The Indian Claims Commission Proceedings is a continuing series of official reports, background documents, articles, and comment published by the Indian Claims Commission (Canada).

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CONTENTS

Letter from the Co-Chairs v

Abbreviations vii

SPECIAL ISSUE ON LAND CLAIMS REFORMS

Indian Claims Commission

Arthur Durocher
Land Claims Reform 25

Mary Ellen Turpel
A Fair, Expeditious, and Fully Accountable Land Claims Process 61


THE COMMISSIONERS 247
FROM THE CO-CHAIRS

On behalf of the commissioners and staff of the Indian Claims Commission, we are pleased to present this second volume of the Indian Claims Commission Proceedings. Part of our mandate is to offer "advice and information" to the Joint Assembly of First Nations/Canada Working Group. The Joint Working Group on Specific Land Claims was set up to review and make recommendations on changing the land claims policy and process; a protocol describing its role was signed in July 1992, and its mandate expired in July 1993 with no agreement reached. Since that time there has been no special forum to discuss land claims issues, and no progress appears to have been made in reforming policy or process. The Commission is now in its fourth year of operation, and, as a result of the planning conferences, community sessions, and inquiries, we have acquired much valuable information and understanding of both policy and process. We should like to ensure that we all benefit from that knowledge.

In October 1993, a few months after the Joint Working Group’s mandate expired, a new government was elected on a platform that included land reforms for First Nations. For many reasons, an opportunity now exists for a meeting of minds, therefore, this volume is devoted to the issue of land claims reform. We urge all to read and consider the material contained in these pages so that we can move on to new and workable solutions.

The issue begins with a paper prepared by the Commission which traces the path that has brought us where we are today. It sets out the historical background to land issues, describes the origins and activities of the Commission, and discusses the failure of the Joint Working Group to achieve its task. It is followed by independent papers written by lawyers Art Durocher and Mary Ellen Turpel for this Special Issue. They discuss the different processes available for settling land disputes, drawing on examples from different parts of the world, and the legal issues involved in the land claims process. We should like to thank Ms Turpel and Mr. Durocher for their contributions to this debate.


Much discussion concerning the reform of the Specific Claims Policy has taken place over recent years; little of fundamental importance has been accomplished. We hope that these materials will promote a resumption of debate, and debate at a knowledgable and useful level. There is an urgent need for reform of the Specific Claims Process to provide a fair and accountable land claims process for First Nations and indeed for all Canadians.

Daniel J. Bellegarde  P.E. James Prentice, QC
Co-Chair                Co-Chair
ABBREVIATIONS

AC       Law Report Appeal Cases (Eng.)
AFN      Assembly of First Nations
AIAl     Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians
ALR      Australian Law Review
Alta L.R. Alberta Law Reports
Alta L. Rev. Alberta Law Review
BCJ      British Columbia Judgments
BCLR     British Columbia Law Reports
BCSC     British Columbia Supreme Court
CA       Court of Appeal
CBA      Canadian Bar Association
CBAO     Canadian Bar Association of Ontario
CCC      Canadian Criminal Cases
CHRYYB   Canadian Human Rights Year Book
CJC      Chief Justice of Canada
CLR      Commonwealth Law Reports (Aus.)
CNLC     Canadian Native Law Cases
CNLR     Canadian Native Law Reporter
DIAND    Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DLR      Dominion Law Report
ETR      Estates and Trusts Reports
FC       Canada Federal Court Reports
FCA      Federal Court Appeal Division
FCJ      Federal Court Judgments
FCTD     Federal Court Trial Division
FG       Federal Government
FN       First Nations
FTR      Federal Trial Reports
Georgia L. Rev. Georgia Law Review
Harv. L. Rev. Harvard Law Review
ICC      Indian Claims Commission
ICCP     Indian Claims Commission Proceedings
ICO      Indian Commission of Ontario
JWG      Joint Working Group
L. Soc. Gaz. Law Society Gazette (Law Society of Upper Canada)
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.Ed.</td>
<td>Lawyer’s Edition Supreme Court Reports (U.S.)</td>
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<td>LJPc</td>
<td>Law Journal Reports, Privy Council (Eng.)</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>NR</td>
<td>National Reporter</td>
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<td>Northwest Territories Territorial Court</td>
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<td>ONC</td>
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<td>Supreme Court of Canada</td>
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<td>TARR</td>
<td>Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre</td>
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<td>TD</td>
<td>Trial Division</td>
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<td>University of Western Australia Law Review</td>
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<td>Union of Ontario Indians</td>
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<td>United States Reports</td>
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<td>United States Supreme Court</td>
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<td>UTLJ</td>
<td>University of Toronto Law Journal</td>
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<td>University of Western Ontario Law Review</td>
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Special Issue on Land Claims Reforms
A FAIR AND EQUITABLE PROCESS

