender null and void solely because of non-compliance with the formalities of s. 51(3) would certainly not promote the main object of the legislation where all substantial requirements have been fulfilled; it might well cause serious inconveniences or injustice to persons having no control over those entrusted with the duty of furnishing evidence of compliance in proper form. In the subsection, unlike s-s. (1), where it is provided that unless it is complied with no surrender shall be valid or binding, there is no provision for any consequences of non-observance. I therefore conclude that the provisions of s. 51(3) are merely directory and not mandatory.\(^\text{434}\)

It is interesting to note this last reference to the lack of a “provision for any consequences of non-observance” in subsection (3). There is likewise no such provision in subsection (2), but Addy J nevertheless concluded in \textit{dicta} that subsection (2) is “substantial or mandatory.” Addy J previously concluded that non-compliance with a merely directory provision “would not render void the surrender,”\(^\text{435}\) from which we infer that non-compliance with subsection (2), if mandatory, \textit{would} render the surrender void \textit{ab initio}. In the result, Addy J held that subsection 51(3) had been “sufficiently complied with” and that, in any event, its provisions were directory, not mandatory.\(^\text{436}\)

Justice Addy’s decision was subsequently appealed.\(^\text{437}\) Although Stone JA of the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed with the conclusion that subsection 51(3) had been “sufficiently complied with,” he agreed with Addy J that the subsection was merely directory and that non-compliance with it would not render the surrender void. He commenced by stating:

There remains the question of whether this formality had to be complied with strictly in order for the surrender to be valid. The statute provides that the surrender “shall” be certified on oath. While the word “shall” in a statute is presumed to be imperative, a statute may itself contain some indication that a failure to comply with the duty which that word imposes will not nullify the action otherwise authorized. In such a case the provisions are viewed as merely directory. In the present case, it has been suggested that the provisions of section 51 are designed for the protection


\(^{436}\) \textit{Apsassin v. Canada}, [1988] 1 CNLR 73 at 135 (FCTD).

of the Indians and that “the Crown was duty bound to proceed according to that
section”: Lower Kootenay Indian Band v. Canada (1991), 42 F.T.R. 241 at 284,

After quoting from the Montreal Street Railway case regarding the test for determining whether a
statutory provision should be construed as mandatory or directory in nature, Stone JA continued:

It is my view that this issue is to be decided in the statutory context. I agree
with the Trial Judge that in the circumstances strict compliance with the particular
formality in s. 51.3 was not essential to the validity of the surrender. The opening
words of s. 51 provide that “no release or surrender ... shall be valid or binding”
unless assented to by a majority of the male members of a band of the stipulated age
at a meeting held in the presence of the Crown’s representative. It thus appears that
the main object of s. 51 was to ensure that no surrender could be effected without the
prior assent of the concerned Indians. Section 51.2, respecting entitlement to vote, is
related to it and must also be satisfied for an assent to be effective. Section 51.3 does
not itself address the validity of the surrender, and appears to provide for a formality
to be fulfilled subsequent to the assent and as a means of showing that the assent was
duly given. Section 51.4, which provides for submission of the surrender documents
to the Governor in Council for acceptance or refusal of the surrender “[w]hen such
assent has been so certified,” may suggest that no acceptance is possible unless the
s. 51.3 certificate is among the surrender documents. As I have stated, the main
object of s. 51 is set forth in its opening words which prohibits the surrender of
reserve lands unless the surrender is first assented to in the manner therein specified.
I respectfully agree with the Trial Judge that the formality in question, although
stated to be imperative, should be taken as directory. Other evidence established to
the satisfaction of the Trial Judge that the required assent had been given at the
surrender meeting in the presence of the Crown’s representative. I therefore conclude
that the Crown did not breach a fiduciary obligation by failing to observe the
particular formality under the Indian Act.

Isaac CJ in dissent did not deal with section 51 and Marceau JA, although concurring with Stone JA
in the result, would have disposed of the arguments relating to section 51 on a different basis.

438 Apsassin v. Canada, [1993] 2 CNLR 20 at 47 (FCA), Stone JA.

Ultimately, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada following the release of Justice Iacobucci’s judgment in the Vancouver Island Railway case, McLachlin J concurred with the lower courts on this issue:

This raises the question of whether the ss. 51(3) and 51(4) are mandatory or merely directory. Addy J. and Stone JA below held that despite the use of the word “shall”, the provisions were directory rather than mandatory, relying on Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, [1917] A.C. 170 (P.C.). Addy J. concluded that to read the provisions in a mandatory way would not promote the main object of the legislation, which is to ensure that the sale of the reserve is made pursuant to the wishes of the Band. Stone JA agreed. This Court has since held that the object of the statute, and the effect of ruling one way or the other, are the most important considerations in determining whether a directive is mandatory or directory: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41.

The true object of ss. 51(3) and 51(4) of the Indian Act was to ensure that the surrender was validly assented to by the Band. The evidence, including the voter’s list, in the possession of the DIA [Department of Indian Affairs] amply established valid assent. Moreover, to read the provisions as mandatory would work serious inconvenience, not only where the surrender is later challenged, but in any case where the provision was not fulfilled, as the Band would have to go through the process again of holding a meeting, assenting to the surrender, and then certifying the assent. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the courts below that the “shall” in the provisions should not be considered mandatory. Failure to comply with s. 51 of the Indian Act therefore does not defeat the surrender.

The predecessor to section 51 – section 49 of the 1906 Indian Act – was the subject of further judicial scrutiny in the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point case. At trial, Killeen J rejected the “public law” argument that the Governor in Council had an independent and unreviewable discretion under subsection 49(4) to decide whether the conditions in subsections (1) to (3) had been satisfied. He then turned to the interpretation of those three preceding subsections:

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440 Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 374-75 (SCR), McLachlin J.

441 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 85 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).

442 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 82 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).
What, then, is the effect of s. 49(1)-(3)?

Section 49(1) lays down, in my view, in explicit terms a true condition precedent to the validity of any surrender and sale of Indian reserve lands. It makes this abundantly clear by saying that no such surrender “shall be valid or binding” unless its directions are followed.

Bearing in mind the prophylactic principle at stake in the Royal Proclamation, as reinforced by s. 48-50, it is simply impossible to argue that s. 49(1) does not lay down a mandatory precondition for the validity of any surrender. If the surrender in question has not followed the s. 49(1) procedure, it must be void ab initio. To suggest otherwise is to rewrite history and the commands of the Royal Proclamation and the Indian Act.

Section 49(1) may be summarized in this way. It states that no surrender is valid or binding unless

1. it was “assented to” by a majority of male members over 21 years;
2. the assent must have been given at a “meeting or council” called for that purpose;
3. the meeting or council must have been called “according to the rules of the Band”;
4. the meeting or council must have been conducted “in the presence of” the Superintendent General or his agent – in practice, an Indian agent.443

Before turning to subsection (2), Killeen J dealt with the band’s argument that seven of 27 individuals who voted in favour of the surrender in that case – including one, Maurice George, who did not even attend the surrender meeting and was later induced by the prospective purchaser, A. MacKenzie Crawford, and Indian Agent Thomas Paul to vote for the surrender – “had no status as Band members to vote.” Had Killeen J not concluded that these seven individuals – all members of the George family – were in fact entitled to vote, the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point case might have been a binding precedent on the Commission in this inquiry. However, he did in fact find that all seven were eligible, and in his opinion there was no chance “that the Band will be able to uncover future credible evidence impeaching the status of the Georges as voting members.”444 Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly in light of his comments regarding the mandatory nature of subsection (1), he stated with regard to Maurice George’s unconventional participation in the vote:

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443 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 82-83 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).

444 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 86 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).
It is true that Maurice George’s vote was defective in that he did not attend the meeting, but his non-attendance cannot invalidate the vote. There is nothing in s. 49 or elsewhere [in the] Act supporting such an argument and common sense is against it. The 26 [of 44 eligible voting members] who did vote favourably clearly constituted a strong majority.\textsuperscript{445}

While we agree that there was nothing in section 49 of the 1906 \textit{Indian Act} or section 51 of the 1927 statute to compel an eligible voting member to attend and vote at a surrender meeting, we do not read those sections as permitting members to vote \textit{other than} at a surrender meeting specifically called for the purpose of dealing with the surrender. As we have already noted, we are not called upon to address that issue in this inquiry since, despite Deputy Superintendent General Scott’s authorizing memorandum, there is no evidence to suggest that the surrender was considered in meetings with small groups or individual members of the Duncan’s Band. However, what we find interesting is that Killeen J was prepared to consider Maurice George’s vote as merely “defective” but not as placing the validity of the surrender in doubt.

With regard to subsection (2), Killeen J was primarily concerned with Crawford’s attendance at the surrender meeting to offer cash inducements to the voting members to encourage them to vote in favour of the surrender. Killeen J held:

\begin{quote}
Section 49(2) provides that no Indian shall vote or be present at the council meeting unless he habitually resides at or near the reserve and is interested in the reserve. I have already ruled that those who voted at the General Council meeting were entitled to vote as legitimate members of the Band....

However, Mr. Vogel [counsel for the Band] takes another tack in attempting to argue that s. 49(2) has been violated. His argument is that s. 49(2), by necessary implication, prohibits anyone other than the Indian agent and qualified voters from being in attendance at the General Council meeting. His point, here, really goes back for attempted reinforcement to the Royal Proclamation and the broad context of the Act itself. He submits that the Royal Proclamation contains a general prohibition against “direct dealing”, as he put it, between a prospective purchaser and an Indian Band. Thus, s. 49(2) should be read broadly to prohibit a purchaser such as Crawford from having any dealings of a direct nature, including attending at the General Council meeting or offering the $15.00 cash payments to the voting members.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{445} \textit{Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 87 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).}
As to the undoubted attendance of Crawford at the General Council meeting, I can find no support in the Royal Proclamation or s. 49(2) for an express or implied prohibition against that.

The Royal Proclamation does not prohibit direct dealings per se. What it does is prohibit direct sales and interposes the presence of the Crown through the surrender procedure in an attempt to protect the Indians from the sharp and predatory practices of the past.

It would have been easy for Parliament, if so-minded, to prohibit all direct dealings and, within s. 49(2), to prohibit the attendance of outsiders, including a prospective purchaser, at a surrender meeting. It chose not to do so and I find no warrant anywhere in the Royal Proclamation or the Act for virtually re-writing s. 49(2) such that it could be interpreted to prohibit direct dealing or attendance at the surrender meeting.

Equally, I cannot conclude that the promises of the $15.00 direct cash payments and the distribution of $5.00 to each of the voters at the March 30 meeting violated s. 49(2) or any other provision of the Act.

There can be little doubt that these cash payments, and the promises which preceded them, have an odour of moral failure about them. It is, perhaps, hard to understand why the Departmental officials could countenance such side offers even in the different world of the 1920s in which they were working. However, as I have said above, I cannot read a prohibition against them within the statutory code of the Act.

I may also say, here, that I am not persuaded that s. 49(2) contains a mandatory procedural requirement of the kind specified in s. 49(1). There is nothing in s. 49(2) itself to suggest that failure to comply with its directive would render the surrender invalid. In any event, I am entirely satisfied that s. 49(2) was complied with and that no one who voted at the meeting violated its prescription.446

On the appeal of Justice Killeen’s decision,447 Laskin JA on behalf of a unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal, after setting out the provisions of the Royal Proclamation and section 49 of the 1906 Indian Act, stated:

The underlying rationale for the Royal Proclamation and for these provisions of the Indian Act was to prevent aboriginal peoples from being exploited: Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321. The Royal Proclamation and the statute protected the aboriginals’ interest in their reserve land and at the same time permitted

446 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNLR 54 at 88 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)). Emphasis added.

447 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 31 OR (3d) 97 (Ont CA).
them to make their own decisions about the land. As Killeen J. noted at p. 683, the Crown “assumed a protective and fiduciary role”; it became a buffer or an intermediary between aboriginal peoples and third party purchasers of aboriginal land. If the meeting was public with dealings conducted in the open, frauds, abuses and misunderstandings were less likely to occur.

The Band argues that “it is a reasonable and necessary interpretation” of s. 49 that only the Indian agent (appointed by the Department of Indian Affairs) and qualified voters are entitled to attend a Band meeting that considers a surrender. In this case, Crawford, one of the purchasers, attended the meeting of the General Council of the Band on March 30, 1927, which was called to consider his proposed surrender of the Kettle Point land. While there, Crawford was permitted by the Indian agent to pay $5 cash to each voting member in attendance. The Band submits that s. 49 precluded Crawford from attending and from negotiating directly with the Band.

After quoting Killeen J regarding the absence of language in the legislation to prohibit the attendance of outsiders, including prospective purchasers, at surrender meetings, Laskin JA continued:

A case could arise in which direct dealings between an Indian Band and a prospective purchaser would violate the spirit, if not the express words, of the Royal Proclamation or s. 49 of the Indian Act. I do, however, agree with Killeen J. that in this case the mere presence of Crawford at the meeting violated neither the language nor the rationale of the Royal Proclamation or the Act. I would therefore not give effect to the Band’s first ground of appeal. The Band’s real complaint is not that Crawford attended the meeting, but that he exploited the members by offering them a “bribe” to vote for the surrender.

This decision was ultimately upheld without additional reasons on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

It is on the basis of these reasons that Canada argues that the presence of someone other than an eligible voter and the Crown’s representative at a surrender meeting will not taint or invalidate

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448 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 31 OR (3d) 97 at 101 (Ont CA).

449 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 31 OR (3d) 97 at 102 (Ont CA).

the surrender. In the Commission’s view, however, the only decision made with regard to subsection 49(2) in *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point* is that it did not apply on the facts of that case. The prohibition in subsection (2) was aimed at *Indians*, but there is nothing to suggest that the prospective purchaser, Crawford, was aboriginal. Therefore, according to Killeen J and the Ontario Court of Appeal, his presence at the meeting was not prohibited even though, by definition, he could not be interested in the reserve in the manner contemplated by the Act. The case does not support the proposition that an Indian who is not habitually resident on or near, and interested in the reserve can attend and vote at a surrender meeting, and that subsection (2) is therefore merely directory.

We have already noted Justice Killeen’s conclusion that “[t]here is nothing in s. 49(2) itself to suggest that failure to comply with its directive would render the surrender invalid.” However, Killeen J later shed additional light on subsection (2) in his discussion of subsection (3):

I cannot agree with Mr. Vogel’s contention that s. 49(3) contains a mandatory precondition to the validity of the surrender.

It is true that s. 49(3) uses the phrase “shall be certified” but, considered in context, I believe this language to be directory and not mandatory.

In order to get at the meaning and scope of this phrase, one must consider the object and purpose of s. 49(3). As it seems to me, its purpose is clearly differentiated from the purpose of s. 49(1) or (2). These latter provisions establish the exact procedures to be followed in effectuating a valid surrender on the part of a given *Indian band*. On the other hand, s. 49(3) achieves what I would call an after-the-fact evidentiary purpose, namely, to provide sworn documentary proof that the requirements of s. 49(1)-(2) have been complied with in all respects.

I cannot believe that an evidentiary or proof proviso aimed at providing future proof in sworn form that appropriate procedures for an assent to surrender have been followed can somehow have a nullifying effect on an assent to surrender that would otherwise be valid. Section 49(3) itself does not use the same language as s. 49(1) does – “no release or surrender of a reserve ... shall be valid or binding, unless ...” – and, absent such language, the context and purpose of s. 49(3) dictates that it be given a directory rather than mandatory effect.

I note here that, on my view of the evidence in this case, there is overwhelming proof that the Band gave its assent to the surrender with a strong overall majority vote of at least 26 out of 44 eligible voters, and it would be ludicrous, I think, to hold that established assent to be invalid because an after-the-fact proof requirement is defective. It may be added, also, that the statutory

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declaration is only partially defective because the statutory declaration is valid so far as it relates to the joint oaths of the three Indian representatives who were, after all, present at the vote and who have pledged their oaths that the procedures of s. 49(1)-(2) were followed.

I am comforted in this conclusion by the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Apsassin. 452

It will be recalled that Stone JA in Apsassin concluded that subsection (3) was merely directory, but that subsection (1) and – in dicta – subsection (2) were both mandatory. Justice Killeen’s comments are therefore confusing. On one hand, he says he is “not persuaded that s. 49(2) contains a mandatory procedural requirement of the kind specified in s. 49(1),” and he notes that, unlike subsection (1), subsection (3) does not contain the sort of language and purpose that require it to be given a directory rather than mandatory effect. Like subsection (3), subsection (2) does not contain wording like “no release or surrender of a reserve ... shall be valid or binding, unless ...” that is found only in subsection (1).

On the other hand, Killeen J differentiates the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the former being part of what is required to “establish the exact procedures to be followed in effectuating a valid surrender on the part of a given Indian band,” and the latter to achieve “an after-the-fact evidentiary purpose, namely, to provide sworn documentary proof that the requirements of s. 49(1)-(2) have been complied with in all respects.” Since Stone JA in Apsassin viewed subsections (1) and (2) as being “related,” with both subsections needing to be fully satisfied for a surrender to be valid, and Addy J also concluded that subsection (2) is “substantial or mandatory,” it is perplexing that Killeen J purported to find support in Apsassin while concurrently being unpersuaded that subsection (2) was the same sort of mandatory provision as subsection (1).

In this curious – and entirely obiter – jurisprudential context, it now falls to the Commission to decide whether subsection (2) is mandatory or merely directory. If it is mandatory and any of its terms have not been met, then, as we have noted, the surrender must be considered void ab initio. If it is merely directory, the failure to satisfy its terms can be treated as a technical defect that, while possibly leaving Canada open to some form of sanction, will not affect the validity of the surrender.

452 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNL R 54 at 89-90 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).
McLachlin J in *Apsassin* distilled the relevant principles from the *Montreal Street Railway* and *Vancouver Island Railway* cases into a test that requires us to determine whether a mandatory interpretation of subsection 51(2) of the 1927 *Indian Act* will result in serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the statutory duty, and at the same time does not promote Parliament’s main or “true” object in enacting the legislation. The most important considerations in applying this test are the object of the statute and “the effect of ruling one way or the other.”

As to the object of section 51, it will be recalled that Addy J stated:

> It seems clear that s. 51 has been enacted to ensure that the assent of the majority of adult members of the Band has been properly obtained before a surrender can be accepted by the Governor in Council and become valid and effective. The object of that section is to provide the means by which the general restrictions imposed on the surrender, sale or alienation of Indian reserve lands by s. 50 of the Act can be overcome.

Similarly, Stone JA considered that the object of the legislation was “to ensure that no surrender could be effected without the prior assent of the concerned Indians,” and McLachlin J characterized it as ensuring “that the sale of the reserve is made pursuant to the wishes of the Band.” In short, while an underlying theme of the *Indian Act* may be to protect Indians from exploitation and the erosion of their land base, section 51 of the 1927 statute and like provisions preceding and following it were enacted to permit an Indian band to dispose of its reserve lands provided that Canada and the band both consented.

That being said, it is understandable why all three courts in *Apsassin* would have concluded that the provision at play in that case was directory rather than mandatory. Subsection (3) is much more ancillary to the purpose of section 51 than subsections (1) and (2). As Killeen J stated in *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point*, the purpose of subsections (1) and (2) is to set forth the

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454 *Apsassin v. Canada*, [1993] 2 CNLR 20 at 49 (FCA), Stone JA.

455 *Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)*, [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 374 (SCR), McLachlin J.
procedure by which a surrender is to take place, whereas subsection (3) merely confirms that the surrender was validly assented to by the Band.\textsuperscript{456}

Valid band assent to a surrender is clearly a “mandatory” requirement or condition precedent to a valid surrender of reserve land. The substance of the Commission’s inquiry, therefore, must be to determine whether there has been a fair vote conducted that accurately reflects whether the consent of the community has been given. To read section 51 otherwise would completely nullify the underlying purpose of the surrender provisions. In short, under that provision a surrender would be void \textit{ab initio} if it did not receive majority assent of the adult male members of the band at a meeting or council summoned according to the rules of the band for the purpose of considering the surrender and held in the presence of the Superintendent General or his duly authorized representative. We find that such assent \textit{was} given.

McLachlin J also said that not only is the object of the statutory provision to be considered, but also the effect of ruling one way or the other. Where treating a provision as mandatory will result in serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the statutory duty, and at the same time does not promote Parliament’s main or “true” object in enacting the legislation, then the provision should be treated as directory. In considering whether a serious inconvenience would arise, we must also recall Justice Iacobucci’s admonition in the \textit{Vancouver Island Railway} case to consider all possible inconveniences, whether public or private, without considering or over-emphasizing one type of inconvenience to the exclusion or under-emphasis of another.

McLachlin J in \textit{Apsassin} alluded to the sorts of inconvenience that can arise where it is alleged that a statutory provision regarding surrender has not been met:

... to read the provisions as mandatory would work serious inconvenience, not only where the surrender is later challenged, but in any case where the provision was not fulfilled, as the Band would have to go through the process again of holding a meeting, assenting to the surrender, and then certifying the assent. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the courts below that the “shall” in the provisions should not

\textsuperscript{456} \textit{Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 1 CNL R 54 at 89 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.).)
be considered mandatory. Failure to comply with s. 51 of the *Indian Act* therefore does not defeat the surrender.\(^{457}\)

There may also be serious inconvenience to those individuals who acquired the lands following the surrender and now own them in fee simple. On the other hand, a serious inconvenience may have been worked to the Duncan’s First Nation if in fact the surrender was imposed by representatives of the federal government contrary to the Band’s wishes. Obviously, if true Band assent was not obtained, the object of the surrender provisions of the *Indian Act* would be frustrated and rendered meaningless.

In the context of these competing considerations, the Commission takes the view that the terms of subsection 51(2) prohibiting Indians from attending or voting at a surrender meeting unless they habitually reside on or near, and are interested in the reserve should not be considered mandatory in nature. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the inadvertent presence or vote of one or more ineligible Indians has cast a band’s majority assent into doubt, we believe that the meeting and vote should be treated as valid. Furthermore, we believe that, if a surrender was to be rendered void by the presence of one ineligible voter in the face of a strong majority in favour of the surrender, that would result in a serious inconvenience. Therefore, provided that the quorum and majority assent requirements of a surrender meeting have still been met after discounting the ineligible votes, and further provided that the attendance of ineligible Indians at the surrender meeting has not been demonstrated to have irretrievably undermined or discredited the meeting, the surrender should be allowed to stand.

In the present case, the Duncan’s 1928 surrender meeting appears to have been attended by at least one ineligible Indian, Emile Leg, and perhaps more if members of the Beaver Band were also present. Leg also voted in favour of the surrender. Nevertheless, there is no evidence before us that would suggest that the surrender proceedings were compromised by the presence or participation of one or more of these individuals. Accordingly, if the First Nation’s challenge of this surrender is to be upheld, it must be on the basis of whether the disqualification of ineligible voters raises doubts

\(^{457}\) *Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)*, [1995] 4 SCR 344, [1996] 2 CNLR 25, 130 DLR (4th) 193 at 374-75 (SCR), McLachlin J.
that the quorum and majority assent requirements of subsection (1) were satisfied. It is to those questions that we now turn.

Was There a Quorum?

A quorum is the number of band members who must be present at a surrender meeting before it can be said that the meeting is properly constituted and the band can transact business. The First Nation’s initial position is that none of the Duncan’s Band members lived near the reserves in question, meaning that it would not have been possible to convene a surrender meeting at all.\textsuperscript{458} Alternatively, if IR 151A might be considered “near” the reserves to be surrendered, then the only two band members who would have been eligible to vote were Samuel and Eban Testawits; since only Eban attended the meeting, the majority of eligible voters required to establish quorum was not met and the meeting was still not properly convened.\textsuperscript{459} Finally, in the further alternative, assuming that Alex Mooswah was eligible to vote at the surrender meeting, the First Nation argues that the total number of members who were eligible to vote was eight, resulting in a quorum requirement of five, which, in counsel’s submission, was not met if any one of the five who attended was not eligible to do so.\textsuperscript{460} As we have already seen, the First Nation submits that, at the very least, Emile Leg was ineligible, and that others may have been as well.

In reply, Canada argues that there were seven eligible voters,\textsuperscript{461} and that, since five of those seven attended the surrender meeting and voted, quorum was achieved.\textsuperscript{462} Alternatively, even if Alex Mooswah was at least 21 years old in 1928 and otherwise eligible to vote, five of eight still constituted a majority of eligible voters and thus a quorum.\textsuperscript{463}
The quorum requirements of section 49 of the 1906 *Indian Act* – virtually identical to those of section 51 of the 1927 statute – were considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Cardinal v. R.*

In that case, 26 of the 30 to 33 male members of the Enoch Band of the full age of 21 years attended the surrender meeting, with 14 voting in favour of the surrender and 12 opposed. To use the terminology employed by J. Paul Salembier in a recent article, the surrender was approved by only a “relative majority” of those in attendance at the meeting and not by an “absolute majority” of all 30 to 33 eligible members of the Band. For the Court, Estey J held that a majority of the male members *eligible to vote* must be present to establish quorum at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on surrender. Significantly, he also concluded that, in determining that majority, those members rendered ineligible by subsection (2) are *not* to be counted in establishing the potential voting population:

Some help can be gained from a reference to subs. (2), which for convenience I repeat here:

2. No Indian shall be entitled to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near, and is interested in the reserve in question.

*The effect of this subsection is to remove from the list of members otherwise eligible to assent to a surrender those Indians who do not habitually reside on or near the reserve.* Nevertheless, such a member remains a member of the band, because only by the procedure set out in s. 13 of the Act shall an Indian “cease to be a member of the band”. It is to be assumed that the “majority” referred to in subs. (1) means a majority of those members who remain eligible to vote after giving effect to the restriction in subs. (2). If such is not the case, then a member who does not vote for any reason, including non-compliance with subs. (2), would be given a negative vote for the purposes of determining whether a majority vote had been obtained under subs. (1). However, subs. (1) taken by itself is worded very broadly, and refers only to “a majority of the male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one years”. That certainly would include members of the band who do not reside on or near the reserve. If the minority in the Court of Appeal is correct, then the absentee member, disentitled to vote under s. 49(2) but still a member, as he has not been removed under s. 13, is given a negative vote, in the sense that he is included in the absolute

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number of male members of the band the majority of whom must assent to the proposed surrender.\textsuperscript{466}

\textit{Cardinal} was later considered and adopted by Jerome ACJ of the Federal Court, Trial Division, in \textit{King v. The Queen}.\textsuperscript{467} In that case, the Chief of a band that had surrendered reserve land sought a declaration that the surrender vote was valid because a majority of the electors of the band had assented to it as required by section 39 of the 1970 \textit{Indian Act}. That statute, worded differently from the 1906 and 1927 versions, provided that “[a] surrender is void unless ... it is assented to by a majority of the electors of the band” at a meeting or by referendum. The surrender had been put to a vote in a referendum in which 190 of 378 eligible voters cast ballots, with 172 votes in favour, 15 opposed, and three spoiled ballots. After quoting Estey J extensively, Jerome ACJ held that, “[b]ased on the reasoning in \textit{Cardinal} and the language of s. 39(1)(b) the requirements of that paragraph are met where a majority of those electors of the band who completed a ballot in the referendum, assented to the surrender.”\textsuperscript{468} Acceptance of the fact that the 190 voters casting ballots would constitute a quorum is implicit in this conclusion.

Applying this reasoning to the circumstances of the Duncan’s Band, it will be recalled that we have already determined that Emile and Francis Leg were not eligible to participate in the surrender proceedings. We find that, of the six remaining male members of the Band of the full age of 21 years, four – Joseph Testawits, Eban Testawits, John Boucher and James Boucher – participated in the surrender vote. We conclude that these four constituted a majority of the six eligible voters and therefore the surrender meeting achieved the required quorum.

\textbf{Did the Surrender Receive the Required Majority Assent?}

In \textit{Cardinal}, Estey J held that, while the words “a majority of the male members of the band” in subsection 49(1) of the 1906 \textit{Indian Act} represent the \textit{quorum} requirement of the meeting, the common law supplies the \textit{assent} requirement. In other words, at common law, assuming that the


\textsuperscript{467} \textit{King v. The Queen}, [1986] 4 CNLR 74 (FCTD).

\textsuperscript{468} \textit{King v. The Queen}, [1986] 4 CNLR 74 at 78 (FCTD).
quorum requirement has been fulfilled, a majority of the votes cast at the meeting – a “relative
majority” rather than an “absolute majority” – decides whether assent will be given to the proposed
surrender. Estey J stated:

There remains to determine only the requirement for the expression of assent,
in the sense of that term in s. 49(1), at the meeting attended by the prescribed
majority. In the common law and, indeed, in general usage of the language, a group
of persons may, unless specially organized, express their view only by an agreement
by the majority. A refinement arises where all members of a defined group present
at a meeting do not express a view. In that case, as we shall see, the common law
expresses again the ordinary sense of our language that the group viewpoint is that
which is expressed by the majority of those declaring or voting on the issue in
question. Thus, by this rather simple line of reasoning, the section is construed as
meaning that an assent, to be valid, must be given by a majority of a majority of
eligible band members in attendance at a meeting called for the purpose of giving or
withholding assent....

To require otherwise, that is to say, more than a mere majority of the
prescribed quorum of eligible band members present to assent to the proposition,
would put an undue power in the hands of those members who, while eligible, do not
trouble themselves to attend or, if in attendance, to vote; or, as it was put by
Gillanders JA in Glass Bottle Blowers,\(^{469}\) supra, at p. 656, it would “give undue effect
to the indifference of a small minority.”\(^{470}\)

Counsel for the First Nation suggests that Estey J was wrong, and that only an absolute
majority can assent to a surrender:

[Y]ou figure out how many people are really over the age of 21 and you must have
a majority of them, and if certain people can’t vote, they can’t vote. You still need
a majority of people over 21 after removing the ineligible voters. So if you have ten
in a band and you have two ineligible voters, you still need a majority of six. I think
that [subsection] 51(1) – and here is where I disagree with Justice Estey – isn’t just
a majority of the eligible voters. It means what it says. It’s a majority of male
members over the age of 21.\(^{471}\)

\(^{469}\) Glass Bottle Blowers’ Association of the United States and Canada v. Dominion Glass Co. Ltd., [1943]
OWN 652 (Lab. Ct).


Arguing that Justice Estey’s comments regarding majority assent were *obiter* and thus not binding, counsel further submits that his own approach should be preferred notwithstanding that, in some circumstances, it might become mathematically impossible to achieve a majority vote in favour of a surrender.\textsuperscript{472}

Canada’s view is that, while Estey J may have discussed the question of majority assent in *obiter*, his analysis is nonetheless compelling and should be followed. In other words, once quorum is achieved, assent must be given by a majority of those voting at the surrender meeting who remain eligible after disqualifying those rendered ineligible by subsection (2).\textsuperscript{473} This means that, in the present case, given that four eligible members attended the surrender meeting, three of those four had to vote in favour of the surrender for a valid assent. In fact, Canada contends that the Band did better than that by having all of the eligible voters in attendance vote for the surrender.\textsuperscript{474}

We have already established that, with the exception of Emile and Francis Leg, the remaining five individuals on Murison’s 1928 voters’ list were all habitually resident on or near, and interested in the reserves being surrendered, as was Alex Mooswah. Therefore, to obtain a valid surrender, four of six eligible voters were required to attend the meeting to achieve quorum; three of those four were required to vote in favour of the surrender for the required majority assent. Since all four eligible voters who attended the meeting in fact voted for the surrender, the majority assent requirement was met.

**Did Canada Accept the Surrender?**

Subsection 51(4) of the 1927 *Indian Act* stipulates that, once a band’s assent to a surrender has been certified on oath by the Crown’s officer and by some of the band’s chiefs and principal men, it is to be submitted to the Governor in Council for acceptance or refusal. Of this having been done there is little doubt since, as we have seen, Order in Council PC 82 dated January 19, 1929, confirmed the

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\textsuperscript{472} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 235-36 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{473} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 236 (Perry Robinson).

\textsuperscript{474} ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 165-67 (Perry Robinson).
Governor in Council’s acceptance of the surrender of IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G by the Duncan’s Band.  

Counsel for the First Nation contends that, although Canada’s acceptance may have been technically sound, it was inappropriate for Canada to have accepted the surrender when it knew, first, that the requirements of the Act had not been met and, second, that the surrender documents were inadequate, “having been prepared in suspicious circumstances and with a motive to fabricate” to procure the surrender. At this point, however, the Commission is prepared simply to conclude that Canada accepted the surrender in accordance with the strict technical requirements of subsection 51(4). We will address the First Nation’s concerns in the context of our analysis of whether, with regard to this surrender, Canada breached the fiduciary obligations superimposed by the courts on subsection (4) or violated any other fiduciary obligations to the First Nation.