A DISCUSSION PAPER ON LAND CLAIM REFORM

PREPARED BY THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

SEPTEMBER 1994
PART I  BACKGROUND  6

History  6
  Contact  6
  The Royal Proclamation  6
  Treaties  7
  Confederation  8
  First Attempts at Claims Resolution Process  9
  The White Paper  9
  Development of Current Policy  9

Land Claims Policy: Difficulties and Inequities  10
  Artificial Distinction between Comprehensive and Specific Claims  10
  Conflict of Interest  11
  Lawful Obligation  11
  Fiduciary Obligations  12
  Compensation Negotiations  12
  Summary  13

The Indian Claims Commission  13
  1990  13
  A New Federal Initiative  14
  Indian Claims Commission Created  15
  Commissioners Named  16
  A Change in Leadership  16

PART II  A FAILED PROCESS OF REFORM: THE JOINT WORKING GROUP  18

PART III  NEXT STEPS  21
A FAIR AND EQUITABLE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

This discussion paper is meant to stimulate discussion. The Indian Claims Commission is concerned that, since the mandate of the Joint Working Group (JWG) of the Assembly of First Nations and the federal government expired in July 1993, no specialized forum has existed for First Nations and Canada to discuss the reform of land claims policies and processes. As a result, little progress has been made on these issues for some time.

In an attempt to revive serious consideration of these critical issues, we have commissioned two papers on land claims reform, one from Mary Ellen Turpel and one from Art Durocher. Both papers are included in this volume of the Proceedings, along with critical background material: the Indian Commission of Ontario’s 1990 Discussion Paper Regarding First Nations Land Claims, and Neutral’s Draft Recommendations from the JWG. The 1990 First Nations Submission on Claims was reprinted in volume 1 of the Proceedings.

This Commission has a mandate at present to provide advice and guidance to Canada and First Nations on how to reform and improve the existing system. In our view, we can assist Canada and First Nations in the land claims reform process by facilitating negotiations, providing advice based on our experience to date, and by mediating when and if required. If we are to avoid further violence and bloodshed over unsettled land claims in Canada, we must act now, before the next confrontation.
PART I
BACKGROUND

HISTORY

Contact
Land disputes between North American Indians and European immigrants developed shortly after the arrival of the first settlers and continue to this day. The settlers found organized, self-governing communities that were using the lands and resources of this continent in a sustainable way, in harmony with nature. Many of these communities were, in some ways, more sophisticated than the so-called civilized newcomers. The government of the Five Nations Confederacy (now Six Nations), with its complicated system of checks and balances, was studied by Benjamin Franklin and used, in part, as the model for the government of the United States.

Similar examples of the sophistication of First Nations are numerous but, unfortunately, not well known.

What the Indians did not have was gunpowder, iron and steel, alcohol, and, most disastrously, any resistance to European diseases. Estimates of the population of North America prior to contact are in the vicinity of 18 million. After the arrival of the Europeans, approximately 95 per cent of North American Indians died, over 130 years, of diseases such as measles and tuberculosis. Waves of epidemics swept the continent, leaving the First Nations decimated and vulnerable to European powers bent on colonization. The impact of disease should not be underestimated in the taking of North America.

Another important consideration in the history of Indian and settler land dealings is the huge cultural gap between the participants to the various treaties and land "sales." Although it is improper to generalize about First Nations' cultures, as they are all unique, most First Nations had no concept of land "ownership" as such. They believed that they were placed upon the land by the creator to care for the land and those things that cannot speak for themselves. How can one sell something one does not own? It would appear that First Nations more often believed they were entering into agreements to share the land with the newcomers.

The Royal Proclamation
By the mid 1700s, as the European powers fought each other for control of North America (with various Indian tribes playing strategic roles as military allies), the colonies in New

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A Fair and Equitable Process

England and New France began to expand. Problems developed over the haphazard, and often fraudulent, way in which settlers acquired land from the Indians. Things came to a head during the summer of 1763, when the Ottawa warrior Pontiac led a series of devastating raids on interior trading posts in which more than 2000 people were killed.  

Quebec had fallen in 1759, and the French had capitulated to the British at Montreal the following year. At the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the European powers signed the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Britain gained control of most of the continent, east of the Mississippi, from Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. In response to the new situation, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. That proclamation, which dealt with the administration of Britain's new lands, also set aside most of the interior of North America as Indian Territory. In addition, the Royal Proclamation established a procedure for the surrender of Indian lands which is still in place today (in a modified form, set out in the Indian Act). That process was established to prevent the "great Frauds and Abuses . . . committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians" by forbidding private persons from purchasing Indian land. Instead it required the following procedure:

if at any Time any of the Said Indians shou'd be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively within which they shall lie; . . .