**Conclusion**

The Commission has determined that, following appropriate notice being given, five adult male members of the Duncan’s Band – Joseph Testawits, Eban Testawits, John Boucher, James Boucher, and Emile Leg, the first four of whom habitually resided on or near and were interested in the Band’s reserves – convened on IR 152 on September 19, 1928, for the express purpose of deciding whether to surrender IR 151 and IR 151B to 151G. In attendance were Inspector of Indian Agencies William Murison and Indian Agent Harold Laird, who were authorized to represent the Crown at the meeting. The four eligible Indian participants, constituting a quorum of the Band’s eligible voting members, unanimously assented to the surrender, with three – Joseph Testawits, Eban Testawits, and James Boucher – making their way to Waterhole, Alberta, later that day. There, along with Murison, they appeared before lawyer William P. Dundas, who notarized their affidavit deposing that the surrender had been duly approved by the Band. The surrender was subsequently forwarded to the Governor in Council, who accepted it by Order in Council dated January 19, 1929. It is based on these facts

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476 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 69.
that the Commission concludes that the 1928 surrender by the Duncan’s Band complied in all material respects with section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act.

In previous inquiries, the Commission has had occasion to discuss the effect of finding that a surrender has satisfied the statutory requirements of the Indian Act. For example, in our report dealing with the 1907 surrender by the Kahkewistahaw First Nation, we wrote:

Extinguishing the aboriginal interest in the surrendered land means that it is not open to the Kahkewistahaw Band to challenge the titles of the current registered owners of the surrendered lands, most, if not all, of whom by this late date must be bona fide third party purchasers for value. It must be kept in mind, however, that the appeal in Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point arose from a motion by the Crown seeking summary judgment dismissing the Band’s claim for a declaration that the 1927 surrender and the 1929 Crown patent in that case were void. Although the decision confirmed the surrender as well as the titles of those defendants who now own land surrendered by the Band in 1927, Killeen J also recognized that certain issues could not be disposed of summarily and remained to be decided at trial:

Any finding of unconscionable conduct under the facts of this case cannot affect the validity of the Order in Council [approving the surrender]; rather, such finding or findings must surely go to the Band’s other claim for breach of fiduciary duty.477

Similarly, the Court of Appeal concluded:

... what then of the cash payments, which, in the words of the motions judge, had “an odour of moral failure about them”? In my view, there is no evidence to suggest that these cash payments, in the words of McLachlin J., vitiated the “true intent” or the “free and informed consent” of the Band or, in the words of Gonthier J., “made it unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention.” In keeping with Apsassin, the decision of the Band to sell should be honoured. Therefore, like Killeen J., I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial on whether the cash payments invalidated the surrender. I would dismiss the Band’s second ground of appeal.

I add, however, that the cash payments or alleged “bribe” and consequent exploitation or “tainted dealings” may afford grounds for the Band to make out a case of breach of fiduciary duty against the Crown. As the parties have recognized, this is an issue for trial. The same may be said of the Band’s contention that the sale to

477 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Attorney General of Canada (1995), 24 OR (3d) 654 at 698 (Ont. Ct (Gen. Div.)).
Crawford was improvident, he having immediately “flipped” the land for nearly three times the purchase price. In discussing whether the Crown had a fiduciary duty to prevent the surrender in Apsassin, McLachlin J. wrote at p. 371:

It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to surrender the reserve, and its decision was to be respected. At the same time, if the Band’s decision was foolish or improvident – a decision that constituted exploitation – the Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown’s obligation was limited to preventing exploitative bargains.

This, too, is an issue for trial.\footnote{Indian Claims Commission, Inquiry into the 1907 Reserve Land Surrender Claim of the Kahkewistahaw First Nation (Ottawa, February 1997), (1998) 8 ICCP 3 at 73, quoting Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General), unreported, [1996] OJ No. 4188 (December 2, 1996) at 24-25 (Ont. CA). Emphasis added. The references to “improvidence” in this passage relate to the issue of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations arising out of the Governor in Council’s acceptance of a surrender under subsection 49(4). This issue will be dealt with later in this report.}

Our mandate under the Specific Claims Policy is to determine whether an outstanding lawful obligation is owed by Canada to the Duncan’s First Nation. Although we have concluded that the surrender was technically valid, an outstanding lawful obligation may nevertheless be grounded in Canada’s breach of its fiduciary duties to the First Nation. We now turn to our analysis of the fiduciary duties, if any, owed by Canada to the Duncan’s First Nation on the facts of this case.

**ISSUES 2 AND 3  CANADA’S PRE-SURRENDER FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS**

Did the Crown meet its pre-surrender fiduciary obligations?

Was the decision of the Indians tainted by the conduct of the Crown in the pre-surrender proceedings?
In the course of its inquiries into the claims of the Kahkewistahaw, Moosomin, and Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nations and the Sumas Indian Band, the Commission has already had several opportunities to canvass at some length the leading authorities dealing with the Crown’s fiduciary duties to First Nations – most notably Guerin v. The Queen and Apsassin. Having done so, we now find it convenient to deal jointly with the second and third issues in this inquiry, since both require the Commission to consider the Crown’s pre-surrender fiduciary obligations to the Duncan’s Band.

Moreover, since we have already set forth our views on the implications of these leading cases, there is no need for us to undertake this analysis afresh. However, understanding Guerin and Apsassin is critical to appreciate the nature and extent of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations and to apply those principles to the facts of this inquiry, so it is necessary to set forth the basic facts and legal principles that have emerged from those cases. This we propose to do by relying extensively on the review of the authorities set forth in our earlier reports.

In the course of our analysis, we will consider the issues that have arisen from the cases and our earlier inquiries regarding whether a fiduciary obligation exists in given circumstances – in particular, where the band’s understanding of the terms of the surrender is inadequate, where the conduct of the Crown has tainted the dealings in a manner that makes it unsafe to rely on the band’s understanding and intention, where the band has ceded or abnegated its decision-making authority to or in favour of the Crown in relation to the surrender, or where the surrender is so foolish or improvident as to be considered exploitative. We will also address the First Nation’s submission, relying on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada, that the Crown was obliged to ensure that the surrender was implemented in such a way as to cause the

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480 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.

least possible impairment of the Band’s rights and to avoid fettering the Band’s decision-making power. In applying the jurisprudence to the facts of this case, we will consider whether the Crown failed to satisfy any fiduciary duties to the Duncan’s Band and, if so, whether Canada may be said to owe the First Nation an outstanding lawful obligation.

The Guerin Case

Although Guerin dealt with the fiduciary obligations of the Crown with respect to the sale or lease of Indian reserve lands after a band has surrendered its land (post-surrender fiduciary duties), the judgment provides significant guidance in relation to the evaluation of the Crown/aboriginal relationship since it was the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that the Crown stands in a fiduciary relationship with aboriginal peoples. Guerin remains the most authoritative and exhaustive discussion of Crown/aboriginal fiduciary duties by the Supreme Court of Canada and, despite its 1984 vintage, remains good law. In our report dealing with the surrender claim of the Kahkewistahaw First Nation, we discussed the Guerin case in these terms:

In Guerin, the Musqueam Band surrendered 162 acres of reserve land to the Crown in 1957 for lease to a golf club on the understanding that the lease would contain the terms and conditions that were presented to and agreed upon by the Band Council. The surrender document that was subsequently executed gave the land to the Crown “in trust to lease the same” on such terms as it deemed most conducive to the welfare of the Band. The Band later discovered that the terms of the lease obtained by the Crown were significantly different from what the Band had agreed to and were less favourable.

All eight members of the Court found that Canada had breached its duty to the Band. On the nature of the Crown’s fiduciary relationship, Dickson J (as he then was) for the majority of the Court stated:

Through the confirmation in the Indian Act of the historic responsibility which the Crown has undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect their interests in transactions with third parties, Parliament has conferred upon the Crown a discretion to decide for itself where the Indians’ best interests really lie. This is the effect of s. 18(1) of the Act.

This discretion on the part of the Crown, far from ousting, as the Crown contends, the jurisdiction of the courts to regulate the relationship between the Crown and the Indians, has the effect of transforming the Crown’s obligation into a fiduciary one. Professor
Ernest J. Weinrib maintains in his article “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. 1, at p. 7, that “the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal positions are such that one party is at the mercy of the other’s discretion”. Earlier, at p. 4, he puts the point in the following way:

[Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relation in which the principal’s interests can be affected by, and are therefore dependent on, the manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the control of this discretion.

I make no comment upon whether this description is broad enough to embrace all fiduciary obligations. I do agree, however, that where by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary. Equity will then supervise the relationship by holding him to the fiduciary’s strict standard of conduct....

... When the promised lease proved impossible to obtain, the Crown, instead of proceeding to lease the land on different, unfavourable terms, should have returned to the band to explain what had occurred and seek the band’s counsel on how to proceed. The existence of such unconscionability is the key to a conclusion that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty. *Equity will not countenance unconscionable behaviour in a fiduciary, whose duty is that of utmost loyalty to his principal.*

Justice Dickson held that the *Indian Act* surrender provisions interposed the Crown between Indians and settlers with respect to the alienation of reserve lands. He described the source of the fiduciary relationship in these terms:

In my view, the nature of Indian title and the framework of the statutory scheme established for disposing of Indian land places upon the Crown an equitable obligation, enforceable by the courts, to deal with the land for the benefit of the Indians. This obligation does not amount to a trust in the private law sense. It is rather a fiduciary duty. If, however, the Crown breaches this fiduciary duty it will be liable to the Indians in the same way and to the same extent as if such a trust were in effect.

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The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots in the concept of aboriginal, Native or Indian title. The fact that Indian Bands have a certain interest in lands does not, however, in itself give rise to a fiduciary relationship between the Indians and the Crown. The conclusion that the Crown is a fiduciary depends upon the further proposition that the Indian interest in the land is inalienable except upon surrender to the Crown.

An Indian band is prohibited from directly transferring its interest to a third party. Any sale or lease of land can only be carried out after a surrender has taken place, with the Crown then acting on the band’s behalf. The Crown first took this responsibility upon itself in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 [see RSC 1970, App. I]. It is still recognized in the surrender provisions of the Indian Act. The surrender requirement, and the responsibility it entails, are the source of a distinct fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the Indians.483

The Guerin case is instructive for two reasons: first, it determined that the relationship between the Crown and First Nations is fiduciary in nature; second, it clearly established the principle that an enforceable fiduciary obligation will arise in relation to the sale or lease of reserve land by the Crown on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a band to a third party following the surrender of reserve land to the Crown in trust. However, the Supreme Court of Canada was not called upon in Guerin to address the question whether the Crown owed any fiduciary duties to the band prior to the surrender. That issue was not specifically addressed until Apsassin appeared on the Court’s docket.484

In the Commission’s report regarding the surrender claim of the Moosomin First Nation, we added:

Dickson J noted that “[t]he discretion which is the hallmark of any fiduciary relationship is capable of being considerably narrowed in a particular case.... The Indian Act makes specific provision for such narrowing in ss. 18(1) and 38(2).”485 Accordingly, fiduciary principles will always bear on the relationship between the Crown and Indians, but, depending on the context, a fiduciary duty may be narrowed because the Crown’s discretion is lesser and a First Nation’s scope for making its


own free and informed decisions is greater.\textsuperscript{486} Section 49(1) of the 1906 \textit{Indian Act} is an example of such narrowing: although reserve land is held by the Crown on behalf of a band (pursuant to section 19 of that \textit{Act}), it may not be surrendered except with the band’s consent. It is this “autonomy” to decide how to deal with reserve land that the Supreme Court considered in \textit{Apsassin}, to which we now turn.\textsuperscript{487}

\textbf{The \textit{Apsassin} Case}

As we have already noted, the leading case regarding the Crown’s \textit{pre-surrender} duties to First Nations is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in \textit{Apsassin}. In discussing this case in the course of its report on the Moosomin surrender claim, the Commission stated:

In \textit{Apsassin}, the Court considered the surrender of reserve land by the Beaver Indian Band, which later split into two bands now known as the Blueberry River Band and the Doig River Band. The reserve contained good agricultural land, but the Band did not use it for farming. It was used only as a summer campground, since the Band made a living from trapping and hunting farther north during the winter. In 1940, the Band surrendered the mineral rights in its reserve to the Crown, in trust, to lease for the Band’s benefit. In 1945, the Band was approached again, to explore the surrender of the reserve to make the land available for returning veterans of the Second World War interested in taking up agriculture.

After a period of negotiations between the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) and the Director, \textit{Veteran’s Land Act} (DVLA), the entire reserve was surrendered in 1945 for $70,000. In 1950, some of the money from the sale was used by DIA to purchase other reserve lands closer to the Band’s traplines farther north. After the land was sold to veterans, it was discovered to contain valuable oil and gas deposits. The mineral rights were considered to have been “inadvertently” conveyed to the veterans, instead of being retained for the benefit of the Band. Although the DIA had powers under section 64 of the \textit{Indian Act} to cancel the transfer and reacquire the mineral rights, it did not do so. On discovery of these events, the Band

\textsuperscript{486} This view was reaffirmed in \textit{R. v. Sparrow} (1990), 70 DLR (4th) 385, [1990] 3 CNLR 160 (SCC), and most recently by Mr Justice Iacobucci in \textit{Quebec (Attorney-General) v. Canada (National Energy Board)} (1994), 112 DLR (4th) 129 at 147 (SCC), where he states:

\begin{quote}
It is now well-settled that there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and the aboriginal people of Canada: \textit{Guerin v. Canada}.... None the less, it must be remembered that not every aspect of the relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary takes the form of a fiduciary obligation: \textit{Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.} (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 26 C.P.R. (3d) 97, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574. The nature of the relationship between the parties defines the scope, and the limits, of the duties that will be imposed.
\end{quote}

sued for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming damages from the Crown for allowing the Band to make an improvident surrender of the reserve and for disposing of the land at “undervalue.”

At trial, Addy J dismissed all but one of the Band’s claims, finding that no fiduciary duty existed prior to or concerning the surrender. He also concluded that the Crown had not breached its post-surrender fiduciary obligation with respect to the mineral rights, since they were not known to be valuable at the time of disposition. He found, however, that the DIA breached a post-surrender fiduciary duty by not seeking a higher price for the surface rights.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Band’s appeal and the Crown’s cross-appeal. However, the majority rejected Addy J’s conclusion regarding a pre-surrender fiduciary duty: they found that the combination of the particular facts in the case and the provisions of the Indian Act imposed a fiduciary obligation on the Crown. The content of that obligation was to ensure that the Band was properly advised of the circumstances concerning the surrender and the options open to it, particularly since the Crown itself sought the surrender of the lands to make them available to returning soldiers. On behalf of the majority, Stone JA (with Marceau JA concurring and Isaac CJ dissenting) concluded that the Crown discharged its duty, since the Band had been fully informed of “the consequences of a surrender,” was fully aware that it was forever giving up all rights to the reserve, and gave its “full and informed consent to the surrender.”

Stone JA also found that there was no breach of the post-surrender fiduciary obligation concerning the mineral rights, since there was a “strong finding” that the mineral rights were considered to be of minimal value, so it was not unreasonable to have disposed of them. Finally, once the rights had been conveyed to the DVLA, any post-surrender fiduciary obligation on the part of the Department of Indian Affairs was terminated, and the Crown had no further obligation to deal with the land for the benefit of the Band.

The Supreme Court of Canada divided 4-3 on the question of whether the mineral interests were included in the 1945 surrender for sale or lease. Nevertheless, the Court was unanimous in concluding that the Crown had breached its post-surrender fiduciary obligation to dispose of the land in the best interests of the Band, first, when it “inadvertently” sold the mineral rights in the reserve lands to the DVLA, and, second, when it failed to use its statutory power to cancel the sale once the error had been discovered. Justices Gonthier and McLachlin, respectively writing

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488 An abridged version of the decision is reported as Apsassin v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1988] 3 FC 20 (TD), and the complete text is reported as Blueberry River Indian Band and Doig River Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) et al., [1988] 1 CNLR 73, 14 FTR 161 (TD).


for the majority and the minority, also concluded that, to the extent the Crown owed any pre-surrender fiduciary duties to the band, they were discharged on the facts in that case.

The Court’s comments on the question of pre-surrender fiduciary obligation may be divided into those touching on the context of the surrender and those concerning the substantive result of the surrender. The former concern whether the context and process involved in obtaining the surrender allowed the Band to consent properly to the surrender under section 49(1) and whether its understanding of the dealings was adequate. In the following analysis, we will first address whether the Crown’s dealings with the Band were “tainted” and, if so, whether the Band’s understanding and consent were affected. We will then consider whether the Band effectively ceded or abnegated its autonomy and decision-making power to or in favour of the Crown.

The substantive aspects of the Supreme Court’s comments relate to whether, given the facts and results of the surrender itself, the Governor in Council ought to have withheld its consent to the surrender under section 49(4) because the surrender transaction was foolish, improvident, or otherwise exploitative. We will address this question in the final part of our analysis.⁴⁹¹

From Apsassin it can be seen that the Court has contemplated several distinct sources of the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to Indians in the pre-surrender context: where a band’s understanding of the terms of the surrender is inadequate; where the conduct of the Crown has tainted the dealings in a manner that makes it unsafe to rely on the band’s understanding and intention; where the band has abnegated its decision-making authority in favour of the Crown in relation to the surrender; and where the surrender is so foolish or improvident as to be considered exploitative. We now turn to those issues as well as the submission by the Duncan’s First Nation, based on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Semiahmoo, that the Crown was obliged to ensure that the surrender was implemented in such a way as to cause the least possible impairment of the Band’s rights and to avoid fettering the Band’s decision-making power.