This process effectively interposed the Crown between the settlers and the Indians by preventing the sale of Indian lands to anyone other than the Crown. It was, therefore, the beginning of the Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Indians, and of the treaty process as well.

Treaties
Most of the treaties in the Maritime provinces and in Quebec are "peace and friendship" treaties, more concerned with military alliance than land. There are more than 30 different treaties covering the Great Lakes basin entered into between 1763 and 1850. The prairies were settled through the "numbered" treaties, entered into between 1870 and 1921. The adhesion to Treaty 9, covering most of northern Ontario, was entered into in 1929. For several reasons, including a reluctance to pay for Indian land, most of British Columbia is not covered by treaties. A modern treaty-making process commenced in British Columbia in 1992 with the creation of the British Columbia Treaty Commission. The current

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6 ibid., 180.
7 For a detailed analysis of the Crown's fiduciary obligations to Indians, please refer to Mary Ellen Turpel's paper included in this volume.
negotiation of comprehensive claims in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon are also examples of modern treaty-making.

The Crown did well by this special process. It purchased Indian land at low value, and then resold it to speculators, who in turn sold it for a further profit. What little land had been "reserved" for the Indians pursuant to the treaties was also coveted by the settlers. Utilizing the surrender provisions of the Indian Act, vast tracts of land were taken away from First Nations reserves all across Canada, especially during the period from the introduction of the Indian Act in 1876 to the Second World War. Many people profited during this period; few (if any) were Indians:

Significant Crown revenues were generated by the purchase of Indian lands at minimal cost and subsequent resale to speculators. However, Indian lands were often improperly taken and sold; Indian moneys too often went missing or were invested in improvident schemes; treaty promises were ignored (always excepting, of course, the Indians' promise to cede the land).  

Confederation
Prior to Confederation, Indian claims could only be advanced by petition to the Crown, with no right of appeal. After 1867, First Nations could do little more, except complain to their Indian agent. There were various commissions and boards, which looked into issues regarding Indian lands. Most dealt with federal-provincial jurisdictional disagreements. Some of those, like the St Catherine's Milling case, ended up in the highest Court in the land (then the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain). This case was the most important Indian land rights decision in Canada for decades, even though no Indians were before the Court.

As a result of this case, the provinces of Canada obtained control of all the lands within their boundaries that the Indians had ceded by way of treaty to the federal Crown, or to the British Crown before 1867. Those treaties contained solemn promises made to the Indians regarding the right to hunt and fish and the right to continue their traditional pursuits, for "as long as the sun shines and the rivers flow." It was not long, however, before the provinces were enacting game and fish laws that abrogated treaty rights (as decisions such as Sparrow have determined).

Following the First World War, returning Indian veterans began to demand justice on land issues. A growing number of court applications sought to redress the way in which Indian land had been taken. This led the federal government to amend the Indian Act in 1927 to make it illegal for an Indian Band to raise funds to retain legal counsel to litigate a land claim. These provisions remained in effect until 1951.

9 St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. R. (1888) 14 AC 46 (PC).
First Attempts at Claims Resolution Process

After the Second World War, Canada recognized that it must address “the Indian problem.” For over 100 years, law and policy directed towards Indians had been built upon the premise that Indians were a disappearing race, doomed to extinction as a result of disease and assimilation. By this time it was becoming apparent that this premise was mistaken.

Joint committees of the Senate and the House of Commons, in 1946–48 and again in 1958–61, recommended the creation of an Indian Claims Commission. Draft legislation was prepared and tabled in 1963 and again in 1965. Like the American Indian Claims Commission, this commission would have had courtlike powers and would have been able to “hear and consider” five classes of claims. The draft bills died on the order paper.

The White Paper

In 1969 the federal government tabled a White Paper. It maintained that aboriginal title claims were “too vague and undefined” to be dealt with. Treaty rights were to be abolished, along with the concept of a “status” or “treaty” Indian. Only lawful obligations of the Crown would be fulfilled, with the assistance of an Indian Claims Commissioner.

The White Paper was not well received by Indians. The backlash it sparked helped to solidify the growing Indian rights movement of the time and assisted in the development of the National Indian Brotherhood, now the Assembly of First Nations.

Development of Current Policy

It was not until after the 1973 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Calder that Canada began to take native claims seriously. In a 3-3-1 split decision, three justices found that “aboriginal title” was a legal entity that had to be addressed by Canada. Shortly thereafter, negotiations commenced on “comprehensive claims” (those claims dealing primarily with unextinguished aboriginal title). The James Bay Agreement in 1975 was the first settlement of its kind.