Pre-surrender Fiduciary Duties of the Crown

Where a Band’s Understanding Is Inadequate or the Dealings Are Tainted

In its report on the *Moosomin* inquiry, the Commission wrote:

For the majority of the Court, Gonthier J focused on the context of the surrender, concerning himself with giving “effect to the true purpose of the dealings” between the Band and the Crown.\(^{492}\) He wrote that he would have been “reluctant to give effect to this surrender variation if [he] thought that the Band’s understanding of its terms had been inadequate, or if the conduct of the Crown had somehow tainted the dealings in a manner which made it unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention.”\(^{493}\)

At the heart of Justice Gonthier’s reasons is the notion that “the law treats Aboriginal peoples as autonomous actors with respect to the acquisition and surrender of their lands, and for this reason, their decisions must be respected and honoured.”\(^{494}\) In so holding, he emphasized the fact that the Band had considerable autonomy in deciding whether or not to surrender its land, and that, in making its decision, it had been provided with all the information it needed concerning the nature and consequences of the surrender. Accordingly, in Justice Gonthier’s view, a band’s decision to surrender its land should be allowed to stand unless the band’s understanding of the terms was inadequate or there were tainted dealings involving the Crown which make it unsafe to rely on the band’s decision as an expression of its true understanding and intention.\(^{495}\)

As we noted in the *Kahkewistahaw* inquiry,\(^{496}\) Gonthier J did not define what he meant by “tainted dealings,” but it is clear that, like McLachlin J, he placed considerable reliance on the following findings of Addy J at trial in concluding that the dealings in that case were not tainted:


1. That the plaintiffs had known for some considerable time that an absolute surrender of I.R. 172 was being contemplated;
2. That they had discussed the matter previously on at least three formal meetings [sic] where representatives of the Department were present;
3. That, contrary to what has been claimed by the plaintiffs, it would be nothing short of ludicrous to conclude that the Indians would not also have discussed it between themselves on many occasions in an informal manner, in their various family and hunting groups;
4. That, at the surrender meeting itself, the matter was fully discussed both between the Indians and with the departmental representatives previous to the signing of the actual surrender;
5. That [Crown representatives had not] attempted to influence the plaintiffs either previously or during the surrender meeting but that, on the contrary, the matter seems to have been dealt with most conscientiously by the departmental representatives concerned;
6. That Mr. Grew [the local Indian Agent] fully explained to the Indians the consequences of a surrender;
7. That, although they would not have understood and probably would have been incapable of understanding the precise nature of the legal interest they were surrendering, they did in fact understand that by the surrender they were giving up forever all rights to I.R. 172, in return for the money which would be deposited to their credit once the reserve was sold and with their being furnished with alternate sites near their trapping lines to be purchased with the proceeds;
8. That the said alternate sites had already been chosen by them, after mature consideration.

In particular, Gonthier J found that Crown officials had fully explained the consequences of the surrender, had not attempted to influence the Band’s decision, and had acted conscientiously and in the best interests of the Band throughout the entire process. In other words, although the Court of Appeal and McLachlin J had commented that the Crown was arguably in a conflict of interest because of the presence of conflicting pressures “in favour of preserving the land for the Band on the one hand, and making it available for distribution to veterans on the other,” the Supreme Court was nevertheless able to find, beneath the technical irregularities and confusion over the nature of the surrender, a genuine intention on the part of the Beaver Indian Band, formulated with the

497 Blueberry River Indian Band and Doig River Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1988] 14 FTR 161, 1 CNLR 73 at 129-30 (TD).

assistance of a conscientious Indian Agent, to dispose of reserve land for which it had no use. Thus, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that there was a neat reconciliation of the Crown’s interests in opening up good agricultural land for returning soldiers and the Band’s interests in selling land it did not use to obtain alternative lands closer to its traplines.

However, where there are “tainted dealings” involving the Crown, caution must be exercised in considering whether or not the band’s apparently autonomous decision to surrender the land should be given effect. In *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point*, for example, Laskin JA considered that the alleged bribe provided to the Band members by the prospective purchaser of the reserve lands might constitute “tainted dealings.” Although he recognized that it was a question for trial which could not be dealt with in Canada’s preliminary application for summary judgment, he nevertheless forged the explicit link between “tainted dealings” and fiduciary obligation that Gonthier J was not required to make in the context of *Apsassin*. In our view, Canada’s use of its position of authority to apply undue influence on a band to effect a particular result, or its failure to properly manage competing interests, can contribute to a finding of “tainted dealings” involving the Crown. Such a finding may cast doubt on a surrender as the true expression of a band’s intention. Both of these elements are relevant to the question of “tainted dealings” because they have the potential to undermine the band’s decision-making autonomy with respect to a proposed surrender of reserve land.

**Understanding and Intent**

In relation to the autonomy of a band to freely decide whether to surrender its reserve lands, the First Nation submits that a truly autonomous decision to surrender requires knowledgeable, uncoerced consent with full understanding of the implications of, and alternatives to, the surrender; in the absence of such understanding, or if the surrender is tainted by coercion, effective autonomous decision-making is negated. According to counsel, the Crown’s role as fiduciary is to fully inform the band, as beneficiary, of the breadth, scope, and consequences of the decision the band is making,

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499 *Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1997), 31 OR (3d) 97 at 106 (CA).

and this duty is accomplished by making all material information available in a manner that indicates that the information was “understood and appreciated” by the band. 501 Canada agrees that “the requirement that the surrender be assented to by a majority of the male members of the First Nation implies that free and informed consent to the surrender must be given.” 502

Where the parties disagree is with respect to whether the Band was fully informed at the time of the surrender. In this respect, the First Nation argues that there could be no clear expression of the Band’s understanding and intent when, in the First Nation’s view, five of the seven individuals on the voters’ list did not reside on or near, and were not interested in the reserves, leaving the intentions of the community resting in the hands of just two eligible voters, one of whom did not even vote. 503 The Commission has already concluded that five of the seven individuals on the voters’ list, as well as Alex Mooswah, were eligible to be there, so there is no need to address this argument further.

The First Nation also argues that the facts in this case do not measure up well against the key findings in Apsassin relied on by Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. As counsel put it:

Reading through those criteria, we see in the first one that the Plaintiffs [in Apsassin] had known for some considerable time that an absolute surrender was being contemplated. They had had a long time to think about it. Here it was only mentioned a couple [of] years earlier. No evidence of a considerable amount of time of concerted thought and effort about the surrender.

The Indian agent rarely met with the Duncan’s people. Mostly he met with them at annuity time. This would make the meetings one year apart. They say [in Apsassin] that they had met at least on three formal meetings where representatives of the Department were present, formal meetings, and there was extensive documentation of what was presented at those meetings.

Now, they said that the Indians had a chance in the circumstances there to discuss this between themselves on many occasions in an informal manner. That may have been the case up there where they had a community, but in this case the members were scattered over a hundred-mile-plus radius. It’s doubtful whether they


502 Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 5).

had very many occasions at all to meet collectively to discuss the implications, and consequences and options.

Number four, the surrender meeting itself, the matter was fully discussed between the Indians and the Department representatives. There is no evidence that there was a full discussion or even a surrender meeting in this case. Number five, there was no evidence that they attempted to influence the Plaintiff either previously or during a surrender meeting. Here Murison’s instructions were go out, bargain, make a deal, get it done whatever it takes. The inducements were handy. He had authority to negotiate the deal on the spot.

It says in six, Mr. Grew fully explained to the Indians the consequences of the surrender. At no point is there any documentary evidence that Laird or Murison explained the consequences of the surrender or the options to the surrender. In fact, we know at times when such options were available, they took no action, took no consultation.

I would point out to number eight there that in this case, the Beaver case, and, sorry, in this Blueberry case [Apsassin] and in the Beaver case’s surrender, they had had discussions of alternative sites. They knew that they were getting new, and other and different reserves. They had had some discussion in their location. Certainly, that requires a fairly lengthy consideration and consultation process on reserve selection if it’s anywhere as complicated as it is today.

No suggestion, no offer, no indication that that was ever even presented to the Duncan’s First Nation.\textsuperscript{504}

Counsel for the First Nation suggests that the facts in this case are more akin to those in the Moosomin inquiry than those in Apsassin, particularly the evidence regarding the manner in which the vote was taken and the extent to which the terms of the surrender were explained and the Band may be said to have understood them.\textsuperscript{505} The main problem, in counsel’s view, is that there is no record to indicate when, where, or with whom the surrender was discussed in 1928 or in preceding meetings with Agent Laird; no evidence of the discussion of terms, options, or whether to surrender at all; and no indication that material information was made available to band members to permit them to make the decision in an informed way.\textsuperscript{506}

Ultimately, counsel submits that there is no evidence to suggest the existence of the requisite understanding and intention to surrender, given that the surrender document and affidavit were

\textsuperscript{504} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 108-09 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{505} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 112-13 (Jerome Slavik).

\textsuperscript{506} ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 90-91 (Jerome Slavik).
prepared, in the First Nation’s submission, before the meeting took place. In this context, the First Nation argues that it is open to the Commission as the trier of fact in this case to give those documents no weight as evidence of band members’ understanding and intent.  The lack of other significant documentation to record the nature and extent of the discussions “invites an inference that the subject matter of surrender was either not raised or that it was raised in a superficial or speculative manner.”

Canada replies that the topic of surrender had a long history with the Duncan’s Band prior to 1928, having been raised as early as 1912, since the Band, other than Duncan Testawits, was already not making use of its reserves in the Shaftesbury Settlement area. By the time the surrender was taken, Murison reported that “[t]hese Indians were prepared for me and had evidently discussed the matter very fully amongst themselves, having been notified on August 3rd that an official would meet them some time this year to take up the question of surrender with them.” As Director General Michel Roy of the Specific Claims Branch wrote on January 31, 1997:

The evidence indicates that the matter of a surrender was discussed with members of the DFN [Duncan’s First Nation] at least three times prior to the date of the surrender. It is of particular note that the subject of the surrender was discussed at treaty time in 1925, 1927 and 1928 when many of the members would have been present. The evidence also indicates that DFN members had indicated a willingness to surrender the lands in question depending upon the terms offered. Inspector Murison’s report on the surrender suggests that members of the DNF [sic] had an opportunity to consider and discuss the surrender among themselves prior to the surrender vote. It is Canada’s view that the DFN has not sufficiently established that free and informed consent to the surrender of the reserves was lacking.

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507 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 58.
512 Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, pp. 5-6).
In the Commission’s view, while it is true that there is little documentation of the actual surrender meeting and the discussions that took place there or in previous meetings, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the Band did not understand the terms of the surrender. In fact, Murison’s evidence, corroborated by Angela Testawits, indicates that the Band was prepared for him and indeed negotiated additional terms of the surrender, including the initial payment of $50 per band member, annual payments of interest, and provision of farming implements. Moreover, once the Beaver surrender had been completed, it appears that the Duncan’s Band petitioned to be treated in the same manner – that is, by payment of a second instalment of $50 from the sale proceeds to each member of the Band. Particularly significant, in the Commission’s view, is the lack of evidence that band members sought to reverse the surrender or to register a complaint that their lands had been stolen or otherwise wrongfully taken from them. From these facts, it seems evident that the Band was aware of the nature of the transaction and, once it was in place, sought to obtain even better terms.

Counsel for the First Nation seeks to distinguish Apsassin from the present case on the basis that Apsassin featured “viva voce [oral] evidence from ‘absolutely independent and disinterested’ witnesses who described in detail the meetings held, the attendance, the location, the questions raised, and the discussion generally.” In the Commission’s view, however, it must be recalled that the surrender at issue in Apsassin took place in 1945 and the trial occurred in the mid-1980s – a difference of roughly 40 years but still within the life span of some of the participants. The Duncan’s surrender took place 17 years earlier, at a time when records appear to have been less religiously kept, and the Commission’s inquiry commenced in the mid-1990s – 67 years after the fact. The Commission agrees that it would be preferable to have surviving participants available to explain what took place. However, this case must be decided on the evidence before us, and that evidence points to the conclusion that a meeting was held at which the matter was discussed and negotiated.

Despite this time difference, the present case is in fact consistent with Apsassin in a number of respects. The members of the Duncan’s Band knew for some time that a surrender was being

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513 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan's First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 58.
considered, and appear to have met on several occasions – some in the presence of Crown representatives, others where they discussed the matter among themselves. Despite the scarcity of records regarding the surrender meeting, it appears that the matter was discussed and terms negotiated prior to the actual surrender being signed. Moreover, the members of the Duncan’s Band likely understood that, by the surrender, they were giving up forever all their rights in the surrendered reserves in return for an initial cash payment of $50, annual payments of interest, and farm implements and assistance. On the other hand, unlike Apsassin, there was no need in this case to give “mature consideration” to the selection of alternative reserve sites; nothing would have been gained in moving the Duncan’s Band, since its traplines appear to have been quite scattered in any event.

As for the First Nation’s submission that there are similarities between this case and the circumstances that were before the Commission in the Moosomin inquiry – in particular the meagre documentation of the surrender meeting – there are also significant differences. In Moosomin there was no list of eligible voters and no tally of voters for and against the surrender. Since 15 members voted for the surrender, and census statistics for 1909 suggest that the Band had 30 eligible voters, the combination of these factors made it impossible for the Commission to determine whether the surrender provisions of the Indian Act were complied with in that case. The Commission further concluded:

In addition to the ambiguity of the certificate, the absence of any further evidence means that we cannot determine whether a meeting was called according to the Band’s rules for the express purpose of considering the surrender proposal. Assuming there was such a meeting, there are no details of any notice of the meeting, when and to whom notice was given, the number of persons present at the meeting, whether an actual vote was taken, and, if such a vote was taken, the tally of votes for and against the surrender. There is also no evidence of the nature of any discussion with the eligible voters and the extent to which the terms of the surrender were explained to members of the Band. We find it astounding that, although Agent Day was vigilant about communicating virtually every detail of his activities to the Department on other subjects prior to the surrender, he kept no records pertaining to this most important of meetings.

The elders’ testimony supports the conclusion that some sort of meeting was held and that those present may have signed the surrender document at that time. However, it is not clear whether the 15 men who signed or affixed their marks to the document were aware of what it meant, since there is no evidence of what was discussed at this meeting....
In this case, the surrender document and sworn certificate must be considered in light of the oral history and the Department’s own records, both of which raise very real doubts about whether the Band fully understood what was going on with respect to the surrender…. In our view, the combination of all these factors makes it at least arguable that section 49 was not complied with when the surrender was taken in 1909. 514

By way of contrast, although the documentation in this case is scarce, it is nevertheless sufficient to demonstrate the number of eligible voters in attendance at the surrender meeting, the number voting in favour of the surrender, the manner in which the meeting was summoned, and, to a limited extent, the nature of the discussions and the readiness of the Band to address the issue of surrender. The doubts we expressed in Moosomin are much less evident in this case.

We conclude that the evidence fails to establish that the Band’s understanding of the terms of the surrender was inadequate.

“Tainted Dealings”
It will be recalled that Gonthier J in Apsassin remarked that he would be reluctant to give effect to the surrender in that case “if the conduct of the Crown had somehow tainted the dealings in a manner which made it unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention.” On the facts before him, he agreed with Addy J that the Crown’s representatives had not attempted to influence the Beaver Indian Band either before or during the surrender meeting, but rather dealt with the matter “most conscientiously.”

In the present case, the Duncan’s First Nation has devoted considerable energy to proving that just the sort of tainted dealings eschewed by Gonthier J formed the backdrop to the surrender proceedings in 1928. As to the factors to which the Commission should have regard in determining whether tainted dealings existed, counsel submits:

So we have to look at what conduct of the Crown and in what circumstances there may have been, first of all, tainting of the dealings in this matter. And we have to look as to whether or not there were improper inducements to Indians in vulnerable

circumstances. Whether there was undue haste in procuring a surrender, whether there was indirect coercion, intimidation or improper influence by third parties on the Crown or the Indians and they allowed themselves to be susceptible to this. Whether the Crown adequately and fully informed the Indians of the implications and consequences. All these are facts, circumstances and conduct which must be considered.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 107 (Jerome Slavik).}

According to the First Nation, in Moosomin the Commission emphasized how the Department of Indian Affairs struggled with the question of selling the reserve, and ultimately decided to proceed because the reserve land in that case was useless to the Band and the proceeds from its sale would be required to acquire replacement land closer to the Band’s traplines. By way of contrast, in this case, counsel submits that the land was valuable and could have been leased, but, since the Department was intent on pursuing a surrender, the only issue with which it struggled was timing.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 110 (Jerome Slavik).}

Whereas the Department in Moosomin fully explained the consequences of the surrender and acted conscientiously in the best interests of the Band, there is no evidence in this case, counsel contends, of the Crown attempting to reconcile competing interests; rather, the Crown bowed to pressure from the Soldier Settlement Board, the Province of Alberta, the municipal district, and local settlers. It also benefited itself by reducing its administrative obligations, and by applying the proceeds of sale, first, to offset the costs of maintaining the Band and, second, to fund benefits that the Crown was already obliged by treaty to provide to the Band.\footnote{ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, pp. 113-14 (Jerome Slavik); Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 63.}

The First Nation argues that its position is borne out by the Crown’s initiation of the surrender process and its active efforts to consummate the transaction. It contends that a litany of facts supports this conclusion:

XVI. According to the First Nation, since he knew the predispositions of Commissioner Graham and Deputy Superintendent General Scott, Agent Laird’s immediate reaction to the inadvertent encroachment of farmer A.C. Wright’s improvements on IR 151G in 1922 was
to suggest the surrender of not only that reserve but also IR 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151H, and 151K.  

XVII. In November 1926, Scott advised Charles Stewart, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and Minister of the Interior, that the reserves were not being used to advantage by the Band and that “possibly an agreement to surrender them for sale could be obtained if the matter was brought before the attention of the Indians.”

XVIII. By late 1927, the Crown had decided on a course of action and at that point “all pretense of neutrality ceased,” according to the First Nation. In December of that year Scott advised Stewart of his intention to secure a surrender of all the reserves, except IR 151A, and of his understanding, based on a report by Laird, “that the Indians would be willing to surrender these reserves, excepting 151 A, providing some reasonable inducement is offered.”

XIX. Counsel submits that Laird was so keen to obtain surrenders to prove himself to his superiors that he blindly plunged ahead with taking an abortive surrender of IR 151K from Susan McKenzie without establishing the ownership of the reserve, observing the statutory requirements, or waiting for instructions.

XX. Counsel further submits that, because of Laird’s past failures in obtaining surrenders, the Crown sent out Murison, who was much more innovative, competent, and painstaking in bargaining, but who was also prepared to callously disregard the procedural requirements of the Indian Act.

XXI. Scott’s advice to Murison in July 1928 that, having regard for the particular circumstances of Treaty 8, surrenders could be obtained by meeting with individuals or small groups of band members rather than a general assembly of the band shows, in the First Nation’s view,
that the Department was prepared to override both the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act “to get the surrender however you can.”

XXII. Counsel contends that, “[g]iven Laird’s representation of rapidly increasing land values, the representation that the Band had previously had occasion to discuss with Laird the prospects of a surrender, and the ongoing interest among settlers in the land it would seem unlikely that the Band would present Laird with a proposal to surrender significant Reserve land holdings with no idea of what they wanted or expected by way of surrender terms.” It was more likely, according to counsel, that “the willingness to surrender the land may have been Laird’s evaluation of the propitious timing for seeking a surrender rather than an expressed desire on the part of the Band to depart [sic] with these reserves.” Indeed, if Laird was in fact aware of current land prices, then counsel finds it strange that the Crown was not prepared to discuss the likely price the land would fetch and instead merely advised the Band that the land would be sold at public auction at whatever price it might obtain.

XXIII. The Crown took a surrender of good agricultural land notwithstanding the expressed desire of some Band members to take up farming. This demonstrated, in the First Nation’s view, that the Crown failed to take the Band’s best interests into account.

In response, Canada submits that the documents before the Commission do not bear out the First Nation’s argument that the Crown acted in a “duplicitous and wrongful manner” by “aggressively” and “ruthlessly” seeking a surrender as a partisan proponent of the interests of local settlers, the municipal district, the Province of Alberta, and “various bureaucrats.” Rather, members of the Duncan’s Band demonstrated “an independent interest in the issue of the surrender of their own reserves,” and it was their “lack of use of these reserves and their own inquiries about the possibility of a surrender [that] contributed to the initiation of the surrender process.” Counsel countered the First Nation’s list of facts tending to show that Canada proposed the surrender with

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525 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 15.
526 ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 44 (Jerome Slavik).
his own list of facts showing that the Band initiated the surrender process and that Canada in fact took steps to protect the Band’s interests:

XXIV. In response to a request in 1919 by Brigadier-General W.A. Griesbach, the Member of Parliament for Edmonton West, to throw open the reserves for settlement, Graham replied that “[i]t seems strange to me that the Indians should be called upon to surrender lands in that district at this early date, as there must be large areas of dominion lands available.” He added: “I do not think we should attempt to get these lands surrendered until such time as other available lands in the district are exhausted.”

XXV. In July 1925, Secretary-Treasurer E.L. Lamont of the Municipal District of Peace noted that “[t]he above Indian Reserves situated within the boundaries of this Municipal District have been unoccupied for many years and the few Indians left who were attached thereto have expressed a wish to surrender this land in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act.” Counsel for Canada submits that this letter demonstrates that the Band was willing to surrender its reserves.

XXVI. A.F. MacKenzie, the Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary of Indian Affairs, advised Lamont in September 1925 that “the Department is not disposed to proceed further with the matter, in view of the fact that the present current land values in that district are very low.” Although MacKenzie added that the Department might be prepared to further consider the matter if land prices were to increase, Canada contends that the refusal to sell the land when prices were low was in keeping with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to protect the Band from an exploitative transaction.

XXVII. With regard to Scott’s letter to Stewart in November 1926, referred to by the First Nation as evidence that a surrender “possibly ... could be obtained if the matter was brought before the attention of the Indians,” Canada notes that Scott went on to say that Indian Affairs considered a surrender “inadvisable” at that time. Scott continued, “It seems to me that if land prices are very low in this vicinity, plenty of farming

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531 E.L. Lamont, Secretary-Treasurer, Municipal District of Peace, to Secretary, DIA, July 7, 1925, DIAND file 777/30-7-151A, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 174).


lands must be available to purchase, and it would not be to the advantage of the Indian owners to dispose of their reserves at the present time.”

Counsel for Canada argues that the Crown once again pre-empted a surrender to protect the Band’s interests.

XXVIII. On July 14, 1927, Laird reported that he had been “requested to take up the matter with the Department, regarding the surrendering of several reserves, belonging to the Indians of the above named [Duncan’s] Band,” including IR 151, 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151G, and 151H. In Canada’s view, this request could only have come from the Band.

XXIX. J.D. McLean, the Secretary and Assistant Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, wrote to Laird on November 23, 1927:

The Department is prepared to give consideration to the question of a surrender of these reserves for sale and settlement, but before proceeding further, it will be necessary to ascertain what terms and conditions the Band would be prepared to accept....

If the Indians are prepared to surrender these reserves, and to permit the Department to offer them for sale by public auction at some opportune time in the near future, we are prepared to go ahead with the matter. On the other hand, it may be that they have in mind some upset price or other condition which they would insist upon before granting a surrender.

Counsel for Canada submits that this letter shows that it is unwarranted to conclude, as the First Nation would invite the Commission to do, that the Crown proposed and ruthlessly pursued the surrender.

XXX. Finally, Canada refers to Laird’s letter of December 6, 1927, in which he advised McLean that the Band had asked him in July of that year "what terms the Government would
offer, as well as Laird’s letter of March 10, 1928, in which he stated: “I shall no doubt, receive enquiries as to whether any action has been taken re the suggested surrender of their small reserves, therefore I would like to be informed if the Department is considering the matter of taking a surrender this coming Summer.” These letters, as well as the preceding ones, reveal, in Canada’s submission, the Band’s interest in selling its own reserves and the Department’s resistance to selling the reserves when, in view of low prices, it did not appear to be in the Band’s best interest. Moreover, the fact that the Band wanted to sell part of its reserves is not surprising, counsel contends, since IR 151A became the most important reserve at an early date while the others ceased being used to any great extent.

In short, Canada argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Band was unduly influenced or pressured by the Crown in the course of the surrender being taken. Furthermore, the First Nation’s allegations of forgery in the execution of the surrender documents amount, in Canada’s submission, to an accusation of fraud, requiring a standard of proof higher than a balance of probabilities, although not as strict as the criminal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In either event, the First Nation has not, in counsel’s view, satisfied the requirement.

The Commission is inclined to agree with Canada’s submissions on this issue. Counsel for the First Nation seeks to paint a picture of a surrender taking place over a background of conspiracy by Canada’s representatives to dispossess the Duncan’s Band of its land in favour of local settlers and other more powerful interests. Both parties have pointed fingers, claiming that the other side initiated the surrender, but the evidence does not categorically support either position. The fact that the parties were able to selectively pick and choose facts in support of their respective arguments illustrates that both Canada and the Band may have had an interest in consummating the surrender – in Canada’s case, to make land available for settlement, and, in the Band’s case, to dispose of
reserve lands that were of no immediate benefit in exchange for cash payments, annual interest payments, and the provision of stock, farm implements, and building materials.

We are struck by the Crown’s relatively non-committal stance regarding this surrender until a decision was made in late 1927 or early 1928 to proceed. The First Nation contends that, at this point, the Crown lost “all pretense of neutrality,” but we do not view the Crown’s decision in those terms. Rather, we have considered it in the context of the first of Scott’s guidelines to his Indian agents for taking surrenders of reserve land. The guideline states:

1. A proposal to submit to the Indians the question of the surrender of an Indian reserve or any portion thereof must be submitted by an officer of the Department for approval by the Superintendent General or his deputy, upon a memo setting forth the terms of the proposed surrender and the reasons therefor.  

Unlike subsection 51(4) of the 1927 Indian Act, which contemplates the Crown granting or withholding its assent to the surrender after a band’s consent being given, this guideline suggests approval of a surrender by the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs before the matter is even taken up with the band. It precedes all the other surrender guidelines dealing with questions such as notice and conduct of the surrender meeting, voter eligibility, majority assent, and certification of the result. In other words, it appears to set forth a Crown policy that a surrender should be vetted by the Department at the outset so that a preliminary determination can be made as to whether the Crown would be prepared to support the disposition of reserve land.

In our view, this is precisely what took place in relation to the Duncan’s Band. A number of proposals were brought forward for consideration by the Crown in the early 1920s, but most were considered premature since other land was available and prices were low. There was no need even to consider displacing the Indians, and, rather than acting as an active proponent of surrender, the Crown instead refused to proceed. However, as more settlers entered the area and land became more scarce, prices rose and the Department was again called upon to make a decision as to whether it would permit reserve lands to be surrendered for settlement purposes. It is significant that, in this period, the Crown remained largely non-committal, indicating that, if the Band was prepared to

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surrender its reserves, the Crown would likewise be willing to proceed, subject to determining “what terms and conditions the Band would be prepared to accept.” Once the Crown had expressed its willingness to proceed, however, it moved resolutely towards convening a surrender meeting and placing the matter before the Band’s eligible voters, but there is no evidence to suggest that it employed unscrupulous methods to force or trick the Band into surrendering its unused reserves. Even Scott’s willingness to permit Murison to obtain surrenders from individuals or small groups rather than at a general meeting or council of a band appears to have been motivated more by questions of practicality than malevolence or corruption.

We find support for these conclusions in the evidence of Angela Testawits. In recounting the details of the surrender meeting, Angela remarked:

The officials told him [Joseph Testawits] there isn’t a figure that we can count with in terms of money entitled to each individual with the amount of land you have sold, now what do you want to do? He replied, “as long as there is one of my people left, every fall and spring money should be given to them.” His other request was that if someone wanted to farm, he should be provided with a tractor and implements, that was what he wanted, we never saw any of these things. We received $200 in the fall and the same in the spring but since my husband died we didn’t even get $50. But we haven’t received anything in a very long time.\textsuperscript{546}

The key words in this passage, in our view, are “what do you want to do?” These words are not the language of tainted dealings, but of the Crown, in response to a proposal to surrender reserve land, and having indicated its readiness to go forward, asking whether the Band was prepared to do so as well. This is not a case like Kahkewistahaw, where the Crown’s representatives said in so many words that they intended to take a surrender, before descending in the dead of winter with money in hand to coerce a surrender from starving and destitute people. The record in this inquiry conveys none of the sense of urgency or single-minded purpose that characterized the surrender dealings with the Kahkewistahaw people, nor does this case feature a sudden, unexplained reversal of the Band’s position like the one that occurred in Kahkewistahaw.

With regard to the surrender documents, we have already stated that the process of touching the pen is a reasonable explanation for the similarities in the voters’ marks on a given document and

\textsuperscript{546} Interview of Angela Testawits, December 5, 1973, p. 3 (ICC Exhibit 6, tab G). Emphasis added.
the dissimilarities in a given voter’s marks from document to document. We remain unconvinced that the surrender documents were forged, and we agree with Canada’s argument that the requirements for proof of fraud have not been met. In conclusion, we see nothing else in the conduct of the Crown that might have tainted the dealings in a manner that would make it unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention.

Where a Band Has Ceded or Abnegated Its Power to Decide
In the Commission’s report dealing with the 1907 surrender by the Kahkewistahaw Band, we addressed in some detail Justice McLachlin’s reasons concerning the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in the pre-surrender context. In considering whether the Crown owes a fiduciary obligation to a band in those circumstances, McLachlin J drew on several Supreme Court decisions dealing with the law of fiduciaries in the private law context:

Generally speaking, a fiduciary obligation arises where one person possesses unilateral power or discretion on a matter affecting a second “peculiarly vulnerable” person: see Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 [[1988] 1 CNLR 152 (abridged version)]; Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226; and Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377. The vulnerable party is in the power of the party possessing the power or discretion, who is in turn obligated to exercise that power or discretion solely for the benefit of the vulnerable party. A person cedes (or more often finds himself in the situation where someone else has ceded for him) his power over a matter to another person. The person who has ceded power trusts the person to whom power is ceded to exercise the power with loyalty and care. This is the notion at the heart of the fiduciary obligation.547

In analysing this passage, the Commission stated the following in the Kahkewistahaw report:

On the facts in Apsassin, McLachlin J found that “the evidence supports the view that the Band trusted the Crown to provide it with information as to its options and their foreseeable consequences, in relation to the surrender of the Fort St. John reserve and the acquisition of new reserves which would better suit its life of trapping and hunting. It does not support the contention that the band abnegated or entrusted its power of decision over the surrender of the reserve to the Crown.” Because the Band had not abnegated or entrusted its decision-making power over the

surrender to the Crown, McLachlin J held that “the evidence [did] not support the existence of a fiduciary duty on the Crown prior to the surrender of the reserve by the Band.”

Justice McLachlin’s analysis on what constitutes a cession or abnegation of decision-making power is very brief, no doubt because the facts before her demonstrated that the Beaver Indian Band had made a fully informed decision to surrender its reserve lands and that, at the time, the decision appeared eminently reasonable. In our view, it is not clear from her reasons whether she merely reached an evidentiary conclusion when she found that the Band had not ceded or abnegated its decision-making power to or in favour of the Crown, or whether she intended to state that, as a principle of law, a fiduciary obligation arises only when a band actually takes no part in the decision-making process at all.548

After considering further jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada on the question of what is required to cede or abnegate decision-making power to or in favour of a fiduciary, the Commission continued:

Both Norberg549 and Hodgkinson550 suggest that decision-making authority may be ceded or abnegated even where, in a strictly technical sense, the beneficiary makes the decision. Neither case deals with the fiduciary relationship between the federal government and an Indian band, however, and therefore Apsassin must be considered the leading authority on the question of the Crown’s pre-surrender fiduciary obligations. In reviewing that case, we cannot imagine that McLachlin J intended to say that the mere fact that a vote has been conducted in accordance with the surrender provisions of the Indian Act precludes a finding that a band has ceded or abnegated its decision-making power. If that is the test, it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances in which a cession or abnegation might be found to exist.

We conclude that, when considering the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to a band, it is necessary to go behind the surrender decision to determine whether decision-making power has been ceded to or abnegated in favour of the Crown. In our view, a surrender decision which, on its face, has been made by a band may nevertheless be said to have been ceded or abnegated. The mere fact that the band has technically “ratified” what was, in effect, the Crown’s decision by voting in favour of it at a properly constituted surrender meeting should not change the conclusion that the decision was, in reality, made by the Crown. Unless the upshot of Justice McLachlin’s analysis is that the power to make a decision is ceded or abnegated only


549 Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 4 WWR 577 at 622-3 (SCC), McLachlin J.