The Office of Native Claims (ONC) was established in 1974 to negotiate land claims settlements with First Nations. It is part of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), and reports to the deputy minister. Over time, policies with respect to native claims were developed in a piecemeal fashion by Canada. During the 1970s and early 1980s many approaches were considered and many reports were written. In a report commissioned by and for the ONC in 1979, Gerald V. La Forest, QC (now a justice with the Supreme Court of Canada) recommended that an administrative tribunal be created.
through legislation to deal with specific land claims (those relating to the administration of Indian land and assets and the fulfilment of treaties):

This independent body should for all practical purposes be a specialized court, but with power to adopt procedures and practices suitable to its particular functions. Its jurisdiction should extend beyond claims now enforceable in a court of law to encompass those arising out of the honourable treatment that should be accorded the Indians by the government. In addition, a number of technical rules, such as limitation periods and certain rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, should be removed or relaxed to permit substantial justice in the settlement of Indian Claims.¹⁴

The government did not establish an independent body. Instead, Canada retained the practice of party-to-party negotiations, amalgamated its various policies on land claims, and then published two booklets, one in 1981 and the other in 1982, delineating government policies and procedures for dealing with native claims. The first was In All Fairness, setting out the policy on comprehensive claims. The second was Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy, dealing with specific claims. Despite more than two decades of relentless criticism, both policies remain in effect today, almost unchanged.

**LAND CLAIMS POLICY: DIFFICULTIES AND INEQUITIES**

For a comprehensive examination of the problems with the 1982 policy Outstanding Business (the Policy), please see the September 1990 Discussion Paper Regarding First Nation Land Claims prepared by the Indian Commission of Ontario (printed below), and the December 1990 First Nations Submission on Claims, prepared by the Chiefs Committee on Claims (reprinted in ICCP 1). The following is a brief overview of the major difficulties and inequities that have been identified to date.

**Artificial Distinction between Comprehensive and Specific Claims**

From its creation, the distinction between the two types of claims has caused great controversy:

A fundamental difference between the federal government and First Nation perceptions of claims is the artificial division of federal policies into “specific” and “comprehensive” claims. Two narrowly defined policies have been developed which are inadequate to meet the needs and priorities of First Nations. Most First Nations view their claims within the greater context of constitutionally protected aboriginal and treaty rights, and their political relationship with the rest of Canada.¹⁵

Canada has recognized difficulties with the distinction and has developed a third category, "claims of a third kind," to deal with claims that do not fit neatly into either category. The federal Liberals, in their 1993 Red Book, promised to do away with the distinction between claims.16

Conflict of Interest
There are many distinct conflicts of interest inherent in the present claims policy. Most of these arise from the fact that, when a claim is brought forward, Canada is the accused, the banker, and the judge and jury. To further complicate matters, Canada stands in a fiduciary relationship to the claimants. It is difficult to imagine a better example of the meaning of the phrase "conflict of interest," as David Knoll pointed out in 1986:

[The most fundamental criticism of the 1982 claims policy is that Canada still remains the ultimate adjudicator of claims made against it. This has been a constant criticism of the Federal Government's native claims policy which they have repeatedly ignored. The Federal Government remains the ultimate determiner of what claims will be funded, validated and accepted for negotiation. No appeal is available except to commence an action through the Courts. There is not even the least effort to preserve the image of neutrality. This situation, more than any other, is what condemns this policy and process to be viewed as biased, arbitrary and unfair.17

Any meaningful reform of the system must address this fundamental flaw. The federal Liberals have promised to create an independent claims body. Properly structured with an appropriate mandate, it could solve some or all of the perceived problems with respect to conflict of interest.

Lawful Obligation
The concept of lawful obligation originated in the 1969 White Paper and found its way into the Policy, as the central concept:

The government's policy on specific claims is that it will recognize claims by Indian bands which disclose an outstanding "lawful obligation," i.e., an obligation derived from the law on the part of the federal government.18

18 Outstanding Business, 20.
The policy is prepared to go “beyond lawful obligation” only in the following rather narrow circumstances:

i) Failure to provide compensation for reserve lands taken or damaged by the federal government or any of its agencies under authority.

ii) Fraud in connection with the acquisition or disposition of Indian reserve land by employees or agents of the federal government, in cases where the fraud can be clearly demonstrated.19

“Lawful obligation” as the basis for a valid claim falls short of the test of a fiduciary, as is now set out in law, as was stated by the AFN:

federal land claims policy criteria are inconsistent with the developing law on aboriginal rights in this country. Landmark cases such as the recent Guerin (1984) and Simon (1985) decisions are ignored in the criteria for its comprehensive claims policy. . . . In Sparrow (1990) the Supreme Court of Canada said that Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is a solemn commitment to aboriginal peoples which must be given meaningful content by government legislation, practices and policies. The federal government has yet to respond in any sufficient manner to the requirements delineated in these decisions.20

The above criticism was written in August 1990. More than four years later it is still valid. The basis for the policy must be brought up to date with current law.