550 Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 9 WWR 609 at 645 (SCC), La Forest J.
when a band has completely relinquished that power in form as well as in substance, we do not consider the fact of a band’s majority vote in favour of a surrender as being determinative of whether a cession or abnegation has occurred. Moreover, if the test is anything less than complete relinquishment in form and substance, it is our view that the test has been met on the facts of this case – the Band’s decision-making power with regard to the surrender was, in effect, ceded to or abnegated in favour of the Crown.  

It is in the context of the foregoing comments from the Apsassin case and the Kahkewistahaw inquiry that counsel for the Duncan’s First Nation argues that a surrender, even if apparently valid on its face, may still simply reflect the will of the Department of Indian Affairs and not the surrendering band. It becomes necessary to look behind the decision to determine whether the power to make that decision was ceded to or abnegated in favour of the Crown. According to the First Nation, the question turns in large measure on the Band’s capacity, and accordingly its control of the surrender process:

We would ask you to consider whether or not the autonomy of the Band was really there, because the autonomy of the Band relates to their ability to take, as she [McLachlin J in Apsassin] says, a measure of control over the surrender process both in terms of understanding the process by which it occurs, the terms on which it occurs and having the capacity to assert such control.

There is no evidence here that this Band had any capacity whatsoever to effectively control this process, to assess its merits, to control its timing, location, events, to acquire the information. It was completely reliant on the Department in terms of the process, the terms, et cetera.

He [Murison] alleged that the Band had input into the process, that they asked for the surrender implements. That’s not what the record shows. That’s what Murison’s letter says, but that surrender document, according to Mr. Reddekopp and according to a clear reading of it, was unchanged from the day it was sent out. There was no control over the terms.

So in short, we feel that the circumstances of the Band led to no control and an abnegation of the decision-making authority of the Band in effect.


552 ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 228-29 (Jerome Slavik).

553 ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 219-20 (Jerome Slavik).
Another indication of such cession or abnegation is the state of the band’s leadership, as the Commission noted in the Kahkewistahaw inquiry. Counsel for the First Nation points out that the Duncan’s Band had no Chief and lacked formal leadership, and many of its members did not speak, read, or write English or have any familiarity with commercial agricultural practices. In the absence of independent advisers, they were, in counsel’s submission, vulnerable to ongoing external pressures to surrender their reserves, and, like their counterparts at Kahkewistahaw, relied on, and indeed effectively ceded their decision-making power to, the Crown. According to the First Nation, the Crown represented the Band’s only adviser regarding the implications, benefits, and drawbacks of the surrender, and, based on the reasoning of Isaac CJ in *Semiahmoo*, was obliged “to ensure that the Band’s discretion was not fettered by a belief that the surrender was inevitable” or by the belief that the pressure to surrender would continue unabated if the surrender was not granted. Instead of providing impartial advice, however, Murison took advantage of the Band’s vulnerability to secure the surrender, according to the First Nation. It would have been more appropriate, counsel contends, for the Crown to refrain from taking the surrender until the Band had leaders in place who could address the decision in a more structured way, such as the traditional community decision-making process described by John Testawits. However, given that the Crown was the sole adviser, it becomes necessary to determine whose interest was being served by the decision and thus who really made the decision. In this case, according to the First Nation, it was the Crown’s interest and decision.

Canada too focuses on capacity and control as critical criteria in assessing whether a band’s power to surrender has been ceded or abnegated. It also agrees that a fiduciary obligation may arise

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554 ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 60 (Jerome Slavik).
555 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 21.
556 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 64. This argument is drawn from the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal in *Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada*, [1998] 1 FC 3, 148 DLR (4th) 523 (CA), which we will be considering at greater length later in this report.
557 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 21.
where band members entrust to Canada their power of decision over the surrender of their reserves.\(^{560}\) However, unlike the First Nation, Canada is of the view that “[t]he decision to surrender, or not to surrender, remained with the Duncan band throughout the surrender process\(^{561}\) and was not ceded to, or abnegated in favour of, Canada in relation to the surrender of IR 151 and IR 151B through IR 151G.\(^{562}\) As counsel stated in oral submissions:

Now, what I’ve been suggesting when I initially began to review all the pre-surrender documentation leading up to the surrender, is that there has been a third party interest in this land, but the Crown’s conduct in securing the surrender was not ruthless. It was not partisan. There was not a surrender fever here. The Band itself, the evidence discloses, had reason to want to surrender their reserves, because they were not using the reserves that they surrendered; and the Band itself had been making independent inquiries of the Department as to the possibility of a surrender. It’s not a situation where the Band has abnegated their decision-making responsibility.\(^{563}\)

Counsel further notes that, contrary to the First Nation’s submission, the evidence demonstrates that the Duncan’s Band had structures of leadership, with Joseph Testawits being identified by John Testawits as a headman. Moreover, the surrender provisions of the 1927 Indian Act required consent from a majority of the male members of the Band over the age of 21 years at a meeting convened for the purpose of considering the surrender, but those provisions do not stipulate that a surrender cannot be given unless the Band has a council formally elected in accordance with the Act.\(^{564}\)

Canada also relied on evidence of the Band’s actions following the surrender as relevant in determining whether the Band had ceded or abnegated its decision-making power in granting the

\(^{560}\) Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 6).


\(^{562}\) Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 6).

\(^{563}\) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, p. 188 (Perry Robinson).

\(^{564}\) ICC Transcript, November 26, 1997, pp. 188-89 (Perry Robinson).
surrender. Counsel noted that, after negotiating a single payment of $50 per person from the proceeds of sale of the surrendered land and later discovering that the Beaver Band had negotiated two such payments, members of the Duncan’s Band sought a second $50 payment of their own and even presented Agent Laird with a petition to that effect – “[a] rather unusual course of conduct for a Band that had its land stolen from under them and didn’t know that the land had in fact been surrendered.” In 1930, the Band also retained a law firm because of the federal government’s alleged failure to comply with the terms of the surrender with regard to agricultural implements. In counsel’s view, these actions were similar to the requests by the bands in Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point and the Sumas inquiry to complete the respective sales and pay the outstanding balances of the purchase prices – actions which were “consistent with [their] free and informed consent to the surrender[s]” and which suggest that the bands never abnegated their decision-making power.

The First Nation’s reply to these submissions about the Band’s post-surrender activities is that they should be given little weight for three reasons. First, those activities were, in counsel’s submission, irrelevant to the issue of statutory compliance; second, they have no impact on the Crown’s conduct and the Band’s understanding or control – and thus autonomy – at the time of surrender; and, third, the request for the second payment of $50 merely represented the Band’s effort to make the best of a bad situation. As counsel stated:

Well, if your goose is cooked, you might as well eat it. The deal was done for them or to them. Once the reserves are gone, this Band had no capacity, no resources to do what? Bring a legal action in the circumstances? The prohibitions in the Indian Act against bringing such claims are very clear at that time.

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566 Written Submission on Behalf of the Government of Canada, November 17, 1997, p. 32. It is notable that the Peace River firm retained by the Band included William P. Dundas, the lawyer before whom Band members Eban Testawits, James Boucher and Joseph Testawits swore the surrender affidavit in Waterhole, Alberta, in September 1928.


In the Commission’s view, although there is a minor parallel with the Kahkewistahaw inquiry in that the Duncan’s Band did not have a Chief at the time of surrender, there are too many significant differences for us to reach the same conclusion. The Duncan’s Band may not have had a Chief, but we see nothing in this case like the leadership void so evident on both the Kahkewistahaw and Moosomin reserves. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that the Band was actually prevented from selecting a Chief or that steps were taken to restrain band members from seeking outside advice, as occurred in Kahkewistahaw.

In Kahkewistahaw, the Band had rebuffed previous attempts to secure a surrender but, five days after voting down one surrender proposal, it did a complete about-face, giving up virtually all its good agricultural lands after receiving cash inducements and being threatened, while in desperate straits during a harsh prairie winter, with the curtailment of all future government aid. Similarly, we saw in the Moosomin inquiry that, while the Band consistently expressed the desire to retain its reserve, Indian Agent J.P.G. Day was censured by the Department of Indian Affairs for his failed attempt to secure a surrender in 1908 prior to the eventual surrender in 1909. No events like these took place on the Duncan’s reserves. Nor do we see ongoing reports of persistent efforts like those of Indian Agent Peter Byrne to seek a surrender in the Sumas case – efforts that, despite our finding that Byrne had not applied undue pressure on the Indians against their will, nevertheless warranted our close scrutiny of the surrender in light of the competing interests that the Crown must balance in any such transaction.

Moreover, in the present inquiry, we have already addressed the First Nation’s submission that the surrender documents, having been prepared in advance, demonstrate that the Band had no input into or control over the surrender process. In our view, the documents were prepared at or following the surrender meeting, and we infer from Murison’s report of October 3, 1928, and from Angela Testawits’s evidence that band members, led by Joseph Testawits, actively participated in the discussions and, indeed, negotiated terms.

We have had careful regard for the Duncan’s First Nation’s arguments, based on Semiahmoo, that its ancestors’ sense of powerless in the face of the “inevitable” loss of their reserve lands fettered their ability to make an autonomous decision. To properly understand the First Nation’s allegation of the Crown’s corresponding obligation “to ensure that the Band’s discretion was not
fettered by a belief that the surrender was inevitable,” or by the belief that the pressure to surrender would continue unabated if the surrender were not granted, it is necessary to review the facts in Semiahmoo.

The factual background to the Semiahmoo case began in 1889 when the federal government set apart a reserve comprising 382 acres of land for the Semiahmoo Indian Band of British Columbia. The reserve is located just north of the international border between Canada and the United States adjacent to Semiahmoo Bay. In 1928, the federal Department of Public Works expropriated 15.78 acres of the reserve without the Band’s consent, but this land was transferred to the Province of British Columbia in 1936 when it became apparent that the Department did not require it. Canada acquired a further 5.74 acres of the reserve from the Band by means of a surrender in 1943, and the land was turned over to the Province for use as a provincial park.

In 1949, the federal Department of Public Works began to consider the possibility that Canada’s customs facilities at the Douglas Border Crossing adjacent to the Band’s reserve would have to be expanded. An initial proposal to the Band that year was rejected, but in 1951 the Band agreed to a more formal proposal to surrender 22.408 acres for $550 per acre. Reed J at trial found that the Band would not have surrendered the land in the normal course of events, but knew from its previous experience that Canada had the right to expropriate for public purposes if the Band refused to surrender. The headnote from the case succinctly sets forth the remaining relevant facts:

The purpose of the surrender was to improve customs facilities adjacent to the reserve. However, most of the land was not used for that or any other purpose, but the Crown retained title to it. The Indian band made inquiries about having the unused land returned on many occasions, beginning in 1962. In 1969 it became apparent from a consultant’s report that the land would not be used for an expanded customs facility in the foreseeable future, so the band formally sought to recover the land. It made further inquiries about recovering the land several times thereafter. However, the band was always told that the land was needed in the foreseeable future for expansion of the customs facility, or that a study was being prepared regarding its development. In 1987 the band sought legal advice, after which the Crown retained consultants to prepare a study. It recommended development of a resort on the land. The report was sent to the band in 1989. In 1990 the band brought an action alleging that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty to the band with respect to the 1951 surrender in failing to obtain an adequate price and in failing to protect the best interests of the band when it consented to an absolute surrender of the land.
Thereafter the Crown commissioned a study that recommended redevelopment of the customs facilities. The report of the study was not received until 1992. As Isaac CJ noted, “[t]hat study was commissioned and completed on the assumption that the existing facility was inadequate.”

In addressing the fiduciary obligation that can arise out a band’s perception that the loss of its reserve lands is inevitable, Isaac CJ applied to the facts in Semiahmoo the guidelines formulated by Wilson J in Frame v. Smith for determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists:

[In Frame v. Smith, Wilson J. proposed the following indicia of a fiduciary relationship:

(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power....

In virtually all cases dealing with reserve land, the Crown has considerable power over the affected Indian Band by virtue of the surrender requirement. In this case, however, the Band was particularly vulnerable to the influence of the Crown. The evidence indicates that land had been taken from the Band by expropriation before and that, prior to the 1951 surrender, Public Works was considering expropriation as a means of obtaining the reserve land at issue in this case.... It is clear from the reasons of the Trial Judge that the Band’s discretion to give or to withhold their consent to the 1951 surrender was significantly influenced by their knowledge that, regardless of their decision on the issue of surrender, there was a risk that they would lose their land through expropriation in any event....

The Trial Judge also found that the Band’s ability to give or to withhold their own consent to the absolute surrender in 1951 was fettered by their knowledge of the respondent’s power to expropriate. In her reasons for judgment, the Trial Judge stated the following:

It is important to underline that the band knew that the defendant, at all times, had the right to expropriate the land for public purposes if the band refused to surrender. Secondly, I agree with counsel for the plaintiff’s characterization of the evidence that the

band would not have surrendered the land, in the normal course of events, even though they might have subdivided it for occupation by others under long-term leases....

The respondent’s assertion that the Band gave full and informed consent to the absolute surrender rings hollow in the face of these findings. In my respectful view, in finding that the Band surrendered their land to the respondent despite the fact that they “would not have surrendered the land, in the normal course of events” the Trial Judge concluded, based on the evidence, that the Band felt powerless to decide any other way....

In failing to alleviate the Band’s sense of powerlessness in the decision-making process, the respondent failed to protect, to the requisite degree, the interests of the Band.  

In the present case, there is no evidence that the Duncan’s Band was conscious of the possibility of expropriation and no indication that its members were influenced by such considerations. As to whether the circumstances otherwise resulted in the Band feeling powerless to decide in any other way, we acknowledge that most members of the Band may have been illiterate and could not speak, read, or write in English, but we do not necessarily equate those circumstances with powerlessness or incapacity. In fact, in this case, the evidence suggests the opposite. The Band’s members appear to have been largely independent and self-supporting, and were not reliant on either the reserves or each other to sustain themselves. In the surrender of IR 151 and 151B through 151G, they were not faced with the prospect of losing their primary livelihood, but instead were disposing of lands of which they made very little use in exchange for an immediate cash payment and annual instalments of interest that would supplement their primary sources of income from other means. In these circumstances, we do not perceive the sort of powerlessness and helpless resignation that earmarked the Semiahmoo case or the surrenders considered in our earlier inquiries for the Kahkewistahaw and Moosomin First Nations. Nor do we see the persistent efforts to secure a surrender, or any indication that pressure on the Band would continue unabated until a surrender was secured, that characterized the earlier inquiries before the Commission.

The record also demonstrates that the issue of surrender was discussed with the Duncan’s Band on a number of occasions before the 1928 surrender meeting. Notwithstanding the various

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locations at which band members resided, they appear to have had opportunities to discuss the issue among themselves, as Murison’s report of them having done so and being “prepared” for him attests.

In addition, we have already alluded to our finding that, although the First Nation argued that the surrender was initiated by Canada’s representatives, the evidence does not definitively support that conclusion. We also harken back to Angela Testawits’s evidence that, after Murison advised the band members that he could not tell them the price the land would fetch prior to the public auction, he asked them, “What do you want to do?” In our view, this simple statement dramatically emphasizes the conclusion that Canada, far from usurping the Band’s autonomy, actually sought the Band’s decision on whether it wanted to surrender. We have also referred to other examples of Canada’s non-committal approach to the surrender and its inquiries regarding the terms the Band would be prepared to accept, none of which suggests that the Crown sought to impose its will on the Band. In contrast to the Semiahmoo case and the Kahkewistahaw and Moosomin inquiries, we find nothing in Canada’s motives and methods in securing the surrender that were deserving of reproach, other than perhaps marginal record-keeping. We therefore conclude that the Duncan’s Band did not cede or abnegate its decision-making power regarding the surrender to or in favour of the Crown.

**Duty of the Crown to Prevent the Surrender**

The next question that the Commission must address is whether, on the facts of this case, the fiduciary obligation grafted by the Supreme Court of Canada onto subsection 51(4) of the 1927 Indian Act required the Crown to prevent the surrender of the reserve.

In Apsassin, the Beaver Indian Band had argued that the paternalistic scheme of the Indian Act, which vests title in the Crown on behalf of a band, imposed a duty on the Crown to protect Indians from making foolish decisions with respect to the alienation of their land. In essence, the argument was that the Crown should not have allowed the Beaver Indian Band to surrender its reserve because this was not in the Band’s long-term best interests. Conversely, the Crown asserted that bands should be treated as independent agents with respect to their lands. McLachlin J dealt with the issue in these terms:

The first real issue is whether the Indian Act imposed a duty on the Crown to refuse the Band’s surrender of its reserve. The answer to this is found in Guerin v. The
Queen ... where the majority of this Court, per Dickson J. (as he then was), held that the duty on the Crown with respect to surrender of Indian lands was founded on preventing exploitative bargains....