Fiduciary Obligations
The topic of fiduciary obligations is considered at length in Mary Ellen Turpel’s paper. Many critics would seem to prefer this concept, rather than “lawful obligations,” as a basis for a claims policy.

Compensation Negotiations
Even when a First Nation is able to convince Canada that it is owed a lawful obligation, the present process for negotiating compensation, as well as the compensation criteria themselves, 21 leave much to be desired. The criticisms of process and criteria include: the “discounting” of claims in ways that many believe are arbitrary; the refusal to recognize “special value” to a claimant; the way in which the negotiations are funded; the length of time the negotiations can take; “take it or leave it” offers; and the amendment of the Policy to include the concept of “technical breach” in a way that could lead one to conclude it was done to defeat a particular (expensive) claim.22

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19 Ibid.
20 AFN’s Critique 6.
22 See ICO Discussion Paper, 4ff, regarding the claim of the Mississaugas of the New Credit.
A FAIR AND EQUITABLE PROCESS

Summary
A considerable body of material details the shortcomings of the present Policy and its attendant process. Nearly all of it points towards the need to broaden the basis upon which Canada accepts its responsibilities to the First Nations:

In light of the need for a satisfactory resolution for all parties, the case is argued for a broad definition of the obligations upon the federal government which are "lawful" in the truest sense of the word. This issue is by far the most complex to be dealt with in developing a new model, yet it is obviously fundamental.25

Again, most reports and papers emphasize the need for an independent body to administer or oversee the land claims process and the way in which the Policy is administered.

THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
For a succinct history of the Indian Claims Commission (the Commission), including Inquiries conducted and Reports submitted, please see our Annual Report, 1991-1992 to 1993-1994, issued in July 1994. Here we will give only the details regarding the creation of the Commission from the period 1990-91, in relation to the other reforms initiated during that same period.

The Commission is a product of over 200 years of frustration and the tumultuous events of 1990, including the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sparrow24 released in May, the blocking of the Meech Lake accord by Elijah Harper in June, the violence at Akwesasne that spring over gambling, and the "Mohawk summer" at Oka.

1990
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) released a detailed critique of government land claim policies in August 1990. At a special meeting of the Tripartite Council on August 23, convened to address the crisis in Oka and the failure of negotiated solutions, the Indian Commission of Ontario (ICO) gave a commitment to government and Indian leaders to produce a discussion paper on land claims reform within 30 days. That influential paper (included in this volume) was released on September 24 and contained 38 recommendations, including the creation of an independent claims body. It also systematically detailed the problems with the 1982 policy Outstanding Business:

On September 25 the government announced its "Native Agenda" based on the "Four Pillars." The first was to accelerate the pace of land claim settlements so that they would all be concluded by the end of the decade. On October 10 and 11 the Minister of Indian Affairs met with 20 Indian leaders from across the country to discuss changes to the federal...

24 Note 19 above.
land claim policies. A working group of Indian leaders was established, co-chaired by Chief Clarence T. (Manny) Jules of Kamloops First Nation and Harry S. LaForme, then Commissioner of the ICO. This working group became known as the Chiefs Committee on Claims (CCC) and produced the paper First Nations Submission on Claims, which was presented to the Minister on December 14. The First Nations Submission on Claims had already received support in principle at a special Chiefs assembly of the AFN, held in Ottawa on December 11. It contained 27 recommendations, including the creation of an independent claims body and the creation of a joint working group to develop policy reform.

A New Federal Initiative

After a period of negotiation, involving proposals and counter proposals between the Chiefs Committee on Claims and the Minister, the federal government announced a new initiative on specific claims on April 23, 1991, which included:

1. **Increased Resources**: Funds available for settlements were increased from $15 million to $60 million annually, and DIAND and the Department of Justice (Justice) were provided with additional staff.

2. **Administrative Policy Changes**: The size of claim the Minister could approve without Treasury Board authority was increased from $1 million to $7 million; a “fast track” process was created to deal with claims under $500,000; no limit was placed on the number of claims that could be negotiated at one time; and legal costs of claimants were no longer subject to the review and approval of Justice lawyers.

3. **Pre-Confederation Claims**: The ban on pre-Confederation claims was lifted.

4. **Creation of the Joint Working Group**: A joint First Nation/government working group was proposed to review and make recommendations regarding the Policy and the process (the JWG will be discussed in more detail in Part II).

5. **Creation of the Indian Claims Commission**: On an interim basis, an independent claims body was proposed to review specific claims, to provide mediation to the parties upon request, and to provide input to the JWG on reforming the policy and process.