My view is that the Indian Act’s provisions for surrender of band reserves strikes a balance between the two extremes of autonomy and protection. The band’s consent was required to surrender its reserve. Without that consent the reserve could not be sold. But the Crown, through the Governor in Council, was also required to consent to the surrender. The purpose of the requirement of Crown consent was not to substitute the Crown’s decision for that of the band, but to prevent exploitation. As Dickson J. characterized it in Guerin [p. 136 CNLR]:

The purpose of this surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to prevent the Indians from being exploited.

It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to surrender the reserve, and its decision was to be respected. At the same time, if the Band’s decision was foolish or improvident—a decision that constituted exploitation—the Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown’s obligation was limited to preventing exploitative bargains....

The measure of control which the Act permitted the Band to exercise over the surrender of the reserve negates the contention that absent exploitation, the Act imposed a fiduciary obligation on the Crown with respect to the surrender of the reserve.573

Gonthier J concurred that “the law treats Aboriginal peoples as autonomous actors with respect to the acquisition and surrender of their lands, and for this reason, their decisions must be respected and honoured.”574

On the facts in Apsassin, Addy J had found that the decision to surrender the reserve made good sense when viewed from the perspective of the Beaver Indian Band at the time of the surrender. McLachlin J agreed, concluding that the Governor in Council was not obliged to withhold consent because the evidence did not establish that the surrender was “foolish, improvident or amounted to exploitation.” The question now before the Commission is whether the 1928 surrender by the


Duncan’s Band was so foolish, improvident, and exploitative as to give rise to a duty on Canada’s part under section 51(4) of the 1927 Indian Act to withhold its own consent to the surrender.

The First Nation submits that the Crown’s duty in such circumstances entails close scrutiny of the transaction to confirm that it is not exploitative and to ensure that the band giving the surrender has consented knowledgeably, freely, and without compulsion from outside pressures, including the ulterior motives of the Crown. As counsel phrased it:

As an exploitative bargain, that has a number of ramifications and that must be considered in light of the future interests and the future generations, not just is it okay from a commercial point of view. Are they getting too little? That’s a completely irrelevant consideration, because the land is always available on the market. Is it a bad deal for the Band in light of their circumstances, in light of their needs, in light of their long-term best interests, in light of the fact they can never have a reserve again if they give it up, that they will lose all tax advantages, that they will lose a homeland and an economic base?

Based on the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal in Semiahmoo, the First Nation contends that the Crown is subject to a strict standard of conduct in assessing whether a given surrender is exploitative. To use the words of Isaac CJ, “[e]ven if the land at issue is required for a public purpose, the Crown cannot discharge its fiduciary obligation simply by convincing the Band to accept the surrender, and then using this consent to relieve itself of the responsibility to scrutinize the transaction.” According to counsel, the Crown did not undertake the required level of scrutiny in this case and failed to protect the Band’s interests by allowing the surrender.

The First Nation further contends that the 1928 surrender was exploitative because the Crown, in advising the Band and later assenting to the surrender, failed to consider leasing or other options to an absolute surrender. Counsel points to the efforts of neighbouring farmer J.B. Early to obtain a lease of IR 151E, which had fallen into disuse and disrepair, and which Early reported that

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575 Written Submission on Behalf of the Duncan’s First Nation, November 12, 1997, p. 64.
578 ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 120 (Jerome Slavik).
band members had refused to sell. It will be recalled that, shortly before Early’s letter, farmer A.C. Wright had inadvertently constructed his house and other improvements on IR 151G, and the Crown proposed to resolve the problem by obtaining a surrender of IR 151G. When these instructions were conveyed to Agent Laird, he recommended obtaining surrenders of IR 151B, 151C, 151D, 151E, 151F, 151H, and 151K as well, since “[t]here has been no work done on any of them for a considerable number of years, and if they are surrendered the Indians will still have ample land remaining in Reserves 151 and 151A., which contain 3,520 and 5,120 acres respectively of good farming land.” Accordingly, the Crown informed Early that it was seeking a surrender of IR 151E and, if it was obtained, his application would be considered and he would be informed of the result.

The First Nation contends that, despite Early’s interest, “the Crown did not seriously consider the option of leasing land to Early... [and] did not appear to conduct inquiries or feasibility studies for the purpose of informing themselves as to whether other Reserve holdings which were otherwise unused could be profitably leased to local farmers”; moreover, “[t]he historical record yields no evidence that any option but the sale of reserve land was ever presented or discussed with the members of Duncan’s.” In the First Nation’s view, although leasing was a “practice and policy” of the Department of Indian Affairs in the years preceding the surrender, it was rejected by the Crown in the Duncan’s case in favour of surrender for sale. Counsel submits that, as a result, the Band lost the potential benefits of leasing in addition to losing its land:

The Band did not have any knowledge or capacity to farm the land, but the land was amongst the best farm land in the area. It would have clearly been leasable and available to lease. Normally a leasing arrangement in that time gave three years free rent if there was breaking to do, and then a graduated rent after that. It was a way of having the land cleared and broken without losing ownership, and when the land was not being used. Yet it preserved the land and in fact enhanced the value of the land.

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579 Harold Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, January 23, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 150).


582 ICC Transcript, November 25, 1997, p. 22 (Jerome Slavik).
for the potential future use by Band members when they had their capacity, resources and manpower to farm the land.

Reserve land, once it is sold and surrendered, cannot be recovered. It is a one-time asset. Once gone, it can never be recovered. Leasing was clearly an option here. It was known to the Department. Graham makes reference to it. It was never raised. 583

Counsel later suggests why, in his view, the leasing option was not taken up with the Band:

But I think the Crown itself had an interest in disposing of these reserve lands. Smaller Indian lands for the Crowns [sic] to administer was important. It would also allow them to use the proceeds of sale to offset economic and maintenance costs that may have to be provided to the community. They also intended to use the money to enable the Band to acquire or provide to the Band provisions that were owed to it under treaty. 584

The inference that we take from these submissions is that the Crown’s failure to consider or discuss leasing constituted exploitation, and Canada therefore breached a fiduciary obligation to the Duncan’s Band by failing to withhold its assent to the surrender.

In response to these submissions, Canada takes the position that its role is not one of substituting its decision for that of a band, since bands have autonomy and can make their own decisions; rather, its function is to interpose itself between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of the land to prevent the Indians from being exploited. 585 Canada then argues, based on Justice McLachlin’s reasons in Apsassin, that “[t]he determination of whether a surrender was foolish, improvident or exploitative must be made within the context of the circumstances existing at the time of the surrender and must be based upon what could have been reasonably anticipated given the information available at that time.” 586 In this case, counsel submits that, based on the information available in 1928, the surrender was not foolish, improvident, or exploitative, and Canada did not manipulate or take unfair advantage of the Duncan’s Band; accordingly, the Crown

was not obliged to withhold its consent to the surrender.\textsuperscript{587} As Director General Michel Roy of the Specific Claims Branch wrote in the months leading up to the oral submissions in this inquiry:

The evidence indicates that consideration was given to the Band’s interests in proceeding with the surrender of the reserves. The matter of obtaining a surrender of the reserves appears to have been discussed in 1925 when it was observed that the reserves had been unoccupied for many years. At that time, Acting Assistant Deputy and Secretary Mackenzie was not disposed to proceed with a surrender and sale of Reserve 151 given that the current land values in the district were very low. As well, Inspector Murison’s report on the surrender of the reserves noted that the Band was a small one and they appeared to be decreasing. He also noted that the Band had not been making use of the surrendered reserves and that the availability of water, hay and farming lands on Reserve 151A made it a “much more desirable reserve” than the surrendered lands. Murison also noted that members of [the] Band had expressed a desire to settle down on their reserve and start farming and that the surrender provided for the purchase of necessary equipment from the sale proceeds. It is Canada’s position that the Band has not established that the surrender was foolish, improvident or exploitative.\textsuperscript{588}

Generally speaking, the evidence in this case does not support the conclusion that Canada’s actions were inspired by the same motives that characterized the surrenders considered by us in the Kahkewistahaw and Moosomin inquiries. In those cases, it was clear that the interests of the Indians were given scant regard, with the Kahkewistahaw people losing the lion’s share of their good land and the members of the Moosomin Band being relocated to a reserve that was largely useless for agricultural purposes. By way of contrast, the comments of Crown representatives regarding the Duncan’s surrender demonstrate that the Band would be retaining the land – IR 151A – “which the


\textsuperscript{588} Michel Roy, Director General, Specific Claims Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Donald Testawich, Chief, Duncan’s First Nation, and Jerome Slavik, Ackroyd, Piasta, Roth & Day, January 31, 1997 (ICC Exhibit 11, p. 6).
Indians would in any case desire to retain as their common reserve\textsuperscript{589} and which would likely satisfy their agricultural needs for the foreseeable future\textsuperscript{590}.

For example, in January 1923, on recommending the surrender of the Band’s eight smaller reserves in the wake of the inadvertent encroachment on IR 151G by A.C. Wright, Laird commented that “the Indians will still have ample land remaining in Reserves 151 and 151A., which contain 3,520 and 5,120 acres respectively of good farming land.”\textsuperscript{591} It is true that, at that time, it was contemplated that the Band would be retaining IR 151 as well as IR 151A, but when IR 151 was later included among the parcels to be surrendered, Canada’s representatives still believed that IR 151A would adequately meet the Band’s needs. As J.C. Caldwell noted in a postscript to his letter of July 14, 1928:

| I have omitted to explain that from Agent Laird’s letter of October 21\textsuperscript{st} last, it appears that it is the intention of the present owners of Reserve 151 to 151K to move to and reside on Reserve No. 151A, which contains something over five thousand acres. You will see, therefore, that the surrender of the Reserve mentioned and dealt with in this letter does not mean that the Indians will be without a suitable place of residence.\textsuperscript{592} |

Murison’s report of October 3, 1928, following the surrender explicitly demonstrates that Canada’s representatives turned their attention to the Band’s interests:

\textit{This is a small band and they appear to be decreasing. They have not been making use of the lands which they have surrendered...}  

This band are retaining Reserve No. 151A which comprises 5120 acres. I would say that at least 35\% is open farming land and the balance is covered with a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{589} D.C. Scott, DSGIA, to SGIA, December 29, 1927, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, pp. 189-91).
\item \textsuperscript{590} As Neil Reddekopp observed, “Fairly early, IR 151A became the most important reserve to [the] Duncan’s Band”: G.N. Reddekopp, “The Creation and Surrender of the Beaver and Duncan’s Band’s Reserves,” p. 60 (ICC Exhibit 5).
\item \textsuperscript{591} H. Laird, Acting Indian Agent, to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, January 23, 1923, DIAND file 777/30-8, vol. 1 (ICC Documents, p. 150).
\item \textsuperscript{592} J.C. Caldwell, In Charge, Land and Timber Branch, DIA, to W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner, July 14, 1928 (ICC Documents, pp. 210-12).
\end{itemize}
medium sized growth of poplar with open spaces here and there. There is a small lake called Old Wives Lake, with a creek running along at the south end of the reserve, as well as a spring, where water can be obtained. There are also some hay lands on the border of Old Wives Lake. This makes it a much more desirable reserve for Indians than the land which they have agreed to release. The village of Brownvale is situated about two miles from the north west corner of this reserve.

It will be seen from the foregoing that ample provision has been made for this small band in retaining Reserve No. 151A, and after going carefully into the whole situation, it appears to me that it would be in their best interests if the Government can see fit to accept the surrender as it stands. The members of this band, in the past, have earned their living by hunting and working out for settlers and they have had no fixed place of abode. Some of them expressed a desire to settle down on their reserve and start farming, hence the request that provision be made to supply equipment for them.593

In forwarding Murison’s report to Scott, Graham commented: “You will note what the Inspector says regarding Reserve 151A, which the Indians have retained for their own use, and which seems to be ample for their requirements.”594 All of these statements suggest that IR 151A was both desired by the Band for its reserve and sufficient to meet the Band’s requirements.

The First Nation also suggested that Canada, while making “ample” provision for the Indians in their then-current condition, lacked foresight and failed to provide for the Band’s future – in other words, consented to an improvident surrender. Based on the conclusions of Isaac CJ in Semiahmoo, the First Nation may be correct in venturing that it would have been more prudent for the Band to lease out its land base rather than surrender it for sale. In this way the Band would allow area farmers to break the land and improve it so that it would be of greater utility to Band members should they eventually turn their attentions from hunting to farming.

We note that Isaac CJ agreed with the following finding by Reed J at trial that the Crown’s fiduciary obligations require it, in cases involving surrender, to minimize the effect of the surrender on the band:


When land is taken in this way and it is not known what, if any, use will be made of it, or whether the land is going to be used for government purposes, I think there is an obligation on the fiduciary to condition the taking by a reversionary provision, or ensure by some other mechanism that the least possible impairment of the plaintiffs’ rights occurs. I am persuaded there was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs.\footnote{Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada, [1998] 1 FC 3, 148 DLR (4th) 523 at 537 (CA).}

Isaac CJ further agreed with Justice Reed’s conclusion regarding breach, and continued:

In my view, the 1951 surrender agreement, assessed in the context of the specific relationship between the parties, was an exploitative bargain. There was no attempt made in drafting its terms to minimize the impairment of the Band’s rights, and therefore, the respondent [Crown] should have exercised its discretion to withhold its consent to the surrender or to ensure that the surrender was qualified or conditional.

The Trial Judge found that, in 1951, the respondent did not have any definite plans for the construction of an expanded customs facility in the foreseeable future which necessitated the taking of 22.408 acres of the Band’s reserve land. In fact, for over 40 years, no development plan was prepared for the Surrendered Land. It was only after this litigation was commenced that the respondent commissioned a study that did recommend redevelopment of the Douglas Border Crossing. The report for this study was not received until 1992....

The bargain, in other words, was exploitative. For this reason, the respondent should not have consented to the absolute surrender, at least not without first ensuring that it contained appropriate safeguards, such as a reversionary clause, to ensure the least possible impairment of the Band’s rights.

I should emphasize that the Crown’s fiduciary obligation is to withhold its own consent to surrender where the transaction is exploitative. In order to fulfil this obligation, the Crown itself is obliged to scrutinize the proposed transaction to ensure that it is not an exploitative bargain. As a fiduciary, the Crown must be held to a strict standard of conduct. Even if the land at issue is required for a public purpose, the Crown cannot discharge its fiduciary obligation simply by convincing the Band to accept the surrender, and then using this consent to relieve itself of the responsibility to scrutinize the transaction. The Trial Judge’s findings of fact, however, suggest that this is precisely what the respondent did....

The fact that the Trial Judge did not view the $550.00 per acre received by the Band for the surrendered land as “below market value” does not negate the possibility of a breach of fiduciary duty. The focus in determining whether or not the respondent breached its fiduciary duty must be on the extent to which the respondent protected the best interests of the Band while also acknowledging the Crown’s
obligation to advance a legitimate public purpose. In this case, the Band did not want to surrender the land at all but felt it had no choice. The respondent consented to an absolute surrender agreement in order to take control of much more land than they in fact required, and they did so without any properly formulated public purpose. For these reasons, I find that the respondent did breach its fiduciary duty to the Band in the 1951 surrender even though the Band may have received compensation for the Surrendered Land somewhere in the neighbourhood of market value.

The Band had to, and did, rely upon the respondent’s representations to the effect that the land was required for customs facilities, thereby implying that an absolute surrender was necessary and that the interests of the Band were being safeguarded as much as possible. While it is true that the express wording of the surrender instrument does not indicate that the land was being acquired for the purpose of a customs facility, a court should not confine its analysis so narrowly. The “oral terms” of a surrender are part of the backdrop of the circumstances that determine whether the Crown has acted unconscionably. As stated by Dickson J. in Guerin, they serve to “inform and confine the field of discretion within which the Crown was free to act.”

On the basis of the foregoing, I find that the Trial Judge did not err in concluding that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty when it consented to the 1951 surrender. The spectre of expropriation clearly had a negative impact on the ability of the Band to protect their own interests in the “negotiations” which ultimately led to the surrender. While the Crown must be given some latitude in its land-use planning when it actively seeks the surrender of Indian land for a public purpose, the Crown must ensure that it impairs the rights of the affected Indian Band as little as possible, which includes ensuring that the surrender is for a timely public purpose. In these circumstances, the Crown had a clear duty to protect the Band from an exploitative bargain by refusing to consent to an absolute surrender which involved the taking of reserve land for which there lacked a foreseeable public need.596

Among the factors to which Isaac CJ referred in concluding that the Crown had breached its fiduciary responsibilities to the Semiahmoo Band were the following:

XXXI. the Crown’s failure to protect the Band’s interests, as evident in the Crown’s negotiation of the surrender without any timely public purpose and its failure to qualify or condition the surrender terms to minimize the impairment of the Band’s rights;

XXXII. the Crown’s reliance on the Band’s “encouraged (required)” consent as the basis for relieving the Crown of its responsibilities to scrutinize the transaction and to withhold consent for a clearly exploitative transaction;

 XXXIII. the Band’s sense of “powerlessness” in the decision-making process in light of its knowledge that the Crown could expropriate should the Band refuse to surrender; 

 XXXIV. the Band’s reliance on the Crown’s oral representations regarding the purpose and necessity of the surrender to safeguard the Band’s interests in the transaction; and 

 XXXV. the insignificance of the fact that the price paid to the Band was market value or close to it in assessing whether a fiduciary obligation was breached.