These reforms were considered “modest” at best and drew the following response from the AFN:

Although the above measures fall far short of establishing the independent claims resolution process called for by both First Nations and Independent observers, (indeed these initiatives will further expand the existing Specific Claims Branch and Dept. of Justice bureaucracies) the Minister maintains there will be an opportunity for the longer term policy and process issues to be dealt with through the proposed Joint Working Group.
In any event, it is obvious that the government intends to move forward on these initiatives. Therefore the First Nations must respond with a united voice and make clear to the government of Canada what is expected for the future in terms of resolving claims and land rights issues.25

Indian Claims Commission Created

The government went ahead and implemented the reforms. The Indian Claims Commission (sometimes referred to as the Indian Specific Claims Commission by the federal government) was established by Order in Council on July 15, 1991, and Harry S. LaForme was named as Chief Commissioner. The wording of the Order in Council immediately became an issue, as it merely reiterated the wording of the Policy. It was also contrary to the recommendations of the Chiefs Committee on Claims, and the committee passed a resolution calling for “major changes.”26

After a delay of one year, and much debate involving the Commission, the AFN, the CCC, the JWG, and the government, a second Order in Council was issued which amended the mandate of the Commission to its present form. The Commission is a federal Royal Commission, mandated under the Great Seal of Canada and Part I of the Inquiries Act to perform the following functions:

- inquire into and report on: (a) the rejection of a specific claim by the Minister; or (b) “which compensation criteria apply in negotiation of a settlement”;
- provide “advice and information” to the JWG;
- submit an annual report and such other reports as the Commissioners consider required to the Governor in Council (the federal Cabinet); and
- provide mediation to the parties where both parties request it.27

The Commission is what has been referred to as a “soft adjudicative tribunal,”28 like New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal,29 in that the recommendations of the Commission are not binding on the parties but are only advisory in nature. This means that at the completion of an Inquiry, the First Nation involved, and/or the government, may choose to ignore the recommendations of the Commission.

26 AFN, Resolution, August 7, 1991.
28 Joseph Williams, New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal: An Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism (Canadian Bar Association, 1988).
29 See IC3, Discussion Paper, 78, for a discussion of the Waitangi Tribunal.
Commissioners Named
On September 1, 1992, a third Order in Council was issued naming six additional Commissioners to the Commission. Three were selected from a list submitted by the AFN: Chief Roger Augustine, Chief of Eel Ground First Nation of New Brunswick; Dan Bellegarde, First Vice Chief with the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN); and Carole Corcoran from the Fort Nelson Indian Band in northern British Columbia, who is also a Commissioner with the BC Treaty Commission. Three Commissioners were appointed by the federal government: Charles Hamelin (who passed away on July 29, 1993); Carol Dutcheshen (who resigned to take another position in May 1994); and Jim Prentice, QC, a lawyer knowledgeable and experienced in land claim matters with the Calgary firm of Rooney Prentice.

A Change in Leadership
In February 1994 the Chief Commissioner of the Commission, Harry S. LaForme, was appointed to the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division). On March 17, 1994, Commissioners Dan Bellegarde and Jim Prentice were appointed Co-chairs of the Commission. Native businessman Aurelien Gill (former Chief of Mashteuiatsh First Nation) was appointed Commissioner by the federal government in December 1994.

For the purposes of this discussion paper it is important to note that the Commission was created as an interim step only, not as a permanent body. It was part of an overall process of reform that was to rely heavily on the recommendations of the JWG to effect substantial change to the Policy and process. The Commission was to play a role in the JWG, as set out in the Commission's Order in Council and the Protocol for the JWG:

8. Having regard to the reporting duty of the Indian Specific Claims Commission as determined by the Governor in Council, the Co-chairpersons of the Joint Working Group may request from time to time that the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Specific Claims Commission provide the Joint Working Group with such information, or attend such meetings, as may be considered necessary in its discussions.

The Commission was established to perform two functions. The first was to provide input into the overall reform process as performed by the JWG. The second was to oversee the existing Policy and process, as an interim measure, until such time as substantial reforms were realized:

To oversee the management of the current policy we agreed to establish the Indian Specific Claims Commission to assure that claimant bands would have access to a third party to

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pursue any concerns they might have about the fairness of the existing process. The order-in-council establishing the commission therefore reflects the policy components and criteria of the existing policy, adjusted as agreed to provide interim improvements.31

The failure of the JWG (as discussed in Part II) and the subsequent lack of negotiations have prevented the Commission from advising on reform of the present system. Thus, in an attempt to fulfill this aspect of our mandate, the Commission has begun this current process. This involves the production of this discussion paper (and attached materials) so that the important issue of land claims reform can once again be addressed.