 There is no doubt that, in the present case, the Crown, in taking an absolute surrender of IR 151 and IR 151B through IR 151G, did not qualify or condition the surrender to minimize the impairment of the Band’s rights. However, for reasons already expressed, we do not agree that the Crown sought to relieve itself of the obligation to scrutinize the transaction by relying on the Band’s consent. Nor do we see any indication that Canada suggested that the surrendered lands would be used for any purposes other than those to which they were eventually put – sale and settlement – or that the Band relied on any misrepresentations by the Crown regarding the purpose and necessity of the surrender.

 Ultimately, this transaction must be judged, as Canada has argued, from the perspective of what appeared to be in the Band’s best interests at the time. The First Nation has attacked the surrender on the basis that, by consenting to a surrender for sale rather than lease, the Crown failed to minimize the impairment of the Band’s rights regarding its reserve lands. With the benefit of hindsight, and in the context of the 1990s, that may be so. However, it must be remembered that Semiahmoo dealt with a surrender that took place in 1951, by which time significant changes in the views of how best to serve the Indians’ best interests had taken place. Moreover, the Semiahmoo surrender was exploitative because, in the words of Isaac CJ, it “involved the taking of reserve land for which there lacked a foreseeable public need.” By way of contrast, the Duncan’s surrender occurred in 1928, when, based on the evidence before the Commission, it was perceived to be in the public interest to encourage the settlement and development of western Canada. Just as significantly, the Department of Indian Affairs at that time considered the surrender of reserves for sale – and investing the proceeds in a trust account, with annual payments of interest to the Band – an appropriate means of acting in the Indians’ best interests.
In a paper prepared in November 1986 for the *Apsassin* trial, J. Edward Chamberlin commented on the evolution of Crown policy with regard to the disposition of interests in Indian reserves following the turn of the 20th century. He noted a preference in the early years for surrenders, ostensibly “to encourage more rapid assimilation of the Indian population,” but, in his view, actually driven by “the pressures of white settlement.” In response to these increasing pressures, the *Indian Act* was amended in 1906 to increase the permitted distribution of sale proceeds to the surrendering band from 10 per cent to 50 per cent in the hope that this would “encourage more surrenders ... improve the financial situation of the lands, and lessen the burden on government.” Chamberlin continued:

Pressures for access to reserve lands continued to build, despite the 1906 amendments, and in 1911, amendments to the *Indian Act* dramatically extended powers for expropriation of reserve lands for public purposes, and enabled the federal government to alienate reserve lands adjoining municipalities without band consent; but even so, and even while it was obvious that there was capitulation to non-native interests, the appeal of the government was to the British and Canadian principles of responsible guardianship of Indian interests.

A proposed amendment in 1914 to extend this provision for unilateral action even further was turned down, after strenuous debate, when it reached the Senate.

Duncan Campbell Scott superintended the introduction of the ‘Great Production Campaign’ in 1918, as a contribution to the war effort. The object was to bring as much reserve land as possible into production, especially on the western plains; and in order to facilitate this an amendment to the *Indian Act* was passed, and Inspector W.M. Graham in Regina was put in charge. The amendment allowed the Superintendent General to lease uncultivated reserve lands without a surrender. Explaining this provision, Superintendent General Arthur Meighen said that

the Indian Reserves of Western Canada embrace very large areas far in excess of what they are utilizing now for productive purposes... We want to be able to use that land in every case; but of course, the policy of the department will be to get the consent of the

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band wherever possible ... in such spirit and with such methods as will not alienate their sympathies from their guardian, the Government of Canada....

We would be only too glad to have the Indian use this land if he would; production by him would be just as valuable as production by anybody else. But he will not cultivate this land, and we want to cultivate it; that is all. We shall not use it any longer than he shows a disinclination to cultivate the land himself.

This move was undertaken in the urgency of the moment by Robert Borden’s government, and did in some cases include initiatives to take surrenders of parts of reserves for sale as well as for lease. But it should not be interpreted as anything like the kind of deliberate policy to alienate reserve lands that informed the general allotment policy in the United States....

The 1918 amendment giving the government authority to lease land for agricultural purposes without the consent of the band was significant in that while it increased the flexibility of the Department in responding to non-native interests, it also increased the burden of responsibility on the Department to act in a manner that was in the Indians’ best interests. The 1914 amendment, if it had passed, would have brought into play public scrutiny of Departmental action in selling Indian lands against the owner’s wishes; while the 1918 provision for unilateral decisions regarding leasing kept the matter within the Department.

*By the mid-1930s, the development of reserves and the maintaining of these lands for future Indian needs became increasingly recognized as the key to Indian advancement, and the protection of reserve lands was consistently and continuously reiterated as government policy.* Even during the period when surrenders for sale were being encouraged, the Department’s responsibility to act in the Indian’s interest by ensuring the best possible terms was routinely emphasized. In particular, Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott had a very firm sense of the responsibilities of the Department in any sales of Indian land. In a letter written in 1918 to the Great War Veterans Association, Scott conveyed the views of the Superintendent General on

the question of utilizing the Indian Reserves for the purpose of soldiers’ settlement.... He wishes me to point out that it is not possible to allow homesteading on Indian Reserves and that the first obligation of the Department, after Indian land is surrendered for sale, is to sell it to the best possible advantage in the interests of the Indians. To act otherwise would be a breach of trust, as the reserves were allotted to the Indians as part of their compensation for their abandonment of aboriginal rights over larger territories. The necessity of obtaining the full value of Indian lands makes it difficult to deal with such properties under the Soldiers’ Settlement Act and the regulations governing the Board.
Indeed, following a run of surrenders, it became apparent that selling land to provide a capital base for Indian economic advancement did not work in the long-term interest of the Indians. The point was grimly confirmed in the Meriam Report in 1928, which demonstrated beyond question the appalling consequences for the Indians of the dispersal of lands out of Indian ownership in the United States since 1887, when the General Allotment Act was passed.\textsuperscript{600}

From this passage it can be seen that the leasing initiative in 1918 represented a response to the demands for increased production during the war years, but the primary policy appeared to remain the surrender for sale until at least the late 1920s and perhaps the mid-1930s. Chamberlin went on to discuss a conference jointly sponsored by the University of Toronto and Yale University in 1939 at which Canadian and American officials evaluated and rejected the policy of surrender for sale, “concluding that it was not in the best interest of the Indian people to separate them from their reserve lands.”\textsuperscript{601}

However, in 1928, it appears that Crown officials still considered that surrendering for sale, and investing the proceeds in an interest-bearing trust account, was a prudent course of conduct in attending to the interests of aboriginal peoples. Although such actions might have been considered misguided as little as 10 years later, and might today be viewed with disdain for failing to minimize the impairment of the Band’s rights, we see nothing in those actions \textit{at that time} to suggest that the Crown was acting other than honestly and in what it perceived to be the Band’s best interests.

There was also a property management issue. Since most of the reserves were unoccupied and unused by Band members, and since the Crown’s presence in the area was typically limited to annual visits by the Indian Agent to pay annuities, there would rarely be anyone in the vicinity to supervise a lessee to ensure that the lands were being used in a proper and husbandlike manner. As Graham noted in a 1922 memorandum to Scott with regard to a request by farmer A.D. Madden to make reserve lands on the Beaver Band’s IR 152 available under lease for pasturing cattle:


In the past no land has been leased by the Department in that part of the country, and it is for the Department to decide whether it would be a wise plan to do so now. In my opinion to do so would be unwise as we have no organization in that district by which lessees could be controlled.\(^602\)

Eventually the Crown, over Graham’s objections, did express a willingness to discuss leasing with the Beaver Band, but nothing came of those discussions. Assuming, as the Crown apparently did in the mid-1920s, that surrendering for sale, with the sale proceeds invested for the benefit of the Indians, was an equally attractive alternative to surrendering for lease, it presumably made sense – at least in circumstances where property management would be an issue – to convey the fee simple interest rather than a mere tenancy, since the recipient farmer was more likely to manage the property properly if he could call it his own. In retrospect, the Crown’s assumption that surrender for sale was a viable option may now appear to have been an error in judgment, but, as we have already stated, it appears to have been honestly made and with the best interests of the Band in mind.

For these reasons, and given that the Duncan’s Band was evidently not using the lands surrendered and would be left with a reserve that appeared to satisfy its needs, we conclude that the 1928 surrender for sale, with the sale proceeds intended to be invested for the benefit of the Band, cannot be considered to have been exploitative in the context of the time.

There is one significant caveat to this conclusion, however, and that is with respect to IR 151E. It will be recalled that, on January 12, 1923, J.B. Early approached the Crown with a proposal to lease the 118.7-acre IR 151E. Early offered to pay $2.00 per acre annually for the 75 acres that had previously been plowed and, after five years’ free use of land “cleared and broken up by me,” to pay $2.00 per acre for that land as well. Early also offered to pay 10 cents per acre for pasture land. He renewed this proposal through his Member of Parliament, D.M. Kennedy, on April 10, 1923. We see no evidence that Early’s proposal was ever presented to the Band as an option for its consideration, notwithstanding Early’s statement that he had the “consent of resident and remaining ‘Breeds’” to rent the land.

Although it might be possible for the Commission to undertake a detailed comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the lease proposed by Early and the terms of the ultimate sale of IR 151E, we do not believe that it is necessary to do so. Leasing clearly presented a viable option to surrender for sale, and subsequent events suggest that Canada later came to the conclusion that leasing was generally the better of the two alternatives. Given that leasing would have provided band members with a steady revenue stream and would have allowed them to retain their interest in the reserve, it seems evident that they should have been given the opportunity to consider Early’s proposal. Nor does it appear that Canada’s representatives gave Early’s leasing initiative much thought.

In the Commission’s view, Canada was under a positive duty to present the offer to the Band so that band members might weigh and choose between the alternatives before them. Canada failed to fulfil that duty. In these circumstances, the Governor in Council should have withheld consent to the surrender of IR 151E since, without the Band having been afforded the opportunity to consider its options, the surrender must be considered to have been foolish, improvident, and exploitative. We conclude that the Crown breached its fiduciary obligations to the Duncan’s Band with respect to the surrender of IR 151E, and accordingly Canada owes the First Nation an outstanding lawful obligation under the Specific Claims Policy.

Conclusion
The Apsassin and Semiahmoo decisions require us to review circumstances of the relationship between the Crown and a First Nation to determine whether, on the facts of a given case, a fiduciary obligation is owed by the Crown to the First Nation and whether such obligation, if found to exist, has been breached. In 1928, the Duncan’s Band was a relatively small community, with many of its principal men earning their livelihood trapping and hunting. Few were involved in agriculture or used the Band’s reserves to any great extent, or at all, for residential, commercial, or other purposes. The record reveals a pattern of local political pressure to open up the Band’s reserves for settlement. The record also supports the view that the Crown sought to protect the Band’s interests by not actively pursuing surrender, and in fact rejecting requests for surrender, until other available lands in the area had been taken up and the Band’s reserves would attract a better price. There is also
evidence before us that, prior to the surrender and in the course of the surrender meeting, the Crown consulted and negotiated with the Band regarding the surrender. Although details surrounding these consultations and negotiations are sketchy, we cannot engage in speculation or conjecture to conclude that the surrender was in some way improper. There was no evidence of bribery, fraud, or undue influence on the facts before us in this inquiry.

Nor does the record support the conclusion that the Duncan’s First Nation was particularly or peculiarly vulnerable. In Semiahmoo, the court was faced with a fact situation where a Band was faced with either surrender or the threat of expropriation. Regardless of the Band’s decision, the land would be lost, a fact that left the Band feeling powerless. Similar facts simply do not exist in the context of this inquiry. There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Duncan’s Band were threatened or influenced by the Crown to sell their lands. The record, though rather meagre, supports the conclusion that the Crown properly discussed surrender with the Band and that the Band exercised its autonomy and control in surrendering its lands. With the exception of IR 151E, with respect to which we have concluded that Canada owes the First Nation an outstanding lawful obligation, we see no evidence that, in the context of 1928, the surrender of the remaining Duncan’s reserves would have been considered improvident or foolish.

Finally, it will be recalled that, in our earlier discussion of Deputy Superintendent General Scott’s instructions to his Indian agents, we noted that those instructions may constitute evidence regarding the standard of “due diligence” to which the Crown expected its representatives to adhere, and thus may be relevant in determining whether the Crown discharged its fiduciary duties to the Duncan’s Band in obtaining the 1928 surrender. In closing, we see no marked and substantial departure from those instructions that would indicate a breach of fiduciary obligation in this case.

As a result, we conclude that the 1928 surrender of IR 151E constituted the sole breach of fiduciary obligation owing by the Crown to the Band. Accordingly, we recommend that Canada open negotiations with the First Nation with respect to this aspect of the claim only.
PART V

RECOMMENDATION

We have been asked to inquire into and report on whether the Government of Canada owes an outstanding lawful obligation to the Duncan’s First Nation. We have concluded that it does, but only with respect to the surrender of IR 151E.

In the 1928 surrender of IR 151 and 151B through 151G, the requirements of section 51 of the 1927 Indian Act regarding surrender were satisfied, and it does not appear that the Crown breached any fiduciary obligations to the Band in the course of the surrender proceedings. Specifically, we see no evidence that the Band’s understanding of the terms of the surrender was inadequate, that the conduct of the Crown tainted the dealings in a manner that would make it unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention, that the Band ceded or abnegated its decision-making authority to or in favour of the Crown in relation to the surrender, or that the surrender was so foolish or improvident as to be considered exploitative. The sole exception to this conclusion is IR 151E, with respect to which the Crown breached its fiduciary obligations to the First Nation by failing to present J.B. Early’s leasing proposal to the Band as an alternative to surrender for sale in 1928.

With regard to the First Nation’s submissions based on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Semiahmoo, we see nothing in the present case to suggest that the Duncan’s Band felt powerless or that its discretion was fettered in the face of a threat like the “spectre of expropriation.” Moreover, although Isaac CJ concluded that the Crown was obliged to ensure that the surrender was implemented in such a way as to cause the least possible impairment of the Band’s rights, he reached this conclusion in the context of his decision that the Crown had a duty to protect the Band from an exploitative bargain by refusing to consent to an absolute surrender that involved the taking of reserve land for which there lacked a foreseeable public need. We find that, in this case, the surrender was for a valid public purpose, and, although perhaps it might be considered unwise from the perspective of hindsight, it was considered at the time to be a viable means of protecting the Band’s interests. Nevertheless, the Crown breached its fiduciary obligation with regard to IR 151E, not because leasing may have been a viable option in a general sense, but because the Crown failed to present J.B. Early’s specific leasing proposal to the Band for its consideration.
In conclusion, we therefore recommend to the parties:

That the claim of the Duncan’s First Nation regarding the surrender of IR 151E be accepted for negotiation under the Specific Claims Policy.

FOR THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Daniel J. Bellegarde                                      P.E. James Prentice, QC
Commission Co-Chair                                      Commission Co-Chair

Carole T. Corcoran                                        Roger J. Augustine
Commissioner                                              Commissioner

Dated this 10th day of September, 1999.
## APPENDIX A

**Duncan’s First Nation Inquiry – 1928 Surrender Claim**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planning conferences</th>
<th>Ottawa, June 8, 1995</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ottawa, April 8, 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Community session</td>
<td>Brownvale, Alberta, September 6, 1995</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Commission heard evidence from Duncan’s First Nation elders Isadore Mooswah (Ted Knott) and John Testawits.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Legal argument</td>
<td>Edmonton, November 25 and 26, 1997</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Content of formal record</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The formal record for the Duncan’s First Nation 1928 Surrender Claim Inquiry consists of the following materials:</td>
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<td>• the documentary record (3 volumes of documents, with annotated index) (Exhibit 1)</td>
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<td>• Exhibits 2-15 tendered during the inquiry, including the transcript from the community session (1 volume)</td>
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<td>• transcript of oral submissions (1 volume)</td>
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<td>• written submissions of counsel for Canada and counsel for the Duncan’s First Nation, including authorities submitted by counsel with their written submissions</td>
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The report of the Commission and letters of transmittal to the parties will complete the formal record of this inquiry.