31 The Honourable Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to H.S. LaForme, Chief Commissioner, ICC, Ottawa, November 8, 1991. Emphasis added.
As noted in Part I, Canada proposed the creation of the Commission and the Joint Working Group at the same time, as part of an overall set of reforms. The reforms were kept modest because the government had decided to delay fundamental change until after the JWG had deliberated and made recommendations. This strategy was set out by the Minister in a letter to the National Chief in 1991:

the Chiefs' Committee on Specific Claims had accepted that only some issues could be dealt with immediately and others, especially policy issues which tend to be inherently complex, would be the subject of a serious review over the medium term. That is why the chiefs suggested, and why I agreed to, the Joint Indian/Government Working Group on Specific Claims. This group would review the criteria for both validation and compensation and whatever other policy issues members agree upon. It is the recommendations of this group as well as the joint evaluation of the Commission which will form the basis of proposals to Cabinet regarding more fundamental policy changes.32

The JWG was made up of political representatives and technical advisers from the eight AFN regions for First Nations and by three officials from DIAND and Justice for the federal government. It was co-chaired by Chief Clarence T. (Manny) Jules and John Graham, Director General, Policy Development Branch, DIAND. Its mandate was to review all aspects of the specific claims policy and process. The JWG first met in February 1992, and a protocol describing the role of the JWG and the working relationship among its members was signed in July 1992 by the National Chief and the Minister.

The JWG met a total of 15 times between February 1992 and June 1993. A wide range of issues was discussed, from the nature of a claim to the form and structure of an independent claims body. The parties retained the services of an independent facilitator, Bonita Thompson, who produced what is generally referred to as “Neutral's Draft”33 (included in this volume). This document outlined the areas of agreement and disagreement, between the parties. Progress was made in several areas. In particular, significant agreement was reached on the details of an independent claims body.

32 The Honourable Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to Ovide Mercredi, National Chief, AFN, Ottawa, November 9, 1991.
The mandate of the JWG expired in July 1993. The parties were unable to reach agreement on an extension of the JWG's mandate, and the process ended. No recommendations were made. The AFN has made several criticisms of the JWG process, including the following:

the Working Group's mandate was unduly limited to only "specific" claims. Federal representatives were not given sufficient authority to make significant changes. Inadequate resources were provided to First Nations for their full participation, particularly at the regional level.

First Nation representatives on the Joint Working Group strongly felt that the federal representatives were more concerned with defending the current policy, rather than making fundamental and necessary changes to it.\(^\text{34}\)

A letter from John Graham to Manny Jules in July 1993 clearly demonstrates that the government felt it had demonstrated significant "movement" within the JWG process in the following areas, by agreeing to the following:

1. the development of an independent claims process where a neutral body has real "teeth" to manage the negotiation process and where the "acceptance" decision is ultimately in the hands of independent panels with an appeal to the courts;
2. the funding of First Nations to participate in an ongoing process as a partner with the federal government to review the operation of the independent process and to work on improvements;
3. the administration of research and loan funding by a body outside of the federal government; and
4. the removal of existing compensation criteria as a precondition to begin negotiations.\(^\text{35}\)

However, at the same time there remained 12 or 14 outstanding issues involving fundamental disagreement. Fourteen are set out in Neutral's Draft, and 12 were attached as an annex to the above letter from John Graham to Manny Jules:

1. Limitation and Laches
2. Without Prejudice
3. Negotiation Loans vs. Grants
4. Issues Revolving around the Definition of a Claim
5. Onus of Proof
6. "Technical" Legal Defences


There may have been some “movement” with respect to four issues, but clearly, by the end of the JWG process, substantial areas of disagreement were still outstanding. Indeed, it would appear that there was not even agreement on what constituted a claim. The JWG process came to a close in July 1993, and since that time no specialized forum has existed for First Nations and Canada to discuss reform of land claims policies and processes.

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36 Ibid., attached Annex.
PART III
NEXT STEPS

The federal Liberal party took office in October 1993. Prior to its election, it made a number of promises with respect to aboriginal issues generally and to land claims reform in particular. These are contained in their Red Book and in a number of important speeches and statements. They are well documented in the papers included in this volume by Mary Ellen Turpel and Art Durocher. Our concern at this point is how to begin the process of implementing these promises, promises that echo the calls for reform made by the First Nations for decades.

In the spring of 1994 the federal government agreed to provide funding for a meeting of the Chiefs Committee on Claims. That meeting was held in Winnipeg on June 1 and 2, 1994. It was chaired by the National Chief. All four Commissioners (now five) of the Indian Claims Commission were invited to speak to the assembled Chiefs regarding the Commission. The Chiefs present expressed concern that the Commission lacked “teeth,” since its decisions were not binding. Also expressed was the concern that, to date, the federal government had not responded to any of the recommendations made by the Commission. The Chiefs felt strongly that an independent body must be involved in the claims process from start to finish:

There must be an independent body involved in facilitating claims throughout the entire process, from research and development, submission of claims and implementation of settlements.38

The resolution passed at the conclusion of the meeting called for: “a bilateral forum (First Nations/Canada) to prepare recommendations on acceptable policies and processes to resolve First Nation land and resource rights issues. . . .”39 The resolution also called for adequate funding of the CCC to facilitate the development of a national policy. Unfortunately this resolution could not be put before the AFN General Assembly in July 1994, and therefore has not yet received formal support.

37 The Commission received its first response from the federal government on August 5, 1994. That response was to the Anaham Dam Dam Inquiry, released to the parties on December 21, 1993. Responses to the Cold Lake and Canoe Lake (Primrose Lake Air Weapons Range) Inquiries, Young Chipewyan Inquiry, Mikmaq of Gaspe Peninsula Inquiry, and Chipewa of the Thames Inquiry were received in February and March 1995.
As it stands, the Commission has no knowledge of any formal negotiations or discussions taking place at this time, although both First Nations and Canada have stated their desire to overhaul the existing land claims system. How then do the parties move towards fundamental reform of both the Policy and the process? There are a number of options open to the parties at this point, including (in no particular order):

1. The JWG could be reconstituted and the attempt to find a consensus on reform continued.
2. Direct negotiations could take place between Canada and the AFN and/or the CCC.
3. The AFN/CCC could prepare an updated proposal on land claim reform followed either by negotiations, or by Canada preparing draft reforms based on the updated proposal.
4. Canada could prepare draft reforms based on the materials at present available and the Red Book promises, followed by negotiations.
5. Canada could take unilateral action to implement reform after a process of “consultation.”
6. The concept of a national policy could be abandoned altogether and regional solutions pursued, perhaps based on treaties or “Nations.”
7. Nothing is done and the present system is left in place, or minor amendments and adjustments are made from time to time.

Option 7 would lead to disaster and most likely another Oka. Option 6 has potential and may also be the “default” option: if none of the other options is pursued, then this will be. It also contains the inherent risk of a “balkanization” of the claims process and the end of national standards for claims. There is an important role for regional bodies, such as the ICO, to play in negotiations, but even the ICO recognizes the need for an independent claims body with “teeth” to make the process work.46

Option 5 runs the risk of First Nations’ rejecting whatever reforms are implemented (regardless of merit), based on opposition to the process. Option 4 runs a similar risk in that any proposals prepared by Canada prior to negotiations could also be criticized more because of process than content.

Option 3 has the First Nations make the first proposal, with Canada responding to those recommendations. The AFN and the CCC would require special funding to produce the proposal, but this process should be more acceptable to First Nations than options 4 to 7.

46 ICO, Discussion Paper, 99.
The viability of options 2 and 1 would depend primarily upon the way in which the negotiations were structured, as well as upon the goals that were established. It is our position that there exists at present a broad consensus between First Nations and Canada on the need for at least some fundamental reforms, such as:

- the creation of an Independent Claims Body (ICB);
- the validation of claims by some other body (such as the ICB), so as to remove the conflict of interest that exists for Canada in the present system;
- the facilitation of claims negotiations by the ICB (or some other body like the ICO) to ensure fairness in the process;
- the need for the ICB (or some other body) to possess the authority to break impasses in negotiations regarding compensation.

It is our submission that it may not be necessary (or possible) to reach consensus on all details of fundamental reform at this time. Instead the parties could consider implementing now those reforms where substantial consensus exists, while simultaneously establishing a permanent process to consider ongoing reforms to the new system. This would have parallels to the reforms that were instituted in 1991 with these differences: (1) the ICB would be a truly independent claims body (not an interim body established to oversee the existing system); and (2) the body or forum established to consider ongoing reform of the system would be permanent (not established through a one-year protocol agreement as was the JWG).

Regardless of what option the parties select, this Commission believes that we have a role to play in the reform process. Our Orders in Council require us to provide advice and guidance to Canada and First Nations on how to reform and improve the present system. We can assist Canada and First Nations by providing input to the reform process. That input would be based on what we have learned by conducting Inquiries and from travelling to First Nations to hear directly from elders, and others, the problems associated with the current Policy and process. In addition, we can facilitate negotiations and provide mediation, when and if required.

Everything that this Commission has learned to date indicates that it is imperative to commence the process of reform immediately, before it is too late. The return of native land is central to any real progress on the wide range of problems that face First Nations today. Meaningful self-government, and true economic self-sufficiency, depend on an adequate land base. It is time for a fair and equitable process.